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Abstract 
Since the beginning of China’s transition to a market economy, there have been other voices, calling 
for a different kind of change. One such voice is the co-operative movement, which has continued to 
grow in recent years. However, China’s new co-operatives suffer from widespread problems, which 
vitiate the principles put forward by activists. Based on two years of multi-sited fieldwork in the co-
operative movement, this thesis explores the experience of the co-operatives, and the activists and 
institutions which promote them. 
Framing the analysis in terms of the cultural evolution of co-operation, it argues that the co-
operatives are threatened by a range of factors. The erosion of social capital and material 
interdependence resulting from urbanisation and modernisation tends to undermine the 
foundations of the system of mutual aid based on indirect reciprocity. Meanwhile, the trauma of the 
Cultural Revolution and the uncertainty of the reform era have rendered alternative forms of 
collectivistic morality equally unable to support co-operation. 
While many co-operatives have succeeded by carefully avoiding any form of co-operation which 
requires trust or costly monitoring, some problems cannot be solved in this way. In particular, the 
thesis argues that participation in democratic decision-making is itself a collective action problem, 
which co-operatives cannot, by their very nature, avoid. And when activists and the state provide 
resources to help overcome these challenges, the result is often a ‘crowding out’ of co-operation. 
Finally, the thesis explores the idea that the difficulties of the co-operatives may reflect a shift in the 
psychological underpinnings of co-operation in wider Chinese society. Through a combination of life 
history interviews with young people experiencing moral conflict, and a psychometric survey 
designed to measure differences in moral reasoning, it argues that non-market forms of co-
operation are being undermined by a process of interlinked social and psychological change. 
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1. Introduction 
One cold spring morning in the remote desert town of Meibian1, built on a windswept oasis on the 
old Silk Road, in western Gansu, I headed to the local office of the Co-operative Federation. My 
purpose was to meet the local activists with whom I had been discussing securing my own 
permission to stay, and Tom, a co-operativist activist from New Zealand, who was there to volunteer 
at a local school affiliated with the Co-operative Federation. An urgent meeting had been scheduled 
with officials from the county Foreign Affairs Bureau, who had somehow heard of my arrival in the 
county, and wanted to meet with us and discuss why I was there. When they arrived at the office, 
they were all smiles, sharing tea with us, and making small talk about their own visits to Western 
countries, and our opinions about food. Nonplussed, Tom repeatedly attempted to steer the 
conversation toward discussion of business—how the government could support local co-operatives, 
in particular. But the officials continued to brush away any question of why they were there, and to 
insist that this morning was a social visit. 
Suddenly, they announced it was time for the morning’s most important activity. It was nearly 
Qingming Festival—or Tomb Sweeping Day—and as the time was right, we would be taken to pay 
homage to two long-dead foreign co-operative activists buried here, in the desert sands. Rewi Alley, 
a New Zealander, and George Hogg, a Briton, had come to this place in the 1940s, as part of their 
long sojourn in China as pioneers of the Chinese co-operative movement. When Hogg died from an 
infection in 1945, he was buried here, and when Alley died in 1987, he was interred next to Hogg. On 
the way to their graves, Mr Li, the chief official from the Foreign Affairs Bureau, informed us that we 
were here to ‘represent’ Hogg and Alley. As both Hogg and I were Oxford graduates, I would 
‘represent’ Hogg, while Tom would ‘represent’ Alley, his countryman. 
The grave site itself was a large, dusty memorial garden on the outskirts of town. A far cry from 
Hogg’s original humble grave in the sand, it had at some point been transformed into a grander, 
walled area, with smart, engraved tombstones. We arrived there with an entourage, consisting of 
the officials, local government representatives, and a photographer. A minor official appeared with 
bunches of flowers, which he distributed sombrely to Tom and me, and to the more important 
officials accompanying us. Led by Mr Li, the whole party assumed an attitude of seriousness and 
respect. Mr Li then gave us silent directions as to what to do. We walked single file up to the two 
graves, and then the six of us stood in a row, facing them. Mr Li then instructed us to bow; and we all 
bowed to the waist, three times, while holding the flowers. One official took me over to Hogg’s 
                                                          
1
 To maintain confidentiality, all names of informants and place names below province level, with the 
exception of Beijing and Shanghai, have been replaced with pseudonyms throughout the thesis. 
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grave, while the others went to Alley’s, and the whole party squatted down next to the graves 
thoughtfully, as if praying. For a moment, I felt moved, contemplating Hogg’s sacrifice, and 
wondering what he would have made of the results of his work. Then I noticed the photographer, 
taking a barrage of photos of us posing respectfully. A moment later, the official who had 
accompanied me wandered off, looking bored. Mr Li told him he wasn’t finished yet, and he duly 
squatted next to me again to pose for more photos, with an appropriately serious expression. As 
soon as the photographer was finished, we quickly and unceremoniously returned to our cars. 
From there, we were taken to Meibian’s best restaurant for a banquet lunch, permeated, as usual, 
by baijiu, the potent spirit favoured by officials. The local great and good were there, from the 
mayor to representatives of the local forestry commission and propaganda department. Throughout, 
Tom expressed to me how impressed he was with the priority the government seemed to give to co-
operatives. The special journey to see us, and in particular, the grave-tending ceremony, seemed to 
indicate that they really understood the importance of the co-operative movement and its values, 
and were willing to support its attempts to develop co-operatives here. He was still confused, 
however, about the purpose of their visit. Throughout the banquet, the officials continued to bat 
away Tom’s attempts at discussing the needs and vision of the co-operatives, preferring instead to 
drink endless rounds of baijiu, and make increasingly eloquent toasts to their international friends. 
Finally, suitably inebriated, we were loaded back into Mr Li’s car. It had been a successful visit, he 
said, but there was just one thing left to do. We were to accompany him to a meeting, as observers. 
Tom did not speak Chinese, and that was fine, but I should pretend not to speak Chinese, as it would 
be better that way. The meeting took place in a modern office building, where we were met by 
higher government officials. Mr Li introduced us as ‘foreign experts’, and it quickly became clear that 
this had nothing to do with co-operatives. Instead, he was attempting to persuade them to allocate 
him a share of a large amount of money that had been provided by a foreign agency for a local 
carbon capture scheme. Our role in this was to pose as foreign faces, to lend more gravitas to Mr Li’s 
bid—a common enough scheme, for which foreigners are often paid. One of Mr Li’s officials 
pretended to translate from Chinese into English for us, while we pretended to nod sagaciously. The 
‘interpreter’, however, fell silent, and at one point Mr Li angrily rebuked him in English: ‘Come on, 
just say something!’ Tom was increasingly confused, thinking we had been brought there to make a 
genuine contribution. Finally, he asked openly, ‘Are we just here as foreign faces?’ Mr Li, 
exasperated, replied, ‘Yes, you can think of it like that’. 
After the meeting, Li and his party left town in their smart, black government cars, and Tom and I 
were left deeply unsettled. He and I, a foreign activist and researcher respectively, had come to 
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Meibian for the sake of co-operatives and the ideals associated with them. In taking us to tend the 
graves of Alley and Hogg, Mr Li made a grand symbolic gesture which appeared to appeal to our 
motives. At the same time, his photographer ensured that the local press, and perhaps his superiors, 
would have documentary evidence of his showing public support for this idealistic movement. But as 
it later turned out, Mr Li’s own motives were less than idealistic. Neither he, nor even the staff of the 
local Co-operative Federation, knew how many co-operatives there were in Meibian, if there were 
any at all—or how to contact them, let alone support them. Although we did not know it, we 
possessed more valuable resources—resources which we unwittingly provided, in exchange for a 
simple, if meaningless, ritual display. What Hogg and Alley would have made of this will remain a 
mystery. 
1.1 Chinese co-operatives in the reform era 
In the years preceding the fall of the Soviet Union, a renewed interest in ideas of market socialism 
flowered across the socialist world (Brus & Laski, 1991). While in the Soviet Union itself, these ideas 
inspired the large-scale and ultimately doomed experiment that was perestroika (Kornai, 1992), in 
China, they heralded the beginning of a long era of decentralised, local experimentation with a wide 
variety of forms of economic organisation (Naughton, 2007, p. 87). Some of these became the seeds 
which would grow into fully-fledged private enterprise, as the 1990s brought the transition to a 
market economy into sharper relief. But others continued, for a time, to give voice to the idealistic 
sentiments of socialism, and developed into a form which, even today, claims to embody a more 
principled, collectivistic form of production than that reflected by the society which surrounds it. 
That form is the contemporary Chinese co-operative. 
In spite of a frequent Western narrative to the effect that China is in full transition to a capitalist 
economy, the number of co-operatives is continuing to rise (Zhao & Develtere, 2010). From the 
passage of the Peasant Specialised Co-operative Law in 2007, which gave them a solid legal footing 
for the first time, more than one million co-operatives have been officially registered. The bulk of 
these are agricultural, but there are also transport, service and handicraft co-operatives. Not 
included in this figure are the many other forms of co-operatives established before 2007, on a 
variety of more or less informal legal bases. On the face of it, the Chinese co-operative movement 
appears to be going from strength to strength. 
Perhaps we should not be surprised. Co-operatives continued after the end of socialism in some 
cases, such as that of Hungary (Forgács, 2008; Schaffer, 1996), and have enjoyed a rebirth in others 
(Tisenkopfs, et al., 2011). But there is arguably something distinctive about the Chinese backdrop. 
The Communist Party of China is, after all, still in power; and although they have for all practical 
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purposes abandoned Communism as a guiding ideology, the language of socialism is still pervasive 
(Nathan, 2003). Moreover, the notion of democracy remains problematic and highly sensitive; the 
state, and the co-operatives, claim to be democratic, as they always have done, while consistently 
denouncing Western ideas of competitive elections. While China is no longer a socialist state in any 
ordinary sense, it retains an uneasy, though cautiously supportive attitude toward the idea of 
autonomous organisations (Shieh & Deng, 2011). As my encounter with Mr Li in Meibian suggests, 
the role of the state in the economy is both pervasive and ambiguous—and both the motives and 
the effects of state assistance are not always what they first seem. 
Moreover, in addition to this unusual political setting, Chinese co-operatives have been spreading 
against the backdrop of a growing discourse of moral panic—a sense among many that society has 
lost its moral compass (He, 2015, pp. 119-123). With the repudiation of socialist morality, people 
were encouraged to look after their own interests, to ‘get rich’ rather than striving to serve society. 
But, so the narrative goes, ‘Confucian’ ethics have broken down, too, leading not only to scandalous 
incidents in which people ignore strangers suffering and dying in the street, but also to anxieties 
about increasing neglect of parents by children, who are said to be failing more and more to visit 
their elderly relatives and fulfil their filial obligations. 
If this kind of story is correct, then we would hardly expect co-operatives to be thriving. For around 
the world, what keeps co-operatives together is often a sense of member participation and 
ownership, which depends, if not on trust and social capital, at least on a moral or legal framework 
which allows the rules of the co-operative to be enforced—even by the weak against the strong 
(Lindenfeld & Wynn, 1997). Contemporary China hardly seems like the most hospitable environment 
for co-operatives. Nevertheless, they have been multiplying. 
This thesis is, in part, an attempt to shed light on this puzzle. What does it mean for something to be 
said to be a co-operative in contemporary China? How have the co-operatives survived—and what 
can we learn from this about the upheaval of the moral and social order through which the country 
is passing? 
To answer these questions, I carried out more than two years of fieldwork in urban and rural China. 
The story of my fieldwork is not unlike that of other researchers who have struggled with access and 
administrative permissions in China. That is, it is a multi-sited ethnography, located more in a 
network of individuals and institutions than in a defined geographical area. This is a study, first, of 
the co-operative movement itself, and second, of the social backdrop of that movement, which I 
studied as I attempted to navigate it. 
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Theoretically, this project was motivated by a currently thriving programme of interdisciplinary 
research on human co-operation, and the notion of its cultural evolution—that is, the idea that 
under certain conditions, practices which support co-operation may spread through a population 
because they do so; and that, by combining anthropology, psychology, and related disciplines, we 
may be able to explain these practices by studying that process, like epidemiologists (Sperber, 2001; 
Henrich & Henrich, 2007). This theoretical background, which will be elaborated in chapter 3, 
provides a way of understanding not only the experiences and problems of the Chinese co-
operatives, but also the competing moral systems which underlie, and sometimes undermine, 
attempts to construct these and other idealistic projects, at a time of great uncertainty. 
1.2 Co-operativism as a moral and social movement 
Before turning to the specifics of the Chinese context, it is important to consider the nature of co-
operativism in general, taken as a global movement. The co-operative movement was born in Britain 
and Germany in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, in the furnace of the industrial revolution 
(Thompson, 1994). The growth of industrial capitalism had brought with it all the attendant miseries 
of inequality and exploitation, and in response came a flowering of ideas for solutions to these 
problems—the seeds of what would become socialism, anarchism, and the other ideologies that 
would come to define the modern world. In contrast to the grand designs of the ‘utopian’ and 
revolutionary socialists, the co-operative ideal began with a smaller, more experimental approach. 
Shops and banks owned collectively by their customers, rather than by merchants and bankers, held 
the promise of delivering goods and credit more affordably, thus uplifting the working class. 
Workshops and factories owned by their workers, rather than by a capitalist, might deliver not only 
higher wages, but better working conditions, once the motive for exploitation had been removed. 
From the beginning, these experiments were instigated largely not by impoverished workers 
themselves, but by intellectuals and social reformers who had the resources and education to 
contemplate them (Birchall, 1997). It was, however, a self-starting group of weavers in Rochdale, 
Lancashire, who famously formulated the principles which would become the founding document of 
the international co-operative movement. These Rochdale Principles would, from then on, provide a 
clear demarcation between the notion of a co-operative and other forms of enterprise, both 
socialistic and capitalistic. With the co-operative movement rapidly spreading worldwide, the 
International Co-operative Alliance was founded in 1895, and today functions as the global umbrella 
group for co-operatives. Embodying the spirit of the original Rochdale Principles, the ICA mandates 
that co-operatives worldwide should conform to seven basic principles, quoted from their most 
recent revision, as of 1995, in the table below. 
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Table 1: Principles of the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA, 2015) 
1. Voluntary and open membership 
‘Co-operatives are voluntary organisations, open to all…’ 
2. Democratic member control 
‘Co-operatives are democratic organisations controlled by their members, who actively participate in 
setting their policies and making decisions. Men and women serving as elected representatives are 
accountable to the membership.’ 
3. Member economic participation 
‘Members contribute equitably to, and democratically control, the capital of their co-operative…’ 
4. Autonomy and independence 
‘Co-operatives are autonomous, self-help organisations controlled by their members.’ 
5. Education, training and information 
‘Co-operatives provide education and training for their members…they inform the general 
public…about the nature and benefits of co-operation.’ 
6. Co-operation among co-operatives 
‘Co-operatives…strengthen the co-operative movement by working together…’ 
7. Concern for community 
‘Co-operatives work for the sustainable development of their communities through policies 
approved by their members.’ 
 
Even a cursory examination of these principles makes clear that they are heavily laden with political 
and moral values. This is hardly surprising, for the co-operative movement is just that: a social 
movement which aims to transform society, even if only on a small scale. Central to several of the 
principles is the idea of democratic control. This is a legacy of the early days of co-operativism, when 
the idea of democracy, whether political or economic, was still deeply radical; but it is also an 
expression of the fundamental notion that a co-operative is an enterprise which is controlled, 
collectively, by all of its members, and not by any external agents. 
In part because democracy is a widely contested concept (Doughty, 2014), this has led to a wide 
range of interpretations of the co-operative principles, and debates over what constitutes a ‘true’ 
co-operative. In the socialist countries of the 20th century, co-operatives of all forms were promoted 
widely. According to the dominant version of Marxism-Leninism, co-operatives in a socialist society 
are a transitional form, a step on the way to a ‘higher’ form of socialised production, in which all 
economic activity will eventually be socially coordinated (Ostrovityanov, et al., 1957). Because 
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socialist states claimed to be democratic, this was a distinction between two forms of democracy—a 
‘lower’ form of democracy, in which co-operatives were controlled by their members, and a ‘higher’ 
form, in which they were subsumed under democratic control by the whole society. Many co-
operativists outside the socialist bloc took issue with the Marxist-Leninist conception of democracy, 
illustrating the difficulty of defining an entity which is intrinsically delimited by normative principles. 
The notion of ‘autonomy’—bound up with the idea of member control—is no less problematic. This 
idea was added to the ICA principles in 1995, specifically in response to the experience of co-
operatives in the socialist countries. Under socialism, in part because of the penetration by the 
Communist Party of all sectors of society, it was arguably difficult to characterise any organisation as 
autonomous with respect to larger political and economic structures. Perhaps the greatest example 
of this problem is that of the Yugoslav experience, in which the vast bulk of the economy was 
converted into ‘self-managed’ enterprises (Estrin, 1983). These firms, while technically owned by the 
state and therefore not characterised as co-operatives, were ostensibly controlled democratically by 
their own workers, who also enjoyed a share of any profits. The Yugoslav experiment has often been 
taken as the greatest ever attempt at a co-operative economy, and it inspired a number of economic 
theories of the co-operative (Vanek, 1970). The degree of ‘autonomy’ of Yugoslav firms, either from 
the state or from the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, is open to debate; but it is hard to argue 
with the notion that this experience, too, is part of the history of co-operativism. 
These problems of contested concepts like democracy and autonomy extend beyond 20th century 
socialism. For in the rest of the world, co-operatives were promoted by activists and governments 
alike as a means of facilitating economic development, at times as part of a movement to push 
society leftwards, and at times as an attempt to do the opposite, by mollifying workers and peasants 
through improved conditions to quell insurrectionary politics (Ness, 1961). But in all these cases, co-
operatives were an attempt at social engineering. The imposition of co-operative principles in a wide 
range of social contexts, many of which had little experience of concepts of democracy, represented 
an attempt to transform cultures at a local level, and to build engineered communities, in which 
people would become members, with rights and responsibilities which would alter their relations 
with each other and the community around them. 
A great deal of research has accordingly been devoted to identifying the causes of the success and 
failure of co-operatives worldwide. While the ICA (2015) claims that today, co-operatives represent 
more than one billion members worldwide, the long arc of the co-operative movement has seen 
spectacular failures, as well as successes. 
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Anthropological approaches to co-operatives have emphasised that, as engineered communities, 
they must arguably be seen as ‘total social institutions’ (Nash & Hopkins, 1976), in which social 
relations and internal culture form and develop within the pre-existing wider social context. And as 
specifically normative, political projects, a great deal of their success or failure hinges on the 
interaction between co-operative norms and values and the extant normative systems of 
participants (Hogeland, 2003). 
Apart from their status as a political project and engineered community, co-operatives have a 
further feature which sets them apart from other forms of economic organisation. Their explicit 
egalitarianism and embrace of common ownership means that, at least insofar as they adhere to co-
operative principles, they must depend for their functioning on effective collective management of 
commonly held resources, when at least hypothetically, members hold the power to discipline or 
dismiss a manager who attempts to impose order through hierarchical means (Dyer-Witheford & de 
Peuter, 2010). 
Thus they are prima facie vulnerable to what economists would call a ‘collective action’, or ‘free-
riding’ problem (Hardin, 1968). In such a scenario, individuals have an incentive to over-exploit or 
under-contribute to a shared resource, but the cumulative effect of such free-riding by many 
individuals is that the shared resource is itself diminished or lost. In one of the classic economic 
models of the ‘labour-managed firm’, or producer co-operative, this manifests itself in the form of 
collective decisions not to hire new workers, even when it would be more efficient and thus more 
competitive, because of a short term desire not to spread wages more thinly across a larger 
workforce (Vanek, 1970). Thus workers undermine the long-term survival of the firm to guarantee a 
greater short-term individual return. But this is only one example of how collective action problems 
may affect co-operatives. The more general form of the problem for co-operatives is simply that if 
any resource is held in common, there must be some way to stop members from abusing or over-
exploiting it. Otherwise, in a competitive market without some form of external subsidy, a co-
operative cannot survive. 
This problem is a special case of a more general problem, faced by people in many contexts: how to 
overcome collective action problems in the absence of external enforcement mechanisms. But a 
growing body of research in economics, anthropology, and other fields has shown that people often 
resolve these problems, using a variety of social and cultural practices to enforce collaborative 
behaviour (Poteete, et al., 2010). 
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This project was inspired in part by the notion of applying these approaches to understanding how 
co-operatives overcome the problems they face. But while much of that research is inspired by the 
rational choice model of the individual posited by microeconomics, the approach employed by this 
thesis comes instead from evolutionary theory. 
Mathematical models of evolution incorporate many of the structures of game theory, but without 
any assumptions about psychology or behaviour, human or otherwise. They do this by assimilating 
‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ to changes in fitness, i.e. the rate at which a trait reproduces itself in the 
population; and by identifying the ‘strategies’ of game theory not with choices, but with traits or 
evolved behaviours. This body of work gives us a clear definition of co-operation, as any trait or 
behaviour which evolves by virtue of the fact that it produces a fitness benefit for others (West, et 
al., 2011). Accordingly, the aim of much research in evolutionary biology and beyond is to explain 
how co-operation, so defined, can evolve and survive in a variety of environments. 
Applying this notion to humans, however, requires a further step. For the models of evolutionary 
biology are general enough to apply to any form of information transmission through a population, 
whether by genetic or other means. As such, anthropologists have argued that practices and 
concepts may spread through a population, much like genes, as a result of processes such as 
imitation, conscious learning and cultural group selection (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Henrich & 
Henrich, 2007). The proposal, then, is that much human cultural variation may be explicable by 
reference to the propagation of cultural forms as mechanisms which spread by virtue of their 
success in promotion co-operation. 
It was this body of research, and the desire to test its application to the case of Chinese co-
operatives, which provided the inspiration for this project. It is important to note that despite the 
deceptive nominative similarity, co-operation as defined in this thesis bears no necessary relation to 
co-operatives or co-operativism. The connection lies merely in the suggestion that co-operatives 
face co-operation problems, and it is therefore possible that they may overcome these problems by 
means of culturally evolved practices. Moreover, ‘co-operation’ as defined in terms of cultural 
evolution implies neither conscious choice nor equality; it can encompass forms of hierarchical 
domination, as well as egalitarian sharing, and many other practices besides. It is also important to 
note that this thesis does not employ a rational choice model, but sides instead with the 
evolutionary approach; that is to say, every mention of ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ should be taken as a 
reference to changes in the extent to which a person (or the behaviours they exhibit) will be 
imitated or otherwise propagate the behaviour in question. 
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1.3 The story of the project 
When this project began, my hypotheses were different from those which evolved out of my initial 
attempts at fieldwork. I was aware that in the mid-1990s, China had undergone a mass privatisation 
of state-owned SMEs into a unique and idiosyncratic form known as the ‘shareholding co-operative’; 
I was aware, too, of the more recent co-operative movement which began with the passage of the 
Peasant Specialised Co-operative Law in 2007. I hypothesised that in the wake of the breakdown of 
the Communist project, and the associated attempt to create large-scale co-operation through 
either a collectivist or a universalist morality, the new co-operatives could instead survive by 
employing an older Chinese personalist morality, which, if mobilised amongst networks of workers, 
could succeed in overcoming co-operation problems inherent in the co-operative form. My original 
project, then, was to carry out long term fieldwork in an industrial shareholding co-operative, one in 
which the labour process was highly integrated, and therefore presented significant co-operation 
problems, but which was successful enough that its workers must have found a way to solve or 
ameliorate those problems. In this way, I hoped to discover precisely how they had done it, and test 
my hypothesis that the solution they had found was the sophisticated employment of particularist 
morality. 
In April 2011, I spent four weeks on an initial field visit to mainland China. The purpose of this visit 
was to establish contacts with co-operative institutions, to carry out initial interviews, and to begin 
the process of searching for a co-operative where I could conduct  long-term fieldwork according to 
the original plan of work. I began my visit at the Beijing headquarters of the National Co-operative 
Federation, conducting interviews with the chairman and board members, who recommended I 
continue on to both Haibian University’s Co-operative Institute, and the NCF’s Shanghai branch, to 
conduct further inquiries. In both locations, I conducted interviews with the staff of those 
institutions, as well as with managers of several co-operatives they took me to visit in the 
surrounding areas. I reached an agreement with the Co-operative Institute that I would return in the 
autumn and be based there while conducting further research. 
After returning to Haibian in the autumn, I began interviews with local agricultural co-operatives. I 
was based there for nine months, during which I participated in and observed activities of the 
Institute, as well as local co-operatives. Although I was not primarily interested in agricultural co-
operatives at that time, I went along with the staff of the Institute on visits to local agricultural co-
operatives, where I interviewed managers and ordinary members. 
While in Haibian, I simultaneously continued to pursue other avenues in my search for an industrial 
co-operative. A key element in this search was the Shanghai NCF, where I returned for a longer stay. 
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While in Shanghai, I interviewed members of several small service and handicraft co-operatives 
which maintain relationships with the NCF. I gained substantial insight into the nature of the political 
relationship between the NCF, the Shanghai government, and the co-operative movement. However, 
because the nature of all of these co-operatives was such that their members were not actually 
working together, and therefore did not require substantial sustained co-operation, I decided 
against proceeding with attempting extended fieldwork with any of these co-operatives. 
Nevertheless, working with the Shanghai NCF, I was finally able to discover that while shareholding 
co-operatives across China had become virtually extinct, in Shanghai there was a glaring exception: 
Shanghai had a federation of shareholding co-operative enterprises, which boasted 5000 member 
firms. However, during the course of interviews with representatives of the federation and these 
enterprises, it became apparent that even in Shanghai, the shareholding co-operatives were now 
illusory. As chapter 5 will show, a variety of forces had led them, too, to give up co-operative 
production. 
I resolved to continue searching for an employee-owned factory where I could conduct my original 
research project. After meeting with academics at another university in Haibian who had conducted 
a survey of such enterprises several years before, I arranged visits to neighbouring cities, including 
Gongshi, where there had previously been numerous SHCs. The academics warned me, as had those 
at the Co-operative Institute, that while a few years ago, there had been many SHCs in existence, 
today they were ‘very few’—a phrase which I guessed might mean ‘none at all’. But I decided to find 
out first hand before giving up entirely on the idea. In these cities, I visited several factories which 
were formerly shareholding co-operatives, but which had been transformed into ordinary joint-stock 
corporations on the orders of the central government. Although I was able to conduct retrospective 
interviews with workers and managers at these factories about their memories of the SHC period, 
there were no SHCs to be found. 
I continued my search, traversing my network of connections to visit co-operatives and NCF centres 
as far away as Yunnan, all the while attending NCF events, conferences, training sessions, and 
banquets, and interviewing activists. Finally, an NCF expert in Yunnan told me about one place 
where there may still be some industrial co-operatives: the NCF ‘co-operative experimental zone’ 
which had been established in the 1980s in Meibian county, in the Hexi corridor in Gansu. He 
believed that there were at least a dozen small industrial co-operatives still operating there, and I 
might be able to investigate them. Although by now my optimism was dwindling, I travelled to 
Meibian in March 2012 to pursue this last possibility. 
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Meibian had a small local branch of NCF, which was now primarily occupied with supporting 
agricultural co-operatives, and which nominally also supported the small industrial co-operatives 
which had originally set up with its support. Although they provided me with the names and 
addresses of these industrial co-operatives, they were oddly unable to tell me how many of them 
were still in operation, as they seemed to have fallen out of contact with them. However, I decided 
to make Meibian my base and begin a general ethnographic study there, while attempting to track 
down the industrial co-operatives, all of which were located in small villages in the desert around the 
county town, where I stayed for several months. During this time, I developed friendships with a 
variety of informants in the county town, and began to document local culture, history, and dialect. 
After a time, I found that the industrial co-operatives—as well as some local SHCs—had all, 
apparently, disappeared. However, at this point I had gathered enough initial ethnographic data 
about Meibian to feel that if I shifted the focus of my research to an agricultural co-operative, I 
might be able to establish myself there and conduct fieldwork. I visited several agricultural co-
operatives and conducted interviews with members and managers, and obtained permission from 
one, in principle, to live there and carry out long-term fieldwork. 
At this point, however, my plans met with another unexpected obstacle. I discovered that my key 
informants in Meibian had been repeatedly warned by local police that they should not speak to me, 
or continue their friendships with me, and that if they did, their future might be put in jeopardy. The 
police had, it became clear, been tracking my movements around the county, and intimidating those 
I spoke to. I immediately decided to leave, not wanting to cross a clear ethical line by endangering 
my informants. I booked a flight to Beijing from a nearby airfield, and on the way to the airfield, my 
taxi driver inexplicably turned into a military base, where I was detained and interrogated by military 
intelligence overnight. At the end of the interrogation I was warned not to return to Gansu, and to 
‘be more careful’ in future. Needless to say, this brought to an end my hopes of conducting 
fieldwork in Meibian. 
I made one final attempt at conducting long-term research in a single co-operative. In November 
2012, I travelled to Jiaohu county, in western Ningxia province. I had decided to study an agricultural 
co-operative, and academic colleagues in Beijing had recommended Jiaohu because their University 
maintained a relationship with a number of microcredit projects and agricultural co-operatives there, 
all supported by international development funds. On arrival in Jiaohu, I was met by my local contact, 
who promptly informed me that, while there were some thriving microcredit projects, most of the 
co-operatives had gone out of business, or were artificial legal vehicles, which would not be 
interested in receiving foreign researchers. He took me to the one local co-operative he believed 
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was actually functioning, a pig co-operative in a small village called Damo. I spent several months in 
Damo, but quickly realised that even the co-operative there was hardly functional. Although I was 
able to collect valuable data on Damo itself—a ‘ghost’ village emptied of young people by 
urbanisation, where no real co-operation happened, and most people lived increasingly atomised 
lives, surviving on state subsidies and remittances—I eventually decided to move on. 
Thus the project had evolved from a study of a single co-operative to a study of the co-operative 
movement as a whole, including its interactions with co-operatives around the country. But I had 
also collected data concerning the lives of people outside the movement, whom I got to know while 
traversing its networks, from Haibian to Meibian. These experiences led me to believe that a more 
complete picture of the problems of the co-operative movement would require addressing the 
changing social backdrop against which they have taken place. 
The apparent breakdown and failure of co-operatives across China, as well as the social atomisation I 
saw in Damo and Meibian, inspired a new set of hypotheses about a transition in Chinese society 
from old forms of co-operation to new, or a tendency for those forms to breakdown altogether. I 
decided to test these hypotheses through urban fieldwork and ultimately a survey, described in 
chapter 9, conducted in Beijing. To that end, I spent much of 2013 in Beijing, designing, co-ordinating 
and conducting the survey, and gathering interview and observational data from my urban 
informants. Finally, at the end of 2014, I returned to China to gather the final survey results and 
conduct a series of life history interviews with informants I already knew around the country. 
The multi-sited nature of this project presents some clear limitations. Because I was not able to 
remain in a single co-operative for an extended period of time, it was not possible to observe the full 
calendrical cycle in any of these locations. More importantly, given their infrequent nature, it was 
not possible to attend formal co-operative meetings personally. Instead, I relied on interviews with 
co-operative members and managers to recall their experiences of meetings, decision-making and 
other aspects of co-operative life. Nevertheless, while these are second-hand accounts, and should 
be treated as such, they provide an insight into the meaning given to these events by their 
participants. Moreover, while the relatively brief periods I spent in each locale did not, perhaps, lend 
themselves to the interpersonal intimacy which might have developed otherwise, I nevertheless 
developed long-term relationships with many informants, whom I got to know through repeated 
visits as well as extended stays. The data I collected lend themselves not only to comparative 
analysis, but to the painting of a portrait of a network of individuals and institutions which is as 
geographically scattered as the fieldwork itself. 
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Conducting research in China, from finding informants to securing permission, depends entirely on 
one’s ability to traverse the network of interpersonal connections (Yang, 1994). While in some 
respects, I was fortunate to find a network which included the institutions of the co-operative 
movement, the frustrations of my search for an industrial co-operative were in part underpinned by 
the fact that, in part because my interlocutors were not particularly interested in industrial co-
operatives, the network failed to transmit reliable information about where one could be found. 
Nevertheless, traversing this network provided a wealth of ethnographic material on the dynamics 
of the network itself. For to make use of a connection or get to know a friend of a friend, one must 
make use of a combination of exchanges of gifts, favours, and invitations to banquets and other 
social events. Experiencing this through the medium of the co-operative network showed that the 
personalistic ethics which have long formed the fabric of Chinese society continue to constitute an 
important backdrop against which co-operativism must operate. 
1.4 Outline of the thesis 
This thesis is an attempt to engage with the broad question of how morality and co-operation are 
changing in China, through the lens of the contemporary Chinese co-operative movement, and the 
fieldwork I carried out both within and around that movement. 
The introduction has argued that co-operativism is a moral system which must contend with pre-
existing moral orientations wherever it attempts to operate. Chapter 2 begins the thesis proper by 
giving a conceptual explication of what I will call the ‘relational ethic’: an idealised model of a bundle 
of practices and orientations which have long been said to structure Chinese society. The chapter 
explores debates about whether that ethic is in the process of breaking down, and provides 
ethnographic evidence for ways in which it continues to pattern everyday life, even as the post-
socialist period reshapes people’s concepts of themselves in ways which may conflict with it. 
Chapter 3 puts the relational ethic in the context of economic co-operation, by providing both a 
historical overview of the Chinese co-operative movement, and a theoretical framework through 
which to interpret that history. The framework put forward is the theory of the cultural evolution of 
co-operation—a broad, interdisciplinary approach to understanding co-operation problems, and 
how they are overcome through culture and psychology. The chapter argues that the relational ethic, 
its interaction with state coordination, and important aspects of Chinese economic history can be 
understood as evolved co-operation mechanisms within this framework. It then sets the stage for 
the rest of the thesis by framing the research questions in terms of this background. 
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The following three chapters form the core of the ethnographic treatment of the contemporary co-
operative movement. Chapter 4 analyses the institutions and activists which support and advocate 
co-operatives—that is, the co-operative movement as such. It argues that, while resources provided 
by the state and foreign agencies have been crucial to the propagation of co-operatives, they have 
not necessarily resulted in the propagation of the co-operative ideals which they purport to endorse. 
On the one hand, some state actors see co-operatives as simply a convenient way to achieve other 
policy goals, thus replicating the paternalistic pattern suggested above. On the other hand, the 
provision of monetary and other resources, even by idealistic activists, may result in what chapter 3 
will call a ‘crowding out’ of moral motives—that is, the co-operative movement unintentionally 
undermines its own social goals. 
Chapter 5 then narrows the focus to the experience of individual co-operatives. It explores this 
through the lens of three sets of problems which co-operatives have had to face. First, it shows that 
the lack of formal rule enforcement, itself rooted in the politico-legal structure of contemporary 
China, undermines attempts to enforce explicit co-operative principles. Then, it argues that 
economic change and migration may not only be subjecting co-operatives to intractable competitive 
pressures, but also undermining the social basis for the relational ethic, thereby precluding co-
operation even through informal mechanisms. Finally, it suggests that the shared memory of the 
Mao period may further undermine trust in all but the most straightforward forms of co-operation. 
For all these reasons, it argues that many co-operatives have achieved co-operation neither through 
moral change, nor through webs of interpersonal relationships, but by assiduously avoiding any form 
of co-operation problem that would require either of these to operate. 
Narrowing the focus still further, chapter 6 explores a specific co-operation problem which co-
operatives cannot avoid, namely the problem of participation in ‘democratic’ decision-making. In the 
terms of the theoretical framework proposed in chapter 3, it argues that decision-making is itself a 
collective action problem, particularly in the Chinese context. It suggests that this is perhaps the 
central problem of the co-operatives; and its insolubility leads to a default reliance on a hierarchical 
mode of coordination. Finally, it elaborates on this suggestion by exploring the notion of hierarchy in 
Chinese society, examining the history of hierarchy in Chinese culture, and arguing not only that 
relationships in the relational ethic are intrinsically understood as hierarchically structured, but that 
there are reasons to believe that Chinese culture tends to inculcate a hierarchical cognitive style 
which permeates every domain of life. If this is correct, then it is easy to understand why hierarchical 
coordination would tend to undermine democratic participation in the co-operatives. 
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The following three chapters move away from the co-operative movement itself, and examine the 
wider social and moral context in which they operate, focusing on data collected from informants I 
encountered while studying the co-operatives, although they are not part of the movement itself. 
These informants provide a window onto changes taking place in contemporary Chinese society, 
particularly the kind of moral change which may help to explain the experience of the co-operatives. 
Chapters 7 and 8 thus consist of a series of life history interviews with young people experiencing 
moral conflict—pulled in one direction by the demands of the relational ethic, and in another by 
new and different values and norms. The individuals in chapter 7 have felt this conflict, but have 
essentially decided to live their lives in accordance with the relational ethic, in spite of their own 
conflicting desires. Those in chapter 8 have, to varying degrees, rejected the relational ethic, 
choosing to live their lives according to different moral codes altogether, or according to none at all. 
These two chapters together argue that the lives examined here suggest the relational ethic is, as 
the theoretical scheme in chapter 3 would predict, breaking down in specific circumstances, as a 
result of changes in sociological factors which previously underpinned the system; but, contrary to 
certain theories of modernisation, it is not necessarily being replaced by any other ethical system. 
Chapter 9 attempts to test this hypothesis further, using a psychometric survey developed to 
measure patterns in moral cognition, which was administered in Beijing in 2014. It argues that, not 
only is it possible to detect a psychological corollary to the social changes taking place, but there is 
evidence that changes in moral reasoning are linked to several key sociological factors, as well as to 
a general generational effect which may reflect a change in the overall cultural milieu. 
Finally, chapter 10 concludes the thesis by examining the weight of the evidence for the trajectory of 
moral change in China, and how this bears on and is reflected in the case of the co-operative 
movement. It reflects on the lessons this can teach us, not only for the theory of co-operation and 
co-operatives, but for the anthropology of China itself. It then ends by putting these developments 
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2. The ‘relational ethic’ and the fabric of Chinese society 
On an autumn morning at the railway station in Haibian, I met Zhimin, an undergraduate at a local 
university, who had agreed to travel with me that day as a research assistant. His professor had 
conducted a study of shareholding co-operatives nearly a decade before in another town, Gongshi, 
and had arranged for me to meet with and interview workers and managers in some of those 
factories. He insisted that Zhimin accompany me, out of consideration for my ‘safety’. When I 
protested that I would be perfectly safe on my own, he repeated that if anything happened to me, it 
would also be a problem for him; so I must not go alone, as it was not safe. On the train, Zhimin and I 
chatted about his studies, and his plans for a future with his girlfriend. 
In Gongshi, we were met at the station by Zheng, a functionary in the local government who knew 
the professor, and would take us to visit the factories in his car. We spent the day visiting several 
factories, speaking to workers and managers about their experiences, and touring production lines. 
At each stage, Zheng seemed impatient to move on, and seemed to assume I was only interested in 
gathering a few general statistics. 
Toward the end of the day, he tried to convince us to stop—surely we had seen enough already; 
these factories were all the same. Then his face lit up. ‘Now let’s go have fun! Do you like karaoke? 
I’ll invite you!’ Though I could see the reluctance on Zhimin’s face, we both knew we had no choice 
but to accept the invitation. To refuse would have been impolite, but perhaps also impossible; for his 
invitation was, as these sorts of invitations often are, made forcefully. 
Karaoke bars come in all shapes and sizes, but they are pervasive across the country. For the most 
part, they serve as local social centres, and are often the only form of entertainment in rural towns. 
During my fieldwork, I spent many an evening in them with friends and associates. Hiring a room in a 
karaoke bar with a group of friends, drinking, singing and chatting together is an important form of 
bonding, particularly for young people in provincial towns and cities. However, a minority of karaoke 
bars provide a different sort of service—ranging from women paid to accompany and flatter male 
guests to some which employ women as sex workers. Fortunately, I had never received an invitation 
to the latter form of karaoke bar, but the ambiguity made this invitation an uncomfortable one. 
We were led into our karaoke booth—a dimly lit private room with a large projection screen, 
armchairs and tables. Waiting for us were others whom Zheng had not told us about: some of his 
friends in local government and business, and a chief of police. He introduced me to them as an 
honoured foreign guest, and explained that this was to thank me for visiting, and give me a welcome 
to the city. 
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Zhimin and I were growing increasingly apprehensive. I tried to explain that we were tired, that 
maybe we should leave and not stay up late, but Zheng persisted, pushing us to sit down in the 
armchairs. A door opened, and a dozen young women walked in, forming a line-up in front of us. I 
looked over at Zhimin, who looked extremely worried. ‘What do we do?’ he said, under his breath. 
‘If they try to make us do anything, we leave, OK?’ I replied. He nodded uncomfortably. 
Zheng then explained that we must each pick a girl—and since I was the honoured guest, I should 
pick first. I refused as politely as possible, saying that there was no need, that it wasn’t my sort of 
thing—but Zheng and his friends were having none of it. After several rounds of refusals, he chose 
two women for me and Zhimin. Then he and his friends chose theirs, and each of the women sat 
next to the man to whom they had been assigned. 
Fortunately, we soon discovered that the role of the women was limited to making a show of 
enjoying themselves, and repeatedly complimenting the men. As the evening wore on, we shared 
round after round of drinks, punctuated by the singing of the officials—dutifully applauded by the 
women. After the initial formalities, they made little show of talking to me or Zhimin, instead talking 
amongst themselves about their own business and gossiping about mutual acquaintances. I tried 
unsuccessfully to talk with the woman who had been assigned to me—asking her, ‘Doesn’t it get 
boring having to pay so many fake compliments to these men?’ She was at first nonplussed at my 
attempt to open an ordinary conversation, then slipped into obvious boredom when she realised I 
did not expect her to perform. 
Then the apparent safety of the situation broke down. The police chief having become sufficiently 
inebriated, he began to grope one of the women, who complained loudly and ran to the other side 
of the room. He began to chase her around the room, lunging at her. When she protested that it was 
forbidden, he replied, ‘Do you know who I am? I am the chief of police. I can do whatever I want’. On 
hearing this, she looked frightened, and fell silent, though she continued to pull away when the 
police chief came near. Her colleagues did little to intervene, and the other men made only a 
dilatory show of attempting to distract him with conversation. Zhimin looked horrified; I was 
uncertain what to do, and just as I had decided to intervene, the police chief gave up his pursuit and 
became lost in another drunken conversation with one of his friends. 
As the men became increasingly inebriated and absorbed in their gossip, it became increasingly clear 
to us that we were not the main event of the evening. Zheng intimated that he had used funds 
allocated for visits of foreign experts to pay for the evening, and perhaps a visit by a foreigner was 
simply sufficiently exotic to use as grounds to invite his friends for an evening out; but whatever the 
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cause, it was apparent that our presence was merely an excuse for the men to spend the evening 
together at the karaoke bar. Through drinking, smoking, gossiping, singing, and displaying their 
masculinity through the affected interest of the women, they used the evening to cement and 
reaffirm their relationships with each other—relationships with political and administrative 
importance, as well as any affection they may have felt. Our presence was merely a pretence for the 
evening. 
This uncomfortable episode illustrates many of the dynamics of interpersonal exchange networks in 
Chinese society. I could only access factories in Gongshi through personal connections held by Zheng, 
who in turn agreed to introduce me to the factory managers as a favour to the professor. But his real 
interest on the day was not in facilitating factory visits, but rather in using the occasion to do a 
favour for his friends through the vehicle of the karaoke night—in a sense, my attendance of that 
event was a form of payback for his assistance. Zhimin’s clear discomfort at receiving this ‘favour’ is 
not an atypical experience; the obligation to accept from others, and thereby allow them to create 
an obligation to return, is often a source of moral conflict. Finally, the police chief’s treatment of the 
karaoke girl illustrates the paramountcy of connections over formal institutions; for whatever the 
law may dictate, his personal status could override it. 
This complex interplay of motivations also helps to illustrate the difficult backdrop against which 
social research in China necessarily takes place. For any researcher, even one mindful of the 
importance of relationships, must contend with the fact that these relationships take precedence 
over other priorities nearly all of the time—including the idea of truthful disclosure. Ethnographers 
in all contexts must be aware of the hidden motives of their interlocutors, but conducting research 
within networks of such relationships carries its own particular challenges. 
But the episode at the karaoke bar illustrates a further point. For moral obligations and 
understandings are in a state of flux, in which individuals like Zhimin are often forced to grapple with 
conflicting normative worlds. As the previous chapter argued, co-operativism itself entails the 
construction of a normative system; but if we are to understand the fate of any attempt to implant 
this system in shifting moral sands like these, we must first understand the lay of the land. This 
chapter provides a sketch of what might be considered the baseline moral system from which much 
social interaction in China departs. It begins by outlining what I will call the ‘relational ethic’: an 
idealised model of a set of key conceptual, behavioural and psychological tendencies which have 
typically been taken to characterise Chinese sociality in a variety of contexts. It then considers to 
what extent this model applies to China today, arguing through ethnographic examples that 
although individuals may feel decreasingly comfortable with this pattern, the relational ethic 
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continues to function as the dominant mode of coordination of interpersonal behaviour—and 
therefore the backdrop against which attempts at co-operativism must take place. 
2.1 The relational ethic 
As part of crisscrossing the country, traversing the networks which connected co-operatives and co-
operativists, I became acquainted with some co-operativists who took, on the whole, a sceptical 
view of the prospects of Chinese co-operativism. One such was Zhao, a middle-aged academic who, 
though connected officially with institutions in Beijing devoted to rural development, spent most of 
his time in field sites in Henan. Speaking with him one day as we walked through citrus groves in a 
village there which did not yet have a co-operative, he explained his view of the situation. 
“There can be co-operatives, but only with difficulty. The problem is maybe that in China, there is no 
religion. If there were something like a god, sitting on that mountain—something to bring people 
together—maybe they would feel that they are all together, in one community. But there is not. If 
you want to make them start a co-operative, you cannot require them to share land, share tools. No 
one would trust this, because they fear others will take advantage of them. They will help their family, 
their friends, but only knowing their help will be returned. Why should I help the co-operative, when I 
must first help my kin? This is the traditional mentality. It is very difficult to overcome.” 
Zhao’s frustrated observations summarise in a few words what is a complex and variegated system. 
This section will outline that system in an idealised form, arguing for a model in which the key 
tendencies form an integrated and mutually reinforcing totality, which this thesis will call ‘the 
relational ethic’. 
It is important to emphasise at the outset that the relational ethic is not intended to exhaust the full 
variety of moral personas or systems of social interaction that are or historically have been available 
in China. In contrast to the personalist particularism of the relational ethic, a wide variety of 
universalistic moral systems have long played important roles in Chinese society, from the universal 
compassion and monasticism propounded by Buddhist doctrine, to modern movements including 
Christianity, liberalism and Communism. In practice, these modes of action are often mixed; thus in 
Weller’s (1987, p. 63) account of ghost-feeding rituals in Taiwan, while some informants report 
motives consistent with the relational ethic, such as maintaining ‘face’, many appear to be 
motivated to feed ghosts out of compassion for strangers, or the belief that compassion for 
strangers is morally good. However, throughout history, it would appear that these universalist and 
egalitarian instincts have often ultimately been relegated to the margins, or reinterpreted in ways 
more consistent with the precepts of the relational ethic (Weller, 1987, p. 170; Teiser, 1988, p. 203). 
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The argument of this section is that this is no coincidence; the relational ethic displays a strong self-
reinforcing, self-replicating dynamic which appears to make it particularly resilient as a form of social 
organisation. In treating the relational ethic as the baseline from which the analysis departs, this 
thesis is thus claiming not that it is or ever has been the only extant moral form in Chinese society, 
but that it would appear in many cases to be the dominant form, and the form with which rival 
moral orientations, such as co-operativism, must principally compete. 
By way of sketching an idealised model of that form, the following six sections will outline its key 
features, and how they interrelate. Section 2.1.7 then provides a summary definition and underlines 
ways in which this model departs from existing characterisations in the literature. 
2.1.1 Personalism  
A first point to consider is hinted at by Zhao’s complaint about the difficulty of creating loyalty to a 
collective entity. That is the nature of the objects of moral obligation—that is, to whom, or to what, 
are obligations owed? Weber (1951) provided the canonical answer. Confucian ethics, he argued, 
explicitly confined the domain of morality to obligations within the five key social relations: ruler and 
ruled, father and son, husband and wife, elder brother and younger brother, friend and friend. 
Concomitantly, all moral obligations resided in interpersonal relationships, and directed at 
individuals—a notion Weber called ‘personalism’. 
“Hitherto in China no sense of obligation has existed toward impersonal communities, be they of 
political, ideological, or any other nature…In substance, the duties of a Chinese Confucian always 
consisted of piety toward concrete people whether living or dead, and toward those who were close 
to him through their position in life.” (Weber, 1951, pp. 209-235) 
If this is the case, then personalism may pose a fundamental problem for co-operatives, which are 
certainly a form of ‘impersonal community’. 
Weber noted the existence of corporate associations in China, from guilds and ‘sibs’ to co-operatives 
and credit associations. But he argued that these groupings were not themselves the object of moral 
obligations. Instead, they were nothing more than labels applied to networks of personalistic ties. 
Taking the example of credit associations, Weber claimed that these ‘depend upon the strictly 
personal acquaintance of the associates. The contributing members are selected in terms of their 
purely personal trustworthiness…The credit association required either a certain measure of mutual 
supervision or precise knowledge of the members’ way of doing business’ (1951, pp. 292-293). 
Similarly, other corporate groupings relied entirely on interpersonal obligations; ‘the strength of the 
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truly Chinese economic organization was roughly co-extensive with…personal associations’ (1951, p. 
235). 
At first glance, the notion of personalism, and in particular, the claim that collective entities have no 
moral status, may appear to conflict with the common characterisation of China as a ‘collectivist’ 
society, an idea which originated in social psychology. The idea was born with Hofstede’s (1980; 
1983; 1991) pioneering cross-cultural psychometric studies, which identified several value 
dimensions along which cultures ostensibly varied. One of these was the ‘individualism-collectivism’ 
dimension, on which China sat unambiguously at the ‘collectivist’ end of the spectrum. Since then, 
research on individualism and collectivism has expanded into a vast literature in cross-cultural 
psychology, including the psychology of China. While these constructs have never had a single, 
universally agreed definition, a typical characterisation is that ‘the defining difference between 
individualism and collectivism is a primary concern for oneself in contrast to a concern for the 
group(s) to which one belongs’ (Berry, et al., 2002, p. 66). Thus there would appear to be a conflict 
between the notion of Chinese morality as personalistic—concerned exclusively with obligations to 
individuals—and the idea of Chinese psychology as collectivistic—concerned with the larger 
collectivities to which individuals belong. 
More recent research, however, has called into question common understandings of the 
individualism-collectivism distinction. In a critical review of existing scales, Brewer and Chen (2007) 
argued that researchers had confounded multiple concepts, leading them to measure not one 
dimension, but several incomparable ones. So-called ‘collectivism’, it turned out, was only 
sometimes construed as an orientation toward collectivities; in many studies, it referred simply to an 
orientation to others rather than the self. To solve this problem, Brewer and Chen proposed a 
distinction between two forms of collectivism. ‘Group-based collectivism’ refers to concern with a 
larger collectivity, while ‘relational collectivism’ refers to an orientation toward the individuals with 
whom one is associated. Experimental research has borne out this distinction (Sundararajan, 2015, p. 
40). Indeed, not only has this research suggested that China and other East Asian societies are best 
understood as examples of relational collectivism; it has suggested, too, that Western societies 
typically classed as ‘individualist’ often exhibit a higher degree of group-based collectivism than East 
Asian cultures (Yuki, 2003; Li, 2009; Kreuzbauer, et al., 2009). The archetypal loyal American Google 
employee is thus more concerned with the collectivity as such than Weber’s personalist Confucian. 
It is therefore arguable that recent research in cross-cultural psychology, far from contradicting 
Weber’s argument, lends further support to the notion of Chinese society as personalistic. The 
objects of moral obligation in the relational ethic are exclusively individual others, not collectivities. 
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2.1.2 Particularism 
If the objects of obligation in the relational ethic are individuals, then it remains to be said what form 
these obligations take. It has long been noted that in the archetypal Chinese moral system, 
obligations vary depending on one’s relationship with the specific individual at hand. Thus Fei 
Xiaotong (1992 [1947]), one of the founders of Chinese social anthropology, characterised Chinese 
society as structured by what he called the ‘differential mode of association’, in which the 
acceptability of conduct depended entirely on particular relationships, rather than universal rules. 
This notion of particularism has defined studies of Chinese morality for more than a century. 
The distinction between particularism and universalism, suggested also by Weber (1978 [1922]), was 
most precisely elaborated by Parsons (1951, p. 134). In his theoretical scheme, the distinction 
between particularism and universalism is one of the five ‘pattern variables’ which define social roles, 
i.e. bundles of norms which govern social relations. These norms are universalistic if they apply 
equally to all others, irrespective of the details of one’s relationship with a particular other. They are 
particularistic insofar as they are determined by the specifics of that relationship. For Weber and 
Parsons, Chinese morality was a classic example of particularism. 
Again, early sinology drew this conclusion initially from studies of philosophy. It has long been noted 
that the Confucian concept of li, or right conduct, prescribes different obligations to particular others 
depending on one’s relationship with those others—again, according to the five basic relationships 
mentioned above (Roetz, 1993). The centrality of this notion is underlined by Confucian responses to 
its critics. Mozi, the 5th century BC philosopher, argued for a new concept of universal love that 
would transcend the partiality of interpersonal ties (Fung, 1952, p. 91). He was met with harsh 
criticism from the Confucian school, most famously the response by Mencius that such a 
universalistic morality would undermine the more fundamental obligation, to give preference to 
one’s close associates. 
Ethnographic evidence has shown that particularism goes beyond philosophy. While li was an 
explicitly formulated philosophical concept, prescribing ritual behaviour in a number of specific 
relationships, ordinary Chinese people use a wide range of vocabulary to talk about myriad 
ambiguous, shifting, and unclear interpersonal obligations (Silin, 1976, p. 44; Wilson, 2002, p. 174). 
Everyday morality in a broad range of cases has been shown to be based on particularistic 
considerations. This principle has a number of important implications. For not only does 
particularism imply that one must invest in and rely on relationships to ensure one’s own moral 
status; the lack of universalistic rules—and indeed, the suspicion, exemplified by Mencius, that they 
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may themselves be immoral, if they endanger particularistic obligations—creates intrinsic difficulties 
for any project of law, bureaucratisation, or any other governance by impersonal principles. 
It is worth noting that the distinctions between universalism and particularism on the one hand, and 
personalism and group collectivism on the other hand, are orthogonal. It is perfectly possible to 
conceive of a particularistic relationship with or between collectivities, rather than individuals 
(Milner, 1978). Thus to be precise, we can characterise the relational ethic as a form of personalistic 
particularism. 
2.1.3 Exchange: Material and affective 
But if all obligations in the relational ethic are particularistic, then how do they arise? An analysis of 
Chinese society through the lens of Confucianism might suggest that the obligations of li, while 
particularistic in that they vary depending on the relationship, do not require derivation, because 
they represent a universal code of conduct in particular relationships (Schmidt-Glintzer, 1999; Edel & 
Edel, 2000 [1959], p. 130). 
The problem with this conclusion was hinted at by Weber, who saw the roots of particularism in 
Chinese religion. While Western Christians derived their universalistic morality from a direct 
relationship with an omnipotent deity who monitored their adherence to universal rules, Chinese 
deities performed no such role, and ancestor worship was merely an extension of interpersonal 
obligations beyond death. ‘The religious duty toward the hidden and supra-mundane God caused 
the Puritan to appraise all human relations…as mere means and expression of a mentality reaching 
beyond the organic relations of life. The religious duty of the pious Chinese, in contrast, enjoined 
him to develop himself within the organically given, personal relations’ (Weber, 1951, p. 235). 
Whatever we may make of Weber’s religious explanation, the insight stands that without an external 
arbiter of morality, particularistic obligations must arguably be derived from relationships 
themselves. Sanction for misbehaviour—even if this was understood as violating Confucian norms—
could come only from within relationships. Thus it was relationships which determined and enforced 
obligations. 
Leaving Confucianism aside, we come to the fundamental sociological principle which has been said 
to govern obligations in Chinese relationships: that of exchange, or reciprocity (Yang, 1957). For in 
the absence of any external source, obligations can be built up through repeated interaction. A 
considerable bulk of Chinese moral discourse concerns this notion of reciprocity. Exchange of gifts, 
favours, and other resources is used and understood to build relationships and to create and sustain 
mutual obligation. Gifts and favours are often given in such a way that there is deliberate ambiguity 
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about what would be required to repay them. This ambiguity about the clearing of debts helps to 
sustain exchange relationships beyond single interactions. 
The ambiguity is further enhanced by the multiplexity of exchange relationships—that is to say, the 
combination of multiple kinds of exchange in the same relationship. If two colleagues exchange not 
only help at work, but also gifts, social favours, friendly visits, and so on, then the total continuing 
debt between them is never clear, thus allowing the totality of exchange to facilitate each particular 
exchange. 
More specifically, relationships in the relational ethic consistently combine some degree of two 
kinds of exchange: material and affective (Yan, 1996, p. 143). This point is made forcefully by Kipnis,  
(1997) in his 1988-90 study of the village of Fengjia, in Shandong province. He was struck by the 
amount of time spent by villagers on visits, banquets, sharing of tea and cigarettes, visiting ill 
acquaintances, and other activities apparently directed at maintaining relationships. He claims that 
what mattered in the exchange appeared to be whether they had carried out certain behaviours, like 
visiting each other when ill, rather than a question of the presence of some underlying mental state 
(Ibid.: 27-28). But Kipnis rejects an argument put forward by Potter and Potter (1990, p. 183; Potter, 
1988), who claim that, although their Chinese informants appear to experience emotions, their 
speech indicates that they consider their inner feelings to be unimportant and to have little effect on 
relationships. Instead, he draws on the pragmatic view put forward by Lutz and Rosaldo (Kipnis, 
2002) to argue that affect is something that exists when ‘embodied’ in behaviour, and does not 
represent a secret inner emotional life; it is no less ‘moving’ or important in relationships as a result 
(1997, p. 107).  This is echoed by Walder’s claim that, for his informants, to have an affective tie ‘is 
to be concerned about the other person, and to be concerned is to be willing to help someone out’ 
(Walder, 1983, p. 70).  Correspondingly, sincerity in feelings is a matter not of expressing one’s true 
inner feelings, but rather of acting in accordance with expectations created by displays of feelings 
(Kipnis, 1997, p. 108); thus, such a display is a claim on the future of a relationship, rather than only 
an echo of its past. Like Lutz (1990), Kipnis (1997, p. 115) claims that Western discourse about affect 
presupposes that sincerity is a matter of the expression of inner feelings; the difference in China is 
that this ‘ideology’ is not present, not that affect has no relevance. In this way, Kipnis explains the 
concern among the Fengjia villagers for continually embodying good feelings: such displays are 
necessary to ensure the continuation of relationships, and talk of feelings is accordingly licensed, like 
all mental talk, by behaviour, rather than by inner states. 
Relationships of love and affection are thus marked by the importance of mutual material giving, 
without which the affection itself would be hollow. Equally, even relatively impersonal business 
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relationships are typically marked by affective displays, such as gift-giving and banqueting (Van der 
Sprenkel, 1966, p. 100; De Glopper, 1972, p. 322; Silin, 1972, p. 342; Wakeman, 1977, pp. 214-15). 
Much discourse is devoted to discussing the affective component of exchange relationships, 
including how this can be used to create a sense of obligation in those with whom one lacks the 
material resources to do so otherwise (Fried, 1953, pp. 105-106). This constant admixture of 
affective and material exchange further reinforces the overall ambiguity and continuity of the 
reciprocal debt relationship. 
Thus obligations in the relational ethic are derived from the history of each particular relationship. 
Material and affective exchange are combined systematically to create and sustain the debts which 
form the foundation of morality. 
2.1.4 Transitivity of obligation 
In the relational ethic, because moral status is derived entirely from one’s participation in exchange 
relationships, these relationships become the single most important resource in life. For only 
through relationships can one secure help and needed resources, and thus only by cultivating and 
maintaining relationships can one be assured of assistance in case things go wrong. But because 
relationships themselves are then a resource, the obligation to help one’s exchange partners 
extends naturally to an obligation to help them fulfil their obligations to others, thereby maintaining 
their relationships. This is the transitivity of obligation: If X owes a debt to Y, and Y owes a debt to Z, 
then X, by virtue of his debt to Y, can also be brought to owe some debt to Z. It is this principle which 
allows the relational ethic to go beyond governing simple dyadic relations, and instead to give rise to 
the elaborate exchange networks which have long structured Chinese society. 
The principle is evinced in the use of ‘connections’ (guanxi) to locate resources unavailable to one’s 
immediate exchange partners, such as a job in a distant city—a process sometimes referred to as 
‘pulling on (a chain of) connections’ (la guanxi) (Yang, 1994). By appealing to an existing exchange 
partner, who in turn appeals to his or her own exchange partners, and so on down the line, one can 
make use of a chain of obligations to find an individual who possesses the desired resource. The 
transitivity of obligation ensures that the final individual can be appealed to, as having some 
obligation, by transitivity, to the person who began the process. 
Similarly, it is rare that new relationships are begun without an introduction made by an 
intermediary (Blau et al. 1991; Gold et al. 2002). If no intermediary can be found, strangers will often 
attempt to find some common grouping to which they have both belonged, such as a past school or 
workplace, as an indicator that it is likely they do have acquaintances in common (Jacobs, 1979). 
Without an intermediary, two strangers begin, as it were, from square one, with no mutual debts to 
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form the basis of an exchange. Because obligation has a degree of transitivity, an intermediary 
allows for the transfer of some existing debt, thus providing the foundation of a relationship. 
This pattern is also exhibited in the initiation of children into the exchange network. Parent-child 
relationships are conceived of in terms of debt; children owe their parents enqing, the deepest form 
of debt, which can never be fully repaid, in exchange for their parents having given birth to them and 
raised them. The understanding is that throughout their life, and particularly in their parents’ old age, 
they must work to repay this debt. But it is arguably this debt, too, which initiates them into the 
exchange network of wider society. For the debts owed by parents to grandparents, aunts and 
uncles, cousins, neighbours and friends are all, in part, transferred to offspring by transitivity. Thus a 
child becomes part of the network through direct exchange with his or her parents. 
One important result of this patterning is the strong conceptual division between ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’. Those within one’s exchange network, even if not known to one personally, are within the 
moral realm, while those entirely outside one’s network have no moral value within the relational 
ethic. Historically, this division corresponded in rural areas to the distinction between villagers and 
outsiders, but it has always applied more broadly for urbanites and migrants. 
2.1.5 ‘Face’ 
In the broader exchange networks created by the relational ethic, transitivity of obligation is not the 
only force supporting moral behaviour. A more potent sanction ensures that news of good and bad 
behaviour travels quickly through the network, and rewards and punishes individuals by providing 
and denying them access to social resources. That sanction is the notion of ‘face’. 
An enormous literature has been devoted to exploring and elaborating concepts of face, both in 
China and cross-culturally (Agassi & Jarvie, 1969; Lin, 1939; Xun, 1980 [1934]; Hwang, 1987). For 
while the English term, in this sense, was originally a translation of two Chinese words—mianzi and 
lian—the Chinese concept has proven a fruitful platform for theoretical framings of patterns in other 
cultures, too (Goffman, 1955; 1959; Brown & Levinson, 1987; Ho, 1976). This thesis, however, will 
avoid delving into theoretical concepts labelled ‘face’, and will focus instead on the notion of face as 
it operates in Chinese society. 
Broadly, face is a form of reputation, which is gained or lost according to two factors: First, one’s 
record of fulfilling obligations to one’s exchange partners; and second, one’s access to the material 
and social resources that are necessary to fulfil such obligations (Haugh & Hinze, 2003; Hsu, 1996). 
Thus one may lose face either through immoral behaviour, or by losing resources. The two are 
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interlinked, for the key information furnished by face is whether the person concerned would make 
a desirable exchange partner. 
Face is further distinguished from other forms of reputation by what some have called its ‘vicarious’ 
nature (Hinze, 2005). That is, when one gains or loses face, this also has some lesser effect on the 
face of one’s close associates (Chang & Holt, 1994; Brunner & Wang, 1988; Saari, 1982). While 
vicarious reputation exists to some degree in other societies, for example in notions of family 
honour in the Mediterranean (Davis, 1977; Schneider, 1971), the vicarious nature of face is unusually 
extensive, extending not only to family, but also to friends, teachers, and colleagues. 
Face itself is a key resource; for it determines whether and to what extent others will be willing to 
enter into exchanges with a person. This means that it is a powerful sanction (Hsu, 1996, p. 201; 
Hwang, 1987). Failure to fulfil obligations results in face loss, meaning others in the network will be 
less willing to engage in exchanges. But it also results in face loss for one’s close associates. Because 
face is a resource for them, too, one is obliged to look after the state of their face, as well (Yang, 
1947; Lin, 1939; Hsu, 1996, pp. 96-101; Yan, 1996, p. 134). This means that, because of the vicarious 
nature of face, failing to live up to one obligation may imply failing to live up to the further obligation 
to maintain the face of one’s associates—and so on, ad infinitum (Gao, 1998, p. 476). 
This provides a further key motivation for relying on intermediaries to form new relationships. For 
an intermediary risks losing face if one of the people he or she introduces to each other goes on to 
misbehave. This gives the intermediary an incentive only to introduce those he or she trusts, and to 
monitor and control their behaviour after the introduction. It also gives those who are introduced an 
incentive to behave morally, for the presence of the intermediary ensures that news of their good or 
bad behaviour will spread back through their own network. 
This system of reputation is backed up by a powerful emotional response. Face loss is typically 
associated with feelings of shame—wanting to run away and hide, feeling inadequate and not being 
able to make eye contact with others (Hinze, 2005, p. 185; Gao, 2009; King & Myers, 1977). Face 
gain, by contrast, is typically associated with feelings of pride. This emotional pattern underpinned 
the classification of Chinese society as a ‘shame culture’—one in which people are motivated by 
emotions of shame, which result from others finding out about misbehaviour, rather than emotions 
of guilt, which occur regardless of whether others know (Benedict, 1946; Creighton, 1990). While 
there has been disagreement over this label, researchers have continued to concur that shame is a 
more prominent feature of Chinese discourse and motivation than guilt (Ho et al. 2004; Bedford 
2004). Concomitantly, studies of interactions between Chinese parents and children have shown 
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that much explicit socialisation takes place through the medium of face: parents may chastise their 
children for misbehaving by warning them not to lose face for their family, rather than that the 
misbehaviour is intrinsically wrong (Dong & Lee, 2007; Agassi & Jarvie, 1969; Hu, 1944). The results 
of this appear to be an internalisation of moral emotions which serve first and foremost to protect 
reputation by motivating the fulfilment of obligations, and the accrual of the resources needed to do 
so. 
2.1.6 The relational self 
As the aspects of the relational ethic explored thus far suggest a highly interdependent conception 
of life, the question arises whether they imply a specific concept of the individual, the person, or the 
self—understood, respectively, as concepts of individual humans, understood as mechanical objects; 
concepts of moral subjects, i.e. bearers of duties and obligations; and the psychological notion of an 
implicit self-concept which guides behaviour. While it is not possible to give a conclusive answer, 
both anthropological and psychological research shed some light on this aspect of the relational 
ethic. Given the centrality of individualisation to this thesis, it is important to complete the picture of 
the relational ethic by exploring this final aspect. This section will begin with the two anthropological 
concepts of individual and person, before considering the psychological notion of the self-concept. 
For the sake of conceptual clarity, it is useful to make a distinction between two sorts of concepts 
which can be said to apply to humans. The first is what La Fontaine, following Fortes and Radcliffe-
Brown, calls an ‘individual’ (La Fontaine, 1985).  It is a human considered without any rights or duties; 
that is to say, not bound by norms, and not binding others. The second is what La Fontaine and 
Fortes call a ‘person’, and what Radcliffe-Brown calls a ‘social personality’. A person is a bearer of 
rights and duties to other persons, while individuals as such are related only causally, not 
normatively. 
Anthropological debates concerning these concepts have, concomitantly, centred around two 
principal themes. First among these is the notion that person concepts vary cross-culturally. Thus 
Mauss (1985) classically argued that various North American tribes lacked the notion of a person, in 
the sense of a stable concept attaching from birth to death to one individual, and instead employed 
only a concept of ‘persona’, a form of social personality taken on temporarily by individuals at 
different points in time. In other cases, the claim is that personhood exists, but is only assigned to 
some individuals, or is perhaps gradually acquired over the lifespan (La Fontaine, 1985). 
A second theme is the notion that concepts of the individual vary; thus the so-called ‘dividual’. 
Marriott claims that ‘persons are generally thought by South Asians to be…divisible. To exist, 
dividual persons absorb heterogeneous material influences. They must also give out from 
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themselves particles of their own coded substances—essences, residues, or other active 
influences—that may then reproduce in others something of the nature of the persons in whom 
they have originated’ (Strathern, 1988, p. 348). Strathern then claims that Melanesians similarly 
think of themselves as ‘dividual’; they are ‘composite’, the body taking the form of a ‘microcosm’ of 
the society (1988, p. 15). Unlike claims about concepts of persons, Marriott’s claim appears to have 
nothing to do with norms; instead, it is simply a claim about how humans are conceived to work in a 
mechanistic way (Celtel, 2005, p. 62). While this may have normative implications, the two sorts of 
claims are logically distinct. 
The question then arises whether the relational ethic implies a distinct notion of either the person or 
the individual, so defined. Both the vicarious nature of face and the transitivity of obligation would 
seem to suggest that the locus of rights and obligations extends somewhat beyond the individual. In 
Fei Xiaotong’s (1992 [1947]) evocative metaphor, the self extends itself outward into a web of 
relationships like ripples emanating outward from a rock thrown into a pond. Still, the focal point is 
the individual node in the network; thus on this account, the person is ‘egocentric’, although not 
strictly individual (Bruckermann & Feuchtwang, 2016, p. 29). While individuals remain identifiable, 
they are both causally and morally—as persons—inextricable from the relationships which define 
them (Ho, 1995). 
This picture is complicated by the possibility that personhood may wax and wane throughout the 
lifespan. In a study of gendered naming practices in rural Hong Kong, Watson (1986) notes the 
plurality of names acquired by men over a lifetime, many of which denote their position in kinship 
and other networks. By contrast, upon marriage, women cease to be referred to with names of their 
own, and instead are spoken of only in terms of their relationship to their affines. Thus Watson 
argues that the personhood of men correspondingly develops through life, while women are unable 
to attain ‘full personhood’. 
A suggestive counterargument to this is provided by Chen (2015, p. 162), who argues instead that 
Chinese individuals should be understood as constituting an ‘expansive-I’, which partially envelops 
their close associates. On this account, Watson is mistaken in conflating individualisation and 
personhood; for personhood must be understood as attaching not to the individual, but to the 
‘expansive-I’—the immediate ripples, as well as the stone. 
These arguments leave us with a considerable degree of ambiguity. On the one hand, it is possible to 
conceive of the concept of person as extending slightly beyond the individual, in the sense that one’s 
close associates also bear some degree of one’s moral obligations and entitlements. On the other 
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hand, it could be that it is not the concept of the person which bleeds out into the network, but that 
of the individual to which personalities are attached. Nevertheless, it is arguable that in either case, 
the consequences for the relational ethic are identical; for vicarious reputation and the transitivity of 
obligations are supported in both cases by the notion that the locus of moral status extends beyond 
discrete individuals to include those with whom they are associated. 
However, the distinction between person and individual is important for another reason. One of the 
central arguments of this thesis is that while it may be the case that young people are increasingly 
developing a more ‘autonomous’, or less ‘expansive’, concept of themselves as individuals, the 
interdependence, or ‘expansiveness’ of the concept of the person remains strong. That is to say, the 
moral force of the interdependence implied by the relational ethic may remain, even if people begin 
to conceive of themselves and others as causally self-determining. The tension between these two 
forces will be explored in further chapters. 
Research in cross-cultural psychology has provided a further body of evidence which sheds light on 
these considerations. Drawing on both anthropological and psychological evidence, Markus and 
Kitayama (1991) suggested that self-construals—the cognitive and affective constructs with which 
individuals relate to themselves—vary cross-culturally; and more specifically, they proposed a 
distinction between ‘independent’ self-construals, in which individuals are seen as separate from 
others and defined primarily in terms of non-relational properties, and ‘interdependent’ self-
construals, in which individuals see themselves as defined principally by their relationships with 
others. This suggestion has led to a wide-ranging body of studies which have broadly corroborated 
the distinction, and indicated that self-construal may underpin a variety of differences in cognitive, 
affective, and motivational patterns, from causal attribution to communication style (Cross & Hardin, 
2011). 
Concomitantly, a related body of work has focused on cross-cultural differences in the psychological 
priority given to different aspects of the self-concept. Specifically, Andersen and Chen (2002) suggest 
that in general, individuals pattern social behaviour according to a variety of self-concepts, which 
can be activated differently depending on context. These include the ‘individual self’—a concept of 
the self as independent from others—the ‘collective self’—a concept of the self as part of a larger 
collectivity—and the ‘relational self’—a concept of the self as defined within relationships to 
particular others. The suggestion, then, is that different cultural environments may place different 
levels of emphasis on the activation of each of these. 
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In the Chinese context, it has been suggested not only that interdependent self-construal dominates, 
but that the ‘relational self’ receives relatively high priority  (Choi & Han, 2009). Experimental studies 
comparing Han Chinese subjects with Uyghurs and Tibetans have found relatively strong activation 
of the relational self among Han Chinese, as compared to the collective self among Uyghurs, and an 
even activation of all three self-concepts among Tibetans (Mamat, et al., 2014; Huang, et al., 2014). 
Other evidence has been more mixed; while some neuroimaging studies have found support for the 
primacy of the relational self in the motivational systems of Chinese subjects (Kitayama & Park, 2014; 
Zhu, et al., 2015), other behavioural and imaging studies have found results to the contrary (Zhu, et 
al., 2016; Gaertner, et al., 2012). One possibility is that the relational ‘selves’ examined in these 
studies require further subdivision; thus a recent imaging study by Zhu et al (2016) suggests that for 
their subjects, the individual self is motivationally equivalent to mother and father, all of which take 
priority over friends, which take priority over strangers. 
But it may also be that the inconsistency of findings reflects a more fundamental problem: Chinese 
society is both heterogeneous and in the process of rapid change. As section 2.2 below will show, 
there are reasons to believe that concepts of self and personhood may be central to these changes. 
Indeed, many of the neuroimaging studies have used university students as subjects, and as later 
chapters will suggest, this may be precisely the segment of the population in which the relational 
ethic is weakest. Similarly, while anthropological studies of Chinese personhood have varied in their 
conclusions, this may reflect the heterogeneity of Chinese society and the changes it is undergoing, 
rather than vitiating the notion that relational personhood was at least the departure point from 
which these changes have evolved. Thus in both psychological and social terms, we can understand 
the relational individual as playing a key role in the relational ethic. 
2.1.7 The system as a totality 
In summary, the relational ethic can be defined as a moral system in which the object of all 
obligations is other individuals, and the content of these obligations derives from the particularities 
of one’s relationship with each individual—specifically, from the history of exchange in the 
relationship, which must combine both material and affective exchange; in which obligations exhibit 
a degree of transitivity, allowing the expansion of relationships into complex networks; and in which 
compliance is ensured through a form of reputation (‘face’) based both on one’s past fulfilment of 
obligations, and on one’s access to the resources necessary to fulfil obligations, and which is, to a 
degree, ‘vicarious’, reflecting the behaviour and status of one’s associates, as well as oneself. 
Corresponding to this moral system is a concept of self and individual in which one’s interpersonal 
relationships take precedence both motivationally and in characterisations of identity. 
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While a substantial literature exists on each of the principal components of this system, the 
characterisation given here differs from existing literature in some important respects. Firstly, it 
rejects the predominant approach of transforming ordinary language Chinese words such as guanxi, 
mianzi, renqing and bao into theoretical terms suitable for precise sociological description. Not only 
do these terms vary substantially in their use across space and time; their uses in the flow of life are 
principally pragmatic and normative, not theoretical or precisely descriptive. They pertain, as it were, 
to the maze-like, ancient centre of Wittgenstein’s (1986, p. 8) ‘city’ of language, not to its peripheral 
grid-like suburbs. Thus the approach taken here is to posit the relational ethic using etic vocabulary 
wherever possible, eschewing the difficulties of much of the existing literature (Stanford, 2010). 
Secondly, by virtue of stepping away from an attempt at rendering the system using ordinary 
language Chinese vocabulary, it is possible to provide a novel conceptual clarity, particularly about 
the transitivity of obligation, which is implicit in much of the existing literature, but not generally 
made explicit in these terms. Similarly, the vicarious nature of face has been noted by Hinze (2005), 
but the relational ethic as described here puts forward a more explicit characterisation of its 
implications. 
Finally, this etic approach allows the various components of the relational ethic to be combined into 
a system which is both self-replicating and self-reinforcing. For individuals, the relational matrix in 
which one is immersed is often experienced as both a blessing and a curse. Because one’s 
relationship network is one’s greatest resource, a denser network with more connections to well-
resourced others is to be desired. However, each additional relationship also represents additional 
obligations, thus creating more pressure to fulfil them. It is no surprise that people often describe 
their relationship network as feeling like a ‘cage’ which constrains them. Indeed, should one wish to 
escape from some part of the exchange network, one is faced with the difficulty that to renege on 
one’s obligations would be to be deprived of the social resources necessary to survive. Even to 
‘waste’ resources on another sort of ethical commitment might be viewed as suspect. The relational 
ethic thus has a powerful, self-perpetuating dynamic. Even if every individual in the network wished 
for a different form of life, any one person acting individually will be sanctioned by all the others, lest 
they be sanctioned for their own failure to sanction. 
Individuals are initiated into the system through the transitivity of debt owed to their parents. Those 
outside the network are considered to be strangers, with whom it is not possible to have a moral 
relationship on ordinary terms. Formation of new relationships requires, if at all possible, the use of 
an intermediary, who, through a combination of the transitivity of obligations and the operation of 
face, can vouch for both individuals. If an intermediary cannot be found, then two strangers may 
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form a relationship on the basis of some shared past social group, which raises the probability that 
they do share exchange partners somewhere, so transitivity and face can operate as usual. 
The question remains, however, to what extent the idealised model presented in this section can be 
said to structure social life in China today—a question which bears heavily on the prospects of co-
operativism, itself a movement for moral and social change. Is the relational ethic still in force—and 
if so, can the networks it produces provide the foundation of trust and coordination in a co-
operative? Or are other, competing ethical systems beginning to take its place—and if so, what does 
this mean for the attempt to create a small, engineered ethical community in the form of a co-
operative? More fundamentally, what is happening to the fabric of Chinese society, and why? 
2.2 Individualisation and the relational ethic today 
Debate has long raged over both the nature and the trajectory of the patterns which make up what I 
have termed the ‘relational ethic’. Much of this has come under the heading of literature on 
guanxi—a Chinese term meaning ‘relationship’ or ‘connection’ (King, 1991; Yan, 1996; Hwang, 1987; 
Chan, 2006). Some have argued that the reliance on connections in contemporary China is typical of 
many socialist and post-socialist economies, where the experience of the shortage economy made 
connections necessary to circumvent queueing (Yang, 1994, p. 320; Gold, et al., 2002, p. 14). If this is 
the case, we might expect relationships to become less important now that shortages have been 
reduced (Fan, 2002). Others have pointed to the deeper historical and Confucian roots of this 
complex, as well as its continuing presence in overseas Chinese communities, which might suggest 
that it was not created by shortages, and will therefore not necessarily fade away as they do (King, 
1991; Kiong & Kee, 1998). Alternatively, it has been argued that the development of the rule of law 
and written contracts will make connections increasingly obsolete (Landa, 1983). Sociological 
evidence has given a mixed picture: On the one hand, reliance on connections seems, if anything, to 
have increased in the reform era, as marketisation has brought more competition for a limited pool 
of resources, such as university places and job opportunities in cities (Bian & Huang, 2009; Bian, et 
al., 2015). On the other hand, other studies have suggested that, at least in more economically 
developed regions, the importance of connections may be beginning to wane in favour of 
impersonal market or bureaucratic mechanisms (Guthrie, 1998; Hsiung, 2013) 
Alongside this debate over changes in the social structure, there is the question of what is happening 
to morality. Since the 19th century, the relational ethic has been seen by generations of modernisers 
as a ‘backward’ relic, holding back the development in China of modern institutions such as industry, 
science, and the rule of law (He, 2015, pp. 119-123). The Communists were no exception; a central 
motivation of the Cultural Revolution was to eliminate the relational ethic, and replace it with a new, 
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collectivistic morality (Madsen, 1984). When that attempt was given up, a vacuum was left in official 
moral discourse, which has been filled primarily with vague assertions that people should ‘serve the 
nation’, and more recently, with a smattering of hints at a revival of a Confucian moral foundation. 
Today, there is a growing chorus of moral panic—on the one hand, the notion, reinforced by 
infamous examples of bystanders in public places refusing to help strangers, that Chinese people 
have become increasingly selfish, or perhaps only care about their own network; on the other hand, 
the idea that even that network is breaking down, as young people begin to neglect their filial 
obligations and fail to visit elderly relatives. There is a strong sense in this discourse that whatever 
the moral foundation before may have been, society today is increasingly rudderless. 
Concomitantly, the question arises whether notions of the person or the individual are in a similar 
process of flux. Much ethnography has documented a rise in preoccupations with, and open 
discourse about, the pursuit of individual material, affective and sexual desires (Zhang, 2011; Yan, 
2003; Farrer, 2014), and has thus argued that we are witnessing the emergence of a self which is 
both ‘desiring’ (Rofel, 2007), in that it is conceived as a locus of individual wants, and ‘enterprising’ 
(Rose, 1992), in that, as neoliberal subjects, individuals in China increasingly see themselves as 
responsible for their own autonomous self-development in a competitive marketplace (Hoffman, 
2010; 2001; Hanser, 2001). Taking this reasoning further, Yan (2010) has argued that China has 
undergone a process of what Beck (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002) has called ‘individualisation’. First, 
he claims that the collectivism of the Mao period ‘disembedded’ individuals from the old 
personalistic networks, ‘re-embedding’ them within collectives; then, he argues that in the post-
socialist period, individuals were further ‘disembedded’ and thus transformed into new, 
individualised selves. Not only do these new individuals conceive of themselves and their own fates 
as self-determining, rather than determined by pre-existing relationships; they are also governed by 
a new ‘individualistic ethics of rights and self-development’ (Yan, 2011, p. 40), rather than the 
relational ethic, or indeed the collectivist ethic of the Mao period. 
But this argument is not uncontroversial. For a wealth of ethnographic evidence shows the 
continuing force of the relational ethic and its role in how individuals make sense of themselves, in 
particular with reference to familial relationships (Johnston, 2013; Hansen & Pang, 2010; Stafford, 
2015). Far from living in a moral vacuum, Chinese people from all walks of life continue to engage in 
constant and nuanced moral discourse, drawing on norms of the relational ethic, as well as other 
moral systems, to make sense of a still-unsettled normative world (Stafford, 2013; Pia, 2015, pp. 
192-221). Moreover, it would seem that many people, such as the migrant workers studied by Fang 
(2011), are capable of deploying different concepts of self and obligation depending on context—
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suggesting that ‘individualisation’, if it is taking place, is not only uneven, but hardly complete even 
at an individual level. 
Indeed, it is clear to most ethnographers attempting fieldwork in China today that personalistic 
networks have not lost their importance (Yang, 1994). Throughout my fieldwork, the networks of 
relationships I navigated displayed many of the classical patterns suggested by the relational ethic. 
Nevertheless, as in the case of Zhimin, my companion in the karaoke bar episode described at the 
beginning of this chapter, many, though certainly not all, of my informants experienced the 
strictures of those relationships as conflicting with, rather than coinciding with, their desires and 
conceptions of themselves. What I want to suggest, then, is that we should not be too quick to 
assume that a more individualised sense of self necessarily implies a decline in the relational ethic. 
Instead, interactions may still be structured by that ethic, even if this engenders a deep discomfort 
for some individuals who may decreasingly understand themselves in relational terms. What follows 
will illustrate this point by way of two examples: notions of ‘safety’, and banqueting practices. 
2.2.1 Autonomy, ‘safety’, and control 
When I returned to Haibian in the autumn of 2011, I met to discuss my plans with Zhang Yongyuan, 
director of the Co-operative Institute. At our first meeting, I was impatient to find out everything he 
knew about industrial co-operatives. I hoped that through the Institute’s contacts, I would be able to 
meet leaders of a few such co-operatives, and explore the possibility of conducting long term 
fieldwork with them. Zhang should have been, in many ways, a perfect person to consult. He was an 
expert on Japanese co-operatives, having spent several years in Japan studying them; had written 
papers and a book on the 2007 PSC law; and was intimately involved with co-operative activities on 
a daily basis. However, in this first meeting in his office in Haibian, he was circumspect. 
“It’s better you study agricultural co-operatives. There are very few shareholding co-operatives left, 
and very few industrial co-operatives. Besides, here in Haibian we have lots of agricultural co-
operatives. It’s not a good idea for you to go elsewhere—we have to take into account your personal 
safety [geren anquan]. You will live here at the Institute; we will give you a room, and we will take 
you out to visit the co-operatives so you can do a survey. Long-term fieldwork, living in the 
countryside? That isn’t a good idea—it’s not safe [bu anquan]. If you’re interested in going further 
afield than Haibian, you can accompany me on some of my personal visits. This will be the best way 
for you.” 
With limited field experience in China at the time, I was initially perplexed by Zhang’s response. 
What did he mean when he said that the co-operatives I was looking for were ‘very few’ (hen shao)? 
Was this a polite way of telling me, point blank, that they had entirely disappeared? Or did he simply 
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have his own agenda, preferring that I remain attached to the Institute and not venture further 
afield to do my own research? If the latter, what was the agenda—to keep me there to do work and 
attract useful contacts, or perhaps to avoid landing the Institute in trouble if my ‘personal safety’ 
came under threat during fieldwork?  
It quickly became apparent that, whatever the motivation, Zhang had made a clear assumption that I 
would be straightforwardly absorbed into, and subordinate to, the Institute as danwei (work unit). I 
was happy to do what I could to return the favour of helping with research, and I gladly agreed to 
give a series of lectures, and to be based in the Institute for at least a period of several months. But I 
worried that if I did not challenge Zhang’s assumptions about how I would join his hierarchy, then I 
would be sucked into the Institute and unable to conduct my field study. I therefore suggested that I 
preferred to find my own flat, in Haibian city centre, rather than living in the Institute. Zhang was 
taken aback: ‘No. There’s no need to do that, and besides, it’s a bad idea. After all, you’re a foreigner 
here, and being on your own is not safe. Don’t worry, you’re not troubling us! You will live in the 
Institute.’ 
While I felt I had no choice but to agree tentatively to Zhang’s suggestions, as soon as the meeting 
was over I began to plan to escape the gravitational pull of the danwei. I quickly made arrangements 
to find my own apartment, and to make contacts with researchers at another university in Haibian, 
to make clear that I was not wholly dependent on Zhang for contacts. Although I had only just 
arrived, I already began to feel suffocated—this was, perhaps, the experience of a clash between my 
Anglo-Saxon notions of personal space and autonomy on the one hand, and the automatic 
assumption on Zhang’s part that my life would be, and must be, absorbed into the existing social 
network, on the other. Indeed, when I presented my living arrangements to Zhang and his 
colleagues as a fait accompli, they were again taken aback. One of Zhang’s subordinates took me 
aside later, and explained that no one understood why I had done this. ‘It’s probably a cultural 
difference’, he said. ‘In your country, you are used to doing everything by yourselves, you’re very 
independent. Maybe you don’t feel comfortable, but for us it is normal that we should arrange all 
this for you. We want to make sure you are safe.’ 
This talk of ‘safety’, I would later come to realise, is a common feature of life in China. As in many 
other societies, it is common to express concerns about safety when a friend or relative is setting off 
on a journey, or when a child lives apart from his or her parents. In part, it is then likely that ‘safety’ 
talk is often simply a way of expressing care for someone. But talk of safety goes beyond this; 
throughout my fieldwork, I found that when authority figures, like Zhang, disapproved of a course of 
action I wished to take, they often expressed this by claiming that it would not be ‘safe’. This was 
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particularly jarring because mainland China, on the whole, is an extraordinarily ‘safe’ place, in which 
one does not often encounter violence or overt criminality. Thus it always appeared unlikely to me 
that the prevalence of this form of speech was entirely explicable either by actual safety concerns or 
by expressions of care. 
Instead, the attempt by Zhang and his colleagues to look after my ‘safety’ appeared to have been 
both an attempt to demonstrate care and welcoming, and simultaneously an attempt to control my 
activities. If I were to be associated with the Institute, it was important that I be monitored and 
controlled, in case I should misbehave and cause negative repercussions for them. Moreover, I could 
be useful to them, so long as I was within the sphere of their control. Thus they had clear 
motivations to want to keep me under control, and this easily coincided with what it took to express 
care and concern for me as a visitor. 
But it is important not to overstate the case here: it is unlikely that this sort of dual-purpose 
expression of caring control is simply a matter of strategic calculation. For the default position within 
Chinese society is such that the individual must always be subsumed within a work unit. Many of my 
informants spoke as if every individual must naturally have one, and only one, work unit. I was 
frequently asked, when first meeting someone, what my work unit was. If I replied that I didn’t have 
one, or that I had two work units, one in Britain, one in China, these responses were met with 
perplexity, which was typically only resolved when I explained that my real work unit was my 
university in London. Moreover, the boundaries between life in the work unit and life outside are 
generally entirely permeable and unclear. As Pengyi, a young informant I met later in my research, 
said of his civil service job, 
“My mobile phone must always be on, and I often receive calls from my boss late at night, or on 
weekends, telling me to come into work or carry out some task for him. In the past, when I worked 
for [a foreign IT company], it was different—your time was your time. But it’s not like that in 
government jobs.” 
This sense of an assumed overriding duty to the work unit owes a great deal to the legacy of 
socialism. The socialist danwei was an integral community, providing living quarters, food, social 
services, but also functioning as the principal urban unit of social organisation and administration 
(Whyte & Parish, 1984; Walder, 1986). Membership of a danwei meant entering into an exchange 
relationship, in which the danwei provided material benefits and services, in exchange for the loyalty 
of its workers (Walder, 1983). But it also meant subsumption into a community which, particularly in 
the context of rural-urban migration sparked by Mao-era industrialisation, provided a social identity 
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and sense of belonging (Li, 1993). The boundaries of ‘private’ life were deliberately blurred; not only 
did workers eat and live communally, in spaces in which domestic and public activities frequently 
bled into each other (Bjorklund, 1986), but the danwei was also involved in decisions of marriage 
and family planning. In part, these communities were developed with the aim of cultivating a 
collectivistic sense of obligation to the work unit and, by extension, to society as a whole, following 
early Soviet housing concepts. But far from being simply a centrally dictated form of housing, they 
evolved to meet the social and emotional needs of their members (Bray, 2005). 
In the early reform era, the danwei system was abandoned in favour of residential communities 
divorced from workplaces (Hurst, 2009). It has been phased out unevenly, and danwei membership 
continued to structure patterns of interaction well into the reform period (Ruan, 1993). Many 
organisations, including corporations, have continued practices such as providing workers with basic 
necessities, as well as a pervasive discourse of enterprise as jia, or family, mirroring the danwei 
system (Otis, 2007). Thus although the system as a totality has ended, the notion of employment 
relationship as multiplex exchange relation, in which the boundaries of personal and professional are 
blurred, has continued in important ways. 
However, it is worth questioning whether this conception is wholly attributable to socialism, or 
whether it may also owe something to a more general, and older, notion of the self as a socially 
embedded and determined entity. As Bray (2005) has argued, the danwei themselves were the 
inheritors of a prior legacy of urban residential communities, organised around Confucian principles, 
and this was reflected in their self-conscious inversion of the social hierarchies which had been 
expressed in the architecture of those communities. In both cases, the residential community 
mirrored village organisation, placing members within a network delineated from outsiders. But if 
the relational collectivism hypothesis outlined above is correct, then in spite of the socialist goal of 
cultivating allegiance to a collective, the effects of both types of communities may simply have been 
to cement membership of a circumscribed network of interpersonal relationships. This may help 
explain why workplaces have continued to assume so many of the roles of the danwei in an era 
when collectivist morality has been so thoroughly repudiated. Hoffman (2006), in a study of recent 
graduates considering career choices, notes a clear break with older discourse of loyalty to the work 
unit, and its replacement with a sense of autonomous self-development, albeit tempered by talk of 
furthering one’s career in part for the sake of serving the nation. Thus although the continuing 
notion that each person must belong to one danwei or another is a legacy of socialism, the notion of 
temporary subsumption in a network of interpersonal exchange relationships requires no such 
collectivist explanation.  
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This notion shows every sign of being deeply embedded. When I refused to take the Institute’s offer 
of accommodation, and insisted on spending time on my own research activities, uncoordinated by 
the Institute, the reactions of my colleagues there went beyond confusion, and often involved a 
sense of anxiety. How could I possibly decide where to live on my own, and decide what to do on my 
own? Surely, as I was part of the Institute, my life, including my ‘personal’ life, must be interwoven 
with the existing network of people and their activities. 
I experienced similarly anxious reactions from other informants who became friends in other parts 
of China. A language tutor who became a good friend after I lived with him for several months while 
studying Chinese used to express consternation and worry when I would say I felt like going for a 
walk, if he didn’t have time to accompany me. Whenever I tried to explain that I was perfectly happy 
to go alone, this only seemed to confuse him further. These reactions—confusion and anxiety when 
met with the desire to do things outside the social network—were common throughout my 
fieldwork, probably because of my own Anglo-Saxon tendency to want to do things ‘autonomously’ 
(Yum, 1988, p. 379). It does not seem unlikely, then, that Zhang’s reaction, and the discourse of 
‘safety’, stemmed not only from the legacy of a socialist concept of the work unit, but also from a 
deeper predisposition to assume that any person would want to be embedded in the social network, 
and that anything else would be worrying, and should be avoided as a matter of course. 
We might wonder, however, how this would tally with the argument that Chinese society is 
becoming increasingly ‘individualised’, laying greater emphasis on individual autonomy and the self 
as abstracted from relationships. A hint is found in Naftali’s (2010) study of parenting practices, and 
the novel, but now widespread, notion that parents should respect the ‘privacy’ of children, and 
correspondingly that they should be given their own bedroom. Paradoxically, she notes that this has 
been accompanied by an increased level of pressure on children to study and succeed to fulfil their 
filial obligations, a pressure exacerbated by the one-child policy. But grandmothers interviewed by 
Naftali explain their confinement at home as down to concerns of ‘safety’, because cities were more 
dangerous than they used to be. Given competitive pressures faced by contemporary children, and 
the continuing need parents feel to invest in their children and ensure they will reciprocate when 
they reach old age (Naftali, 2014, pp. 118-121), it is hardly necessary to imagine a dangerous outside 
world as the justification for the hothousing of these children. 
This, then, bears on the role of ‘safety’ discourse. For if one starts with the basic assumption of a 
relational individual, then these concerns for safety can function simultaneously as a considerate 
expression of care and as a method of control, presumably without the need for much strategic 
thinking. In a similar example, Marshall (2003) argues that in the three Japanese worker co-
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operatives he studied, workers monitored each other for co-operative behaviour under the guise of 
‘helping’. For many of my Chinese informants, parents making decisions for their children did so as a 
way to ‘look after’ them, and indeed, I would suggest this extends to other sorts of relationships, too. 
Certainly for Zhang Yongyuan, and for many others I encountered, talk of ensuring my personal 
safety appeared not only to be a way of influencing behaviour through expressing care, but also a 
way of exerting control while not directly mentioning a conflict of interest or opinion. It does not 
seem impossible that for Naftali’s informants, too, safety discourse was a covert way of exerting 
control, to ensure the fulfilment of obligations. If that is the case, then one may wonder about the 
stability of this arrangement—a new right to privacy, which may encourage individual autonomy, 
coupled with the continuation of the old system of interpersonal obligations. Nevertheless, it seems 
clear that both forces are presently at work. 
This initial encounter, and the subsequent low-level power struggle I experienced in other 
institutional relationships, demonstrates a pattern which recurred throughout my fieldwork. The 
pattern tends to confirm the ideas outlined above—namely that the relational individual is still an 
informative model when considering experiences of Chinese sociality; that the default mode of 
organisation of life is through network embeddedness; and that it is impossible to account 
meaningfully for individual behaviour in abstraction from the network of social relationships, or 
indeed, as I will argue in subsequent chapters, to account for the behaviour of co-operatives in 
abstraction from the network of institutions supporting them. 
2.2.2 Relationship-building through banquets 
On my arrival in the NCF offices in Shanghai, I was greeted by Wang Wei, one of the directors. He 
immediately held up his mobile and showed me a text message from Robert, a foreigner at a high 
level in NCF Beijing, who was often mentioned reverentially, as someone who had attended 
banquets with Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao on multiple occasions. ‘You see this? Robert has asked me 
to help you. Therefore I will help you with whatever you want.’ 
That night, I was invited to a large banquet held by the Shanghai NCF, to which they had invited 
dozens of their friends, business partners, and political allies. The banquet was held in a large five 
star hotel, equipped with several enormous banquet halls. I was taken there by one of the NCF’s 
drivers, and arrived along with Wang and a group of his colleagues. Before entering the main 
banquet hall, we passed through a sort of vestibule, which was equipped with several large 
armchairs placed side-by-side. The purpose of this room was to take photos documenting the 
various guests of the banquet together, and some of the guests were already doing this. But Wang 
informed me we should wait here for a while, because he had heard that the mayor of Shanghai, 
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with whom he was acquainted, was also in the hotel, attending another banquet, and would come 
pay us a visit shortly. 
A few minutes later, the door opened, and the mayor entered. All eyes were immediately on him, 
and everyone rushed to shake his hand. Wang set about arranging the chairs for a photo, and the 
whole group gathered round, with the mayor in the centre. I was pushed toward him, introduced as 
a ‘foreign friend’ who knew Robert, and told to shake the mayor’s hand for the camera. He then 
swept out of the room, promising to visit again during the banquet itself. 
We filtered into the banquet hall—a vast space with high ceilings and one enormous round table 
filling the floor. I was taken to one of the honoured positions opposite the door, though on this 
occasion, the sheer size of the table and number of these places meant that there was none of the 
usual struggle over who would occupy this place. 
The seating arrangement at banquets follows a pattern known to all. The table must be round, and 
there is a common understanding that one’s position at the table reflects one’s rank in the hierarchy 
of those present, with the highest ranking individual seated directly opposite the door, and all others 
seated next to him in descending order of rank. According to several of my informants, the 
roundness of the table is important because it signifies harmony, as opposed to rectangular tables, 
which seem to suggest conflict and opposition between people. As Li Qiang, a young man in Haibian, 
expressed it, 
“Have you noticed that dinner tables in China are always round? Chinese people don’t like angles. 
They create distance between people. Round tables unite everyone, make this unity public, reduce 
the distance between people. They are a symbol of harmony. There is a hierarchy at the table, too—
and that is a way of making distance between people. But the table both makes order and makes 
people feel more comfortable—maybe you think that’s a paradox.” 
This principle was employed to send signals at many of the banquets I attended. There was a 
tendency, certainly at banquets held by government officials, to invite the driver, the secretary, or 
other low-level employees along, and to seat them at the lowest-status position at the table, nearest 
the door, where they often said little, but participated in eating and toasting. Consistent with the 
frequent use of family metaphors by Chinese companies and other organisations to describe 
themselves, this appears to be intended to demonstrate the inclusion of those employees, and the 
magnanimity of their bosses, while not only not masking, but actually emphasising, their hierarchical 
position. 
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Similarly, there is a ritual conflict which is often played out over who should sit in the most high 
status position. Although it is generally clear, particularly at official banquets, who is the ranking 
individual, there are many instances when he (and it is generally a ‘he’) will make a show of refusing 
to take his place, and instead insisting that another individual, perhaps distinguished by age, 
respected for some other reason, or being treated as an honoured guest, take the place. Often this 
will develop into a physical tussle between two to four individuals, ‘fighting’ to induce each other to 
take the most honoured position, or the ones next to it. Often finding myself in this position in the 
role of guest, I felt it necessary to resist even when being offered the second highest ranking spot, as 
to do otherwise would be to show disrespect for either the acknowledged hierarchy or the 
magnanimity of those at the top of it. 
This ritual occurred at most banquets, apart from two kinds: formal, large, high-level banquets like 
this one, in which there was a strong sense of a fixed hierarchy and seating positions, and the most 
informal banquets between friends who were fairly equal, and knew each other well. In the latter 
type, I would invariably be unceremoniously thrust into the ‘honoured’ position. It might be said, 
then, that the ritual occurred only in contexts where the social hierarchy was personal and known to 
all (not pertaining to remote officials, as at large banquets) but required some management. The 
ritual acknowledges the hierarchy as it is already known to everyone, but provides ranking 
individuals with a chance to demonstrate their respect and affection for those lower down the 
hierarchy. In that respect, it appears to play the same role as Li Qiang claimed for the roundness of 
the table: it makes a ritual claim of unity, or harmony, within the established hierarchy. 
On this occasion, I was sat between two men who were connected to the NCF, but not part of it 
themselves. One was an academic, a specialist in accounting; the other was the head of a large 
municipal rubbish collection company in Shanghai. Speaking with both of them made clear that the 
people assembled at the banquet were for the most part not affiliated directly to co-operativism, 
but instead constituted an important section of the broader social network in which the individuals 
involved in the Shanghai NCF were embedded. On the one hand, Wang and his colleagues had all 
worked for various Shanghai government organisations and companies closely connected to the 
municipal government; and on the other hand, the government’s close relationship with the local 
NCF made clear that it functioned to some extent as a kind of quango, as chapter 4 will make clear. 
More broadly, the network of material interdependencies which spanned the local Shanghai 
administration did not respect the boundaries of departments or organisations. The logic of the 
banquet was clear: for Wang to reward old friends and invest in relationships across his local 
network, much of which consisted of people who also benefited from the opportunity to invest in 
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their ties with each other. Though I had thought of my invitation as via the NCF as an organisation, it 
is perhaps better to understand it as having been by virtue of being known to Robert, who was 
known to Wang, thus placing me within the wider network being cultivated on that evening. 
Food and drink on this occasion were rather unlike the typical Chinese banquet. The size of the table 
meant that, contrary to the usual practice, it was arranged without a Lazy Susan, and we were 
instead served with courses by waiters. As usual, food was chosen according to its impressive 
appearance and obvious high price, but it was particularly delicate and expensive. While the size of 
the table prohibited many of the usual table-wide toasts, many toasts were made between two 
individuals at a time, and some others stood to do the rounds of toasts all round the table. 
At one dramatic moment, the mayor entered the banquet hall and began to make the rounds of 
toasts of every guest, moving clockwise round the table from the entrance. Again, I was introduced 
to him cursorily, and we drank a glass of baijiu together and shook hands. After he moved on, one of 
his aides appeared next to me and handed me a printout of the photo taken earlier of us shaking 
hands in the vestibule. The academic sitting next to me took one look at it and remarked with great 
gravity, ‘Whatever you do, do not lose that photo!’ I looked at him quizzically and asked what for. 
With a smirk, he replied, ‘This photo shows that you know the mayor of Shanghai. It could be very 
useful’. When I remembered stories of officials and their friends being released by traffic police after 
proving they knew important people, the meaning of this became clear. 
Of the many banquets I attended in China, this was the grandest. It shows key aspects of the 
relational ethic at work. The banquet was organised and paid for by Wang in order both to cultivate 
his interpersonal relationships, and to help his associates to cultivate their relations with each other. 
The network of people present reflected not artificial formalistic boundaries of impersonal 
organisations, but the real social landscape of material and political interdependency in the Shanghai 
administration. Moreover, the importance of the photo with the mayor points both to the 
importance of relationships as a social resource and to the notion of vicarious reputation. 
This grand banquet was unusual in several respects. A more usual example of a banquet is another I 
attended in Shanghai several months later, also organised by NCF staff. I had spent the morning with 
Bo, an NCF secretary who had taken me to interview members of several co-operatives of ‘sent-
down youth’. Typically, most meetings and official visits are followed by banquets, either at lunch or 
dinner. On this occasion, Bo invited me and two representatives of one of the co-operatives to have 
lunch, along with several other NCF staff who joined us. The lunch took place in a private room in a 
mid-range restaurant. Including the driver, the whole party consisted of eight people. 
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This time, Bo and I jostled to push each other into the honoured position opposite the door. I finally 
managed to secure the position next to him, on the grounds that it ranks second. The driver sat at 
the lowest-status position, just by the door, and said little during the lunch. Having taken our places, 
Bo asked us if we had any special dietary preferences, and then went to place the order for all. 
It is typical that at this point, having jostled for seats, there is often a lull, while others find their 
seats, and the party perhaps wait for any other guests who will arrive separately. During this lull, at 
less formal banquets, the person inviting the rest will often consult them on their tastes, and will 
then order for everyone, generally asking the waiter if the food will be ‘enough’ for everyone. At 
more formal banquets, ordering is done quietly, away from the table, so the food arrives without 
any of the guests observing the ordering process. 
At this lunch, Bo had ordered a range of ostentatious dishes, and had also ordered red wine, in 
honour of the foreign guest. Ms Qi, an NCF director who was sat next to me, explained with a 
mischievous smile, ‘We do not like red wine at all, but we know that you foreigners drink red wine, 
so we will all drink it’. Toasts then began as usual—this time requiring us to swallow whole wine 
glasses of red wine with each toast. 
Drinking at banquets tends to follow a stereotyped structure (Farquhar, 2002, p. 146). All drinking 
takes place in toasts, which is to say, synchronised completion of the contents of one’s glass. There 
are several kinds of toast. One is the toast involving the whole table. Typically, each person at the 
table is expected to make at least one of these during the course of the banquet, usually 
accompanied by a speech, which may be more or less elaborate, depending on the occasion. The 
speeches are generally full of emotive language, and they tend to become more emotional as the 
banquet wears on, and drunkenness increases. In addition to these general toasts, there are side 
toasts made dyadically: one may address a toast to a particular friend or acquaintance across the 
table. This sort of toast must not necessarily be given to everyone at the table in turn, because it 
may be used to signify especial recognition to particular others. Finally, there is a form of toasting in 
which one stands up, circles round the table and toasts each individual in turn, often followed by a 
waiter with a tray of drinks which he or she continually refills. 
Every toast presents the opportunity for an individual to invest in a particular interpersonal 
relationship. This is not only the case with dyadic toasting in which two individuals express their 
feelings for each other, but also with group toasting, which is always led by the individual who 
proposes the toast, and is typically directed either toward the individual who has sponsored the 
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banquet or toward some other honoured person. Toasting at any given banquet represents an often 
competitive crescendo of individual displays of affection and commitment. 
The role of alcohol here is complex. On the one hand, as drunkenness increases, both speeches and 
body language become more emotional, especially in business meetings. Attendees may wax 
increasingly lyrical about how deep and special their new friendship is, how touched they are to be 
invited, etc. At the same time, discussion of serious matters is often reserved until a sufficient level 
of drunkenness is reached by all, indicating that alcohol increases the potential for trust. In any case, 
for males at least, drinking in this ritualised way is not optional. Attempts to drink less, to 
surreptitiously pour out one’s alcohol, and so on, may be met with ‘punishments’ involving having to 
drink twice as much. Similarly, there is often pressure to smoke, particularly if the ranking male 
smokes. Non-smokers may be pressured into it: one student at a banquet I attended did not want to 
smoke, and the older bureaucrats who had called the banquet harassed him, saying ‘Are you not a 
man? Are you not Chinese?’ until he gave in. Participation in synchronised drinking and smoking is 
an essential part of the bonding process of banquets. 
Drinking to excess is often seen as positive. On this particular occasion, the whole party became 
extremely inebriated. After we had finished several bottles of red wine and moved on to baijiu, Ms 
Qi turned to me and asked me, ‘How drunk are you, on a scale of one to ten?’ When I replied that I 
was at around nine, she said, ‘Ah, you can drink more, then!’ We repeated this game throughout the 
banquet, until she finally said, ‘You can vomit, you know—it’s good to vomit! Then you can keep 
drinking even more!’ On more than one occasion, I was asked the day after a banquet whether I had 
vomited, but with a tone suggesting this was a sign of a really good occasion. 
Throughout all the drinking, speech-making, and conversation, there is a constant reaffirmation of 
both the supposed affective closeness of the participants in the banquet, and their hierarchical 
position with respect to each other. Thus one function of the banquet is, like many other affective 
displays, to signify that one is reaching across a hierarchical gap (Fried, 1953; Watson, 1987); for 
superiors, it is a chance to be magnanimous, and thus elicit an affective and material commitment 
from one’s subordinates, while for subordinates, it is an opportunity to show respect and deference 
to one’s superiors, while eliciting an affective commitment from them through interpersonal 
bonding. Participation in this ritual is mandatory for subordinates in workplaces and at meetings, 
and while some of my young informants have expressed privately to me their exhaustion at the 
excessive drinking, and how much they dislike banquets, there is no question of opting out. To opt 
out of the banquet would be to opt out of commitment to the vital relationships played out and 
reinforced there. 
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That day in Shanghai, I asked Ms Qi why she kept drinking, if she disliked red wine. She explained, 
‘Since I am a woman, maybe I don’t really have to drink the way men do. Traditionally, women don’t 
have to drink or smoke—they are seen as bad if they do so. But today society is changing, and it’s OK 
for women to drink. So, maybe I can drink a bit less than you men, but not to drink at all—that 
would not be appropriate. Of course, if I am invited to lunch, I should drink.’ 
Mason (2013), in a study of drinking and banqueting practices in public health institutions, describes 
a fascinating episode in which women, increasingly capable of forming their own professional 
networks, began to resist drinking and banqueting, only to fall back on these practices, although 
they found them deeply objectionable. She reports that while they argued that these practices and 
the networks they sustained should not be necessary, they ‘did not trust their colleagues to 
cooperate and they did not trust their leaders to promote them if they did not toast. Women did not 
even trust other women to carry out tasks in the complete absence of relationship-building’ (p. ibid. 
129). As Mason argues, these experiences, like those of my informants, tend to call into question the 
notion that individualisation has led to a ‘desiring subject’ (Rofel, 2007), who prioritises his or her 
own wishes over the advancement of relationships. Banqueting and drinking are typically 
involuntary and frequently experienced as unpleasant, but they remain all-pervasive, and necessary 
for career advancement and business, as well as for researchers. 
As we drank, the impressive dishes ordered by Bo continued to arrive. At one point, a large plate of 
duck’s tongues was laid on the table. One of the men asked me if I had ever tried them, and 
explained how to eat them: ‘You just put it in your mouth like this, and suck the bit of meat out. It 
doesn’t taste of very much, but that is how you do it.’ 
Ms Qi then leaned over to me and pointed at the plate of duck’s tongues. ‘You do realise, don’t you, 
that those are very, very expensive? And you know why they’re so expensive? Because every duck 
only has one tongue. Go on, try them.’ She finished with a knowing look. 
The choice of food is communicative. Part of being a good host, and showing hospitality to one’s 
invitees, is consulting them about their preferences, and if they are a guest from elsewhere, offering 
to treat them with local specialities, or to order dishes in accordance with food stereotypically 
associated with their region. More important is the choice of dishes according to price, and their 
visual presentation and impressiveness. The price of a dish is sometimes communicated directly, as 
in the case of the duck’s tongues. Generally, however, the approximate price is understood from the 
rarity of the ingredients or the visual appeal of the dish. Some of my informants privately opined 
that dishes like duck’s tongues, sea cucumber and bird’s nest had little flavour, but they would be 
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impressed if served these at a banquet, because of their price. In the same vein, one of the markers 
of a relatively expensive banquet is that rice or noodles, being cheap ‘fillers’, are not offered at the 
end, as they are at most banquets. And price notwithstanding, visual appeal is an important status 
marker. On several occasions, when I invited informants unacquainted with ‘foreign’ cuisine to 
restaurants serving such food, they commented on how disappointingly plain the appearance was 
(this comment was not made when I prepared foreign foods for the same individuals myself). Just as 
a high priority is assigned, when giving gifts, to the appearance of packaging, much importance is 
assigned to the visual appeal of foods served in banquets or bought for others in restaurant settings. 
Alongside with other indicators of value, it shows the level of commitment of the inviter to his 
relationships, and therefore implies a level of necessary reciprocation. 
Payment is typically made by the person who has invited the others to the banquet. Often, as on this 
occasion in Shanghai, he or she will leave the table quietly during the meal at some point to sort out 
payment without the others noticing. However, particularly when the banquet is less formal, there 
will often be a play-fight over who is allowed to pay the bill. Again, this may manifest itself in rather 
serious, insistent pushing, and it is often necessary to be physically as well as verbally assertive if one 
wishes to discharge one’s obligations to reciprocate for a past banquet or other favour done. 
These two banquets are only two cases of countless banquets I attended across China as I carried 
out my fieldwork. They show the relational ethic at work. For each banquet is an occasion for 
complex and multi-layered exchanges. If the foundational exchange of the banquet consists of the 
invitation by the individual who pays for it, the banquet itself provides a stage on which, principally 
through the vehicle of toasting, each individual can pay homage to other individuals in the room. 
The often deeply emotional content of toasts reflects the intertwining of affective and material 
exchange in the relational ethic. The importance of alcohol as a bonding mechanism further 
reinforces this. Moreover, bringing together multiple people around a round table gives guests the 
opportunity to build and strengthen relationships with each other, thus providing a backdrop for the 
transitivity of obligation and the vicarious nature of face to play themselves out. 
But the often involuntary nature of drinking and banqueting serves to illustrate a larger point: 
regardless of how individuals feel about these practices, they continue to structure social life. The 
relational ethic is a normative structure which governs action, regardless of the extent to which 
‘individualisation’ may have altered the self-concepts of those under its purview. 
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2.3 Conclusion 
The complex social geography of a banquet or karaoke evening reveals insights about the structure 
of Chinese society. For it is no coincidence that Wang’s banquet in Shanghai consisted of all those 
who constituted the core of his social network, rather than the NCF or another collective body, and 
Zheng’s karaoke evening in Gongshi involved his core local contacts, rather than any formal body 
associated with the factories we visited. For the real social landscape in the relational ethic is not 
one of corporate collectivities, but a network of interpersonal relationships, in which institutional 
labels are at best secondary. This personalistic structure has not been supplanted, either by the state 
or by the co-operative movement. 
Moreover, the force of the relational ethic at an interpersonal level remains clear. Indeed, as Yan 
(2010, p. 497) himself notes, even the migrants he claims are at the vanguard of individualisation 
continue to rely on personalistic networks governed by that ethic. While Yan claims the hallmark of 
individualisation here is that these networks must be actively constructed by migrants, rather than 
inherited, this hardly changes the nature of the relational ethic as the default mode of coordination, 
compliance with which is a necessary strategy for social life (Fang, 2011). 
This chapter has argued that the relational ethic is alive and well in the network of people and 
institutions studied in this project. It has used the example of banquets to illustrate one way in 
which that ethic structures interactions within the network; and it has argued that the notion of 
‘safety’, which I found so frustrating in the initial stages of my research, reflects the continuing force 
of a relational self and vicarious reputation. Although there can be little question that notions of 
selfhood and morality are in flux, the relational ethic is, then, still a central aspect of morality in 
China, and one with which co-operativism must contend. The question remains why this ethic has 
been so resilient. The following chapter will address this question, by way of an exploration of the 
role of the relational ethic in the history of labour co-operation in China. 
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3. Chinese co-operatives and theories of human co-operation 
The shifting moral landscape outlined in the previous chapter has clear implications not only for co-
operativism, but for economic activity and joint endeavour more broadly. For among the key 
functions of morality is the facilitation of co-operation, and the suppression of those behaviours 
which tend to undermine it (Tomasello & Vaish, 2013). The purpose of this chapter is to explicate the 
role of the relational ethic and other moral systems in the modern history of Chinese labour co-
operation and co-operativism, and in so doing, to propose an interpretation of that history in terms 
of recent broader theories of human co-operation. 
Explaining co-operation has long been one of the fundamental problems of social anthropology and 
of the wider social sciences (Diekmann & Lindenberg, 2001; Radcliffe-Brown, 1940). Anthropology 
has often suggested that co-operation is sustained through a variety of informal practices and 
relationships, including gift exchange, ritual, and kinship. In recent years, a growing interdisciplinary 
research programme has produced an increasingly precise and unified body of theory attempting to 
predict when and how such practices might support co-operation (Poteete, et al., 2010). It is 
therefore increasingly important for anthropological research to confront this body of predictions. 
An important form of co-operation is co-operation in labour; and industrial anthropology has 
examined ways in which capitalists or managers induce worker co-operation through labour regimes, 
or how workers in turn co-operate to resist management (Baba, 1986; Holzberg & Giovannini, 1981; 
Burawoy, 1979). Less attention has been devoted to labour in which workers are themselves 
collective owners of their enterprises, and must therefore find amongst themselves means of co-
operating (Vargas-Cetina, 2005; Nash & Hopkins, 1976). But because co-operation here cannot rely 
on external coercion, such a context provides an opportunity to evaluate the claims of co-operation 
research, which largely concerns how co-operation may emerge from the ‘bottom-up’. 
By way of providing a historical and theoretical framework within which to understand the case of 
the co-operatives, this chapter will proceed as follows. First, it will sketch the history of modes of 
labour co-operation in modern China, and their connection to the relational ethic and other moral 
systems, as well as to the history of the co-operative movement. The following section will then 
suggest an interpretation of this sketch in terms of wider research on co-operation, laying the 
groundwork for the chapters to come. 
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3.1 Labour co-operation in modern China: A historical sketch 
3.1.1 The pre-revolutionary period 
Although the phrase ‘relational ethic’ is my own, the tendencies grouped together under that 
heading have long been known and discussed in Chinese society. In pre-revolutionary modern China, 
notions of ‘face’ and particularistic morality were seen by many Westward-looking reformers as a 
formidable obstacle to modernisation and industry; it would have to be excised in favour of a 
Western-style universalistic morality, capable of supporting bureaucracy, the rule of law, and other 
‘modern’ forms of large-scale coordination (Lin, 1939; Xun, 1980 [1934]). 
But the relational ethic, far from being entirely antithetical to industry, did provide ways to support 
labour co-operation. Peasants relied on long-term labour exchange relationships with neighbours, 
kin, and friends to achieve tasks for which their own labour was insufficient—from housebuilding to 
harvesting (Fried, 1953, p. 117; Friedman, et al., 1991, p. 53; Potter & Potter, 1990, p. 60). But co-
operation was not limited to dyadic relationships; as chapter 2 argued, whole networks were formed 
from them, and these, too, could be mobilised for labour. Thus the ‘lineage villages’ of southern 
China made use of dense networks of interpersonal kinship-based obligations to coordinate large 
tasks such as irrigation and construction (Baker, 1979). In industry, personalistic networks 
channelled investment, information, and recruitment (Fried, 1953). Craft industries, such as 
papermaking in Sichuan and Shanxi (Eyferth, 2006; Harrison, 2006), and silk weaving in Hangzhou 
(Rofel, 1999, p. 53), relied on moral pressure attaching to relationships between neighbours and kin 
to ensure the diffusion of innovations and mutual assistance among producers; while early Chinese 
urban labour unions were built using pre-existing networks among workers who shared a native 
village (Warner & Zhu, 2000). In short, the relational ethic could organise labour and industry. 
In some cases, it was necessary to elicit co-operation from those with whom it was possible neither 
to engage in equal exchange nor to call on a shared network through which obligation could be 
transmitted—an acute problem in relationships between people occupying different levels of the 
social hierarchy. Fried (1953), in his study of an Anhui township, claims that landlords and tenants 
found themselves in this circumstance: landlords depended on tenants to report crop yields and to 
maintain fields; while tenants depended on landlords for help in times of scarcity. The difference in 
status and lack of kin ties meant that they could not engage in equal exchange, and they lacked a 
basis for obligation. In response, both employed tactics which they spoke of as cultivating ganqing—
a form of affection, resulting from gift-giving, leisure time spent together, and favours—which 
disposed the other party to want to help them, and may also have created a sense of obligation 
stemming from normative structures attached to the feeling itself (Abu-Lughod & Lutz, 1990; Lutz, 
Page 58 of 253 
 
1986; Lutz & White, 1986; Harré, 1986). Correspondingly, Chinese industry often took on a 
paternalistic character, in which managers provided subordinates with gifts and favours, and spoke 
of workplace relations using kin terms, in an attempt to create loyalty and motivate work (Warner & 
Zhu, 2000; Perry, 1997; Yeh, 1997; Chen & Farh, 2010). These affective patron-client relations 
demonstrate how co-operation could be made to work through the blending of material and 
affective exchange inherent to the relational ethic. 
Moreover, Chinese social practices included ways of sanctioning and excluding those who did not co-
operate. In the case of ganqing, Gallin (1966, p. 91) notes that village gossip rapidly spread news of 
those who refused to respond to affective overtures. More broadly, the complex of practices 
surrounding notions of ‘face’ not only supported co-operation in villages through the threat of 
ostracism (Yang, 1947; Hu, 1944), but also may have supported urban industrial partnerships 
between those who shared a reputation network which would dissuade misconduct (Huang, 1980; 
Landa, 1981; De Glopper, 1972, p. 314). Industrial recruitment, which often required hiring workers 
unknown to employers, relied on intermediaries who, in the context of vicarious reputation, were 
driven to recommend those they judged to be reliable, and to police their conduct thereafter (Fried, 
1953). 
3.1.2 Early Chinese co-operatives 
The Chinese co-operative movement began in earnest in the early 20th century (Yan & Chen, 2013). 
Co-operatives were promoted simultaneously by several competing factions. Under Mao’s 
leadership, the Communist Party encouraged the establishment of peasant co-operatives 
throughout the Party’s base areas, as a first step toward ‘higher’ forms of socialist organisation 
(Selden, 1971). Meanwhile, the KMT government promoted co-operatives in areas under its control, 
both as a means of developing agricultural production and to counter the attraction of the 
Communist movement. Both of these forces drew from and promoted the efforts of activists driven 
by a variety of intellectual currents which coalesced in what came to be known as the ‘Rural 
Reconstruction Movement’ (RRM). While RRM intellectuals differed in both their interpretations of 
Chinese society and its problems, they held a common view that the transformation of rural society 
was a necessary precondition of modernisation, and that co-operativism could play a key role in this. 
A further impetus toward co-operativism came from the arrival of foreign activists who established 
embryonic industrial co-operatives modelled on experiences abroad (Clegg & Cook, 2012). As a 
combined result of these activist endeavours and the organisational and financial support provided 
by both the CCP and the KMT, co-operatives mushroomed across the country. 
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By their own lights, these co-operatives met with mixed success (Thøgersen, 1998). Nevertheless, 
their experiences show the interrelations between obligation, reputation, and affect, and their role 
in supporting co-operation. In a village in Guangdong province (Potter & Potter, 1990, p. 60), local 
activists first organised ‘mutual aid groups’, along the lines of existing patterns of labour exchange: 
members were kin, friends, and neighbours; work was rewarded with a gift of a meal; and 
meticulous records were kept to ensure equitable exchange. These characteristics persisted when 
the groups became co-operatives. In a pioneering village in Hebei province (Friedman, et al., 1991), 
most early co-operatives collapsed because of distrust. The sole highly successful co-operative was 
small; comprised of friends, neighbours, and those they recommended; took pains to ensure 
equitable distribution; and had a leader with a paternalistic style, who worked to strengthen bonds 
between members. While activists were often motivated by collectivistic or universalistic ideals, 
these early co-operatives seem to have owed their success to personalistic practices. 
3.1.3 Co-operatives under socialism 
With the proclamation of the People’s Republic, the Communist Party declared that Chinese workers 
were now the ‘masters’, tasked with collective ownership and democratic control of the means of 
production (Warner & Zhu, 2000). Correspondingly, a new ethic would be promoted, in which work 
was carried out not for the sake of one’s favoured acquaintances, but for the good of the enterprise, 
the community, and society. In the years after 1949, reforms were carried out cautiously. As already 
noted, small-scale co-operatives and mutual aid groups were promoted throughout the countryside, 
with some success. Nationalised enterprises introduced worker congresses, and initially emulated 
the Soviet system of ‘one-man management’; but this was seen as insufficiently democratic, and 
various experiments in worker participation took place (Child, 1994, p. 62). Often, however, the 
enterprise Party committee tended to dominate. The new universalist ethic was threatened by 
nepotism and a drift toward a coercive management style borrowed from the Soviet Union (Sil, 
1997). 
As time wore on, some in the Party grew impatient with gradualism in the countryside, seeing small 
co-operatives as promoting only sectional interests, rather than instilling a socialist ethic. Their 
answer was to increase drastically the scale of co-operation (Fei, 1989, p. 228). The aforementioned 
Guangdong co-operatives were directed to agglomerate into co-operatives consisting of entire 
villages; work was to be monitored by a local bureaucracy, rather than through interpersonal 
relationships (Potter & Potter, 1990, p. 66). Villagers found this system to be unworkable; but it was 
soon replaced, at the beginning of the Great Leap Forward, when China’s peasantry were organised 
into enormous communes consisting of multiple villages and thousands or tens of thousands of 
members. In Guangdong, commune members rapidly lost trust in other members, suspecting unfair 
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distribution, and above all, that others would take advantage of their hard work by shirking; effort 
dropped to minimal levels, and people consumed excessive amounts of communal resources, 
resulting in famine conditions (Ibid., pp. 71-75). The formerly successful Hebei co-operative 
mentioned above was similarly integrated first into a village-level co-operative, then into a 
commune; as in Guangdong, enthusiasm deteriorated as distrust and fears of being taken advantage 
of led to endemic shirking (Friedman, et al., 1991, p. 227). Commune workers were exhorted to 
labour for the good of the collective, not for material incentives (Potter & Potter, 1990, p. 91). But 
across the countryside, a higher scale of socialisation had led to a breakdown in co-operation, rather 
than an increased social orientation (Yang, 1996, p. 55). 
In response to the catastrophic famine which resulted, the People’s Communes underwent 
important reforms beginning in 1961 (Yang, 1996, pp. 71-97). Spontaneous experiments in 
household contracting on the part of peasants, which prefigured the reforms of the 1980s, 
ultimately failed to win central political support. However, the leadership recognised the problem of 
excessive ‘egalitarianism’ in the communes, and production was reorganised around small 
production teams in which pay was once again linked tightly to labour—and which frequently relied 
on kinship ties and other interpersonal relations to sustain co-operation and facilitate mutual aid 
(Yang, 1996, p. 80; Oi, 1989, p. 131). By falling back on this hybrid of bureaucratic organisation and 
the relational ethic, agricultural production returned to sustainable levels in the years following the 
Great Leap Forward. 
Similar problems were faced by industry. Attempts to agglomerate craft industry workshops into 
large units repeatedly broke down because of mistrust (Eyferth, 2006), until in 1958 over 100,000 
small industrial co-operatives were declared ‘capitalist’, and either liquidated or merged into large 
state enterprises (Stettner & Oram, 1987, p. 53). Meanwhile, although workers in state enterprises 
were exhorted to work selflessly for the collective (Rofel, 1999, p. 133), experiments in industrial 
democracy continued to struggle (Child, 1994, p. 63). This was exacerbated by the Cultural 
Revolution, in which bands of militant youth were encouraged violently to combat middle-level Party 
leaders, and factory management was taken over by revolutionary committees which suspended 
worker assemblies and enterprise Party committees (Ibid., p. 63). Formal factory institutions and 
material incentives were now considered to lead down the capitalist road; these were abolished in 
favour of pay based only on seniority and factory politics through anarchic struggle meetings. With 
little link between pay and work, and no formal channels for grievances, a sense of unfairness grew, 
and productivity reached new lows (Walder, 1986, pp. 198-219). While the intention had been to 
induce co-operation through a purely moral motive, many workers instead learned a lifelong 
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orientation toward conflict (Rofel, 1999, p. 176). Meanwhile, interpersonal relationships were torn 
apart by struggle meetings and denunciations. Toward the end of the Cultural Revolution, many 
reflected that those who had best weathered the turbulence of recent times were not those who 
embraced universalistic Communist morality, but rather those who maintained a network of 
particularistic ties supported by gift and favour exchange, which supported them through famine 
and chaos (Walder, 1986, p. 211; Rofel, 1999, p. 133). 
The failures of this period gave birth to a sort of compromise between socialist institutions and the 
relational ethic. State enterprises, known as danwei, became significantly more paternalistic than 
their Soviet counterparts (Naughton, 1997), providing comprehensive social care, and rendering 
workers dependent on managers for everything from housing to matchmaking. Positions in many 
enterprises could be inherited by children of their current occupants, enabling managers to cultivate 
relationships with workers by helping them fulfil obligations to kin (Junghans, 2006). In this 
‘principled particularism’ (Walder, 1986), the socialist state relied on patron-client ties to motivate 
co-operation, and use of gift and favour exchange for the strategic development of interpersonal 
relationships became increasingly important to conduct business and secure resources in the 
shortage economy (Oi, 1985; Yang, 1989). After decades of increasingly extreme failures to 
introduce a universalistic ethic by fiat, Chinese socialism appeared to fall back on older methods of 
co-operation. 
3.1.4 The reform era 
The turn away from ideology and toward realpolitik became fully entrenched with the beginning of 
the reform era in 1978. Attempts immediately to create a new Communist man motivated by 
universalistic morality were abandoned in favour of practical experimentation with a vast range of 
new forms of economic organisation, coordinated by markets and indicative planning. This diversity 
has been matched by a variety of forms of labour co-operation. 
One set of new practices has come from foreign investors, who have brought their own ideas about 
how to motivate labour. Factories in China controlled by East Asian capitalists are often organised 
along quasi-militaristic, Taylorist lines (Chan, 2000, p. 45). Managers often claim that this 
authoritarian system of policing co-operation is necessary because socialist values have made 
mainlanders lazy and incapable of disciplined work (Lee, 1998, p. 126; Ngai, 2005, p. 79). By contrast, 
Western investors have attempted to introduce ‘human resource management’, in which workers 
are evaluated against explicit individual performance criteria, and ‘encouraged’ to take individual 
responsibility for improving production (Chan, 2000, p. 43). This has often had mixed success, 
meeting with resistance from Chinese managers unwilling to denigrate the reputations of 
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subordinates through criticism, or to introduce pay differentials which might damage interpersonal 
harmony (Björkman & Lu, 2000). Foreign investors have hybridised their management systems with 
existing practices: they may give workers household necessities and social services reminiscent of 
the danwei to cultivate loyalty (Otis, 2007; Smart & Smart, 1992); or recruit workers who share kin 
and native-place networks, obliging them to perform lest their misconduct reflect on co-workers 
(Ngai, 2005, p. 122). Thus modes of inducing co-operation found in different forms of capitalism 
have melded with others originating in and before Chinese socialism. 
State enterprises have undergone similar transformations. Over time, they have become market-
driven entities in which enterprise directors, rather than Party secretaries, hold sway; formally, 
workers exercise control through workers’ congresses, and receive material incentives including 
bonuses and profit-sharing (Child, 1994, p. 189; Chan, 2000, p. 39). Cut loose from subsidies and the 
plan, managers are now more dependent on the co-operation of workers; in the early years of 
reform, many gave excessive bonuses in an attempt to maintain workers’ loyalty (Walder, 1989). 
Attempts have been made in state enterprises, too, to introduce increasingly authoritarian labour 
regimes and tight links between pay and individual performance; but while these have transformed 
some industries (Sun, 2000; Zhao, 2006), managers may nevertheless continue to rely on 
paternalistic cultivation of loyalty and the manipulation of networks of obligations among workers to 
motivate labour (Hanser, 2007; Rofel, 1999, p. 121). Here again, then, there has been hybridisation. 
In the countryside, related processes are at work. Following the breakup of communes and their 
replacement with long-term leases of land to households, peasants have continued or escalated 
participation in village-wide networks of instrumental and affective exchange, facilitating labour 
exchange (Yan, 1996; Kipnis, 1997). They have also created new forms of large-scale co-operation. 
For the first two decades of reform, China’s unprecedented industrial growth was driven largely by 
Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) (Watson, et al., 1996). TVEs, unlike earlier commune 
enterprises, could be owned by individuals, partners, or local government; but legal property rights 
were only loosely related to de facto ownership—collective enterprises might be controlled by a 
clique of kin and friends (Chen, 1996; Young, 1995, p. 7), while private ones depended on patronage 
networks in local government (Young, 1995, p. 160). Thus the vicissitudes of local informal 
relationships influenced who benefited from and held sway over each TVE; where locals could 
influence and monitor managers, TVEs often operated as collective enterprises (Chen, 2000; Pei, 
1998). These personalistic ties also supported co-operation within TVEs; workers and managers were 
often bound by dense networks of obligation and affiliation extending beyond the enterprise and 
into the community, enabling trust and mutual aid (Chen, 2008, p. 73). Socialist exhortations to 
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serve the commune fell away; in one case, managers attempting these were rebuffed by workers 
who used the collectivist norm to point out that their TVE was run by a particularistic clique (Ruf, 
1998). Other TVEs attempted to introduce Taylorist production and formalistic management, but 
were forced to retrench toward paternalistic practices to bind workers into co-operative 
relationships (Chen, 2008). While large numbers of TVEs have now transitioned into other ownership 
forms, these complex patterns of co-operation in rural industry have continued in other forms. 
Thus in both urban and rural areas, the reform period has resulted in the development of a tangled 
mix of modes of co-operation. But within this, remnants of collectivistic ethics survive—not least in 
the organisations which are the focus of this thesis: the new co-operatives. 
3.1.5 The reform era co-operative movement 
In the early 1980s, when the reform era was still young, a generation of leftist thinkers interpreted 
the winds of change as blowing not in the direction of capitalism, but instead toward a new form of 
market socialism. Inspired by these developments, co-operativist activists who had worked in China 
before 1949 returned, and, in association with local colleagues, successfully lobbied the government 
to reactivate the dormant National Co-operative Federation (NCF). With state backing, they founded 
a series of ‘co-operative experimental zones’ around the country, establishing small-scale industrial 
co-operatives with the aim of demonstrating a successful model which would then spread around 
the country. However, in spite of some initial local successes, these experiments were not consonant 
with the eventual policy direction of the reform, and state support fell away. 
Undeterred, advocates of market socialism found renewed inspiration in a new idea, that the small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) which began to be privatised in the late 1980s might be 
turned instead into worker-owned firms, thus creating a variant of market socialism not dissimilar to 
the Yugoslav model. Beginning with local experiments in Shandong and Jiangsu, local governments 
sold collective enterprises to workers, creating a hybrid form known as a ‘shareholding co-operative’ 
(SHC) (Clegg, 1996). SHCs were never uniformly defined across the country; but while in practice, 
they embodied a wide range of structures, the paradigmatic form was an enterprise controlled, like 
a producer co-operative, on the principle of ‘one person, one vote’, but in which profits were 
distributed to shareholders differentially in proportion to the number of shares held, like a 
corporation. In this way, firms could be privatised, even when no external investors could be found, 
while continuing to uphold the notion that the means of production were, in the final analysis, in the 
hands of the workers (Young, 1995). 
As both SMEs and collectively held TVEs continued to be privatised en masse through the 1990s, the 
SHC became the predominant vehicle through which this was carried out (Garnaut, et al., 2005, p. 
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54). However, studies of SHCs found that while in some cases, their workers reported greater 
satisfaction and feelings of ownership, as well as higher levels of productivity, than in other sorts of 
enterprise (Dong, et al., 2002; Tseo, 1996; Tseo, et al., 2004), in other cases, worker ownership 
appeared to have little effect on the experience of the workers or the control and operation of the 
firm (Chiu, et al., 2007; Chiu, 2003; Chiu, et al., 2005). The clearest exception to this appears to have 
been the case of Shanghai, where some worker-shareholders used their power to defy the will of 
management, blocking reforms and even liquidating their own enterprises (Zeng, 2005; Oi, 2010, p. 
17). But in general, evidence suggests that formal property rights in the SHCs were not often 
enforced. 
For the co-operative movement which had been revived in the 1980s, the SHCs were initially treated 
with cautious optimism. However, as their problems became clearer, many within the movement 
became increasingly critical of their ambiguous hybrid form, and their imperfect realisation of 
worker ownership and control. Rather than continue to advocate SHCs, the movement began to 
focus increasingly on lobbying the state to legislate for and support co-operatives more strictly in 
line with international co-operative principles. At the same time, as chapter 4 will show, a shift 
occurred in the thinking of policymakers in Beijing, where a consensus developed that the SHCs were 
an inefficient form, which must be converted into private enterprises. Increasingly, SHCs had been 
treated as a strictly transitional vehicle; in many cases, authorities who intended to privatise a firm 
first gave money to its workers to allow them to buy shares, then immediately bought the shares 
back to sell to a private investor—a ritual demonstration that workers had definitively sold and 
received compensation for ‘their’ enterprise (Oi, 2010, p. 18). This process eventually played itself 
out on a national scale until the SHCs had all but vanished. 
Meanwhile, with issues of rural development again coming to the fore, a number of intellectuals 
both within and beyond the co-operative movement joined together under the banner of what they 
self-consciously called the ‘New Rural Reconstruction Movement’ (Day, 2008). For these intellectuals, 
as for their eponymous predecessors, co-operativism held out the promise not only of resolving 
pressing problems of rural sustainability and development, but also of providing an alternative to the 
presumption that the countryside must ultimately follow a uniform global pattern of neoliberal 
modernisation. Together with the existing co-operative movement, adherents of the new RRM 
began to experiment with the promotion of rural co-operatives, and worked to lobby the state for 
new legislative and policy support (Yan & Chen, 2013). 
These efforts paid off in 2007, with the passage of the Peasant Specialised Co-operative (PSC) law. 
This was the first time the international co-operative principles had been enshrined in Chinese law, 
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and its passage was to spark the beginning of the third wave of reform-era co-operatives. The PSCs 
are producer co-operatives, principally agricultural, which range in functions from marketing and 
joint purchase of inputs to the operation of value-added production units to process agricultural 
goods into secondary commodities. With the aid of foreign development agencies and the state, the 
NCF helped to propagate PSCs throughout the country, providing training, financing and other 
support. Today, there is a proliferation of PSCs and other forms of co-operative throughout the 
country (Xu & Wu, 2014). 
However, while the number of co-operatives is impressive, there has been heated debate among co-
operativists over not only how successful they are, but to what extent they conform to co-operative 
principles, or can even be considered ‘genuine’ (Zachernuk & Liu, 2014; Zhang, 2013). Indeed, as this 
thesis will argue, the experience of the PSCs has been as varied and problematic as that of the SHCs 
which came before them. Since the 1980s, the co-operative movement as a whole has been buffeted 
by the same forces of social change which have affected economic and interpersonal relationships in 
China as a whole. 
3.2 Explaining co-operation 
The history outlined above may have come as a surprise to those early Chinese reformers who 
believed that progress was to be had by instilling people with a spirit of self-sacrifice and social 
service. How are we to explain this? Why have the old personalistic practices survived—and 
seemingly imbued the reform era with greater economic success than attempts radically to supplant 
them? 
One approach to answering these questions is that of an increasingly important interdisciplinary 
programme of research on human co-operation (Poteete, et al., 2010; Henrich & Henrich, 2007). The 
disciplines that comprise this research—including anthropology, sociology, psychology, economics, 
and evolutionary biology—employ varying assumptions and methods. But they share the view that 
sustained co-operation is a problem, albeit one for which there are many possible solutions. 
Solutions may include social, psychological, or ecological mechanisms; and these may arise through 
conscious design or imitation, or through processes which may be described using evolutionary 
equations, whether genetic or cultural (Mesoudi, et al., 2006; Henrich, 2004; Boyd & Richerson, 
1985). The aim of this research is to provide an increasingly unified picture of how processes at each 
of these levels combine to give rise to co-operation in specific contexts. 
Although it is impossible to give an exhaustive account of this body of research here, it is helpful first 
to clarify what it is not. Modern cultural evolutionary theory is entirely distinct from older, 
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discredited notions of social evolutionism, including the idea of society as an evolving organism, and 
the notion that societies progress through a series of increasingly sophisticated stages (Stocking, 
1968). Instead, it draws on the insight that mathematical models developed in evolutionary biology 
can be used to study the diffusion of any kind of information within a system, given certain 
conditions—whether that information is transmitted genetically, culturally or otherwise (Nowak, 
2006). In recent decades, mathematical modelling in evolutionary theory has made clear that one of 
the fundamental driving forces in evolution is the need to overcome problems of co-operation—
where ‘co-operation’ can be defined in a narrow evolutionary sense as any trait or behaviour which 
evolves by virtue of the fact that it increases the fitness of another (West, et al., 2011). This has led 
to a flowering of ethological research aimed at testing the mathematical models by documenting the 
wide variety of mechanisms used by different species to overcome co-operation problems (West, et 
al., 2007). When combined with the insight that cultural transmission could give rise to evolutionary 
processes—indeed operating more quickly than genetic evolution, as well as interacting with it 
(Boyd & Richerson, 1985)—this research suggests that much human cultural variation may be 
attributable to the development of a range of specific mechanisms to support co-operation in 
different cultural and ecological contexts (Mesoudi, 2011). Like the ethologists, the task of 
anthropologists wishing to test these theories is to attempt to fit the theoretical models to cultural 
practices, and test their predictions (Henrich & Henrich, 2007). 
A second thing that co-operation research is not is wedded in any way to rational choice models of 
individual decision-making, which are used to study problems of co-operation in microeconomics. It 
is important to be clear about this distinction, because both evolutionary theory and research on the 
co-operation problems associated with common pool resource management (Poteete, et al., 2010) 
draw heavily on the mathematics of game theory, itself a key component of the rational choice 
model of the individual. But here, no assumptions are made about individual psychology; the 
‘strategies’ of evolutionary games are not typically conscious choices, but instead simply represent 
different traits or behaviours. Thus while the mathematics, and the framing of some problems, such 
as collective action and ‘free-riding’ problems, mirror those of microeconomics, the empirical 
instantiation of those structures is entirely different. Indeed, far from making a priori psychological 
assumptions, much co-operation research has been carried out by psychologists attempting to 
determine ways in which humans may be predisposed by genetic evolution to co-operate, and to 
adjust their co-operative behaviour depending on their social environment (Tomasello, 2009). What 
this approach can offer, then, is the possibility of insights based on a sensitive combination of 
theoretical models, cross-cultural psychology, and the anthropological study of social and cultural 
variation. 
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Indeed, co-operation research provides a tantalisingly simple way to account for the overall 
structure of the narrative given above of modern Chinese economic history. That is the idea of 
‘crowding out’ (Ostrom, 1990): Co-operation is often supported by myriad informal practices, 
developed over centuries or millennia, whose role in supporting co-operation may not be obvious to 
participants. When conscious attempts are made to introduce incentives to co-operate, they may 
ride roughshod over existing practices, and result in a suppression of co-operation. It might be 
suggested that the relational ethic thus supported co-operation; that attempts to replace it with a 
collectivist ethic simply ‘crowded out’ existing co-operation; and that the reform era has succeeded 
because personalistic practices have been reborn, and allowed to hybridise organically, rather than 
by fiat, with other practices. 
Whether or not there is any truth to this simplistic story, co-operation research makes many less 
grandiose, more detailed claims, which are relevant to the story of co-operation in China. The 
present study, far from taking these claims for granted, aims in part to evaluate them through 
empirical investigation. To that end, the remainder of this section will outline one way in which this 
body of theory might interpret the narrative given above. 
3.2.1 Personalistic co-operation 
One interpretation of the relational ethic is that it combines two mechanisms for supporting co-
operation: indirect reciprocity and affective bonds. With indirect reciprocity, people co-operate only 
with those who have established a reputation for co-operating; thus non-co-operation is sanctioned 
by exclusion, and information about the reliability of others is of paramount importance (Fu, et al., 
2008). Accordingly, much gossip and moral discourse in China is centred around fulfilment and non-
fulfilment of interpersonal obligations, and general terms exist—such as renqing—for evaluating this, 
irrespective of the particular content of the obligations (Silin, 1972; King, 1991). Maintaining a 
reputation for reliability is essential for continued social participation (Silin, 1976). This motive is 
complemented by affective bonds: through helping, time spent together in leisure, and so on, 
people come to like each other, and therefore to be disposed to help each other irrespective of 
sanctions (a capacity which may in turn, at the level of genetic evolution, have developed through 
reciprocity (Back & Flache, 2008; Mitani & Watts, 2001; Lebreton, et al., 2009)). Indirect reciprocity 
and affective bonds together predict multiplexity: people should consider each other more reliable if 
they are more embedded in more sorts of relationships with their associates, and therefore have 
more to lose, materially and affectively, from damage to their reputation. Thus unsurprisingly, 
labour and trade networks in China have tended to overlap with networks of gift and favour 
exchange, kinship, and friendship (Yan, 1996; Yang, 1994)—all providing ways both to signal and to 
evaluate reliability. The importance of this is illustrated by the failure of early attempts to 
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agglomerate successful groupings of neighbours, kin, and friends into co-operatives consisting of less 
mutually embedded individuals (Friedman, et al., 1991; Eyferth, 2006). 
On this view, accurate reputations depend on mutual monitoring in interpersonal interactions, 
which is therefore crucial to supporting co-operation. In such a circumstance, theory predicts that 
smaller co-operating groups—ideally, dyads or triads—will fare better, because it is easier for 
participants to evaluate to what extent each of their colleagues has contributed to the result 
(Diekmann & Lindenberg, 2001; Binmore, 1998). Thus pre-revolutionary labour exchange, like gift 
exchange, was based on a series of dyadic exchanges, accompanied by meticulous record-keeping to 
ensure adequate reciprocation (Fried, 1953, p. 117). It is easy to see how the success of early small 
co-operatives was quickly stifled by attempting to grow to larger scales, in which mutual suspicion 
became rife. 
A further implication of indirect reciprocity is that reputation itself—as the necessary condition of all 
interactions—becomes a valued resource (Dunbar, 2004). It is therefore unsurprising that an 
obligation to protect the reputation of one’s associates might develop. But in China, vicarious 
reputation might further enhance indirect reciprocity in several ways. People might be more likely to 
co-operate to avoid sanction by those whose reputations are affected by their behaviour; and if 
affective bonds are present, out of consideration for their well-being. Moreover, vicarious 
reputation may enable relationships to be established between strangers, if they can employ an 
intermediary known to both; for while a stranger is not embedded in one’s own social network, and 
is therefore suspect for invulnerability to reputational sanctions, an intermediary lacks this 
disadvantage, and can, with vicarious reputation, be held responsible for the actions of the stranger 
(Coleman, 1990). This is the pattern observed—and sometimes explicitly recognised—in the heavy 
dependence on chains of intermediaries for labour recruitment, finance, and trade (Blau, et al., 1991; 
Gold, et al., 2002). When an intermediary cannot be found, relations between strangers may be 
established if cues suggesting a likely shared social network—such as shared native-place or former 
workplace—are present (Jacobs, 1979), consistent with the notion that the threat of reputational 
sanctions confers reliability. Thus indirect reciprocity extends itself to wider networks. 
This interpretation also suggests ways in which large-scale labour organisation may be achieved. As 
with the notion of personalism, indirect reciprocity involves only interactions between individuals, 
not impersonal obligations to a collective. If groups of workers are to be organised to achieve a 
collective goal, this must be articulated through networks of interpersonal relationships. It is likely 
impractical for every worker to be considered individually obliged to every other worker to carry out 
their own part of the work; but this can be sidestepped if each of a group of workers is obliged to a 
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focal individual who reciprocates with payment—a leader. Thus agricultural labour exchanges, in 
which a group of peasants was often required to carry out a task, were organised not as amorphous 
collectives, but as dyadic exchanges between the recipient and each member of the group (Fried, 
1953, p. 117). Moreover, co-operation research suggests that with indirect reciprocity, there is a 
tendency to form stable, relatively closed networks of collaborators (Cook, et al., 2005; Hruschka & 
Henrich, 2006); and that counteracting this tendency, for example in combatting factionalism in an 
organisation, requires fusing these networks together. On this model, invocation of group identity is 
not an appeal to a communal obligation, but rather an evocation of a tightly interwoven social 
network. It is then possible to understand how industrial enterprises have overcome factionalism by 
promoting individual interactions in work and leisure; and to interpret their use of the metaphor of 
‘family’ for the organisation as an invocation of close relations between workers (Chen, 2008). This 
provides an explanation, too, of why so much has been said of the virtues of leaders capable of 
mending and strengthening relationships between workers (Friedman, et al., 1991); and why the 
sudden amalgamation of village co-operatives into immense communes failed to result in a 
straightforward scaling-up of co-operation to a new level of group identity. 
In sum, this interpretation of the relational ethic as a form of indirect reciprocity, combined with 
affective bonds and vicarious reputation, goes some way toward explaining both the successes and 
the limitations of these practices in supporting co-operation in China. 
3.2.2 Co-operation through impersonal obligation 
It is important to understand that the socialist state did not merely attempt to do away with the 
relational ethic; it also attempted to implant new co-operation mechanisms which would operate in 
a different way, independently of interpersonal relationships. When co-operation is framed not as a 
series of dyadic interactions, but rather as an impersonal obligation to follow a norm, co-operation 
research predicts that it must be sustained by one of a variety of possible enforcement mechanisms 
(West, et al., 2007). 
Enforcement through policing 
One such mechanism, known as ‘policing’, involves specialised individuals being tasked with 
monitoring, punishing, and rewarding the behaviour of others (El Mouden, et al., 2010). The need 
for networks of interpersonal exchange is therefore obviated. The commune system after the 1961 
reform, with its specialised bureaucracy responsible for monitoring and rewarding work, can be seen 
as an attempt to use policing in lieu of indirect reciprocity. Similarly, more recent attempts by state 
enterprises and foreign investors to introduce increasingly regimented production and individual 
performance incentives fit this mould. 
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However, policing is not without its problems. It depends on accurate monitoring carried out by 
functionaries who, unlike with indirect reciprocity, have no immediate personal stake in the 
performance of those they are monitoring. Determining who is responsible for errors in a complex 
labour process is difficult enough for participants, but may be impossible for external monitors 
(Rofel, 1999, p. 118). But poor monitoring implies that rewards and punishments will be imperfectly 
aligned with behaviour; and sociological and psychological research suggest that the resulting sense 
of unfairness may rapidly lead to a deterioration in co-operation (Cook, et al., 2005; Johnson & 
Johnson, 2001; Tomasello, 2009). 
These problems might be magnified when policing is grafted onto a social context in which the 
particularistic practices described above are entrenched. Existing networks of interpersonal 
obligation might result in collusion against or with monitors, as in the example of managers in 
foreign-owned firms refusing accurately to review the performance of their subordinates (Björkman 
& Lu, 2000). Moreover, if indirect reciprocity conditions people to harbour a general suspicion of 
strangers, then the opacity of centralised monitoring and sanctioning may exacerbate this, 
particularly if collusion with monitors is suspected. It is easy to see why the hopeful enthusiasm at 
the outset of the commune period may have rapidly deteriorated, as suspicions of shirking and 
unfair treatment spread (Friedman, et al., 1991). As some enterprises in the reform period 
demonstrate, with sufficiently draconian enforcement, policing alone can work; but it is often more 
practical for management to police key individuals, while relying on their interpersonal networks 
when they cannot be monitored (Ngai, 2005, p. 122). 
The ‘moral incentive’ 
A key plank of the Cultural Revolution was the attempt rapidly to advance toward communism 
through the replacement of material incentives with what has been called the ‘moral incentive’ of 
work for the common good (Guevara & Castro, 2009 [1965]). In the context of co-operation research, 
this might be interpreted as an attempt to create two new mechanisms to support co-operation. 
First, people were to be instilled with a new intrinsic motivation to work, by means of mass 
education campaigns. Second, especially with the temporary breakdown of formal institutions, 
punishment and reward for work would be administered not through formal monitoring and policing, 
but through moral pressure exerted by one’s peers (Potter & Potter, 1990, p. 91). 
This effort was plagued by problems. As already noted, even if people become disposed intrinsically 
to co-operate, there are reasons to think this may be rapidly eroded if there are suspicions of 
shirking. Moreover, enforcement of impersonal obligations by peers has its own problems; 
specifically, it carries the danger that some will shirk on the task of enforcement itself (Binmore, 
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1998). Nonetheless, the co-operation literature has suggested that in many contexts, this is a key 
way to support large-scale co-operation. It has been somewhat misleadingly labelled ‘strong 
reciprocity’: the tendency not only to co-operate, but to punish those who misbehave, including 
norm violators, even when one is not necessarily affected by the misbehaviour, and when punishing 
violators does not necessarily bring any direct benefit to oneself (Bowles & Gintis, 2011, p. 148). The 
conditions under which strong reciprocity holds appear to be highly sensitive to variables such as the 
perception that a norm is seen as legitimate and that others will punish violators, too; cross-cultural 
research suggests that in many contexts, specific social practices have developed to ensure these 
conditions are met (Poteete, et al., 2010, p. 255). But in the Cultural Revolution, ‘enforcement’ 
became, if anything, overzealous, in the form of waves of denunciations. Denunciation—perhaps 
enhanced by the lingering presence of vicarious reputation—became a means not to enforce co-
operation, but to assert one’s own innocence or correctness, by contrast with others. It is no 
surprise that, far from learning the ‘moral incentive’, workers became less co-operative than ever 
(Walder, 1986, pp. 198-219). 
In summary, in this interpretation of the story, co-operation in the pre-revolutionary period was 
supported by forms of indirect reciprocity and affective bonding, including vicarious reputation, 
which may have developed gradually over a long period of time. These forms were limited in size 
and scope; but attempts to replace them by fiat, first with policing and then with peer enforcement, 
succeeded only in suffocating existing sources of co-operation. The reform period, in which such top-
down reforms have been abandoned, has seen a combination of particularistic practices and a 
variety of enforcement mechanisms. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has given a brief sketch of the interdisciplinary research programme on human co-
operation. It has argued that this research provides insights not only into problems faced by co-
operatives worldwide, but also into the modern economic and social history of China, including its 
co-operative movement. 
Framing the relational ethic described in chapter 2 as a form of indirect reciprocity, it has argued 
that this ethic can successfully sustain co-operation, but only given certain conditions. When those 
conditions are weakened, co-operation breaks down. In addition to the problems of scale and 
anonymity, because this form of indirect reciprocity relies on sanctions within a long-term exchange 
network, its effectiveness depends on the degree to which individuals are dependent on the 
exchange network, and the likelihood that they will remain so—factors we might expect to be 
heavily affected by the forces of migration, urbanisation and marketisation currently rocking China. 
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Many other co-operation mechanisms are possible. While attempts to introduce a collectivist ethic 
met ultimately with failure, the reform era has seen a hybridisation of co-operation mechanisms—
the relational ethic combined with other means of organisation and coordination. The remainder of 
this thesis is, in part, an attempt to make sense of changes in morality and other mechanisms 
supporting co-operation in contemporary China. In examining the experience of the co-operative 
movement, the following chapters will draw on the theoretical vocabulary and models presented 
above. Equally, the chapters on moral change that follow those will frame their analysis in terms of 
the same theory. Thus what follows is both an attempt to understand contemporary China through 
the lens of co-operation research, and to test the strength of that research by applying it to the 
Chinese present. 
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4. The co-operative movement: Institutions and activists 
The Co-operative Institute, located on a sprawling university campus in a suburban area of the 
famously beautiful coastal city of Haibian, had the feeling, on most days, of an ordinary university 
department. But it frequently received visiting delegations of co-operativists, trainees, foreign 
academics, and activists, and when these visits took place, it was transformed into a bustling hive of 
activity. One such occasion fell on an autumn day, when several dozen managers of co-operatives 
from China’s poorer western regions arrived in Haibian for two days of training at the Institute. 
The delegates gathered on campus early in the morning for a group photo. They had arrived 
separately the night before, and stayed in a hotel on campus belonging to the university. Now they 
assembled in front of the Institute, smiling in their dark jackets and jumpers. Most of them had the 
dark, swarthy look which immediately signals long hours spent outdoors, and thus peasant status. 
They had come from several western regions—Xinjiang, Sichuan, and Qinghai—and greeted each 
other cheerily in clipped dialect, before adopting a serious expression for the group photo, joined 
also by the staff of the Institute. 
Zhang Yongyuan, director of the Institute, posed proudly in a central position for the photo, then 
shepherded the group into the Institute building. On the way through the foyer, several of the 
delegates noticed the photos hung prominently on the wall of famous co-operativists, foreign and 
Chinese—the Rochdale pioneers, Japanese co-operativists, and others, alongside portraits of Marx, 
Engels, Lenin and Mao. They pointed admiringly at the photos, and at plaques commemorating 
foreign visits to the Institute, and its status as a ‘cross-straits’ centre for interaction with 
counterparts in Taiwan. Zhang Yongyuan looked pleased that they were suitably impressed. 
He led them on into a large lecture theatre, where they sat, and he took centre stage at the front. 
There he introduced himself and the training session that would take place. 
“Our class today is called ‘The theory of rural co-operatives’. The first topic is the modernisation of 
the countryside. Why start with this? Because the development of co-operatives and the 
development of the countryside have a very important relationship. What is rural modernisation? 
You come from the countryside, you know the difference between urban and rural areas is still very 
big. If you go to many counties and towns, you sometimes won’t even find a hotel, or an inn. 
Everyone only wants to go to the city. Why? Because the city has a modernised environment, unlike 
the countryside. We want to improve our countryside’s development. So we should understand, what 
is rural modernisation?” 
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He went on to explain the official government line on rural modernisation: six points, summarised by 
twenty-four characters, from the development of rural production to improvements in hygiene. 
Quoting Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, he assumed the tone often taken by officials when quoting 
official Party policy—one suggesting a combination of indubitability and authority tinged with 
tedium. 
“To make the countryside develop, we need rural organisations. The Party department and the 
village committee are among these. But there’s also another extremely important set of 
organisations: Our rural economic organisations. That’s what we’re talking about today—rural co-
operatives. They are an economic organisation of the village. If rural areas have economic 
organisations, this may very well help the countryside to develop, to modernise. Without 
organisations, this is very difficult.” 
For an audience comprised of leaders of already existing rural co-operatives, this tour through 
general Party policy on the countryside was neither novel nor, it appeared, particularly interesting. 
While a few listened attentively, many made little pretence of being interested—checking their 
mobiles, staring into space, and even visibly falling asleep. Zhang Yongyuan appeared to take no 
notice of their reactions, continuing his monologue regardless. He went on to explain the benefits of 
co-operatives for rural development, mainly consisting in promoting the ability for peasants to invest 
in value-added production, access credit and insurance more easily, negotiate better prices for 
agricultural inputs, and other benefits of scaling up production beyond individual households. 
Zhang then turned to the question of what makes a modern co-operative successful. At this point, 
several audience members sat up and took interest. After all, this was the point of their visit. Having 
spent several years in Japan studying Japanese co-operatives, Zhang felt that they set an example 
which China should follow. He explained this with enthusiasm. 
“Let’s have a look at what the most modern co-operatives are like. The most modern co-operatives 
aren’t Chinese, they’re Japanese. What makes them modern? Their management is business-like 
(qiyehua de guanli). If we want to have a co-operative, it should be an enterprise, a modern 
enterprise. Production takes into account local conditions. The co-operative promotes standardised 
packaging and branding—that’s why all Japanese peasants have their own big brands. It adds 
value—instead of just apples, we can produce apple vinegar, dried apples, apple juice.” 
Thus throughout, his focus was not on the theory of co-operatives as compared to other kinds of 
organisations, but rather on the idea of organised, large-scale peasant production, as opposed to 
production at a household level only. The co-operative principles received little mention, except 
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when he outlined the Peasant Specialised Co-operative Law, and briefly mentioned the principle of 
‘democratic management’ enshrined in the law. 
“What is democratic management? It means that it’s not enough that one person decides everything. 
If someone disagrees, or even if everyone has the same opinion and the manager says no, everyone 
must discuss the options. This is democratic management.” 
Apart from this cursory mention, co-operativism as distinct from rural development in general went 
largely untreated. The talk did have an idealistic aspect; Zhang framed it in terms of the need for the 
peasantry, led by the Party, to develop the countryside for the good of the country. But the 
emphasis on co-operatives came not from co-operativism, but from their value as a means of 
promoting large-scale production and efficient consumption. 
The rest of the morning was taken up with this training, consisting mainly of general business and 
marketing advice, not specific to co-operatives: how to move up the value chain and develop 
secondary products; how to improve marketing and accounting. Zhang delivered the training in the 
style of one accustomed to giving lectures—mainly monologues, accompanied by a PowerPoint 
presentation, with little opportunity for questions or interaction. Throughout, much of the audience 
looked bored and distracted, evidently unaccustomed to paying attention to a lecture. 
In the afternoon, the delegates perked up. The training was over, and it was time for a scheduled 
visit to Haibian proper, where they would be able to take photos and buy souvenirs and gifts for 
acquaintances back home. Those who had slept in the lecture looked suddenly energised, and a few 
who disappeared during the training appeared now to join the rest of the delegates on a coach to 
Haibian. On the coach, they chatted and joked, comparing notes about what to expect from the 
famous local seafood, and swapping stories of other official visits. The coach deposited them on the 
seaside promenade, where they spent hours buying gifts and taking photos with and for each other, 
valuable signifiers of their relationships with each other. 
Back at the Institute in the evening, it was time for one of the most important parts of the day: the 
banquet. Delegates were taken in the coach to a restaurant, and the entire staff of the Institute 
were conscripted by Zhang Yongyuan to participate. On these occasions, he made clear to the staff 
that they were required to join, drink and take part, although some grumbled that this was a waste 
of time, and an onerous task they performed only because they had to. 
This banquet room contained five round tables, enough to accommodate the whole delegation. 
Zhang told the staff members where to sit, so each table had at least one or two staff, who would 
represent the Institute in the seating arrangement and make clear to delegates that they were 
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guests of the Institute and of Zhang personally. He emphasised that he had made a special effort to 
order western Chinese dishes suited to the tastes of delegates from those regions. 
As in any banquet, the delegates and staff progressed through many rounds of toasting, becoming 
increasingly inebriated. Toasts were accompanied by speeches in which delegates expressed 
gratitude to Zhang and the staff, joy at meeting each other, and belief that through efforts like these, 
they would help develop China’s western regions and bring better conditions to the peasantry. 
Conspicuous by its absence was any mention of co-operativism itself—the only mention was my own, 
when, suitably drunk, I made a speech, toasting the international co-operative movement and 
wishing for its success in China. This was met by warm approbation, but not echoed by the others. 
Toward the close of the evening, several delegates were sick, and one collapsed and had to be 
carried to the taxi by two others. In this and in other respects, it was a successful banquet. 
The following morning, training continued, though some delegates remained in bed, and others, 
visibly hungover, struggled to pay attention. In the afternoon, they left for the airport, and flew back 
to their respective provinces. It was unclear how much they had absorbed, or indeed attempted to 
absorb. But they were satisfied: They had made connections which each other, which might be 
useful back home; and they had been provided a paid visit to Haibian, where they had gathered 
further resources, in the form of gifts and photos, which would also be useful for them. As for Zhang, 
he had done his duty, and attempted to impart knowledge. But regardless of how much was taken in 
by his guests, he, too, had succeeded; for training days, documented by official photos, served to 
promote the Institute and its mission, and were vital to secure resources from the state. 
This story, repeated on occasions of other, similar events at the Institute, illustrates some of the 
tensions of the co-operative movement. Elements within the state, wishing to promote co-
operatives, make funds available to support institutions like the Institute, which, in turn, must make 
use of these funds to grow, and to continue to secure support. In exchange for participating in visits 
like this one, co-operative members and managers are willing to participate in training, but the 
nature of the exchange means their motives are understandably mixed. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the network of institutions and individuals which support 
and promote co-operatives. It will examine the experiences of activists, Chinese and foreign; of 
policymakers in Beijing; of organisations both within and ostensibly autonomous from the state; and 
of those working within these organisations. Through these experiences, it will argue that the 
movement is caught in a self-defeating position. On the one hand, it has successfully channelled 
resources allowing for the nominal registration of a large number of co-operatives. But on the other 
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hand, the provision of these resources often results in an erosion of adherence to co-operative 
principles. Thus the chapter concludes by arguing that, in line with predictions made by theories of 
co-operation, attempts by the movement to support co-operativism have resulted in a ‘crowding out’ 
of the moral motivation it seeks to promote. 
4.1 Activists in the co-operative movement 
As chapter 2 noted, recent years have seen a growing panic about supposed moral decay in Chinese 
society, in the form of both a weakening of personalistic obligations and a lack of concern for the 
welfare of strangers and society at large. The existence of idealistic activists within the co-operative 
movement both belies and confirms aspects of this picture. For while careerist motives—which may 
themselves be underpinned by personalistic obligations to family and friends—play an important 
role, there is a strain of universalistic idealism within the movement. But at the same time, this 
idealism is often frustrated by a social and institutional environment in which other motives are 
involved. This section will explore the experiences of co-operativist activists, both Chinese and 
foreign, and the role they play in shaping the movement as a whole. 
4.1.1 Chinese activists 
Activists supporting the co-operative movement work within a range of institutions, from academia 
and voluntary associations to NGOs and quangos with intimate links to the state. Some are drawn to 
the movement by their own personal convictions, while others come to it only tangentially through 
unrelated career choices. 
Xunyi was an example of the former. Now in his early middle age, Xunyi had devoted his career to 
working as a teacher and researcher within the co-operative movement. He was passionate about 
the idea of market socialism and promoting co-operative ideals. 
“A co-operative is not a company. It is a big family. Now, a family has brothers and sisters, father and 
mother. It has a leader. But the others can choose the leader. Because a co-operative is an open 
family, with democratic management. Democratic management means the others can also become 
leader. But becoming a leader should not be the goal. The point of a co-operative is for everyone to 
work together, to benefit together. This is what we call the ‘social economy’.” 
Xunyi’s apartment was packed with journals and magazines about co-operatives, collected from 
every corner of China and from abroad. He was devoted to his wife and young daughter, but 
passionate, too, about his ideals, devoting much of his spare time to reading literature. We shared 
impassioned conversations on co-operativism over lunches, and when he would invite me round to 
his flat, and we would talk late into the night. 
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“In a co-operative, some peasants want to co-operate. But others do not. Why? Because they aren’t 
familiar with co-operatives, or what they are. But of course, these peasants would derive many 
benefits from entering a co-operative. So you show them, and they start to want to join a co-
operative, to participate in co-operative meetings. So our task is to educate them on knowledge 
about co-operatives. This can have great benefits for China’s social development, economic 
development—and even its political development.” 
But although Xunyi’s idealism drove him to work hard, he was frustrated by the institution in which 
he worked, and the sense that his colleagues did not share his ideals. Instead, they appeared 
motivated by a careerism which sometimes made it difficult for Xunyi to speak his mind. His 
response was to adopt a tactic of keeping his head down, continuing to educate himself, and hoping 
that through careful compromise, he could continue to advance his ideals in the long run. 
“Not everyone sees things the way we do. Some people only talk about co-operative principles, but 
their goal is just to become a leader, or to achieve personal success. We must educate these people, 
too. But it is a gradual process.” 
A similar picture is given by Li Qiang, a young researcher who felt a sense of moral conflict in his 
work. Unlike Xunyi, Li Qiang was not originally driven by co-operative ideals. Instead, he simply 
sought work as a researcher, and found employment in an organisation conducting co-operativist 
work. However, once he arrived, he developed an interest in co-operativism for its own sake. 
“At first, when I arrived here, I thought, ‘This is just another job’. Of course, I wanted to do good 
research work. But I didn’t really know about co-operatives. What is a co-operative? Why should we 
care about them? I thought they were just another aspect of agricultural development. But I found 
out that they are really interesting. In theory, a co-operative should be a new kind of organisation, 
which could maybe change our culture here in China. If the people learn to help each other, to help 
themselves, I think this could be a very good thing.” 
This newfound interest in co-operativism, however, conflicted with the motives his colleagues. Like 
Xunyi, Li Qiang worked for an organisation which claimed to promote co-operative ideals, but, he 
felt, took little interest in the ideals themselves, instead using its position to amass resources and 
influence. He responded by burying himself in his own studies, and began to read widely, including 
obscure literature on the history of the British co-operative movement. 
“It is very frustrating. Many people in my office do not really care about these ideas. They say they 
care, but really, they do not mean it. For them, it is just another job—it doesn’t matter if this co-
operative really has democratic management, or that co-operative is really a co-operative. You see it 
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also when you meet the leaders of the co-operatives. They speak very beautifully about their 
principles, but in fact, they run their co-operatives like a company. They are the boss. But many of the 
people I work with don’t really care. So, I started to spend a lot of time with my books. I’ve ordered 
some relatively obscure books in English on the 19th century co-operative movement, and I’m thinking 
of translating them into Chinese. Of course, I don’t tell my boss or my colleagues. But in this way, 
even if I do not believe in the work I do in my job, I can know that I have made a real contribution.” 
This was echoed by Yu, one of Li Qiang’s colleagues, who approached her work with a different 
attitude. A young researcher, Yu, too, had come to the organisation with no interest in co-operatives. 
But unlike Li Qiang, her work did not inspire her to look into co-operative values. Instead, it was 
simply a research position, which she needed to further her career. Nevertheless, she, too, felt 
aggrieved by the apparent conflict between the organisation’s values and how it was run. 
“This is just the way things are done in China. What is our job? To help co-operatives. We receive 
funds to support them, to grow our own organisation. The important thing is to keep those funds 
coming. Of course, there are some problems. You might say that many of the co-operatives are not 
really co-operatives. Still, we must support them. And for me, it is not my job to speak out about 
these  problems. As a researcher, this kind of practice does not satisfy me. But I must work in this 
way.” 
On the other hand, there are many activists who feel little conflict, and instead see the movement as 
a way to achieve other goals. To them, the notion of striving for consistency between their actions 
and the principles they espouse is less important. The point of their involvement in the movement is 
that it facilitates other personal goals, such as career advancement, or that it simply forms a natural 
extension of the amorphous body of state and parastatal institutions which provide the general 
ambit within which public service takes place. One such activist was Liang, a middle-aged former civil 
servant who worked at an organisation promoting co-operatives in her city. 
“Democratic management is one of the co-operative principles, and we promote it. We promote all 
the principles. We explain them in our training. This is part of our government’s policy… You asked 
me about worker control in co-operatives. Do you think the members should have the power to elect 
their leaders, to sack them, to decide the future of the co-operative? Such a thing is, of course, 
impossible in China. Maybe in your country, you have this kind of practice. But in China, the members 
and leader cannot be equal. The leader must decide. Even if it were possible, it would not work. The 
members do not have the capacity to make important decisions. This kind of idea is not realistic.” 
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How are we to interpret this apparent lack of concern with consistency, not only between the 
actions of this activist and her beliefs, but even between the beliefs she claims to hold? It is 
important to note that this attitude is widespread not only amongst co-operative activists, but in 
functionaries and officials more generally. Although it remains necessary and commonplace to 
reaffirm ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ in public and official settings, in private, those who 
make these statements often assert the contrary. An example of this is Yuan, a middle-aged Party 
member in Shandong, who brought up the topic of socialism privately, after we had left a banquet. 
“Of course China is no longer a socialist country. Today, we are a ‘state capitalist’ (guojia zibenzhuyi) 
country. You can’t say that openly, but everyone knows. In the Party, we study Marxism-Leninism. It 
has some useful aspects. But 99% of Party members do not believe in Communism. Communists are 
very good, very moral people. But today, it is almost impossible to meet a real Communist in China.” 
In accounting for these attitudes, it is tempting to draw a parallel with accounts of ‘duplicity’ in other 
socialist countries, such as those of some in Romania who compared society to a theatre, in which 
everyone knew they were only acting, but went on performing regardless (The King of Communism: 
The Pomp & Pageantry of Nicolae Ceausescu, 2002; Kligman, 1998; Reconstituirea, 1968). It is then 
possible to see the rhetorical shift from Maoist ideology to a deliberately vague and distant notion of 
socialism as simply a shift toward a new performance of pragmatism (Qiu, 2000). For some, this is 
merely one aspect of a larger Chinese transition to postmodernity, and the loss of concern with the 
truth claims of old ideological frameworks (Litzinger, 2002). 
But it is also possible that this phenomenon draws on deeper cultural roots. A line of argumentation 
originating with James Watson suggests that the historical unity of Chinese culture resulted from the 
concern of the state, over many generations, with orthopraxy, rather than orthodoxy (Watson, 
2007). While this hypothesis has been criticised for overstating the success of such efforts, the 
notion of orthopraxy as the priority of the historical Chinese state, and indeed as the continuing 
standard in many contemporary state practices, has found broad support (Abramson, 2007). More 
broadly, this conception tallies with anthropological arguments against the universality of the notion 
of belief itself, understood as a commitment to act and speak as if a given proposition were true 
(Needham, 1972). Indeed, if belief is understood in this way—not as a psychological construct, but 
as a normative commitment (McDowell, 1996)—then we may wonder whether the relational ethic 
can support belief at all; for that ethic does not, in itself, provide for commitments to action or 
speech outside the context of the function these perform within particular relationships. 
The thoughts of Xuan, a young neo-Buddhist in Guangxi, would seem to support this suggestion. 
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“Most people don’t know what Buddhism really is. Even if they say they are Buddhists, they don’t 
know; all those traditions were lost in the Cultural Revolution. I’m no different—I’m still learning 
what it means. I go to temples and pray sometimes, but like most people, it’s not that I believe in 
those gods. Most people just go for good luck, because it’s something you do when you have a 
problem—they don’t think about whether they believe or not. You know, in China we always say that 
words don’t mean anything, only actions do. If you want to know about someone, you must consider 
their actions, not their words… After I learned about Buddhism, I became a vegetarian. I’ve been 
vegetarian for several years now—it’s very important to me. Of course when I eat with others, I 
always eat meat. Being vegetarian doesn’t mean I should make problems for other people.” 
For Xuan, it was not that performing her relational duties took precedence over her commitment to 
vegetarianism; instead, she simply failed to see any conflict between the two. She was puzzled when 
I suggested that Western vegetarians would behave differently, and responded that this was ‘too 
extreme’. Likewise, her understanding of prayer and meditation centred around practices which 
were, and would remain, personal; she felt no impulse to make her ‘beliefs’ consistent with her 
practices, or even with each other. This would seem to suggest a pattern which extends beyond 
political speech alone. 
But we must be careful not to overstate the case. As Yuan’s reflections on ‘state capitalism’ show, 
people are often not only capable of holding beliefs, but fully aware of the contradiction between 
their beliefs and their own statements and actions. Moreover, from the Taiping Rebellion to the 
spread of Communism, countless Chinese people have been gripped by unbending commitments to 
whole systems of belief. It may be the case that the relational ethic in an idealised form does not 
support belief; but that is not, and has never been, the only moral system at work in Chinese society. 
Indeed, if we dismiss the rhetoric of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ as merely an empty 
performance, we negate the experience of countless people who have seen that rhetoric, and often 
the hypocrisy it engenders, as providing the moral resources to question capitalist modernisation. In 
some cases, the continued rhetorical valuation of socialism has served, for intellectuals and ordinary 
workers alike, as a means of criticising and resisting the state (Choi, 2011; Ruf, 1998). For others, the 
refusal of the rhetoric openly to endorse capitalism provides an opening for continuing debate over 
alternative visions of the social and economic future (Dirlik, 2014; Zhang, 2008). 
Among these alternative visions are those of many of the intellectuals behind the co-operative 
movement, mentioned in chapter 3. But as Yan and Chen (2013) note, those intellectuals are 
themselves divided between some who see the co-operative principles as paramount, and are 
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therefore deeply concerned about the proliferation of ‘fake’ co-operatives, and others who argue 
openly that the implementation of the principles is of little concern. Thus Liu (2010) suggests that 
although only a tiny minority of co-operatives are ‘genuine’, the ‘true-or-false debate is 
meaningless…In light of today’s realities, a loose environment rather than strict regulation is more 
important’. 
This divide between intellectuals is mirrored by the divide between the activists in the co-operative 
movement itself. For some, the co-operative principles are deeply held beliefs which must be taken 
seriously for their own sake; while for others, they may be a useful rhetorical device, but their 
implementation in practice is unimportant. As with political discourse more generally, this conflict 
suggests multiple moral systems at work. Those motivated by collectivistic or universalistic beliefs 
must contend with an environment in which the relational ethic continues to underpin an 
orthopraxic attitude toward the statement of principles, further reinforced by a deliberately vague 
and self-contradictory official discourse. For these idealists, functioning within networks dominated 
by this attitude frequently proves frustrating. 
4.1.2 Foreign activists 
As the history given in chapter 2 showed, foreign activists have long played a central role in the 
Chinese co-operative movement. They have been key proponents of the international co-operative 
principles in China, but they have also often functioned as intermediaries who could secure access to 
valuable resources from foreign organisations and individuals. However, like their Chinese 
counterparts, they have often struggled to implement their ideals, as they are faced with the 
difficulty not only of attempting to import foreign values and social structures, but also that of 
understanding the motives and views of their Chinese interlocutors, including those in the Chinese 
state. 
Robert was a sixty-something man at the heart of the movement. He had grown up in China, to 
Western Communist parents who had arrived before 1949, but stayed to aid the revolution. Their 
status as ‘foreign friends’, and the sacrifices they made willingly during the Cultural Revolution, gave 
them an honoured status in the Party and the state, and Robert inherited some of this honour, 
though he was destined always to be classed as a ‘foreigner’. This family history had allowed him to 
play a central role in the co-operative movement when it was revived in the 1980s, and he had the 
ear of important policymakers in Beijing, as well as those in many co-operativist institutions. Having 
come of age during the Cultural Revolution, he was a strong believer in socialist ideals, who 
lamented the general direction not only of China, but of the world, away from socialism. 
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“If you look back at the thirties and forties, there was tremendous international sympathy for China… 
You know, my dad was  a fundraiser in New York, and he went to the AFL-CIO and they raised money 
to bring to [the co-operative movement] in China. But right now, where’s the big—I don’t know. I 
personally am fascinated with Venezuela. I went there once many years ago, long before Chávez. But 
boy, I wonder what’s happening there. But that’s a personal thing. Do you think the experience in 
Venezuela—is there something we can learn from that? Do you see any successful models in the 
world today?” 
For Robert, the purpose of co-operatives was clear. Though he understood that many in the Chinese 
state saw them as merely vehicles for rural development or other policy objectives, he believed they 
offered the chance for real empowerment of ordinary people through democratic decision-making, 
and ultimately constituted an economic alternative to capitalism and the market economy. 
“People like us, we still think that genuine co-operatives are a good form of organisation and have 
many advantages… For me, the great thing is, when I look at a workers’ co-operative, what’s so 
wonderful about a co-operative is, it’s not a dichotomy between labour and capital. Labour is the 
capital, capital is the labour. That’s what really excites me.” 
But through years of working to promote co-operatives across China, Robert had learned that it was 
no easy task. Notions of democracy and the equality that goes with it were, he felt, alien to Chinese 
culture. And he and his colleagues were faced with the perennial problem of how to verify whether a 
co-operative was ‘really’ democratic, in a cultural context in which little value is placed on a 
consistency between words and actions. 
“What makes co-operatives succeed or fail in the Chinese context? It’s an interesting question, 
because that’s one of the things that, when I look at the ICA principles, they sound wonderful—well, 
you talk about democratic management and so on, but it assumes everyone is equal. But traditional 
Chinese values don’t believe in equality, really—they believe in a hierarchical structure. So what’s 
appropriate for China? Now the government is promoting co-operatives in the countryside, and 
they’re even giving money, and wherever you look in the world, whenever there is money to be had, 
there are always problems, because there are always people who want the money and who will say 
and tell lies and so on to get the money. So right now, if you look at the government statistics, there 
might be tens of thousands of cooperatives, but how genuine are they? Some are just bosses’ co-
operatives where they pretend to have lots of members, but really it’s not democratic, it’s not 
member owned, it’s owned by a few. So there are problems, but we’re pushing for genuine co-
operatives.” 
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Thus although he had unusually good access to networks of influential individuals, Robert was faced 
with enormous challenges in attempting to implement his ideals. Through his networks, he could 
mobilise resources to start and coordinate projects across China. But once those resources were 
deployed, there was an unavoidable degree of opacity about how they were actually used. Like his 
Chinese activist counterparts, Robert did his best to operate within a social and cultural context 
which seemed to make his work a Sisyphean task. 
Sam, another Westerner, was a different sort of activist. In his own country, he belonged to a small 
left-wing group which had long connections with China and co-operatives. He travelled frequently to 
China and spent a great deal of time there, representing his organisation and attempting to aid the 
Chinese projects they supported. Although he spoke little Chinese, and often struggled to 
understand his counterparts, he had a great love for the country. 
“In [my country]—I’m sure it’s the same where you live—there’s just no hope. We in the West think 
we’re so important, but we are really just the past now. That’s why I fell in love with China. Even if 
people say it’s capitalist, you have to admire what they’re doing here, lifting people out of poverty. 
And what we’ve been able to do, teaching people about co-operatives—I think there’s a real chance 
to develop a new social model here, one the rest of the world could learn from. And you know, the 
people here are something else. The women are beautiful. I just wish I could spend all my time here.” 
Being in China was, for Sam, a chance not only to fight for a cause he believed in, but an escape from 
a life back home, in which he felt his ideals were even more marginalised than they were here. 
However, he felt unsure whether he was doing much good, and he recognised the disadvantage he 
faced not only from his limited linguistic abilities, but from the opacity of the power structures 
around him. Speaking of Guo, a local friend and colleague, he explained: 
“I’ve known Guo for many years now. He works incredibly hard, even though there are so few 
resources, even when the government makes it hard for him. He’s come and stayed with me in [my 
country], and in many ways, I feel closer to him than to anyone back home. But he’s still a bit of a 
mystery to me. People here don’t always tell you what they think, and I don’t always have the feeling 
Guo is completely open about how our projects are going. I guess that’s just part of the mystique.” 
By contrast, Andrew had been in the country for many years, and spoke fluent Chinese. He felt 
integrated into Chinese society, with a Chinese wife and child, and had spent much of his career 
working on economic development projects around the country. When I met him in a provincial 
town in a southwestern province, he was in the office of a project which had left him bewildered. 
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“I’ve been here in this office for a year now, and I have to admit, I’ve been twiddling my thumbs. The 
local government put me in here, and I’ve tried over and over to get the work going, but they just 
keep delaying. Here, let me show you—this is the plan for the whole project. It’s an exciting project, 
an integrated centre for disseminating agricultural technology, for experimentation, training and 
production. Most of the funds came from the development agency in [my country]. The local 
government welcomed it. They want the technology, it’s really advanced stuff. I’m here because the 
idea came from the mayor of [a city in my country]. He’s a big believer in co-operatives. He didn’t just 
want to transfer the technology; he wanted to promote co-operatives as a new model for 
development in China. So they attached that condition to the aid money. This project is required to be 
based on co-operatives—training and production co-operatives inside the centre, which are supposed 
to help propagate more co-operatives among farmers in the whole province. My job is to oversee 
that part—the social element, I guess. But I haven’t been able to do anything. You can see they’ve 
already built half the facilities, they’ve started production and training. But every time I ask them 
when I can start on the co-operative side of things, there’s some new reason for a delay. They always 
say they agree that co-operatives are important, but I’m beginning to wonder if they’re interested in 
co-operatives here at all. Meanwhile the mayor back home isn’t in charge of the [foreign] side of 
things anymore, so the co-operatives might just be forgotten. It’s looking more and more like my 
time here has been wasted.” 
As these cases illustrate, foreign and Chinese activists face similar challenges. The distinctive status 
of these foreigners and their access to overseas resources puts them in a particularly difficult 
position; for they can rarely be certain whether their partners and interlocutors share their ideals, or 
are, instead, simply interested in gaining access to the resources they possess. However, this is a 
difference of degree, not of kind, from the idealistic Chinese activists with whom they work. Both 
groups are faced with similar problems, for they are attempting to engineer a moral and social 
change, in a social and political context in which such projects appear to be trumped by the 
imperatives of personal advancement and the priority placed by the state on economic growth 
above all else. 
4.2 Institutions of the movement 
Co-operativist activists work within a broad network of organisations which spans the country. These 
organisations serve as intermediaries between co-operatives and the state and various levels. They 
perform a range of functions, from lobbying and influencing policy to training and supporting co-
operative members. Far from constituting a strict hierarchy, the network is organised loosely and 
highly decentralised, with local organisations drawing support directly from regional or municipal 
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governments as well as foreign donors. At each level, the role these organisations have in 
channelling resources gives them great importance for the co-operatives. However, this section will 
argue that these resources may also be a curse, as they tend to encourage motives not entirely 
aligned with the ideals of co-operativism. It will proceed by examining examples of organisations 
carrying out the key functions of these institutions: lobbying, training and support. 
4.2.1 National Co-operative Federation 
At the centre of the network of co-operativist institutions is the National Co-operative Federation 
(NCF). The headquarters of NCF are located in a residential block in a suburban neighbourhood of 
Beijing, staffed by two secretaries, and decorated by dusty photos and plaques commemorating 
visits by friendly international sympathisers. The Beijing office lacks resources, and it does not 
function as a physical hub of activity. Its staff travel around the country providing assistance to co-
operatives and running programmes to monitor their performance. 
In Beijing itself, the influence of the NCF is derived from the individuals who sit on the board of 
directors, and the network of relationships in which those individuals are embedded. These include 
academics, activists, and politicians. Members of the board have sat on influential committees of the 
NPCC, or national assembly, including the committee which drafted the 2007 law on Peasant 
Specialised Co-operatives. Others have coordinated research programmes on co-operatives within 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The NCF board thus functions as an important nexus of 
policy formation, in which ideas are exchanged and fed through to the state. 
The principal function of the NCF with respect to the co-operative movement itself is as a national 
coordinator of various loosely affiliated branch offices, which themselves liaise directly with co-
operatives. In that capacity, the Beijing office organises occasional meetings between these 
branches, and acts as an intermediary between them and the central state. But each branch is highly 
autonomous in both funding and direction, and as a result, the power of the central organisation is 
relatively limited. 
A clear example of this autonomy is given by the Shanghai branch of NCF, which appears to be the 
most well-financed and professionalised part of the co-operative movement in China. Here, the NCF 
functions as an umbrella organisation for many types of co-operatives, which have accreted from a 
series of historical periods, and the NCF leadership are closely linked to the leaders of many of these 
co-operatives, and—as Shanghai is the only place in China where shareholding co-operatives 
remain—to the leadership of the Shareholding Co-operative Federation. 
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My first introduction to the Shanghai branch was through the banquet described at the beginning of 
the previous chapter. As that banquet showed, the NCF is tightly enmeshed with local government. 
All of the board of directors and staff rotate in and out of various Shanghai government bureaux. 
The Shanghai government has made NCF responsible for managing and organising a large number of 
organisations which happen to fall under the umbrella of co-operatives, but which play important 
parastatal roles such as providing social security and pensions to workers whose former work units 
have folded during the course of the reform. Thus while the Beijing NCF works largely through 
bottom-up efforts to build co-operativism and influence the state, and accordingly attracts idealistic 
activists who wish to change policies, the Shanghai NCF is less interested in promotion of co-
operativism for its own sake, and more interested in functioning as an effective steward of the public 
responsibilities which the Shanghai government has increasingly delegated to non-state institutions 
(Zhang, 2002). Xiao, a secretary of the Shanghai bureau, explained: 
“Shanghai NCF are responsible for all kinds of co-operatives. There are the co-operatives of the ‘sent-
down youth’, which were formed in the 1970s to give work to young people returning from the 
countryside. Today, they don’t produce anything, but they pay pensions to their members. We are 
responsible for them. There are the taxi co-operatives—these are very important for Shanghai’s 
transport system. Our government must support and regulate them, so we are responsible for them, 
too. We have a women’s handicraft co-operative, which the government created to give employment 
to women in vulnerable situations, widows, victims of abuse. As for the Peasant Specialised Co-
operatives, there are some in the countryside of Shanghai, but we are not really involved with them.” 
The autonomy of this NCF bureau from the national organisation mirrors the relative autonomy of 
the Shanghai government from the central state, and thus its ability to channel resources directly to 
the bureau (Li, 1997). NCF branches around the country operate more or less autonomously, 
deriving funding from a variety of sources, including various levels of government, as well as foreign 
agencies. Nowhere is the NCF so enmeshed with government as in Shanghai; and arguably, nowhere 
does it influence government so strongly as in Beijing. Between these two extremes exists a broad 
network of institutions within which activists, foreign donors, and state actors interact and 
sometimes conflict. 
4.2.2 Co-operative Institute 
One of those institutions is the Co-operative Institute. Founded in 2008, the Institute is officially a 
‘station’ of NCF, and has taken some support from NCF in Beijing, as well as from international 
donors. But while its founding was spurred on by the passage of the PSC law in 2007, it is run 
independently of NCF, and the NCF staff in Beijing are only vaguely aware of most of its activities. 
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The prime mover behind the Institute is its director, Zhang Yongyuan. Zhang lived ten years in Japan, 
where he completed his PhD on the Japanese co-operative movement. He proudly mentioned this 
experience—and his fluency in Japanese—frequently. For in spite of the general antipathy toward 
Japan, there is a clear understanding that Japan is more ‘advanced’ than China in many respects, and 
certainly in the case of co-operativism, is more developed. This also meant that Zhang was able to 
attract visits from Japanese organisations, some of which provided funding and all of which provided 
more status to the Institute. 
Similarly, Zhang Yongyuan has hired several foreign-trained specialists, who have recently returned 
to China, and form the core of the Institute’s staff. Employing an agronomist and an accountant 
trained in France appears to give the Institute a degree of greater status and respectability. However, 
it is notable that few of the staff of the Institute come from a background of specialisation in co-
operatives; they are, for the most part, trained in technical disciplines with no particular relationship 
to co-operativism. In my conversations with them, it was clear that they took jobs at the Institute 
simply because these jobs were available, secure, and close to their families, and that prior to 
working at the Institute, they had little interest in co-operativism as such. 
Zhang himself gave the consistent impression of being uninterested in co-operativism as an idealistic 
pursuit. When I explained my desire to study employee-owned or co-operative industries, he told 
me that such things were impossible, and had failed in China, and recommended I go to study the 
village of Huaxincun, a well-known quasi-Maoist village which serves as a sort of nostalgic theme 
park of collectivism. Zhang was certainly keen to discuss co-operative principles and the experience 
of co-operatives in other countries, but when it came to practical implementation in China, he 
tended to be more interested in technical problems faced by agricultural businesses than the 
implementation of co-operative principles themselves. 
The Institute has developed and maintains a close paternalistic relationship with many co-operatives 
in the nearby countryside, and further afield in the province. Following the Japanese model, in which 
co-operatives are principally created through top-down initiatives by co-operative federations, the 
Institute has helped to found and cultivate co-operatives from the ground up, and provides them 
with resources which act as an incentive for them to maintain a relationship with the Institute. The 
Institute trains these co-operatives on technical matters, and provides them with literature on how 
co-operatives should be governed. The walls of their offices are typically plastered with posters 
provided by the Institute, espousing the ICA principles and the text of the PSC law, and displaying 
their organisational charts, in which the members of the co-operative are always shown as holding 
ultimate power. Particularly in the case of a few model co-operatives, the Institute makes regular 
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visits, bringing groups of students, who inspect the co-operatives and hear from the leaders of the 
co-operatives about their experience. In some cases the Institute is able to provide some funds to 
co-operatives or help them to obtain loans, and it also provides the more intangible benefit of high 
status, which comes from association with a larger, urban institution. In the case of an organic 
vegetable co-operative with which the Institute has a particularly close relationship, the leader 
became, in his own eyes at least, something of a minor celebrity: thanks to the Institute, he 
appeared in a local television film about the co-operatives, and he proudly shows a recording of this 
film, in which he is shown standing authoritatively alongside Zhang Yongyuan, to all his visitors. 
Thus the co-operatives receive money, training, connections and status by virtue of their association 
with the Institute. The price of this is that they must appear to be what the Institute requires them 
to be: when visitors are brought from abroad or from other institutions, or when students are 
brought in groups, the Institute expects the co-operatives to display co-operative values just as the 
Institute itself does, through many visible signs hung on the walls; and for the leaders to espouse 
these in their speech. Certainly, on my first visits to these co-operatives, their leaders repeated 
phrases which Zhang Yongyuan himself frequently used, emphasising the importance of ‘democratic 
management’ (minzhu guanli) and adherence to the PSC law. But as the following chapters will show, 
their daily adherence to these notions is less clear. Nevertheless, displaying loyalty to these ideas is 
perhaps necessary to secure continuing support from the Institute. Thus the co-operatives and the 
Institute exist in a symbiotic relationship, exchanging resources for displays of commitment to the 
principles nominally attached to those resources. 
4.2.3 Meibian Co-operative Federation 
A contrast can be found in a distant outpost of the co-operative movement, in Meibian, the desert 
county described in the introduction. It was here that Rewi Alley and George Hogg came in the 
1920s to set up some of the earliest Chinese industrial co-operatives, and as such, when NCF was 
revived in the 1980s, and proceeded to inaugurate several ‘Co-operative Experimental Zones’, one of 
these zones was established in Meibian. The local affiliate of NCF is the Meibian Co-operative 
Federation, a small organisation which was originally tasked with setting up and supporting 
industrial co-operatives in the 1980s with government support, but is now primarily funded by 
foreign development agencies, which also provide training and a stream of foreign experts who 
collaborate with the Federation. 
This foreign influence began, however, in the 1980s, when NCF was revived, and co-operativists 
from New Zealand and Canada arrived to help with the Co-operative Experimental Zone. Eventually, 
15 industrial co-operatives were established, in industries ranging from construction to linen 
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manufacture. While there was as yet no legal framework defining the rules governing co-operatives, 
the foreign co-operativists helped to establish a de facto expectation that these organisations would 
adhere to international co-operative principles. Later, the Federation’s focus shifted toward 
agricultural co-operatives, which were backed both by foreign development agencies and eventually 
by Chinese state policy. Today, it works to promote these co-operatives as a form of poverty 
alleviation and empowerment of the rural poor. 
Mr Chang, one of the leaders of the Federation, exemplified the tone of the most idealistic activists 
of the co-operative movement. He saw co-operatives as a way to aid the poor, but also as a path to a 
different socioeconomic model. 
“Most co-operative members are those who most want to change their material conditions, or those 
of their families. Richer peasants don’t generally join, because they don’t have to. People understand 
there is a process to get richer, and they join to improve their conditions. So co-operatives attract 
poorer people, economically vulnerable people… From when we were re-established in the 1980s, our 
goal was this. Not only to promote development here, but after our experience, to spread co-
operatives around the whole country. To present a new, fairer economic model to the country.” 
At the same time, he was highly critical of the tendency of co-operatives, both in China and abroad, 
to drift away from their own principles. 
“I’ve seen a lot of foreign co-operatives, including in New Zealand and Canada. They have a very big 
scale. But they don’t really represent the international co-operative principles. They are more like a 
company. Because even Mondragon, in Spain—that’s just a big company. A co-operative, when it 
develops, all of its members should get a bigger benefit. But they definitely don’t have enough profit-
sharing, democracy, or fairness. Our co-operatives—we want them to be fair… Members should think, 
‘Who does this co-operative belong to?’ A co-operative is a collective (jiti). Whose collective? It’s the 
collective of all the co-operative members... Some co-operatives are OK. These kinds of co-operatives, 
they have good team spirit (xiangxinli). Their democracy is relatively strong. Other co-operatives have 
some problems.” 
To address this, the Meibian NCF employs the sorts of participatory development methods 
championed by the foreign development agencies which back it. In marked contradistinction to the 
style of the Co-operative Institute, Chang argued for a form of education based around open-ended 
and participatory discussion. 
“We have a method of meeting with them. We don’t just go and lecture them. We raise issues and 
ask them about them. For example, we ask them, ‘What is a co-operative?’ and let them discuss it all 
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together… Only at the end, we explain international co-operative principles, discuss the principles 
with them. Afterward, they understand more clearly. This isn’t something controlled by a committee, 
or a secretary—it’s controlled by its members.” 
Nevertheless, Chang lamented the fact that in many cases, these lessons fell on deaf ears. The 
Federation provides not only training, but also financial support to many co-operatives. These 
include small business partnerships which opt to convert into a co-operative form and thus benefit 
from financial assistance. But according to Chang, despite the best efforts of the Federation, these 
are often run in practice as family businesses, giving little voice to members. 
“These small businesses say they want to turn into a co-operative. Their manager wants to be the 
leader. They will appoint their own family to the management committee to control the co-operative. 
People don’t really trust the co-operative, and later they will leave it. We have had this problem 
many times.” 
Thus even deploying widely accepted methods of participatory development, Chang felt that the 
Federation could not ensure its financial support was encouraging, rather than discouraging, 
adherence to the principles it espoused. 
Moreover, the Meibian Federation is itself not immune to the influence of external financial and 
political considerations. When industrial co-operatives fell out of vogue in the 1990s, the Federation 
lost funding and political direction to support them. At the time of my fieldwork, neither Chang nor 
his colleagues could even be sure which of the 15 industrial co-operatives were still operating, let 
alone in what condition they found themselves. Unlike NCF in Shanghai or the Co-operative Institute, 
the Meibian Federation is under-resourced, and necessarily maintains a narrow focus depending on 
the objectives of its funders. 
These three examples—the NCF, the Co-operative Institute, and the Meibian Co-operative 
Federation—illustrate both the diversity of the institutions comprising the co-operative movement 
and the consistency of some of the problems they face. As with the activists who work within them, 
there is a constant tension between often conflicting motives—a general desire for public service; a 
specific belief in co-operativism; a drive to further one’s own career; and the need to act consistently 
with the political imperatives of the day. But these tensions are further complicated by the 
relationship between these institutions and those who fund and guide them, whether in the state or 
in foreign agencies. While in Meibian, foreign development experts may demand to see participatory 
methods and open discussion, in Shanghai, the imperative of the state is to see that its social service 
provision needs are met. More broadly, while all these larger actors claim to demand that the 
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institutions promote co-operative principles, in practice, their backing is contingent on a range of 
criteria which may or may not have anything to do with those principles. Thus it is no surprise that 
these relationships colour the relationships between the institutions and the co-operatives. 
4.3 The role of the state  
The most important of these larger actors is the state. The co-operative movement is heavily 
influenced by political projects, but it has also played an active role in shaping policy. 
In its interface with state actors, NCF benefits from a group of Chinese academics who sit on its 
board of directors, and lend it influence. Foremost among these is Yu Lin, an economist at the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), who by virtue of her position in both organisations, sat 
on the committee of the NPCC which drafted the 2007 PSC law. Yu Lin and her colleagues at CASS 
appeared to take a different view of co-operatives from that of some of the more idealistic activists 
at the Beijing NCF. They expressed the view that the SHCs of the 1990s had to be eradicated through 
state-supported management buyouts because worker-owned firms did not give sufficient 
incentives to managers in a market short of managerial talent. That is, while my conversations with 
some activists at the Beijing NCF revolved around the problems of introducing democratic and 
egalitarian ideals into Chinese communities, their colleagues at CASS framed their conversations in 
the technocratic terms of neoclassical economic theory. In the words of Yu Lin, 
“The shareholding co-operatives were only a temporary arrangement. Especially with the ‘grasping 
the big, letting go of the small’ [privatisation] policy, the old collective enterprises had to be sold. So 
the government sold them to their employees. But this was not efficient. Experienced managers are 
rare. Why should they work for a firm where their employees might sack them? And if they do, there 
is little incentive for them to perform. There is a principal-agent problem. The solution is for the 
managers to buy the company, so they receive the profits. We argued that this transition must 
happen quickly, if China was to have a normal market economy. So, the government decided there 
would be management buyouts, and now there are very few shareholding co-operatives left.”  
Similarly, the main function of the new PSCs was to assist in the transition of agriculture from the 
smallholdings created by the Household Responsibility System to larger scale agricultural units. 
“China has a problem, because, you know, our population is very big. And our government has 
announced a goal, to urbanise the country. But our agricultural productivity is not high enough. The 
scale of production is too low. Under the Household Responsibility System, each piece of land is 
allocated to one household. We need a way to join them together, to scale up production and 
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increase efficiency. That’s why we wrote the PSC law, to accelerate the scaling up of agricultural 
production.” 
Yu Lin and her colleagues appeared to view co-operatives as nothing but a means to an end, in which 
adherence to the ICA principles was only important insofar as it led to the achievement of that end: 
the successful transition of the Chinese economy to an efficient market enjoying economies of scale 
in production. The writing of the ICA principles into the PSC law is thus emblematic of the basic 
tension at the heart of the Chinese co-operative movement: on the surface, the law appears deeply 
concerned about ideals, but even those who drafted it frankly admit that the realisation of those 
ideals at the local level is at best ancillary to their goals, and at worst, deeply unrealistic. 
This law, and the support of the state generally, has brought many benefits to co-operatives. 
Political endorsement led to the creation of the Co-operative Experimental Zones and the revival of 
the NCF in the 1980s. After successful local experiments in several provinces, it was the central 
government which adopted SHCs as a standard method of privatisation in the early 1990s. And the 
2007 PSC law, as well as funding and endorsement of the institutions that have attempted to 
implement it, originated with the backing of the state. Had it not been for these political foundations, 
the movement would certainly not have had the resources from which it has benefited. 
However, at each stage, state backing has coloured the co-operative movement with wider political 
motives driven by factions within the state. As explained by Yu Lin, SHCs became a vehicle for 
privatisation through a transitional stage of ostensible worker ownership, and a method for the state 
to offload its pension obligations; after these steps had been achieved, the central government 
rapidly abandoned support for SHCs. One of the leaders of the Shanghai Shareholding Co-operative 
Federation, which represents the few remaining SHCs, explained: 
“It is as if the government has forgotten about us. Back then, in the 90s, they promised us support, 
that they would continue to help us and to guarantee our pensions. Then it was decided that 
shareholding co-operatives were no good. Many of our members refused to sell. Outside of Shanghai, 
there are no more shareholding co-operatives. Here, there are, but it seems no one knows about us. 
They are not interested in us anymore.” 
Similarly, for some policymakers, the principal motivation behind the PSC law is to achieve the 
transition to large-scale industrial agriculture. The danger here is that co-operatives provide a useful 
ideological smokescreen for a political agenda which is ultimately aimed not at co-operativism, but 
at ostensible economic efficiency achieved through privatisation of enterprises and agglomeration of 
land. 
Page 94 of 253 
 
But the central state apparatus in Beijing is only one part of the picture. Before centrally formulated 
policies can be implemented, they must be transmitted to lower levels in the form of ranked lists of 
priorities, the fulfilment of which by officials is assessed through the points-based Cadre 
Responsibility System (Edin, 2003). The discretion this affords officials, coupled with often multiple 
lines of authority in the fragmented state system, gives great leeway to local state organs, and has 
underpinned broad economic experimentation and policy entrepreneurialism (Yang, 2013). Central 
to this has been intimate involvement of the local state in the promotion of local enterprises, from 
TVEs to SHCs, an arrangement which has been labelled ‘local state corporatism’ (Oi, 1995). 
However, to understand the relationship between the state and organisations such as the co-
operatives, it is not enough to distinguish between the central and local state. As Pieke (2004) has 
argued, there is no sharp discontinuity between the networks of state of society; instead, local 
officials are driven by their relational obligations as members of the local social network, as well as 
broader networks connecting them ultimately to officials in Beijing. The close dependency between 
cadres and enterprise managers further blurs the distinction between state and non-state within the 
managerial elite, and calls into question the autonomy of organisations (Nonini, 2008). Thus through 
a close examination of the behaviour of county-level officials, Wang et al (2014) argue that the ‘local 
state corporatism’ model is wrong to portray the local state as a collective, acting as one; instead, 
individuals in and around the local state operate through networks governed by the relational ethic, 
which penetrate state and non-state organisations alike. 
Given the unclear distinction between state and non-state, it is hardly surprising that although there 
has been a debate among co-operativist intellectuals over the question of whether the state should 
back co-operatives (Yan & Chen, 2013, p. 969), the vast bulk of co-operatives have received support 
and guidance from various levels of the state and its agents. Studies of the ‘fake co-operatives’ 
mentioned above, which are typically said to constitute the overwhelming majority, suggest that 
they are typically set up either directly by the state, or by powerful local individuals able to coerce 
others to join what is effectively their own business venture (ibid). Liu (2010) claims that even those 
co-operatives he considers ‘genuine’ are principally initiated and operated with the close 
involvement of external institutions, from university departments to NGOs. However co-operative 
policy is formulated in Beijing, the actual relationship between co-operatives and the state depends 
more on the specificities of the interpersonal networks involved. The risk, then, is that the provision 
of resources for co-operativism may end up supporting other agendas entirely, thus undermining the 
cause it is intended to promote. 
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Thus although they enjoy nominal independence, co-operatives in reform-era China, like most other 
forms of organisation, are closely tied to the apparatus of Party and state. As the historical 
discussion in chapter 3 showed, some intellectuals hoped that both the new industrial co-operatives 
of the 1980s and the shareholding co-operatives of the 1990s would yield a new form of market 
socialism, in which state direction would give way to autonomous, decentralised decision-making, 
while remaining within the socialist mould. Indeed, the institutional apparatus supporting co-
operatives continues to espouse this sentiment in its educational and promotional literature. But co-
operatives of all kinds are heavily dependent upon a network of institutions which are themselves 
dependent on various levels of the Chinese state. Moreover, foreign individuals and organisations 
play a key role in resource provision and leadership in some of these institutions. This dependence 
enforces a hierarchical model in which both co-operatives and individuals employed by co-
operativist institutions ritualistically display adherence to co-operativism in exchange for resources 
ultimately provided by the state, regardless of whether they themselves adhere to co-operative 
values. Far from being a spontaneous movement, co-operativism in China is propelled and directed 
from above, and fed by competing ideological agendas both from abroad and from the state. 
4.4 The ‘crowding out’ of moral motivation 
If the only goal of co-operativism were to promote larger-scale agricultural production or the 
formation of efficient businesses, then there would be no reason to be concerned about whether 
the more high-minded principles of fair distribution and democratic management were being put 
into place. Indeed, as we have seen, for some policymakers, this is the case. The ‘co-operative’ label 
is unimportant, so long as scale and efficiency are achieved. However, it is clear that for many 
activists, this is not enough. The co-operative principles enshrined in the PSC law do matter to them, 
and it is a matter of great consternation that they often do not feel these are being respected. 
Arguably, these principles are at an inherent disadvantage. For while it is relatively straightforward 
to verify whether a firm has been created and has achieved a certain income level or number of 
employees, it is more difficult to determine whether, or to what extent, it instantiates nebulous 
concepts such as ‘democratic management’ and ‘fair distribution’. In countries with a strong sense of 
the rule of law, co-operative members may be able to resort to judicial means to enforce their legal 
rights. But as the following chapter will argue, this channel is typically unavailable to Chinese co-
operative members. Instead, enforcement of norms takes places within the network of relationships 
in a community, which may itself present difficulties. As Xunyi explained, 
“The members should be able to choose their leader. But often, the co-operative leader is also the 
leader of the village. In this case, it is very difficult. Because this leader has a lot of power, a lot of 
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knowledge. As co-operatives develop, the members will develop their abilities, so their power will 
increase. But right now, many co-operatives are really the property of the leader.” 
In such circumstances, as Robert pointed out, it is often difficult or impossible for an external agent 
to determine whether members have chosen their leader through a ‘democratic’ process, given the 
pressures at work, not only in that process itself, but even in answering questions posed by outsiders. 
Thus a fundamental problem presents itself, both for activists and for institutions which hope to 
spread co-operatives. To promote these ideas, there is a natural temptation to offer resources, 
whether financial or social, to those who agree to put the principles into practice. But the difficulty 
in verifying the genuine instantiation of those principles means that in practice, rewards may be 
directed simply to those who appear to demonstrate adherence in speech, through appropriate 
platitudes about ‘democratic management’, or worse, simply to those who establish firms with a 
sufficient level of productivity. 
Far from being limited to interactions between supporting institutions and co-operatives, this 
problem reproduces itself within the institutions themselves. For they, too, must demonstrate 
success in exchange for the resources provided them by the state and donor agencies. As we have 
seen, the criteria which define success shape the behaviour of those in the institutions. For the 
Meibian Co-operative Federation, the constant presence of foreign development experts who 
demand and monitor the carrying out of participatory development workshops means that success 
is defined in terms of these processes. But for the Co-operative Institute, it is more important to 
demonstrate the presence of a number of highly productive co-operatives which at least appear to 
abide by the co-operative principles. Generating these observable results must take priority over 
time-consuming and perhaps ultimately futile attempts to ensure that the principles are adhered to. 
The unfortunate result is that many of the idealistic activists who work within these organisations 
feel betrayed by the bureaucratic motives of their superiors. 
The structure of this problem is not unique. It chimes with a broad body of cross-cultural research 
suggesting that in many cases, attempts to use formal regulation or financial reward to encourage 
moral behaviour often have the opposite effect, instead resulting in a ‘crowding out’ of co-operation 
and moral motivation by financial incentives. 
At an individual level, much cross-cultural psychological evidence suggests formal sanctions or 
rewards may undermine moral or intrinsic motivations (Bowles, 2008). Simply by framing the 
situation as instrumental, they may lead individuals to disengage cognitive structures associated 
with moral motivation, and instead exert the minimum of effort required to gain the reward or avoid 
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the sanction. Moreover, the use of formal incentives may convey information about the 
expectations of those responsible—that they themselves do not expect moral behaviour, or that 
they would not trust the individual to act morally were it not for the presence of the sanction. Over 
the long term, the presence of formal incentives may result in a larger attitudinal shift, in which a 
problem is no longer seen in terms of morality, but rather as a simple question of instrumentality. 
Given these findings, it may be that the deep involvement in co-operatives of the state and 
parastatal supporting institutions cannot but undermine motivation to conform to co-operative 
principles, rather than simply claim to do so. 
At a social level, the problem of crowding out may manifest as a breakdown in co-operation sparked 
by state intervention, when it was previously organised through ‘bottom-up’, informal mechanisms 
(Ostrom, 2005). The attempt to motivate people through formal sanctions and rewards tends to 
undermine these informal mechanisms, rather than complementing them. This combined body of 
psychological and social evidence has led researchers in the common pool resource management 
school to conclude that many breakdowns in co-operation can be understood as the unintended 
consequence of misguided attempts at formal support (Poteete, et al., 2010, p. 110). 
Co-operation research suggests, too, that those who would otherwise be disposed to follow and 
enforce a norm tend to become rapidly disinclined to do so when they perceive that few others 
around them will do so, too—a prediction of theoretical models which has been borne out by both 
experimental and ethnographic evidence (Bowles & Gintis, 2011, p. 22). Thus it is hardly surprising 
that problems may arise from state provision of resources to those who create co-operatives and co-
operative institutions. When the state provides subsidies, technical training, and favourable loans, it 
creates an incentive for people who neither understand nor care about co-operativism to claim to 
adhere to co-operative values, in exchange for the resources on offer (Pan, 2012, p. 150). 
In marked contradistinction to the way in which the Maoist state exhorted people to join new 
institutions on the basis of moral motivation, and with a view to building new social forms, the 
reform-era state has used co-operatives for a variety of wider political motives, and has attempted 
to induce people to join them using purely transactional means. For those drawn to the movement 
by idealism, the atmosphere thus created threatens to undermine their own moral motivation. For 
others, it simply signals that, just as with the dominant discourse of ‘socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’, the principles of co-operativism are unimportant compared to the measurable 
outcomes of scaled-up production. The implementation and verification of the co-operative 
principles may, then, be ‘crowded out’ by the provision of resources by the state and foreign donors. 
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4.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has sketched the interactions between three sets of actors promoting co-operatives in 
China: activists, intermediary institutions, and state and foreign agencies. The experiences of these 
actors belie any attempt at a simplistic portrait of moral decay in contemporary China. Instead, the 
moral discourse surrounding co-operativism is interpreted and deployed in a variety of ways. At 
times, it informs the self-concept and the deepest motivations of activists; and at times, it functions 
as nothing but an ideological smokescreen for ulterior motives. These varied uses reflect the 
variegated and shifting moral fabric of Chinese society, but they also present a fundamental problem 
for anyone attempting to operate within that fabric. For activists, co-operative members, and 
policymakers alike, it is, perhaps, never entirely clear whether those with whom they are dealing 
view the co-operative principles as moral injunctions, meaningless phrases, or something in between. 
This vagueness means that those who wish to re-engineer society through policy or activism can 
never be entirely sure where to direct their sanctions and rewards. This chapter has argued that the 
problems encountered by the movement are not unique, but are instead representative of a more 
general problem of the ‘crowding out’ of moral motivation. The next chapter will explore the 
implications of this environment for the co-operatives themselves. 
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5. The experience of the co-operatives 
On a sunny Saturday morning in Meibian, I met Xiao Tao, a young civil servant I had befriended. Xiao 
Tao had a motorbike, and had offered to spend the weekend taking me around Meibian county in 
search of the industrial co-operatives founded by the Co-operative Federation in the eighties and 
nineties. Mr Chang from the Federation had provided me with a list of these fifteen co-operatives, 
and the addresses last on file for them, though he had warned me that it had been years since he 
had been in touch with some of them. Armed with the list, Xiao Tao and I set off into the desert. 
Although its population is less than 200,000, mainly concentrated in the county town, Meibian 
county extends over 5400 square kilometres of desert and grassland, stretching across the Hexi 
Corridor which straddles the old Silk Road, from the mountains of Qinghai in the south to another 
mountain range marking the border of Inner Mongolia to the north. It is no surprise that Chang had 
difficulty keeping in touch with the co-operatives, as the Federation did not even have its own car, 
and they were widely scattered throughout the county. For us, wending along desert tracks between 
ancient Han dynasty watchtowers, it would be no easy task to locate them all. 
As we made our way out of the town and into the grasslands, Xiao Tao turned to me and shouted 
into the wind, repeating what had become a familiar refrain. 
“Industrial co-operatives… Are you absolutely sure? You know, I was thinking about it—I have heard 
of agricultural co-operatives, I’m not very familiar with them, but I know there are some around here. 
But industrial co-operatives? I’ve never heard anything about that. But we will try, we will do our 
best to find them.” 
After riding most of the morning out into the desert, we arrived at the hamlet which was our first 
destination. Here, according to the records, there was a linen co-operative, processing the products 
of local flax growers into a marketable secondary commodity. At first, the hamlet appeared deserted. 
We rode to what seemed to be a central point, dismounted and began to wander through the 
streets, looking for signs of life. Finally, we came across an elderly woman, and asked her where we 
could find the linen co-operative. 
“Linen? You mean the workshop? It’s over that way, outside of the village. But perhaps you won’t 
find anyone there. I think it’s been closed for some time.” 
Xiao Tao and I headed in the direction she indicated, toward the edge of the settled area and the 
threshold of the desert. We came upon the entrance to a small, disused factory; wandering around 
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the grounds, there was no indication it had been occupied recently. It seemed abandoned. On the 
way out, we met another elderly man, and asked him if the factory was still operating. 
“No. Around here there is no industry at all. The factory belonged to the flax farmers—it’s better for 
them just to sell it to a big enterprise. It’s too much trouble to operate a factory. Probably their 
technology wasn’t good enough. It’s been closed for a long time.” 
We resumed our search, but in every corner of the county, we met with similar results. The coal co-
operative, the chemicals co-operative—all seemed to have vanished. There remained the 
construction co-operative, which was located in the county town itself, and which, according to Mr 
Chang, was one of the largest, boasting a membership of more than 800, as well as 400 non-member 
employees. But when we arrived at the site on the outskirts of the county town, we again found 
nothing but a dilapidated, abandoned office complex, with a large lock fixed to the gate. Again, we 
asked a neighbour, a shopkeeper in a shop next door, what had happened. 
“That was the construction co-operative, but it is closed now. All the young men have gone east to 
work as labourers. They don’t want to stay here in the countryside. So they had to close the business.” 
Unbeknownst, it would seem, to the Co-operative Federation itself, the industrial co-operatives it 
had first fostered when it was re-founded in the 1980s seemed to have vanished. 
Indeed, this phenomenon of ‘missing co-operatives’ is not limited to Meibian, but can be found 
throughout China. Shareholding co-operatives have vanished in accordance with the wishes of 
central policymakers. Their uniform disappearance throughout the country would not be so 
mysterious were it not for the fact that several thousand remain in Shanghai. Many agricultural co-
operatives, too, are ‘missing’. In the Ningxia county of Jiaohu, dozens of PSCs were formed with the 
help of an NGO supported by Beijing-based and foreign development organisations, but virtually 
none of them remain. While they still exist on paper, and thus add to the official figures for the 
number of PSCs at a national level, they have simply broken down and ceased to function. According 
to the head of the NGO which backed them, this is simply because people in the area lack education 
and resources, and cannot be persuaded to see the benefits of the co-operatives. All over China, 
countless co-operatives remain registered officially as legal entities despite having disappeared—or 
in some cases, perhaps never operated at all. 
What has driven this mysterious mass disappearance of co-operatives? This chapter will attempt to 
answer this question by examining key forces that have shaped the experience of the co-operatives, 
as well as their successes and failures. It will argue that many attempts at co-operative organisation 
have been vitiated by the uneven enforcement of formal rules stipulating the rights of co-operative 
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members; that larger structural changes in China’s economy, and migration in particular, have 
worked to undermine the bases of co-operation in the co-operatives; and that the historical 
experience of the failures of the socialist period has contributed to an underlying distrust of 
collective forms of organisation. Finally, it will argue that although some co-operatives do achieve a 
measure of co-operation by working around these problems of trust, the structural factors already 
mentioned tend to limit the success of these efforts. 
5.1 Formal rules and rights 
The formal rules defining co-operatives and the rights of their members are central to attempts to 
differentiate them from other forms of organisation. Formally, the co-operative is the property of 
the members, who therefore have the right to a share of its profits, and a say over how it is run, 
including the right to choose the leadership. As chapter 4 argued, the enforcement of these rules is 
uneven at best. In some cases, they are ignored altogether, resulting in organisations operated 
effectively as family firms or the personal domain of their leader; in others, they play a stronger role. 
This section will explore examples illustrating this range of cases, and conclude by arguing that the 
variability in the strength of formal rules, itself rooted in a wider ambiguity about the role of law in 
China, has worked to undermine many co-operatives. 
Dongguang Electronics Factory, in the Shandong city of Gongshi, is typical of many former 
shareholding co-operatives. The factory employs around 600 people, manufacturing a variety of 
consumer electronics. Prior to 1994, it was a collective enterprise2, owned and operated by the 
government of Gongshi. Then, during the wave of privatisation of small and medium-sized 
enterprises, Dongguang was converted into an SHC, through a share sale to its employees. In most 
cases, SHCs were created through forced purchases, in which employees were given no option other 
than to buy shares. Dongguang was no exception; according to Li, a manager there, the share 
purchase was a ‘requirement’. 
“At that time, we were still a collective enterprise. Our technological level was not very high—not 
very suited to market competition. So it was necessary to raise money. All employees invested in the 
enterprise, became shareholders. Some people didn’t want to. They didn’t understand what a share 
was, or if they would receive their money again. I was also reluctant. The reform and opening was 
like that—it was a process.” 
                                                          
2
 In the Chinese context, ‘collective’ enterprises (jitiqiye) are enterprises owned by various levels of the local 
state. As chapter 3 above made clear, when the bulk of these enterprises were converted into Township and 
Village Enterprises (TVEs), their ‘collective’ status often became ambiguous, particularly given that the 
category of TVE included a wide range of ownership forms, from SHCs to corporations privately controlled by 
local families .  
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Legally speaking, the rules governing SHCs were never made uniform across the country. While they 
were touted as a middle way between socialism and capitalism, in practice they apportioned a wide 
range of balances of control between employee shareholders, managers and investors. But in 
Gongshi, one of the first places in the country to experiment with SHCs, they followed a typical 
pattern in which voting rights and rights to profits were separated. Dongguang was no exception; it, 
like many other Gongshi firms, adopted the principle of ‘one person, one vote’, whilst allowing 
individuals, including outsiders, to own variable amounts of shares, and to be paid a fraction of 
profits in proportion to the size of their share ownership. 
Formally, then, the transition to SHC status meant that Dongguang had gone from being the 
collective property of the Chinese proletariat to being the collective property of the specific 
proletarians who worked there. This hybrid form allowed the firm to accept private investment, but 
without abandoning the socialist commitment to worker ownership. Nevertheless, in 2005 the 
factory underwent a management buyout, in which several senior managers purchased the entirety 
of the employee-owned shares—again, in a compulsory sale—thus converting the factory finally into 
a privately owned joint-stock corporation. 
However, throughout this process of formal restructuring, it is unclear whether the legal rights 
conferred upon and subsequently removed from employees made any difference to the operation of 
the factory. Duan, a worker there, recalled: 
“There was no difference. This ‘shareholding co-operative’—no one really understood it. I don’t either. 
Before we were a collective enterprise. Then we became a shareholding co-operative. Now we are a 
private company. Our managers are the same. Life in the factory is basically the same. There was no 
change.” 
This tallies with the experience of other employees of former SHCs—even much smaller firms. 
Meimu Furniture Company is another former SHC located in Gongshi. A manufacturer of wooden 
beds and other furniture, Meimu employs around 90 people, and like Dongguang, was formerly 
owned by the local state. Xuli, a middle-aged worker there, recounted her memory of Meimu’s days 
as an SHC: 
“What is a shareholding co-operative? Something from the reform and opening [period]. This kind of 
thing is the business of the leaders. It’s a management question, nothing to do with us workers.” 
As for the motives for the transition, it was clear that at least in Dongguang’s case, the path from 
collective to SHC to private company was a result of policy direction from above. Li, the manager, 
explained: 
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“The problem with shareholding co-operatives was simply that they were ‘neither one thing nor the 
other’ (bu lü bu ma, lit. ‘neither donkey nor horse’). Neither a company nor a collective. China’s 
economy had to be modernised. That’s why our government decided that the shareholding co-
operatives should became companies.” 
This chimes with sentiments expressed by policymakers in chapter 4. Indeed, in conversations with 
local officials around the country, identical reasons were consistently given for the disappearance of 
local SHCs. It was clear the decision had been made centrally, and enforced by the managers of each 
firm. One may wonder to what extent SHCs, and indeed private companies, can be said to have been 
autonomous from the state, given the uninterrupted ability of the state to dictate their futures. One 
may further wonder what, if anything, employee ownership can have meant, if it neither gave 
workers power within the firm, nor gave them any say over whether their factory should allow a 
management buyout. Why did the employees not resort to legal action to enforce their rights? I put 
this question to Yitao, an engineer in his thirties. 
“Go to court? It’s too much trouble. You say there are still shareholding co-operatives in Shanghai. 
Maybe it’s because Shanghai people are different. Their educational level is very high. Maybe they 
really understand the law, and they are willing to go to court. People here wouldn’t do that. They 
would be afraid that if they do it, they will definitely lose. They just don’t consider the law, or 
whether or not they have rights.” 
This observation is consistent with studies of the contemporary Chinese legal system (Liebman, 
2009). In the systems of socialist law which formed the basis for that of today’s China, judicial 
decisions are, in principle, concerned principally with the public good, and therefore the social 
effects of each judgement, rather than its strict consistency with the law. Legislation, then, 
formulates broad and malleable guidelines, rather than rigid and predictable rules; while the political 
apparatus, led by the Party, is responsible for guiding the judiciary toward the most socially 
beneficial outcome. As this system has evolved in China, it has developed strong mechanisms 
through which political guidance takes precedence over legislation. Specifically, cadres are given 
centrally formulated lists of priorities, fulfilment of which is assessed regularly according to the 
points-based system mentioned in chapter 4; while these may include enforcement of legislation, 
this is by no means mandatory, much less a particularly high priority (Birney, 2014). As a result, legal 
enforcement is highly uneven across the country. Moreover, when cases do arrive in court, there is 
little or no attempt at enforcing consistent interpretations of the law. Instead, judges are expected—
often by the public, as well as the Party—to disregard the law when it is considered better to do so 
(Liebman, 2009). Judges and enforcement officials are themselves enmeshed in the networks of 
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exchange relationships governing any given locality. It is therefore hardly surprising that mere 
factory workers would be reluctant to attempt to pursue a case against their own relatively powerful, 
well-connected managers, particularly when the management buyout which would have been under 
dispute was itself a centrally mandated priority, albeit one contrary to the law. 
But if the rights of employees as owners of SHCs never really existed, what was the point of creating 
them in the first place? One possibility is that the forced purchase of shares by workers was seen as 
a necessary step to raise capital for privatisation of firms which might have been uncompetitive, and 
therefore insufficiently attractive to private investors. However, if this were the sole motive, it is 
unclear why SHCs should have been created with the principle of ‘one person, one vote’, rather than 
simply formed as ordinary employee-owned corporations. It has been suggested that SHCs were 
used as a transitional device because, with the Communist Party still in power, and still officially 
guided by Marxism-Leninism, it would have been unacceptable to effect privatisation directly (Oi, 
2010). Instead, formally at least, collective firms would continue to belong to the workers, who 
became owners through officially voluntary purchases. If several years later these same workers 
decided to sell their shares to managers and investors, this was not the act of the state, but their 
own decision. Thus the SHC moment was used as a sort of ritual transition from public to private 
ownership—but one in which, on paper, the process was driven by the sovereign proletariat itself. 
This suggestion is compelling, and it finds support in the fact that there does not generally seem to 
have been an attempt to encourage SHC employees to exercise their rights, suggesting there was 
little political will behind the idea of the SHC as a permanent organisational form. However, the 
experience of workers like those in Dongguang shows that for many, the idea of employee 
ownership was so unreal as to have barely registered in their memories. That would suggest that if 
the ritual transition hypothesis is true, the intended audience of this ritual may not have been the 
workers themselves. It is worth remembering that in the 1990s, at the height of the SHC period, 
there remained within the Party and the state a substantial leftist faction, which arguably would 
have resisted outright privatisation of so many state assets. Thus it may be that the SHC process was 
adopted as an ideological smokescreen to placate these forces. 
Whatever the case may be, the lack of enforcement of formal rules was a key factor in the 
disappearance of SHCs, as well as their failure to function as worker-controlled organisations. Had 
the formal rights of employees been realised, the outcomes might have been different. 
Not only SHCs, but other forms of co-operative, too, have suffered from the weakness of formal 
regulations. The 2007 PSC law is the clearest legal expression of co-operatives yet to exist in Chinese 
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law, but in practice, the implementation of the rights specified by the law has been highly uneven. 
Mr Chang of the Meibian Co-operative Federation explained: 
“There are two aspects we must consider in the co-operative development process. One is the co-
operative’s organisational development—that is, its internal problems. The other is commercial, that 
is, its economic management. These two develop together. If you get the internal organisation right, 
this will bring great benefits to production, and the co-operative will develop. But if economic 
management is good, so the co-operative gets a lot of income, but you have bad internal 
organisation, bad internal systems (zhidu), unfair distribution of benefits—then regardless of what 
the law says, the co-operative will turn into a company.” 
Junliu Grain Co-operative, in Meibian county, boasts around 120 members, all households which 
cultivate grain on their own land. Its principal function is to pool marketing and distribution of the 
grain produced by its members, as well as making bulk purchases of inputs for production. Legally, 
the co-operative belongs to the households as units. But there is something peculiar about Junliu 
village: For most of the year, apart from the leader of the co-operative and a few staff members, 
there are almost no men present at all. In the words of a female grain farmer there, 
“My husband has gone to work in Jiangsu. He comes back once or twice a year to visit. Most of our 
men are the same—they’ve gone to Lanzhou or outside the province. They come back for the Spring 
Festival, but after they leave again, we women stay to look after our land. Sometimes the men do 
some work here, but most of it is done by us… The co-operative meetings are held during holidays, 
when the men are here—because the men must represent their households. So even though we are 
the ones who look after the farms, when they come back, they decide the business of the co-
operative.” 
Although the vast bulk of the labour is done by the women, and the results of decisions taken in 
Junliu are borne principally by them, it is nevertheless the men, absent for most of the year, who are 
formally consulted as heads of their households. The principle of ‘democratic management’ 
enshrined in law is here overridden by the men’s assumed prerogative; and in spite of the legal 
equivalence of the rights of men and women, men dominate here, as in village ‘democracy’ 
throughout China (Howell, 2006). When I suggested to a group of women in Junliu that they attempt 
to make a legal claim on their rights, this was met with laughter, as an absurd suggestion. Moreover, 
as chapter 6 will show, even the participation of the men in co-operative meetings in Junliu is 
extremely limited. Even if the households—however represented—are taken as comprising the 
demos here, the principle of democratic management is hardly enforced. 
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Often, the unreality of member ownership appears to go further, when co-operatives are run under 
the control of an individual or group with no intention of respecting the formal rules of distribution 
and control (Yuan, 2014). One such case is that of a former dairy co-operative in Meibian. Yueli, a 
farmer who was a member of this co-operative before it ceased to function, relayed the story of how 
it failed. 
“At the beginning, the co-operative went well. My husband and I saw an economic benefit. There 
were some problems even then. The Co-operative Federation offered us support—when the income 
of the members wasn’t enough to support our livelihoods, they gave some money to help. But this 
money didn’t come to us directly. The business manager handled it, and he didn’t always distribute it 
fairly. We later found out that our leader was supposed to deposit it in our account so we would all 
receive what we needed. But all of the leaders were his family, so it didn’t happen this way. Later, 
there was more competition in the marketplace. Our leader should have invested to help us develop. 
Instead, he used the money for his own family. So more and more households began to leave the co-
operative, and we left, too.” 
This story appears by no means to be an isolated case; as noted in the previous chapter, co-
operative activists frequently relayed similar accounts of corruption and mismanagement. As Mr 
Chang put it, 
“There are co-operatives which behave like a private enterprise. Someone starts a co-operative 
because he wants to be a leader. He brings in his family to manage it. He thinks he is the ‘protagonist’ 
(zhurengong) of the co-operative. So he loses any sense of responsibility to the co-operative, because 
he thinks it’s all his affair.” 
Thus just as the ostensible co-operative form of the SHCs was vitiated by the lack of enforcement of 
formal rules, it seems that in many cases, the PSC law, and the internal rules of each co-operative, 
which emanate from it, are at best loosely enforced, and at worst, flatly ignored. As O’Brien and Han 
(2009) argue in the context of village elections, informal institutions such as kinship networks tend 
to override formal democratic rules. Nevertheless, all this is not to say that co-operative members 
are completely powerless. On the contrary, members of PSCs are often at least aware of their status 
as owners, and can make use of this status in ways which have a direct impact on the functioning of 
the co-operative. 
Taoyuan Organic Vegetable Co-operative, in a village on the outskirts of a large city in Shandong 
province, was formed of 12 neighbouring households in 2008, and has since grown to include several 
dozen households and more than 100 people. Its leader, Mr Chen, had worked as a manager in a 
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private company, but returned to the village when he saw a business opportunity. He convinced his 
neighbours to form the co-operative, which would be responsible for packaging and marketing their 
produce, charging a premium for its ‘organic’ label. However, production remains in the hands of 
individual households, and Chen has no way of ensuring that his members refrain from spraying 
their crops with pesticides and industrial fertilisers. 
“It’s very hard to manage this co-operative. In a company, people will do what you say. It’s like 
driving a car—you just drive it where you want to go. Here, I can’t manage them. Whatever I want to 
do, they don’t want to do it. If they don’t do what I say, there’s nothing I can do. I have no power at 
all.” 
Here, the force of member ownership is such that the leader feels unable to compel the members. 
Ironically, this results in a failure of co-operation. The problem of maintaining the organic standard 
of the vegetables is a classic collective action problem. Without any means of testing the produce of 
each household, the co-operative has no way of sanctioning those who use pesticides and fertilisers. 
Each household benefits individually if it does so, because doing so will reduce its costs and increase 
its output. But collectively, there is a risk that consumers will discover the results of this practice, 
and the benefits of the organic brand will be lost. According to Chen, as a manager in a private 
company, he could use his position to enforce co-operation; but as the leader of a co-operative, he is 
unable to override his members. 
However, here again, we must ask whether the formal rules of the co-operative are being deployed 
to the extent possible to address the problem. After all, members have a collective interest in 
preventing other members from spraying their crops. Given that they are the legal owners of the co-
operative, it is within their power to institute a formal rule forbidding spraying, to attach sanctions 
to that rule, and to empower Chen to enforce it. Instead of making active use of their formal rights 
to solve this problem, their status as owners appears to empower them only insofar as it reinforces 
their autonomy as households. For Chen, 
“Any organisation should be like a big family. But this co-operative is not like a family. If I try to 
suggest activities, to make them feel more like a family—to watch a film, to eat dinner together—
they don’t want to do it. They just never want to do what I suggest. Every household has their own 
piece of land. And if they are really unhappy, they will just leave.” 
Indeed, it is perhaps the very autonomy of the households, rather than any sense of formal rights in 
the co-operative, which provides the strongest basis of their power. Under the Household 
Responsibility System, each household maintains rights to its own piece of land, on a long lease from 
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the state, providing it with a crucial source of income and security. Because co-operatives do not 
pool this land, and rarely even pool agricultural production equipment, households remain free to 
leave co-operatives more or less at will, without risking major losses. For many, leaving a co-
operative when it is no longer convenient to be a member is the extent of the power they will ever 
exercise within it, a point discussed in more detail in chapter 6. Again, this is made clear in the 
frustrations of the leader of Junliu Grain Co-operative: 
“If our members don’t receive enough benefits from the co-operative, they may just leave. That has 
happened to many co-operatives in Meibian. The leader must work hard to produce benefits. 
Members are not patient, and they think it is our responsibility to make the co-operative develop. 
This is the biggest problem—to make them stay.” 
This point was echoed by Xunyi, the researcher and activist discussed in chapter 4, who has worked 
with co-operatives around the country. 
“The main thing is to bring material benefits to the members. Peasants may not understand the idea 
of a co-operative. They probably are not interested in it. They want material benefits for their 
household. And if the co-operative stops bringing these, they will not think, ‘This co-operative 
belongs also to me, I should try to improve it’. They will just leave.” 
These sentiments seem to mirror Andrea Pia’s claim (2015, p. 199), in his study of collective water 
management institutions in Yunnan, that villagers resisted rights-based understandings of property 
relations, in favour of a discourse based on the obligations of officials to the people when managing 
shared resources. Although the PSC law is framed in terms of the rights of members, the members of 
these co-operatives appear to frame their involvement in terms of the obligations of co-operative 
leaders to serve the members. 
Thus while the formal rules of co-operatives are emphasised repeatedly in training workshops and 
literature distributed by the co-operative movement, and often keenly repeated by co-operative 
leaders themselves, the reality of their enforcement varies widely. There are, nevertheless, cases in 
which they have an effect. But as these examples have illustrated, the greatest lever available to 
members may be the relative ease with which they can withdraw from the co-operative, particularly 
if their right to withdraw any initial investment or joining fee is respected. 
A further, and perhaps more dramatic, case in which the formal rules of co-operatives function with 
real effect is that of the SHCs of Shanghai. While SHCs appear to have vanished nearly everywhere in 
the country, the one exception, as one of the Gongshi informants indicated, is Shanghai. There, at 
the time of fieldwork, there were still more than five thousand SHCs legally registered as operating, 
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and represented by the Shanghai SHC Federation, an umbrella body. But why is Shanghai such a 
glaring exception to the trend? The leader of the Federation, who is also the head of a rubber 
factory, itself an SHC, explained: 
“In the 90s, we were all state-owned enterprises. But the state decided it couldn’t manage us 
anymore. So they said, ‘Here, you manage it’. We were converted into this new kind of organisation. 
But there were a lot of problems. These new organisations could not compete in the market, and they 
could not raise capital. Eventually, the government decided to close them, or convert them into 
companies. But many people refused. They own the shares, and they did not want to sell them.” 
Indeed, there is some evidence that members of the Shanghai SHCs have not only made use of their 
legal rights; they have dared to do so in direct contravention of the wishes of their managers, the 
state and the Party. In the early 2000s, with Shanghai property prices booming, it became apparent 
that SHC members could make a substantial gain by liquidating their enterprises and dividing up the 
proceeds amongst themselves. At the time, this was contrary to policy; and the managers of these 
factories, at the behest of the local Party, informed these workers that such a move was not an 
option, and that the factories were to continue production. In spite of this, the SHC members boldly 
staked their claim, exercised their legal rights as owners, and liquidated their factories, as a result of 
which, many SHCs went out of business (Zeng, 2005). Again, it is perhaps ironic that one of the most 
dramatic instances of co-operative rules being respected happens also to have been the moment of 
dissolution of those co-operatives. Nevertheless, these cases show that there is perhaps some truth 
to the suggestion made by the worker in Gongshi that there is something unique about Shanghai 
which leads people there to fight for their legal rights, and win. 
But there may be other explanations. Analysing 16 years of corporate law cases in the Shanghai 
People’s Courts, Howson (2010) argues that although there are indications that these courts have 
become increasingly autonomous, they are still constrained by political considerations, in particular 
tending to prioritise the maintenance of the social order over the enforcement of shareholder rights. 
Indeed, enterprise restructuring in Shanghai proceeded at a more gradual and cautious pace than 
elsewhere, a difference which may be attributable to the simple fact that unlike other localities, the 
Shanghai government did not set the speed of enterprise restructuring as a priority target for their 
cadres. As Zeng (2007, p. 123) argues, the political pre-eminence of Shanghai and the economic 
success it experienced even before restructuring may have led to an unusually gradualist attitude 
toward enterprise restructuring. The relative autonomy of the Shanghai SHCs may, then, have been 
as much a result of local cadre incentives as of cultural specificity. 
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Nevertheless, we should not be too quick to dismiss cultural influences. Apart from stereotypes of 
Shanghai as historically open and ‘Westernised’, a consistent observation has long been that 
Shanghai people tend to place a strong emphasis on individuality and autonomy, even including 
social norms to the effect that people should ‘mind their own business’ with respect to major life 
decisions (Li, 1996). This apparent valuation of the individual self would seem to contravene the 
relational ethic, and arguably has more affinity with universalistic morality, and its notion of 
individual rights. 
The anthropology of law has long argued that legal forms can serve not only as rules, but as more 
general sources of meaning which can be called upon in other ways than explicit rule enforcement 
(Geertz, 1983; Cover, 1983/84). Thus Zeng (2005) reports that although Shanghai SHC workers had 
little understanding of their formal rights, and therefore governance and management went largely 
unchanged, managers claimed they were unable to sack employees, who would claim that their 
status as ‘owners’ meant they were immune. This mirrors the complaint of the manager of Taoyuan 
Vegetable Co-operative, that although his members may not have understood their formal rights, 
they knew they were owners, and could not be told what to do. It also helps explain the ritual 
transition to privatisation via SHCs around the country; for everywhere, enterprise restructuring 
required cadres to negotiate with, persuade and cajole workers, who continued to frame conflicts in 
terms of the proletarian ownership they had long been guaranteed (Zeng, 2007; Hurst, 2009, p. 115). 
Like the discourse surrounding ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’, it seems that the laws 
governing co-operatives may function in this way as a symbolic device, even if they are neither 
understood nor enacted literally. The unusual case of the Shanghai SHCs may, then, reflect the 
symbolic currency of individual rights, coupled with unique political conditions allowing for this 
currency to be traded in. 
But for these as well as other co-operatives, a vague symbolic suggestion of member ownership is 
insufficient to ensure cognisance or enforcement of co-operative rules. For such rules to have effect, 
it is not necessary to have recourse to courts, but only for people to accept and enact them as social 
norms. Again, co-operation research suggests that humans may be primed for social norm 
enforcement, and the punishment not only of norm violators, but of those who do not punish  norm 
violators; but as chapter 3 noted, this behaviour—known as ‘strong reciprocity’—depends heavily on 
the perception that a sufficient proportion of others in the group will do the same (Bowles & Gintis, 
2011, p. 22). In a legal culture in which laws are not ordinarily experienced as norms to be enforced 
by ordinary people, but only occasionally by police and the state, theory predicts that the 
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development of enforcement practices on the part of one or a few individuals should be highly 
improbable. 
Thus as this section has shown, the enforcement of formal rules governing co-operatives is highly 
variable, mirroring the status of Chinese law in general, which is unevenly enforced and flexibly 
interpreted, to the point of functioning often as no more than a symbolic gesture. The relevance of 
this problem for co-operatives should be clear. As chapter 1 argued, co-operativism is, in part, a 
conscious attempt at social engineering—the attempt to construct democratic, member-owned 
organisations in a variety of social contexts, which may or may not have had any history of such a 
concept. Formal rules instantiating the international co-operative principles are a standard 
component of this project, providing as they do a touchstone by which members can ensure their 
rights are respected, and in this way, constituting a mechanism through which they can solve co-
operation problems, such as the problem of pesticide spraying in Taoyuan Co-operative. But this 
presupposes a cultural and politico-legal environment in which formal rules are respected and 
enforced, even and especially when they come into conflict with the imperatives of informal 
institutions. Contemporary China does not, on the whole, provide such an environment, and while 
there are exceptions, even those involved in formulating the PSC law were not so naïve as to believe 
that legislation is enough to bring the co-operative principles to life, as some of the reflections in 
chapter 4 showed. 
But formal rules are not the only way to solve co-operation problems, including the sorts of 
problems faced by co-operatives which attempt to pool resources or make decisions together. As 
chapter 3 indicated, the relational ethic and the patterning of relationships which typically 
accompanies it may be understood as instantiating a particular form of indirect reciprocity, a mode 
of co-operation which, in many contexts, may help to overcome co-operation problems through 
purely informal mechanisms. The conditions under which this may occur are not, however, unlimited. 
The following two sections will explore structural and historical forces which have coloured the 
experience of the co-operatives, as well as their ability to rely on informal mechanisms to support 
co-operation in the absence of formal enforcement. 
5.2 Marketisation and migration 
The development of the co-operatives has played out against a tumultuous backdrop of economic 
change, accompanied by mass movements of people which have transformed and uprooted 
communities. In this context, many co-operatives have succumbed to the destructive forces which 
have affected other businesses, too. But at the same time, there are reasons to believe that these 
changes may have weakened the foundations of informal co-operation which might have sustained 
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them in the absence of formal rule enforcement. This section will explore these two broad 
categories of effects. 
The first of these is the general effect of exposure to market pressures. This has manifested itself in a 
number of ways. In the case of the Meibian industrial co-operatives, which were established at a 
time when the market economy was still in its infancy, it would seem that geography was not on 
their side; as ever more industry concentrated along China’s eastern seaboard, it became 
increasingly difficult for small enterprises in a remote, landlocked region to compete (Wen, 2004). 
Moreover, as the case of the construction co-operative shows, they faced competition, too, in the 
form of labour demand, as the rapidly growing private sector lured workers away from the 
countryside with higher wages. If these forces had not been enough to render the industrial co-
operatives unviable, they struggled, too, to update their production technology to a competitive 
level. Mr Chang explained, 
“The local economy was backward, and it had to be brought into line with the market economy. 
These small industrial co-operatives, their scale was too small; the quality of their products was also 
relatively low. Their technology was backward. For a peasant to go from agriculture to industry—
they lack basic knowledge about production. So they have many problems in the process of 
development. In this process, they need more technological development. But at that time, they 
didn’t have the capacity. Foreign investors were more sophisticated and had more capital, so they 
could satisfy the conditions of technological development. So in market competition, the co-
operatives struggled.” 
Thus while the Meibian co-operatives were buffeted by forces which would have affected firms of 
any nature, they were also afflicted by pressures unique to co-operatives. On the one hand, their 
composition as worker-owned organisations staffed by peasants, rather than employing outside 
labourers, meant that they faced a shortage of knowledge and skills necessary to upgrade 
production. On the other hand, they struggled to raise the necessary capital to do so, while private 
firms could benefit from ample financing and often from injections of expertise by foreign investors.  
Indeed, the problem of access to external financing has long been recognised as a fundamental 
constraint on producer co-operatives worldwide; for if equity cannot be sold in exchange for capital, 
the firm’s options for raising funds may be severely limited (Dickstein, 1991). According to Chang, 
the Meibian co-operatives were no different in this respect. 
In the Shanghai shareholding co-operatives, the effects of marketisation and mass migration were 
felt in a different way. As Shanghai boomed into a commercial and service centre, labour and land 
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costs skyrocketed, pushing manufacturing into the periphery of the city. As indicated above, many 
SHCs responded by liquidating themselves and sharing out the proceeds to their members. For many 
of the five thousand which remained, it was no longer profitable to continue production, and they, 
too, sold their facilities, and converted themselves into nothing more than legal vehicles for pension 
delivery. There are many which have nevertheless continued production. However, as the cost of 
living increased, they could no longer afford to pay sufficient wages to their own members. Instead, 
they gradually hired more and more non-member migrant labourers from outside Shanghai, who 
could be paid lower wages. Today, those that remain in operation have, to all intents and purposes, 
become joint-stock companies. Their shares are owned by the original workers, but their labour 
force consists almost entirely of hired migrant workers. The head of the Shareholding Co-operative 
Federation explained, 
“I know the co-operative principles, because I exchange ideas with the NCF—the ideas of Rewi Alley, 
that everyone should work together, for mutual aid. It’s a kind of moral attitude. But in the SHCs, 
people don’t want to work together. They just want to make their money, and that’s enough for 
them. That’s why there are still so many problems—you can’t really say an SHC is a co-operative.”  
Thus while the SHCs continue in name, their flexible and ambiguous legal status has allowed them to 
evolve seamlessly into something indistinguishable from a private company. In the absence of any 
political or ideological agenda to the contrary, there has been nothing to stop them doing so. Just as 
Chang criticised Mondragon and other western co-operatives for allowing themselves to transform 
into corporations, the forces of marketisation and its geographical and demographic implications 
have finally undermined what remained of the Shanghai SHCs. 
In addition to the direct effect of these forces on firms, there are reasons to believe there may be a 
second, indirect effect. That is that the same general social processes may be working to undermine 
the foundations of informal co-operation mechanisms which might otherwise help to sustain co-
operatives, in the absence of formal rule enforcement. One lens which provides a hint of this 
possibility is the example of housebuilding. 
Xiao Zhang was a young government clerk in Meibian. Thanks to a small inheritance, he had recently 
acquired a piece of land outside of the town, where he planned to build a rustic-style restaurant, 
which he hoped would allow him to become a businessman. I first met Zhang at a bar in Meibian, 
through a group of mutual friends. He told me about the restaurant, that it was already half-built, 
and he was brimming with ideas for how to develop it. Then one of our mutual friends suggested I 
come along to the building site at the weekend, to help out with the construction. It turned out most 
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of Zhang’s good friends went on a regular basis, whenever they had time off work, to help out with 
the project. Although they were all white collar workers in clerical jobs, they were young, fit men, so 
I expected we would be able to help out with carrying materials, laying bricks, and other aspects of 
the construction. 
Five of us made the trip to the building site that Saturday morning, in a car owned by one of Zhang’s 
friends. The journey lasted less than half an hour, but seemed a routine trip, punctuated by friendly 
talk about plans for the restaurant, but not about the building site itself. When we finally arrived at 
the building site, I was surprised to find a crew of several construction workers already busily 
working away. While Zhang spoke with them, and then set about surveying the site, his friends 
simply took up positions around the site and relaxed, continuing to chat, a couple of them climbing 
to sit on the roof of the unfinished restaurant and look out across the countryside. Zhang made a 
couple of small interventions in the building process—screwing in a lightbulb, checking some door 
hinges—and one of his friends leapt to offer him a screwdriver during this process. But soon his 
involvement was finished, too, and he joined his friends in hanging around the building site, while 
the hired labourers continued to work. 
When compared with scenes of housebuilding I witnessed in the same year in villages in the 
northwest of Yunnan, while still looking for a field site, the contrast could not be greater. In these 
‘backward’ villages, still without electricity, water, or a substantial cash economy, housebuilding 
continued as it has long done in rural China, through the collaboration of entire networks of 
neighbours and kin (Yan, 1996). Dozens of villagers could be seen hard at work on each building site, 
constructing houses out of rammed earth. The skills necessary to do this were found throughout the 
community, as housebuilding was a regular enough occurrence that most males had multiple 
opportunities to learn and practise. Unlike building a modern house, with electrical wiring and 
industrially produced materials, rammed earth construction simply requires earth, wood, water and 
manpower, and in the villages I visited in Yunnan, these methods were still in constant use. When a 
member of one’s kin network required help, one was obliged not only to show up, but to be seen to 
work hard to help construct the house. 
Why, then, this contrast? I asked Zhang why he had to rely on hired labourers. Constructing a 
modern building, he replied, required specialist knowledge and skills; it wasn’t just something you 
could do yourself. He needed an electrician, a plumber, people who knew how to mix and apply 
cement. Moreover, he had the cash to pay for this labour, and this was factored into his decision to 
build the restaurant at all. The technical requirements of this kind of construction do not begin to 
resemble simpler methods like rammed earth. When I asked Zhang why, if all the work was done by 
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hired labourers, he had to attend the building site at all, he explained that the labourers would only 
work if they were being watched. He had to pay them at the end of each day, because they did not 
trust him to pay them less frequently, and he did not trust them not to abscond and never return to 
the work site. Even with daily pay, he insisted that if he were not personally present, they would 
either not work at all, or deliberately do a shoddy job, which would then have to be repaired later. 
His friends, Zhang explained, were there to ‘help’, and when I asked them in each other’s presence, 
they emphatically agreed: it was important for them to come every weekend to ‘help’ with the 
construction, because Zhang needed it, and they were his friends. 
Later, I spoke privately with Pengyi, who was not a member of Zhang’s friendship group. Pengyi said 
that this sort of ‘helping’ behaviour was common when people built houses, that it wasn’t practical 
to give much actual help, but that Zhang’s friends went along because it was important to give him 
face, and to demonstrate that he had a ‘broad relationship network’ (guanxiwang hen guang). Other 
informants in Meibian confirmed this pattern: exchanges of housebuilding labour had been replaced 
by exchanges of a ritualistic display of friendship, masked in a vocabulary of ‘helping’. 
The same pattern appeared to recur in the village of Damo, a remote village in an economically 
underdeveloped area of Ningxia. Damo is home to a pig co-operative—the one surviving co-
operative in the county, out of many dozens which were founded on the initiative of an NGO backed 
by foreign aid. Even this co-operative, however, has struggled to attract the interest and 
involvement of villagers. The example of housebuilding may, again, help provide an answer as to 
why. 
Although Damo is in a poor region, its villagers are relatively well-off. The majority are shepherds,  
pig farmers, maize farmers, or some combination of the three. They benefit from relatively large 
plots of land, worked mainly by the middle-aged and elderly who remain in the village with their 
grandchildren, now that the majority of young people have emigrated to the cities. They benefit, too, 
from generous government subsidies, enabling them to build and live in relatively modern, spacious 
houses, constructed from concrete, with large glass windows, sliding doors, electricity, and often 
garishly modern fixtures bought from urban suppliers. Just as in Zhang’s case in Meibian, when I 
asked villagers who lived in these houses whether others in the village came to help out, they 
emphatically said yes. But when I pressed them, it became clear that most of the construction and 
repair work was carried out by hired labourers from the nearby city. While I was not able to observe 
house construction directly in Damo, numerous informants confirmed that the ‘helping’ that took 
place when their houses were built and repaired was not actually a matter of technical necessity, 
and could be thought of instead as a sort of friendly visit. 
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Without question, the construction and purchase of houses for young people throughout China is 
still supported financially by immediate kin, specifically parents. In urban areas, this generally means 
parents pay for an apartment, which is then constructed by a building firm. In rural areas, apart from 
provision of finance by parents, support for housebuilding by kin networks, except from in the 
poorest villages, appears to have become purely symbolic. 
This shift in construction methods extends also to infrastructure previously maintained through kin 
and neighbourhood networks. In Damo as in many other villages, collective infrastructure, such as 
roads and irrigation, is managed by the village government, which contracts hired labour to perform 
construction and maintenance, rather than relying on mobilising networks of locals. Thus the 
obviation of the old network-based construction and maintenance methods is complete. 
The implication, then, is that in the sphere of housebuilding and construction generally, the 
relational ethic as an organising principle has been rendered increasingly obsolete by technological 
progress, rising incomes, and the encroachment of the market economy. Technological progress in 
building techniques and materials has made it impractical to rely on unskilled village labour for 
construction and maintenance. Rising incomes have enabled even many relatively poor villagers to 
afford hired labour to perform construction. And the concomitant of these two forces is the 
marketisation of construction, and its removal from the sphere of personalistic organisation. While it 
continues in areas such as the aforementioned villages in Yunnan, where incomes are still too low to 
enable marketisation, the trend appears clear in other areas of the countryside. 
Nevertheless, it is notable that in both Meibian and Damo at the time of fieldwork, a ritual display of 
‘helping’ still accompanied housebuilding. Interpersonal relationships still retain immense value, and 
even if the material basis for the exchange of housebuilding assistance has dropped away, these 
events can still serve as opportunities to signal and reaffirm commitment to relationships. 
Indeed, a similar portrait is painted by Daniel Roberts (2013), in his study of the Zhejiang village of 
Wangcun. His informants, too, have ceased labour exchange in housebuilding, though they cite as 
reasons both the availability of contract labour, and the monetary sacrifice they would be 
demanding now that their associates would have to forego paid work elsewhere to help build. Unlike 
in Meibian, Wangcun villagers do not make a show of ‘helping’ in construction, but they similarly 
seem to shift from material interdependency to more purely affective ties; one of Roberts’ 
informants claims that the result of no longer depending on each other economically means that 
‘you have more connections and actually have more friends and family than before’. Thus although 
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Wangcun villagers are no longer enmeshed in a web of exchange relations, they continue to 
cultivate affective relationships. 
But it is questionable whether these affective relationships can be as effective as material 
interdependency in supporting co-operation when it becomes necessary. In Durkheimian terms, the 
material foundations of organic solidarity provided by the division of labour appear to have eroded 
away (Durkheim, 1984)3. In terms of models of indirect reciprocity outlined in chapter 3, this shift 
may be problematic in two ways. Firstly, by reducing the frequency and intensity of exchange, it 
provides less opportunity for individuals to establish and maintain trustworthiness. Secondly, a 
reduced dependency on the network lowers the costs4 of acquiring a bad reputation, and therefore 
reduces the effectiveness of sanctions, thus further reducing confidence in exchange. 
Has the attenuation of material interdependency undermined the Damo pig co-operative? While the 
co-operative was formally in operation, organising occasional bulk purchases of inputs for farmers, it 
had struggled to grow beyond this function. Jianguo, the mayor of Damo and one of the instigators 
of the co-operative, expressed dismay at the disinterest of the peasants. 
“I saw something on television about co-operatives in Henan. In fact, their conditions aren’t as good 
as here. Their population is high—many people, little land. Maybe in Henan there aren’t many co-
operatives. Their co-operatives are just like this little neighbourhood—this area, from here to here. 
But our co-operative is still not developed; its benefits have not yet manifested… The quality (suzhi) 
of rural people here is very low. Our members gradually get older and older—they are atrophying 
(tuihua). Here, land is plentiful, but people have little interest in working together.” 
This sense of social atomisation was perhaps a reflection of the overall mode of life of the villagers. 
Geographically, Damo is spread over a large, sparsely populated area, and has no public spaces or 
obvious central point. With large plots of land apportioned to each household, and little in between, 
most villagers either drive or ride a motorbike even to visit their neighbours. 
There is much free time when neither the maize nor the animals require attention, and this time is 
typically filled by entertainment. For many, this involves a great deal of alcohol. Many of the men 
                                                          
3
 Here, ‘solidarity’ means social cohesion. Durkheim (1984, p. 84) argues that mechanical solidarity arises from 
uniformity of personality, in which individual and collective consciousness coincide; while the division of labour 
produces organic solidarity because while specialisation leads to psychic differentiation, material 
interdependence necessitates cohesion between differentiated individuals. In light of processes of 
individualisation in China, Durkheim’s notion of mechanical solidarity does not strictly apply. Nevertheless, his 
claim that material interdependence undergirds social cohesion in a differentiated society is apposite. 
4
 Again, defined as the consequences—social, material or otherwise—which result in a lower probability that 
the individual will be imitated or otherwise transmit his or her behaviours to others (cf. p. 15 above). 
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begin drinking in the morning, either alone or with one or two friends at home. For women and men 
alike, the most social form of entertainment available is mah-jong. A few households boast elaborate 
robotic self-resetting mah-jong tables, with lights and sound effects. These households function from 
time to time as a sort of social hub, where villagers while away the hours gambling and chatting 
about their children in the cities and their grandchildren, who attend school in a nearby town. 
But the principal form of entertainment is as atomised as the geography of the village. Nearly every 
household has a television, and villagers spend an inordinate amount of time in their own houses, 
watching television alone or with their spouses. The elderly couple with whom I stayed, a 
groundskeeper of an abandoned school and his wife, did little else, spending practically all day in 
front of the television together silently. As I visited house after house for interviews and social visits, 
I was invariably greeted by the sound of the television on arriving, and more often than not the 
members of the household would be sat in front of it at any time of day. The most popular 
programming was consistently set in and broadcast from the metropolises of eastern China. From 
soap operas to factual programmes about police dogs in Shenzhen or new kitchen designs in 
Guangzhou, the villagers spent most of their days absorbing themselves in the dream of urban 
China—a place and lifestyle few had experienced, but which their faraway children might 
conceivably be living. 
Thus Damo exhibits the classic sense of ‘spectralisation’ of the countryside (Yan, 2003). With the 
young gone, the children expected to go, and the apparent future lying in total urbanisation, there 
seems to be little sense in committing oneself to communal life. As the villagers no longer need each 
other for material exchange either, interactions seem to be principally based on affective ties and 
the desire to pass time in a more enjoyable way, rather than the need for mutual aid. It would seem 
that much of the basis that sustained the relational ethic has fallen away. In place of a complex web 
of intertwined material and affective exchange relations, there is only co-residence and affiliative 
interaction; thus the relational ethic itself has been increasingly abandoned, in favour of a different, 
less interdependent mode of life. 
The implications of this for the co-operative were spelled out starkly by one of its members, a pig 
farmer in his fifties. 
“Life has got better since I was a boy—much better. Before, there were no televisions, no cars. Now 
our children can go to the cities to work. They can buy modern apartments. So we don’t have any big 
problems here. That’s why this co-operative—I think I am a member—but what does it do? I don’t 
understand very clearly, but I can’t say I’ve really thought about it.” 
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These effects can be seen, too, in wealthier communities. Quyuan Egg Co-operative, in the Shandong 
countryside, is located in a fairly developed patch of countryside near a city. The manager explained 
that the co-operative had strict procedures for admitting new members. Applicants had to go 
through a trial membership period of 6 months, to make sure that they would not harm the interests 
of the co-operative, and to make sure they that they demonstrated ‘integrity’ (chengxin). 
“Integrity is the most important criterion for accepting new members. If someone wants to join, we 
must evaluate their integrity. So, we have a six month trial period for new members. We want to 
make sure they will not quarrel with other members, spread gossip, or damage harmony… No, in fact 
no one has ever done these things. But as a modern business, integrity is very important to us.” 
This particular co-operative not only did not engage in any collective labour, it also lacked even the 
type of public goods problem exhibited by the organic vegetable co-operative. It was, then, puzzling 
that the manager emphasised integrity, given the low interdependence between members. Later, in 
private, an assistant who was present in the interview expressed cynical frustration: ‘What is 
chengxin anyway? It can mean anything to anyone. It’s just a word you see in business books and 
people say it without a clear meaning or purpose.’ Later, another manager at the co-operative gave 
a different view of their acceptance criteria: they simply recruited new members who happened to 
have land which abutted that of existing members. It was a co-operative of neighbours; and the 
careful screen process described by the manager appeared to be of little actual importance. 
“We are all neighbours here. If you have a piece of land next to mine, you can join… ‘Integrity’? Of 
course, this village is like anywhere—some people are good, some people are bad. But these days, it’s 
hard to know. So many people come and go between here and the city—it’s not like the past, you 
don’t necessarily know everyone well. So if someone has a chicken farm, and it’s not too far away, 
that’s enough.” 
These examples illustrate the possibility that for some communities, the social fabric may be 
changing in a way that vitiates pre-existing informal co-operation patterns. If the relational ethic is a 
form of indirect reciprocity, then this is unsurprising. Not only can indirect reciprocity be 
undermined by the reduction of interdependency; rapid migration can be expected to undermine it 
by reducing the likelihood that exchange relationships will continue long enough to make sanctions 
work. Having the option of migrating to the city reduces the drawbacks of local social exclusion, thus 
potentially giving more weight to the threat that co-operative members will withdraw from a co-
operative, as the Taoyuan Vegetable Co-operative head suggested. And when people do emigrate, 
the network may be left too sparsely populated to serve its original function. 
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This section has argued that co-operatives have been buffeted by economic and migratory forces for 
two sets of reasons. Firstly, these changes have exposed co-operatives to competition and costs with 
which many could not cope, leading them to fold, or to convert themselves into private companies. 
Secondly, economic development, marketisation and migration may work to undermine the 
functional basis of the relational ethic as a form of indirect reciprocity, thus removing the informal 
mechanisms which might have allowed co-operatives to thrive, similarly to the pre-revolutionary co-
operatives, in lieu of enforcement of formal co-operative rules. 
5.3 The shadow of history 
The experience of the co-operatives has been influenced not only by present trends, but by the past, 
too. In general, there is little awareness of the concept of a co-operative. What everyone is aware of, 
however dimly, is the historical notion of a people’s commune, and the near-universally accepted 
view, officially endorsed, that these communes, along with the Cultural Revolution and other 
experiments of the Mao era, were a catastrophic failure5. For many older people, these topics 
remain taboo, but there is a nascent curiosity among the young. One day in a Meibian park, I asked 
Liang, a 26 year-old friend, what he knew about the communes. 
“When I was a child, no one would talk about these things. Most people still don’t really know what 
happened. At the time, they didn’t know either. My grandparents thought there was only a famine in 
Meibian. They had no idea it was happening in other provinces, or throughout the country. 
Nowadays, we can use the Internet to find out more, but it’s still a sensitive topic. Of course, 
everyone knows it was a very difficult time, that there were some big mistakes. The people’s 
communes were just too extreme—they couldn’t work.” 
Differentiating co-operatives from the people’s communes and the historical trauma with which 
they are associated has been a consistent challenge for the co-operative movement. Mr Chang of 
the Meibian Co-operative Federation described a typical reaction encountered by his staff in training 
workshops. 
“When we’re in the training process, there are some people who understand, they know what kind of 
concept a co-operative is. But more people say, ‘This co-operative, isn’t it a people’s commune?’ 
Their awareness is not great. So in this situation, we discuss it together. We make a comparison 
                                                          
5
 The argument of this section is not that this commonly accepted construal is wholly accurate. Indeed, the 
notion of a people’s commune held by many of my informants perhaps predominantly reflects the experience 
of the Great Leap Forward, rather than the years that followed (cf. the historical account in chapter 3 above). 
But that notion—which may be as much a product of reform-era political agendas as of any personal 
experience—may itself be an obstacle to some forms of co-operation. 
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between co-operatives and people’s communes. A co-operative is a new kind of thing, a self-help and 
mutual aid exchange group. We explain international co-operative principles, discuss with them.” 
The aversion to anything resembling a people’s commune is, however, more specific than a vague 
suspicion. It revolves around a common understanding that the Achilles’ heel of the communes was 
their adoption of a reward system unrelated to individual effort levels, so that regardless of the work 
each member did, he or she could consume an equal proportion of the commune’s products. This 
situation is commonly referred to with the phrase ‘chi da guo fan’, or ‘[all] eating out of one big rice 
pot’. As the normal custom is for rice to be served out in equal portions into individual bowls before 
consumption, the implication is that the communes, by failing to police the effort and reward of 
each member, allowed individuals to take advantage of the group, thus leading the others to stop 
investing effort, too. That is to say, the common understanding reflects the notion that this was, as 
chapter 3 suggested, a classic free-riding problem. That this is the central concern is reflected again 
in the response Chang has received from numerous peasants in his workshops. 
“From the point of view of human nature, anywhere in the world, human nature has a problem of 
selfishness. Now if you want to talk about the members of a co-operative, their conditions are 
different. Some of them, their economic conditions are good, they have more money. Some are 
relatively poor. They stand to gain more from development. So in this process, there will be some 
internal conflicts… That’s why we emphasise that you have to have a clear rule about how to 
distribute the proceeds—for example, giving an equal proportion to each member. Without clear 
rules, you don’t know who it should go to. If it continues like this it turns into a new people’s 
commune. This is very bad!” 
Moreover, the problem extends not only to the distribution of proceeds, but to the pooling of any 
kind of resources, including land or tools. Such pooling would bear a close structural resemblance to 
the free-riding problem in the communes. Thus Zhao, the academic and activist quoted in chapter 2, 
emphasised that co-operatives could only be established if there were no such pooling. 
“If you want [people] to start a co-operative, you cannot require them to share land, share tools. No 
one would trust this, because they fear others will take advantage of them… That’s why whenever we 
start a co-operative, we emphasise that each family’s land must be kept separate. Property rights 
should be very clear. Any other way would just not work.” 
That is not to say that land is never cultivated with the help of inter-household co-operation. In the 
Junliu Grain Co-operative, members rely extensively on the help of their neighbours and kin in the 
village, who are typically also members, for harvesting and ploughing their plots of land. However, 
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this co-operation takes place by means of the network of interpersonal ties spanning the village, 
following the pattern of the relational ethic, rather than within the auspices of the co-operative. The 
co-operative has neither joined together plots of land for large scale cultivation nor enabled the 
purchase of shared equipment, the maintenance of which would itself present a free-riding problem. 
Instead, the pre-existing network of labour exchange in the village has continued unaffected by the 
founding of the grain co-operative. 
In general, then, there seems to be a preference for means of co-operation in which the outcome is 
easily monitored, and therefore easily sanctioned. Xiao Zhang, the young Meibian man building a 
restaurant, thus claimed that he had to remain personally at the site to monitor the builders he 
hired, without exception: 
“I have to come here every weekend when a labourer is here. If I don’t, he won’t do any work. If I go 
away to eat lunch, maybe he won’t do anything, or maybe he will do it very badly. And I have to pay 
him at the end of every day for that day’s work. Otherwise, he won’t trust me to pay him at all, so he 
won’t come back tomorrow. It’s always like this when you hire labourers.” 
Both Zhang and the workers refused to hold up their end of the bargain without being able to verify 
immediately that the other would do the same. Similarly, dyadic exchanges, like the labour exchange 
in Junliu, can be easily monitored, and buttressed by a system of indirect reciprocity, they allow for 
co-operation without requiring individuals to trust others to behave well when unobserved. But 
there are many co-operation problems which cannot be translated into dyadic exchange. In some 
cases, there are workarounds. Thus managers of Junliu adopted the practice of leaving their account 
books on a desk in an open office for all members to inspect at will. 
“When we founded the co-operative, some people were a bit suspicious. If we manage the accounts, 
how can they be sure we will treat them fairly? How can they be sure we won’t use the money for 
ourselves? So we decided that nothing should be secret. The account books are open—they can look 
at the books whenever they want.” 
It is tempting to interpret these patterns as reflecting a lack of trust, perhaps stemming from the 
memory of the betrayals of the Cultural Revolution and similar events (Govier, 1997, p. 164). 
Sociologists attempting to measure ‘trust’ and other components of social capital in China have, 
however, produced conflicting results. Surveys based on asking respondents to rate their general 
level of trust in others have found that China is an outlier, apparently displaying surprisingly high 
levels of trust (Tan & Tambyah, 2010). However, breaking down the question by asking about trust in 
specific categories of people—close kin, friends, neighbours and so on—results in a rather different 
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pattern: high trust in friends and close kin, low trust in strangers, and moderate levels in fellow 
villagers (Huhe, et al., 2015). This ‘particularised trust’ is consistent with the logic of the relational 
ethic, and indeed, some have suggested that its roots lie not in recent events, but in that older 
cultural pattern (Fukuyama, 2001; Pye, 1999). Still, recent studies have found that levels of 
‘generalised trust’ have a strong negative association with the intensity of Cultural Revolution 
activity in each locality (Wu, 2016); while generalised trust as a whole shows a declining trend, but is 
particularly low for those who came of age during the Mao period (Hu, 2015). 
While anthropologists may question the methodological soundness of measuring trust in this way, 
these studies suggest important patterns. As the ethnographic evidence suggests, too, the relational 
ethic proved surprisingly resilient in the face of the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution. However, 
the increasing atomisation of society risks reducing the domain of interaction governed by that ethic, 
at least in the rural communities discussed above. Meanwhile, the notion that trust in others in 
general is declining is consistent with the discourse of moral decay and ‘safety’. 
It is difficult to disentangle which strands of this story lead to the open accounting book in Junliu Co-
operative, and Xiao Zhang’s insistence that he must always watch his workmen. For the relational 
ethic as a system of co-operation does not rely on the assumption that people will behave well 
outside of observable dyadic exchanges. And here, perhaps, is where methodological difficulties 
with trust research become problematic. To ‘trust’ that an exchange partner will reciprocate—a 
monitorable and therefore sanctionable response—is a different thing from ‘trusting’ someone to 
behave well in the absence of all monitoring. The former is, for example, the understanding of the 
term xinyong (‘trust’) amongst the overseas Chinese traders studied by Kiong and Kee (1998). But as 
we have seen, it appears to be the latter kind of ‘trust’ that was undermined by the experience of 
the People’s Communes—though as a concept foreign to the relational ethic, it may never have had 
much purchase. The account books are kept open, then, because there is no clear way of 
transforming the problem into one of dyadic, monitorable exchange; but perhaps Xiao Zhang’s 
attitude reflects not a decline of trust, but continuity with long-established practice. 
That practice is, of course, capable of supporting co-operation in many conditions. For the relational 
ethic, understood as a form of indirect reciprocity, is, in part, a system for supporting what some 
have called ‘co-operation without trust’ (Cook, et al., 2005). On the one hand, the shadow of history 
may mean simply an aversion to practices which seem, like the People’s Communes, to require trust. 
On the other hand, whether through the lasting damage of the Cultural Revolution to the social 
fabric, or through more recent atomisation discussed above, history seems, too, to weigh heavily 
even on the forms of co-operation which do not. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter began by asking why so many co-operatives appear to have vanished. To answer that 
question, it has examined the experience co-operatives have had of a variety of challenges: the lack 
of formal rule enforcement in the contemporary politico-legal system; rapid marketisation and mass 
migration; and the historical trauma associated with memories of the Mao era. Co-operatives and 
activists alike have confronted these problems in a variety of creative ways. Some of these solutions 
have led to the dissolution or corporatisation of co-operatives, while others have maintained them, 
whilst carefully avoiding intractable problems of co-operation and trust. 
What these experiences have in common is the ways in which they reflect the efforts of ordinary 
people to cope with an opaque and rapidly shifting social fabric. The activists and institutions 
described in the previous chapter have attempted to propagate a consciously designed economic 
model based on international standards, but the shifting sands on which that model has been placed 
mean that its practical implications are variable and unpredictable. While the provision of resources 
to the co-operative movement may crowd out the motivation to comply with co-operative principles, 
this chapter has shown that at the same time, the political, social and economic context renders the 
implementation of those principles particularly difficult. 
In response to this problem, many co-operatives have succeeded by avoiding problems of resource 
pooling and collective action. The next chapter will argue that there is one form of collective action 
problem which they cannot avoid: that of member participation in decision-making. 
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6. Participation as a collective action problem 
Chapter 5 argued that many co-operatives survive by working around problems of trust, assiduously 
avoiding the sorts of co-operation that would require a reliance on individual good will or collective 
orientation. But there is one domain in which co-operatives cannot avoid these sorts of problems, 
because it is a key aspect of what defines them as co-operatives. That is the domain of member 
participation, or so-called ‘democratic management’—the idea that the co-operative not only 
belongs to members as a shared resource, but must be controlled collectively by its members. 
As the discussion thus far has already suggested, member participation is widely considered to be 
severely lacking, by co-operative members, activists, and leaders alike. When members do not 
participate, this does not stop decisions being made. Instead, co-operatives tend to default to a 
hierarchical leadership style in which decisions are made from the top-down, and if the results are 
poor, members often vote with their feet, by leaving the co-operative when it fails to benefit them. 
This pattern demands explanation. On the one hand, one might imagine the preponderance of top-
down decision-making results from a power relation, in which leaders make use of their greater 
social and economic resources to dominate the co-operative against the wishes of their members. 
The first section of this chapter will offer evidence that this may, indeed, be one strand of the story. 
However, even leaders with hierarchical tendencies often express frustration that they receive little 
feedback or information from members. There is reason to believe that for members, participation 
represents the kind of collective action problem discussed in chapter 3: the individual costs of 
participation are simply too high relative to the potential benefits6. The second section will elaborate 
on this suggestion. The following section will propose a combined model, in which paternalistic 
leadership exacerbates the collective action problem, which in turn reinforces the strength of 
hierarchy as a means to avoid deadlock. Finally, the last section will argue that the use of hierarchical 
coordination as a default mode is underpinned by a deeper hierarchical principle in Chinese culture 
and social structure—a principle the basis of which has been transformed by socialism and post-
socialism, but the effects of which continue to be felt in every domain of life. 
It should be noted that the evidence presented here is interview-based. Because of the multi-sited 
nature of the fieldwork and the sporadic timing of meetings, it was not possible to observe co-
operative meetings directly. However, interviews with leaders, activists and members provided 
                                                          
6
 Again, the use of these terms throughout this chapter should not be taken to imply a rational choice model, 
or even that conscious decision-making is at work. ‘Costs’ and ‘benefits’ here refer to changes in circumstance 
which affect the probability the individual will be imitated or will otherwise transmit the relevant behaviours 
to others (cf. p. 15 above) 
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ample evidence of goings-on both during and between meetings, and how meetings often seemed 
to be less salient to members than co-operative ideals would suggest. 
6.1 Decision-making and the leader’s prerogative 
Garden Products Co-operative is a small fruit co-operative in the countryside outside of Haibian. 
They were founded in 2008 at the instigation of Qianfeng, a village man who had heard of the new 
co-operative law and convinced a group of 14 friends to join him in this new enterprise. Qianfeng 
was the leader from the beginning, and has formed a bridge between the co-operative and its 
sponsors in the nearby Co-operative Institute. Though Garden Products Co-operative has, like many 
other co-operatives, an office wallpapered with copies of the co-operative law and explanations of 
international co-operative principles, Qianfeng was remarkably candid about his own management 
style: 
“According to the co-operative law, every member has a right to participate in decision-making. But 
the market changes every year, every day. And a lot of members don’t understand it, they don’t 
know even the most basic things about the way the market works. For example, what to sell, how to 
market it, and for how much—deciding the price—the members don’t know how to decide these 
things. Even when the members think they have a good idea to make a decision for the co-operative, 
the decision may not be very good for its development. So the management committee won’t accept 
their vote. As general manager, I will make the decision, not the members. Of course, in the 
production process, every member has the right to vote on how to make production better, but 
anything serious—how to make a contract, when we should sign it—on these issues, not every 
member knows all the details. So I should control every detail.” 
For this co-operative manager, it was clear that the principle of democratic management could not 
take priority over the overriding purpose of the co-operative, to provide a material benefit to its 
members. Moreover, because the members lacked the education and sophistication of the 
management, it was necessary for the management to fulfil a paternalistic duty to ensure that the 
co-operative would thrive. Far from being resisted by the members, Qianfeng claimed that they 
were satisfied with this arrangement from the beginning, and that the principles of co-operatives 
had never been especially important to them. 
“When we established the co-operative, no one came up with any ideas apart from me. Many people 
didn’t understand what a co-operative was, what they should do, what kind of production it would 
involve. I explained to them many times that their advice, their ideas were important. But how to 
choose, how to make decisions, how to give better advice—this is a matter of development. The 
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leader must say yes or no. We had to make an example out of the co-operative, to show the peasants 
the advantages, because no peasant knew the advantages of co-operatives. They had no concept of 
co-operatives. So of course they may give me advice, but the most important thing is that I take the 
decisions.” 
There were, then, several important aspects of Qianfeng’s attitude toward member participation. 
First, he felt that in spite of the protestations of the literature and training he accepted from the Co-
operative Institute, the concept of democratic management was not particularly central to what 
made the co-operative a co-operative. Instead, it was at best an abstract ideal which must, at least 
for the foreseeable future, be deferred to ensure the right decisions were taken. Second, Qianfeng 
was at pains to emphasise that although he attempted to elicit ‘advice’ from his members, they were 
unwilling to contribute ideas and feedback, particularly in the early stages of the co-operative. 
Finally, he appeared to hold the view that, regardless of the feedback he received from members, it 
was his responsibility and his prerogative to take the final decision about important matters within 
the co-operative. 
This admixture of justifications for top-down decision-making was also reflected in interviews with 
ordinary members of Garden Products Co-operative. Lixin, a female member in her early forties, 
who had joined the co-operative upon its founding, explained it thus: 
“Democratic management? Yes, this is a very important co-operative principle. But I’m not really 
interested in management. Maybe I have some ideas for how to help my family improve production. 
But I wouldn’t want to suggest these to the co-operative. That’s the leader’s responsibility, and 
anyway, our ideas don’t matter much. Why should I cause a conflict or a disagreement? I would be 
ignored anyway. Better to let the leader do his job, and let us ordinary folk (laobaixing) do our job.” 
These sentiments raise an important question. For while it appears that in this case, the notion of 
member participation is dismissed out of hand by both managers and members as being impractical 
or undesirable, it is not clear what is driving this dismissal. On the one hand, Qianfeng expresses 
frustration at the difficulty he has had eliciting member participation; while Lixin’s explanation 
suggests an attitude of indifference or impassivity toward the management of the co-operative. On 
the other hand, there is a prima facie case for suggesting that Qianfeng’s own paternalistic attitude, 
and the power he derives from his role as founder of the co-operative, and therefore as broker 
between the co-operative and external institutions and markets, supply him with both the motive 
and the means to exert top-down control and quash any dissent amongst his members, running the 
co-operative as his own personal fief. 
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However, while in this case, the relationship between the paternalistic attitude of the leader and the 
lack of member participation appears evident, participation problems in other co-operatives suggest 
there may be more to this relationship than straightforward domination. 
6.2 Member participation as a public goods problem 
I first met with Jianguo, the mayor of Damo, on a cold winter morning, at his house on the outskirts 
of the village. He and an old friend, both weathered men in their forties, sat at his kitchen table, 
smoking and chatting while his wife prepared lunch. Like most people in Damo, he had little to do at 
this time of year, so he invited me to sit and drink, to pass the time. We drank and smoked for a long 
while, playing a drinking game lackadaisically until the effects of the baijiu made themselves felt, and 
he began to talk. 
“It’s not easy being mayor of this village. The people don’t want to listen to me, they aren’t 
interested. I do it because I am a Marxist, I am a Party member, and I must serve the people. I also do 
it because I want face, of course I want face. But basically, I must try to serve the peasants, even if 
they are still very traditional, and do not want to listen to me.” 
It transpired that Jianguo was not only mayor, but had for a time been director of the local co-
operative, and had liaised with the state and with an international NGO to secure the resources to 
create it. He saw himself as being apart from other villagers—a member of an enlightened vanguard 
trying to help the backward countryside. This sense of being apart was consonant with the general 
social atomisation of Damo, noted in the previous chapter. Jianguo’s feeling of distance from the 
local social network may have been a reflection of the fragmentation of the network itself. 
However, when the conversation turned to problems of the co-operative and of village governance, 
this sense of fragmentation took on a new light. 
“Our co-operative is not yet mature; its benefits have not yet manifested. People’s thinking is still not 
liberated (jiefang). If they can liberate their thinking, to make the co-operative serve the members, 
then they can do it. In China, the leadership (lingdao ceng), our thinking is liberated. But most 
people’s thinking is not. Their worldview is traditional, old-fashioned. My thinking is open and 
liberated. I consider everyone’s interests—individual, collective, national—especially national. But 
ordinary people don’t. They just think of their own interests. Their cultural level is very low. The 
quality of their character (suzhi) is very low.” 
This use of vanguardist language reflected Jianguo’s training and role within the Party and the state 
apparatus. His invocation of suzhi reflects a broader discursive pattern in the reform-era, in which 
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many problems are blamed on low suzhi (Judd, 2002; Jeffery, 2000), and all manner of policies are 
justified by their potential to raise it (Yan, 2003). But it also chimes with Jianguo’s general sense of 
frustration and detachment from his fellow villagers, rationalising both his alienation from them and 
his legitimacy (Thøgersen, 2002, pp. 213-214). Most important, perhaps, was his eagerness to 
present himself as a selfless volunteer, serving the nation, in contradistinction to the relatively self-
centred attitude of the peasants whom he attempted to lead. This self-centred attitude, according to 
Jianguo, was at the root of the problems of the co-operative. 
“If their thinking is not liberated, they just consider their own advantage (liyi). They haven’t thought, 
‘If my co-operative develops, then through the development of the co-operative, I also benefit’. Right 
now, they are just thinking of their own advantage. They don’t think about developing the co-
operative and how it would bring benefits. So their thinking is not liberated. They need a long time, to 
struggle to open their thinking. They must learn to disregard (paokai) their own interest; then it will 
be resolved. This is the disease of the co-operatives—individual interests are not disregarded. In a co-
operative you must have a spirit of devotion (fengxian jingshen), you must surpass your individual 
interests, not just think how much you can get for your own family, but how much you can get for 
everyone. So co-operative development is not very easy.” 
This reflection appears perhaps to suggest a collectivist sentiment, and certainly Jianguo’s comments 
about the ‘low cultural level’ are typical of Communist Party cadres, both today and in the socialist 
period. Indeed, while some have suggested that the function of suzhi discourse is to shift blame onto 
individuals to justify neoliberal policies (Anagnost, 2004; Pun, 2003), Jianguo’s sentiments tend to 
support the view that, on the contrary, suzhi can be used to discuss policies of all kinds, including 
those contrary to neoliberalism (Kipnis, 2007). However, this self-described Marxist had no nostalgia 
for collectivism. I pressed him on whether the old collectivism was closer to what he advocated, but 
he shook his head: the old attitude was one of blind ‘worship’ (chongbai), which was not desirable. 
“In that time, the sixties and seventies, people worshipped great men like Mao Zedong and Zhou 
Enlai. Whatever those great men said in Beijing, our laobaixing in Damo would all accept it. After the 
reform and opening up, their thinking changed. We don’t just accept whatever Hu Jintao or Xi Jinping 
say today. The laobaixing have their own thoughts. Their thinking is, ‘I have my freedom, you have 
your policies’. The Communist Party’s policies are good, of course, but the laobaixing has its own 
ideas. ‘What I want to do, I do’. What he doesn’t want to do, he doesn’t do.” 
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Indeed, his proposal to remedy the problem that members did not see the benefit of the co-
operative was not to replace this attitude with a collectivist spirit, but simply to show them, through 
experience, that the co-operative could benefit their family. 
“In a short period of time, this situation is very hard to change. It must be changed through practice, 
through showing results. People must see that if the co-operative develops, they also receive a 
benefit. Only in this way can it change.” 
Thus the problem, for him, was not a lack of collectivist spirit, which was not the solution anyway, 
but a lack of confidence in the idea that the co-operative would deliver for its members. He had not 
asked members to invest money or land, as this was principally a marketing co-operative; nor had he 
asked them to sacrifice time or labour. The difficulty was a different one. 
“To me, I feel I’m a member of the co-operative. I’m in the co-operative, and I can receive a benefit. I 
can make an effort for the co-operative, think of ways to make it better. But other members don’t 
think this way. What we need are new ideas, and here, there aren’t any… For the co-operative to 
develop, you need new things, innovation to serve members. This is how you attract their interest. I 
always tried to do this, but after I retired as leader, there are no new things. They resist innovations, 
they’re afraid of risks. Why? It’s a problem of participation. No one wants to make suggestions to 
make things better.” 
The investment he was asking for and not receiving, then, was participation. But why? Surely co-
operative meetings provided ample opportunity for members to give feedback and suggest new 
ideas. 
“Every time we have a meeting, I explain to them, ‘If you have any suggestions, just say them’. But 
they never speak. If someone has a good idea, he won’t say anything about it. If he speaks, he might 
anger someone, have a conflict with them. So if he disagrees with something, he won’t say it. And if 
he makes a proposal, whether others accept his proposal or not, he doesn’t know what will come of it. 
Maybe he doesn’t know all the implications, so his suggestion will harm the interests of the others. If 
it might harm their interests, he doesn’t want to speak. He would lose face (mianzi). You made a 
suggestion, but what you said harmed me. So then you don’t want to speak.” 
There was, then, a risk involved in public participation. But could someone with a suggestion 
approach him privately and avoid the risk of face loss? 
“No. In that case, it’s not a problem of face. It’s a problem of participation (canyu). If he has a good 
idea, if it has an advantage for his family, he’ll do it. But he doesn’t want to tell it to the co-operative 
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leader. He doesn’t want to speak. He thinks, after he says it, if it doesn’t work out… this kind of 
thinking. It’s not that he doesn’t want others to benefit. He just doesn’t want to participate.” 
The problem extended not only to proposals and criticisms, but even to positive feedback. 
“If I do my work badly, of course they won’t tell me. They’ll say it behind my back, when I’m not 
around. They won’t say if I have a weakness, or if I’ve made a mistake. But neither will they tell you if 
you’ve done things right. They won’t say good things either. Why? ‘I speak about my own business, 
not about others. If he does a good job, that’s all right—if he does a bad job, that’s also all right.’ 
They prefer not to speak. If they say something, it’s as if they’re saying they’re special (liwai). If other 
people don’t speak, then I also won’t speak. So their thinking is not liberated.” 
For Jianguo, then, these were the two fundamental problems holding back the co-operative and the 
village. On the one hand, the risks of participating in decision-making were too high, because of the 
possibility of conflict, or worse, because one’s ideas might have bad results, leading to face loss. On 
the other hand, as far as he was concerned, the villagers simply could not be bothered to participate 
or give feedback, positive or negative. It was safer and easier for them to sit back and allow the 
leader to take responsibility. 
Interviews with Damo villagers shed more light on this. Bai, a pig farmer and member of the co-
operative, explained, 
“I’ve been a member of the co-operative since the beginning. I don’t really see any difference—no 
one knows what it does. Sure, I’ve been to a few meetings. But they’re a bit boring. I don’t know why 
I should participate. Here in Damo, if you want to get something done, you do it yourself—if I have to 
fix my roof, I hire someone from the town nearby, or I ask my cousin for help. It’s not my 
responsibility to solve the problems of the village. That’s up to the government, and the leaders. Why 
should I make suggestions in a meeting? Others would only think I was arrogant, and anyway, it’s not 
my business. My family is my business. Collective problems are not my business.” 
Some other villagers were not even sure if they were members of the co-operative or not. Wei, 
another middle-aged pig farmer, could not be sure: 
“Co-operative? I don’t really know. I know we have the village, the village work groups (xiaozu)—
that’s the village government, when they want to fix the roads, they organise it through the village 
work groups. What is a co-operative? I’ve heard it’s not the same as a people’s commune, but I really 
don’t understand about these things. Yes, there are meetings—village meetings, farmer’s meetings. 
But this is not something I understand. Politics, administration. How can I participate when I don’t 
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know about these things? It’s best for me to pay attention to managing my own affairs, and let the 
leaders manage those problems.”  
Thus in Damo, it seems clear that even when the leader of the co-operative and the village 
attempted to elicit participation in decision-making, villagers were reluctant to take part openly. 
Both in meetings and in direct conversation with leadership figures, they described a reluctance to 
speak their mind. 
In part, this was described as a question of risking face loss. Face could be lost here for a number of 
reasons. If one’s suggestion were to come into conflict with the ideas of others, one might risk open 
conflict, which itself would result in a loss of face; worse, one might lose face by causing others to 
lose face, either by undermining their views or by drawing them into open conflict. Moreover, by 
speaking out when others tended not to, there appears to have been a risk that one might appear to 
think of oneself as different or better somehow from the rest—thus inviting criticism and possibly 
retribution for inappropriately attempting to rise above one’s station. Finally, if one’s suggestion 
were to be adopted, but resulted in an unfavourable outcome, one would risk being blamed for the 
unfavourable outcome—while keeping quiet along with others, even in response to a bad decision 
by the leader, could not result in face loss, because any individual’s silence would be 
indistinguishable from that of the others, so only the leader could be held responsible. 
In addition to face loss, Damo villagers talked about participation in terms of a dichotomy between 
what was their ‘business’—the affairs of their family—and what was not—the affairs of the co-
operative, village, and public sphere in general. This mirrors recurring classical dichotomies across 
China between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ (Brandtstädter, 2009, pp. 161-162; Judge, 2005), and between 
the particularistic moral world of networks and the non-moral world of interactions governed by 
non-network principles (Wong, 1985; De Glopper, 1972). 
What lay behind this placing of the co-operative in the sphere outside the ‘business’ of the 
household? One possibility is that it was simply a conceptual primitive. That is, we might imagine 
that the co-operative lay within a conceptual domain which could not, by its very nature, be 
subsumed within the domain of the family, and therefore it was unthinkable that the affairs of the 
co-operative could become important. Perhaps any institution governed by formalistic, bureaucratic 
procedures, rather than by interpersonal exchange, is simply taken to be outside the domain of 
importance for ordinary life. Or perhaps the perception that the co-operative is backed by the state 
leads to the presumption that the state will take responsibility for its affairs, and that individuals 
cannot, or should not, involve themselves in it. 
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Certainly, there is reason to believe that for many people in Damo and elsewhere, involvement in 
the political domain is viewed with suspicion, and for some, associated with the chaos and trauma of 
the past. Baiwei, a sixty-year old Damo peasant, explained, 
“Yes, life has got better and is always getting better. The Party has made wise decisions. Sometimes 
local officials make trouble, but this is not the fault of the Chinese government. We all support our 
leaders and the Party—some people like to criticise and complain, but what’s the point in that? When 
I was young we talked about politics all the time, and what good did it bring? Today we know it is 
better to leave politics to others—I prefer to look after my family, to drink, play mahjong and watch 
TV.” 
However, it would be rash to draw the conclusion that individuals are unwilling to enter into the 
domains of politics and bureaucratic organisation, when there is a clear advantage for them or their 
associates. It goes without saying that across China, countless millions of people have involved 
themselves in bureaucratic structures of the state and the private sector in an effort to better their 
own lot and that of their families. In Damo, the mayor, by his own admission, is in part motivated to 
continue his Party membership and political position by the benefits he draws personally from these 
roles. If there is a reluctance to involve oneself in bureaucratic or state domains, it is not so strong as 
to override individual and familial interest. 
Another possibility is that the conceptualisation of the co-operative as outside the business of 
households is masking a power relation, in which the leaders of the co-operative and the village 
dominate decision-making, leading ordinary people to ‘keep to themselves’. That is, it could be that 
the situation described above in Haibian Garden Products Co-operative is mirrored in Damo, but 
masked by an ideological construct which leads members to describe the co-operative as not ‘their 
business’. It is difficult, however, to find support for this position in the statements of either the 
members or the leader; instead, they paint a picture of a leader who is struggling to engage his 
members, and who may have materially lost from his inability to elicit their participation—as the 
lack of member engagement has led to the stagnation of the co-operative, and threatens the village 
with a drying-up of access to funds provided by the state and international donors. 
Perhaps, however, there is another explanation. Contrary to the claims of the mayor, it may be that 
face loss is a consideration, even when feedback is ostensibly given privately. Villagers cannot be 
sure that their private communications with the leader will remain private, and even if these consist 
in nothing more than telling him quietly over a drink that he has done well, there is always a risk that 
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news of this interaction will spread, and the consequences will be the same as they would be if this 
were done in a public meeting. As one villager put it, 
“Of course, we all have our own opinions about what the local leadership is doing. This village has its 
problems. So we complain to each other—but no one wants to talk directly to the leaders. Sometimes 
they ask us, ‘What about this, what about that?’ But you don’t really want to say. You just say, 
everything is all right. Better not to cause a conflict, to let others know you disagree. Even if they ask 
you in private, this is a small village. People would find out quickly.” 
Moreover, if face loss and relationship damage is the potential cost of participation, whether public 
or private, it may also be that the benefits of participating are too small or uncertain to outweigh the 
risk of face loss. The co-operative has not yet provided substantial benefits to its members, and 
there seems to be little enthusiasm for it in the village, in part because it is unclear what benefits it 
may bring. This is reflected in the mayor’s view that the only way to elicit member participation is for 
the co-operative to bring benefits to its members, so they can see that their interests are tied up 
with those of the co-operative. At present, the possible benefits of investing time or energy in the 
co-operative appear rather opaque. 
It seems, then, that we may be able to understand participation in Damo as a case of a classic 
collective action problem. As chapter 3 explained, such problems occur when a number of 
individuals would be better off if some or all of them took a certain action, but for each individual, 
the costs of acting individually outweigh the benefits, thus leading to a suboptimal outcome.  
Again, in the language of the cultural evolutionary schema outlined in chapter 3, we should expect 
the spread of behaviours which instantiate a strategy which, on average, brings a net benefit to 
individuals, in terms of desired social resources, given the strategies instantiated by the behaviours 
of others in the population. In this case, we can understand the costs faced by each individual as 
comprising not only time and energy, but all the social costs that may result from disagreeing, 
putting one’s head above the parapet, and risking relational discord. In addition to this, the cost also 
includes any social sanctions resulting from being blamed in case the participation results in an 
unfavourable outcome. 
But while the costs of participating are borne entirely by the individual who does so, the benefits—
such as increased profits for the co-operative—are largely shared between all members. Individuals 
responsible for good decisions may derive a small social benefit from being responsible for this, but 
this may be relatively insignificant, particularly in circumstances such as giving feedback to the 
leader, in which the leader himself may easily take credit for any benefits this brings. 
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As such, it is easy to see why participation presents a problem. Members cannot be sure whether 
their participation will result in a favourable outcome or not; but they can be fairly sure they will pay 
an initial cost for the participation itself. If the outcome is unfavourable, they risk an even higher 
cost, not only losing out along with other members, but also being faced with reprisal for their 
intervention. Even in the best case, that of a favourable outcome, the benefits will be shared out 
among members who did not participate, and there remains a risk that any individual credit will be 
taken by the leader. Thus it is often in each individual member’s interest to withhold participation, 
and hope that decision-making will be taken care of either by the leader, or by other members. 
If this model is correct, then we should expect that people would be much more willing to 
participate if they are shielded from the risk of punishment and the initial social cost of participation. 
Fortunately, in a different context, a natural experiment was conducted by one of my informants, 
Weishan, interviewed at length in chapter 7 below. Teaching an English language class to 
disinterested students, Weishan attempted to introduce a variety of experimental teaching methods 
from Western pedagogues. Although these did not seem to help, he struggled to elicit any form of 
feedback from his students, who quietly went along with his methods, without showing any outward 
sign of discontent. Finally, he attempted to introduce anonymous feedback, a technique largely 
unknown in Chinese classrooms. The result unsettled him. 
“When I read the comments left by the students, I was shocked and disheartened. Some said I was 
the worst teacher they had ever had—that I should stop wasting their time with all these 
participatory exercises, and instead just concentrate on helping them memorise words for the exam. 
None of them had ever given me any indication they were unhappy, but when they could write their 
comments in secret, some of them were very hurtful. Only then did I fully realise that they weren’t 
really interested in learning English, but instead just wanted to pass the exam so they could find a 
job.” 
Although the context is different, this classroom experiment shares key features with the problem of 
participation in co-operatives. Like the mayor of Damo, Weishan had attempted repeatedly to speak 
to students in private and in groups, to find out their true feelings about his teaching techniques. 
Time and again, they responded passively, insisting everything was all right, in spite of their poor 
performance. Only when Weishan used truly anonymous feedback to remove the possibility that 
their response could result in sanctions either from him or their peers did they finally respond with 
honest criticism. 
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And while Weishan was disheartened about their cynical attitude toward the English language, it 
was arguably in their collective material interest to spend their class time memorising words to pass 
an exam based entirely on rote learning. Thus it would have benefited all of them if one or another 
of them had responded earlier and steered the class in that direction. Nevertheless, they endured 
this apparent waste of time in silence. If the mayor of Damo were right in his assessment that people 
do not participate because they are simply disinterested or lazy, then Weishan’s experiment with 
anonymous feedback would have made no difference. But tellingly, removing the costs of 
participation made all the difference, suggesting that at least in this case, the public goods provision 
model may apply. 
A further parallel can be drawn with experiences of village democracy. Since the early 1990s, elected 
village committees, as well as organs of participation like village assemblies, have spread across the 
country, and become ubiquitous (He, 2003). In general, these elected bodies have not challenged 
the dominance of the Party and of local factional economic interests (Oi & Rozelle, 2000; Kennedy, 
2002). However, from the point of view of voter participation, village democracy appears more 
successful (O'Brien & Li, 2000; Shi, 1999). Voting is itself a collective action problem (Downs, 1957), 
but village elections across China exhibit high turnout rates (Zweig & Fung, 2007; Tan & Xin, 2007). 
On the surface, it would appear that in this case, there is no difficulty with participation. 
However, it is worth noting that electoral turnout is a priority target for cadres, so voters are 
typically either paid or cajoled into participating (He, 2006, p. 231). Moreover, when they do vote, it 
is not at all clear that they do so with a view to helping elect the leaders who will best serve the 
community. In Hu Zongze’s (2008) study of elections in a Shandong village, while a small minority 
saw voting this way, the vast majority were either indifferent, or saw elections as an opportunity 
either to procure favours or to vote for members of their own network of associates. 
Correspondingly, most villagers believed that elections were not an effective way of selecting good 
leaders—‘shepherds’ in their words—but instead simply brought chaos, as factions vied for power. 
Far from solving the problem of participation, this seems to suggest that villagers saw it as just 
another opportunity for personalistic exchange. 
In other cases, villagers take a more positive view of elections, but this does not necessarily imply 
that they see village democracy as requiring their active participation. Brandtstädter and Schubert 
(2005), examining the experience of villages in Fujian, claim that although villagers do not use their 
vote to challenge the local power structure, they nevertheless feel that elections are an important 
endorsement of the relationship between them and their leaders, reinforcing a ‘moral economy’ in 
which leaders are obliged to serve the community; ‘village democracy…was thus not so much 
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sustained by public deliberation…but by the “silent practices” that create local identifications and 
rightful “insiders”, and that turned cadres into village patrons’ (p. ibid.: 810). As in Feuchtwang’s 
(2003) argument that ritual selection of leaders in liturgical associations constitutes a form of 
democracy, what seems to be at stake here is not the active exercise of influence through collective 
action by constituents, but instead a symbolic assertion of the mutual obligations of both patron and 
client (O'Brien, 2001, p. 426; Schubert & Chen, 2007; Tsai, 2007, p. 170). 
Moreover, in some cases, those who claim to seek election for the purpose of serving the 
community, and even dare to challenge power relations to that end, may meet active resistance 
from ordinary villagers. In Hu Zongze’s Shandong village, campaigning was seen as a shameful 
activity, in which people pretended to be interested in the public good, but were only competing to 
serve their own interests. Some elderly campaigners coped with this by telling voters during home 
visits that they needed a job, and that the vote would therefore be a personal favour. When one 
elected man, Wang, launched a crusade against corruption, resulting in the sacking of three party 
secretaries, most villagers doubted his motives, claiming he had a hidden personal agenda, and that 
he should not be ‘disruptive’ and ‘make trouble’; ‘some hated him so much that they secretly cut his 
phone line three times, uprooted his crops, and once set his house on fire’ (Hu, 2008, p. 629). 
This kind of behaviour suggests the violation of a strong social norm (Fehr, et al., 2002). Widespread 
cynicism means people assume candidates can only be pursuing personal interests, although this is 
often considered a moral failing (Feuchtwang, 2016; Tsai, 2007, p. 226). But it is revealing that some 
campaigners felt they would have a better reception if they admitted this openly. This suggests that 
it was not only the scrabbling for personal interests which aroused ire, but the hypocrisy of doing so 
in the name of the collective good. Wang’s moral crusade might simply have been seen as 
particularly hypocritical. But by openly challenging authority in the name of the electorate, he may 
also have angered villagers through the perception that he had damaged the patron-client relation 
between them and their superiors. 
In the presence of norms like these, the behaviour of co-operative members in Damo is easily 
intelligible. For they, too, feel that to participate in meetings, or even to provide feedback to leaders, 
would be seen by others as self-interested behaviour, disguised as concern for the common good. In 
the case of village elections, it is not surprising that people are willing to stand in spite of the social 
costs associated with being perceived in this way; for the personal benefits that accrue from winning 
are substantial (Ogden, 2002, p. 205). But in the case of participation in a co-operative, the benefits 
are spread across the group, and are unlikely to outweigh the substantial costs of social sanctions. 
With the help of payoffs and sanctions to voters, village elections have spread across China; but the 
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substance of democratic participation has remained limited (O'Brien & Han, 2009). It is therefore 
understandable that ostensibly democratic organisations like co-operatives would face similar 
problems. 
Thus there are reasons to believe that the frustration of Damo’s mayor is real. Villagers are not 
simply disengaged because of a power imbalance, for the leadership would materially benefit from 
their participation, too. Moreover, it cannot be the case that they simply see any formal or state-
backed institution as outside the domain of their own activity, as there are too many examples to 
the contrary. Instead, this section has argued that we should take seriously the observation of co-
operative leaders that their best hope for eliciting participation is to show members the material 
benefits of doing so. For if it is correct to view participation as constituting a collective action 
problem, then the problem must be overcome either by reducing the costs of participation, as in 
Weishan’s classroom, or by increasing the benefits such that they outweigh any costs. This model, 
then, helps explain not only why participation fails to take place, but why people respond to this in 
the ways they do. 
6.3 Interactions between member apathy and paternalistic management 
This chapter began with an account of a co-operative in which member participation appeared to be 
limited by the paternalistic attitude of a leader who did not trust his members to make good 
decisions, and preferred to control ‘every detail’ himself. By way of contrast, it then considered 
another case, in which it was argued that participation was held back not by the leader’s paternalism, 
but by the intractability of participation as a public goods problem. But in both cases, the 
experiences of both members and leaders suggest that both member apathy and leader paternalism 
may have some role to play simultaneously. This section will attempt to bring these two 
characterisations together, arguing that paternalism and the public goods problem may be mutually 
reinforcing forces. 
To begin with, it is worth considering again the claim made by Qianfeng, leader of Garden Products 
Co-operative, that he was frustrated at the time of the founding of the co-operative by the lack of 
member participation. As noted above, he claimed that he attempted to induce members to 
participate, and was frustrated by their lack of interest; he also felt that the only way to spark this 
interest was to show them the material benefits the co-operative could have. These remarks parallel 
the problem outlined in Damo, and suggest that participation in this co-operative, too, may suffer 
from a collective action problem. 
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What, then, was Qianfeng’s response to member apathy? It would seem that he felt the only way 
the co-operative would bring the tangible benefits which would draw people in would be for him to 
take the reins and exert control to make the co-operative a success. This response on the part of the 
leadership is evidenced also by the reflections of other co-operative leaders around the country. In 
the words of the leader of Meibian’s Junliu Grain Co-operative, 
“Here, we cannot say we have a  ‘real’ co-operative. In a real co-operative, like you have in Britain or 
America, the members all participate—they criticise, they make suggestions. Here, our members stay 
silent. They don’t come to meetings, and if they do come, they say nothing. Maybe they talk behind 
my back, but if they really have a problem, they just leave the co-operative. I would like to make this 
co-operative develop, to help bring more resources to this village. That’s why I’ve gone to so many 
co-operative training events, and studied co-operative management. But it is very difficult to make 
people understand. Many members still don’t understand what a co-operative is. They don’t 
understand democratic management, and they’re not interested. So no matter how many meetings 
we have, no matter how much I ask for their opinions, they will not give them. Until they start to give 
their opinions, we can never make progress.” 
Thus there is some reason to believe that in response to an intractable public goods provision 
problem, co-operative leaders revert to a paternalistic mode of decision-making to ensure that the 
co-operative has some form of effective management. 
At the same time, however, there is a prima facie case for suspecting that paternalistic management 
may, in turn, exacerbate the collective action problem. We might imagine several channels through 
which this might happen. Firstly, if leaders exhibit a pattern of disregarding member suggestions, as 
exemplified by Qianfeng’s attitude, then members may develop an expectation that their 
suggestions will be disregarded—thus leading in the best case to a waste of time, and in the worst 
case, to a loss of face, or even open conflict with the leadership. Similarly, participation in activities 
surrounding village elections has been found to be strongly related to the perception that elections 
will make a difference to substantive decisions (He, 2006, p. 245). The experiences of many co-
operative members chime with this. In the words of Xiaoli, a young member of another Haibian 
vegetable co-operative, 
“At first, I made many suggestions to the other members—I thought we could give the co-operative a 
more beautiful name, use more attractive packaging for our products. After the experts came from 
the Co-operative Institute and explained about democratic management, I thought, ‘This is great, 
maybe I can suggest my ideas in meetings, too’. But when it came to making decisions, my 
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suggestions were ignored. Sometimes, others would laugh at my ideas. I gradually realised that the 
leaders are not interested, either. So, I stopped speaking my mind. Why should I waste my time, if 
they are not interested in what I say?” 
Secondly, a paternalistic management style may convince members that even if they do not 
participate, leaders will ultimately take the necessary decisions to protect their interests. That is to 
say, the expected benefits of participation decrease, because even if members do not participate, 
they expect that leaders will ensure a positive outcome. Moreover, a leader who tends toward 
taking overall responsibility for decision-making may tend to take credit for positive outcomes, while 
deflecting blame for negative outcomes, as suggested above. Xiaoli goes on: 
“It’s just like in any company. The leader also wants face. If something good happens, he will say, 
‘This is because of my good management’. If something bad happens, he wants to blame it on others. 
So I think that’s the problem. If I make a good suggestion, he will just tell others it was his idea. If I 
make a bad suggestion, he can blame me, and others will criticise me too. That’s why I think the co-
operative principles are not good. In theory, they are beautiful, but how can we practise democratic 
management in this way?” 
There is, then, reason to believe that the lack of member participation in many co-operatives is 
driven not only by either a collective action problem or by paternalistic leadership alone, but by a 
combination of these two mutually reinforcing effects. 
6.4 Hierarchy as a mode of coordination 
This chapter has thus far argued that participation in co-operative decision-making is hampered by a 
negative feedback loop, in which members are held back by a collective action problem, driving 
leaders to take a paternalistic attitude to management, which in turn reinforces the collective action 
problem. However, we could imagine that in other cultural contexts, the collective action problem 
might be resolved in another way. The question arises why paternalistic management, and the 
template of the lingdao with his particular relation of duty to and priority over his subordinates, 
appears to be such a prominent default solution to the problem of decision-making in Chinese co-
operatives. 
The argument of this section is that this is no accident, but the result of a deeply rooted hierarchical 
structuring of Chinese interpersonal relationships (Gao, 1996, p. 88; Bond & Hwang, 1986). As 
chapter 2 argued, co-operatives worldwide are an attempt at social engineering—a deliberate 
project to introduce egalitarian and democratic norms in widely varying cultures. When these fail, it 
is understandable that people may fall back on roles and solutions they already understand. Thus if 
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we are to understand why Chinese co-operatives end up defaulting to paternalistic leadership, we 
must first understand the underlying hierarchical principle governing many Chinese relationships 
and organisations. 
The argument will proceed first by tracing the historical development of official ideologies of 
hierarchy, from imperial times to the present day, and suggesting that the Cultural Revolution 
represented a radical break, after which the justification of hierarchy has occurred in a more 
fragmented and piecemeal way. The second section will consider hierarchical relationships in 
organisations and the family, arguing that while the hierarchical principle still dominates, it is 
becoming increasingly contingent on its immediate benefits for both parties, possibly reflecting not 
only the loss of the official hierarchical ideology, but also the overall weakening of the relational 
ethic. Finally, section 3 will argue that the survival of hierarchy as a mode of coordination may be 
explicable by entrenched psychological patterns and social norms which render it a ‘stable 
equilibrium’, resistant to replacement by other modes. 
6.4.1 Ideologies of hierarchy 
Hierarchy in China has deep historical roots. In an attempt to extend Dumont’s Indian theory to pre-
revolutionary Chinese society, Taylor (1989) argues that the official imperial ideology upheld a 
strongly hierarchical social structure as a necessary means to maintain social and cosmological 
harmony. As in Dumont’s (1980) account, he claims this was an ‘encompassing’ hierarchy, in which 
lower levels were seen as part of, ‘children of’, or ‘engendered by’, higher levels; thus Heaven, or the 
cosmos as a whole, encompassed Man, or society. Hierarchical levels within society in turn 
corresponded to degrees of proximity to Heaven, with the emperor as ultimate intercessor with the 
cosmos, supported by a powerful civil service and followed by a scholarly class, whose legitimacy 
derived from their enlightened familiarity with the cosmological principle of the Way; beneath these 
lay the lower orders of farmers, artisans and merchants. According to this structure, which was 
mirrored also in the structure of the family, those at higher levels bore greater responsibility, as their 
role was to maintain society in harmony with the cosmic order. Concomitantly, no distinction was 
drawn between state and society, between the imperial apparatus and the people as a whole; for 
officially, the whole hierarchical organism served to ensure a proper collective submission to Heaven 
and the cosmic powers. Politics, conceived as the articulation of conflicting interests, was thus 
unacceptable to the official ideology; for there could be only one proper set of collective interests, 
and this could only properly be expressed by the maintenance of the hierarchy in its correct order. 
It is striking how closely this vision of society is mirrored by certain aspects of Marxism-Leninism, as 
it was conceived in its most orthodox phase (Pye, 1990). While Heaven and the cosmic order were 
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removed from the equation by the rejection of idealism in favour of dialectical materialism, parallels 
remain. The legitimacy of the Communist Party derived largely from its claim to have unique access 
to and expertise about the ‘iron laws’ of social development, expressed in dialectical and historical 
materialism. Just as the official role of the imperial scholars had been seen as the ‘heroic vocation’ 
(Taylor, 1989, p. 500) of guiding society and the lower orders in accordance with the Way, the role of 
Communist Party cadres was one of heroic self-sacrifice to guide society in line with Marxism-
Leninism (and eventually, Mao Zedong thought). Equally, while the scholars had a dual role of 
‘autonomous custodians of the Way’ (Ibid., p. 498) and loyalty to the emperor, Communist Party 
cadres in the Stalin era, and in China’s Mao period, were simultaneously guided by their ideology 
(Kornai, 1992), and by loyalty to the supreme leader who was seen as the ultimate living interpreter 
of that ideology. Moreover, the imperial notion that political conflicts of interest were perverse, 
because there was a perfect alignment between all just interests, has clear parallels in the Stalin-era 
expression of Leninist democratic centralism, which assumed that consensus could be reached on all 
issues, because there was only one unified interest in a society in which class conflict had been 
eradicated. So too does the identification of the state with the people carry over; for after the 
imperial state was cast as a feudal dictatorship, the new proletarian state was seen as nothing but 
the expression of the power of all the people. Finally, private property in land had itself never been 
seen as wholly justified in imperial ideology; even when it had fully developed de facto, law and 
officialdom maintained the trappings of ancient communal land tenure (Ibid., p. 501). Thus even the 
collectivisation of land under socialism, and the treatment of land as a communal resource managed 
by the state, had ancient roots. For all these reasons, it is arguable that the transition from imperial 
ideology to Marxism-Leninism was not in all ways a radical rupture, but involved a degree of 
continuity. 
These were some of the key grounds on which the Cultural Revolution was justified (Zhang & 
Schwartz, 1997). A radical rupture was what Maoists demanded, and this would have to involve not 
only the overturning of the old feudal order, but the destruction of the Party hierarchy, and the 
claim of intellectuals and Party cadres to be able to lead the country on the basis of their unique 
mastery of Marxist-Leninist doctrine (Gregor & Chang, 1979). This radical uprooting of hierarchical 
relations touched not only the national level, but also relations within workplaces and families, in 
which those who had, even under the new socialist order, been subservient to management by the 
ostensibly benevolent wisdom of leaders, were encouraged to rebel against those leaders, and take 
knowledge of Mao Zedong Thought directly into their own hands—a transition quite literally 
represented by the ritual demonstration of masses of ordinary hands waving copies of Quotations 
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from Chairman Mao, in marked contradistinction to the idea of Marxist knowledge inculcated in an 
elite cadre by a Leninist vanguard party.  
At the end of the Cultural Revolution, the state and Party reasserted themselves as sources of order 
and authority in a society in which many were fatigued and traumatised, and yearned for stability. 
Thus a key part of the nationalist ideology propounded by the Party today is the total identification 
of the state and the Party with Chinese society as a whole (Guo, 2004). Crucially, this nation-state 
complex is presented as historically continuous with all previous Chinese states and peoples, 
allowing for the perpetuation of a concept of the country, state and people as one united, perduring 
entity, of which individuals can feel proud to be a part, and which lends the state legitimacy by virtue 
of its permanence and, by extension, the permanence of the state itself. 
Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy and the attendant ideological authority of the Party were, however, not 
restored at the end of the Mao period. Instead, the reform era was to be an era of experimentation 
(Heilmann, 2008), of ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’, and the authority of the Party-state 
was rebuilt based not on a role as ideological vanguard, but instead on continually proving its ability 
to guarantee political stability and economic growth (Laliberté & Lanteigne, 2008)—and increasingly, 
on cultivating nationalism and an association with vaguely defined constructs like the ‘harmonious 
society’ and the ‘Chinese dream’ (Holbig & Gilley, 2010; Gilley & Holbig, 2009). It is perhaps at this 
point, then, that the ancient notion of a social order governed by principles understood by a 
scholarly elite was finally consigned to history, and with it the notion of a fixed, proper social order 
in which the extant hierarchy served to sustain the common well-being of all. 
The trappings of deference and paternalism have continued in the absence of an overarching 
justificatory ideology. From continual propagandistic exhortations to serve the country to the hints 
of a cult of personality around Xi Jinping, the state continues to repeat hierarchical motifs (Hart, 
2016; Luqiu, 2016). As we have seen, these echoes of the old ideologies are also found within 
organisations. The continual repetition of banqueting arrangements in which seating arrangement 
emphasises hierarchy, while the roundness of the table suggests unity, serves in part as a 
component of widespread attempts by managers to enforce a vision of their organisations as like a 
‘big family’ (da jiating) (Liu & Chen, 2000; Chen & Chung, 1994)—in which all members benefit from 
their subordination to the hierarchy, just as in the old imperial ideology. 
Within families, too, changes have been afoot. The erosion of hierarchical ideology within the family 
began as early as the 1910s, when the republican New Culture Movement began to promote radical 
family reform as part of an attempt to modernise China (Glosser, 2003). Their explicit aim was to 
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dismantle the old analogy between family and state, and indeed the extended family unit as a whole, 
replacing it with small families (xiao jiating) living together bonded by voluntary ties of affection. 
This initiative was later appropriated by the Communists, who saw family reform as crucial to the 
reform of society as a whole. 
Nevertheless, there are continued echoes of the old ideology within family life. Li Qiang, a 30 year-
old informant whose life is examined in detail in chapter 8, had this to say about seating 
arrangements: 
“When I was very small, I remember sitting in the wrong chair once. My mother told me, ‘My son, 
that is not your chair; your chair is there’. And as you grow up, with every year, your position at the 
table changes—maybe someone dies, so their position is taken, or the older generation makes way 
for the new. Your position isn’t changed or decided by you, but by other people… “ 
But as chapter 8 will show, Li Qiang’s parents and grandparents treated him in an unusually 
egalitarian way. In his words, 
“My father had a wish, that maybe in future I would study medicine and become a doctor. But he 
didn’t force me, because he always respected my choices. In my childhood, my parents didn’t force 
me to do anything. What toys I wanted to play with, and later, my choices about my career, about 
who I should marry. They respected my decisions.” 
Although Li Qiang’s family repeated the practice of hierarchical seating arrangements, they were  
unconventional in other respects. His experience of life in his family was not one of strong hierarchy, 
but rather one of mutual respect and relative equality. Like the repetition of symbols like the 
banqueting arrangement in organisations, this points to a broader trend. For at every level, from the 
smallest scale to that of the state, fragments of the old ideologies of hierarchy survive, but in a 
piecemeal way. Rather than providing an overarching justification for hierarchy, these practices 
instead now form just another part of the loose and shifting social fabric. 
6.4.2 Loosening bonds of hierarchy 
While there is no longer a systematic ideology of hierarchy, relationships continue to be structured 
by a hierarchical principle. However, this section will argue that this principle is tending toward one 
in which subordinates accept a relationship not out of duty, but only on the condition that doing so 
continues to deliver a sufficient degree of benefits. It will consider firstly, relationships within and 
between economic and political organisations, and secondly, relationships within the family. 
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The reform era has radically uprooted not only the basis of legitimacy between individuals and the 
state, but also the political and economic hierarchy which used to tie the state to enterprises and 
other organisations throughout society. Economic decision-making has been rapidly decentralised 
over the last three decades, beginning with the mushrooming of Township and Village Enterprises 
around the country, which vastly increased the financial and social resources available to local 
politicians (Oi, 1995). The process continued with mass privatisation in the 1990s, and reforms to 
corporate governance which have replaced the old planning apparatus with an arms-length form of 
indicative planning (Heilmann, 2013). Moreover, the introduction of a market-based economy has 
meant that resource dependencies are now more often embodied horizontally than vertically 
(Solnick, 1996). The cumulative result of these changes is that central government directives can be 
easily evaded or creatively interpreted by local officials, who are able to exploit ambiguity arising 
from conflicting lines of authority to exercise a great deal of discretion (Mertha, 2009). Thus the old, 
unitary hierarchy, which was the material expression of the notion of a unitary state governed by a 
unifying ideology, has been replaced with a more amorphous form of economic and political 
organisation, in which decision-making is decentralised, and happens through diffuse networks, 
which the central state can influence, but never significantly control beyond the implementation of a 
few priority mandates. 
The case of the co-operatives illustrates this transformation. As previous chapters have shown, there 
is a gap between the policy-making activities of individuals in Beijing and their results around China. 
Co-operatives are not the bottom rung in a national hierarchy; they are locally created units which 
serve local interests, unconcerned with the policy prescriptions of the centre except insofar as 
demonstrating allegiance to them results in a flow of resources. 
The loosening of the bonds of hierarchy within the economic and political apparatus has been 
accompanied further by transformations of social hierarchies more broadly. Reform has led to 
economic and social stratification, and the emergence of cross-cutting political and economic 
hierarchies, in which power accrues not only to those at the top of one hierarchy or another, but 
also to those occupying key network positions, such as intermediary between two hierarchies (Bian, 
et al., 2005). This is consistent with the tightly woven networks linking the institutions of the co-
operative movement, the state, and parastatal organisations; successful operation requires the 
cultivation of multiple horizontal and vertical links. 
Within organisations, while the lingdao tends to command a great deal of power, beneath the 
surface, subordinates do not necessarily hold him in the greatest of respect. In one workplace where 
I spent considerable time, the manager in charge was publicly applauded and praised by all his 
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subordinates, who followed his decisions without question. But privately, they disagreed with many 
of his decisions, and seethed with resentment at his authoritarian management style. Many of my 
young informants have reported similar experiences in their workplaces, and those who have 
worked in relatively egalitarian companies influenced by a Western management style speak of it as 
a breath of fresh air, having enjoyed the opportunity to speak their minds and contradict their 
managers if necessary. It is not, then, that people welcome authoritarian relations in management, 
or that the ideology of the jia convinces them that their managers are benevolent dictators; instead, 
it is often the case that there is simply no escaping the dominant hierarchical model of work 
relationships. 
It seems, then, that the role of lingdao is sustained from both above and below. From the 
perspective of the lingdao, leading a group of subordinates who pay lip service to one’s greatness, 
and obey one’s commands unquestioningly, gives the manager face, as well as allowing him to 
accomplish his goals, albeit at the cost of not being able to rely on accurate information or 
consistent performance from his subordinates. From the perspective of the subordinate, delegating 
all decision-making power to the lingdao means that it is he who is responsible when things go 
wrong, and the subordinate does not have to take the risk of making suggestions which might 
themselves turn out to be in error. As the case of the co-operatives shows, this incentive is 
particularly strong when an individual is not concerned about the long-term success of the 
enterprise itself, because he or she has other options. With the breakdown of the danwei system 
and the marketisation and urbanisation of the economy, this has increasingly become the norm. If a 
project fails, it can be blamed on the leader, and his subordinates can find other opportunities 
elsewhere. Thus there is a strong incentive to maintain the lingdao-subordinate relationship, even 
though it may result in moral and economic problems for both parties. 
These  new forms of economic and political organisation have two key features in common. First, 
they are looser and more fluid than the previously existing hierarchies. Conflicting and overlapping 
networks of influence, as well as the choices provided by migration and the labour market, mean 
that local actors have both more room for manoeuvre and more difficult strategic choices to make. 
Second, these new forms do not rely on ideological grounding  or custom for their legitimacy; they 
are largely transactional, despite the efforts of the state, and indeed many businesses, to construct a 
transcendental vision of themselves. People enter into these hierarchical relationships without the 
old expectation that they were permanent or that they were justified by their production of a 
harmonious or successful social order. Instead, hierarchy is fragmented, fluid, and pragmatic. 
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A final domain of hierarchy is that of family life. Much has been made of the idea that increasing 
numbers of young people are determining their own course in life, no longer allowing their parents 
to determine their career or their marital choices (Brandtstädter & Schubert, 2005, p. 810). But for 
the vast majority of young people I encountered in my fieldwork, parental authority remained 
paramount. The sentiments expressed by these two young people are typical: 
 “I wanted to study literature, but my parents instead chose business administration for me as my 
degree subject. My father is very wise. He wanted me to study business administration because that 
way, I would make more money. Of course, I did not like it, but I respected my parents’ choice.” (Wei 
Yan, male, 31) 
“When I was younger, I fell in love with a boy from another province. We were together for three 
years, and I was really madly in love with him. But in the end, his career prospects were not very 
good. I didn’t care about this, but my parents told me I was forbidden to marry him. We split up, and 
I still miss him to this day. But when your parents decide these things, you must listen.” (Mei Lin, 
female, 25) 
These cases illustrate the hierarchical character of parent-child relationships within the relational 
ethic itself. Giving birth to and raising a child is said to create enqing, a level of feeling and a debt 
owed by child to parent so profound that it can never be fully repaid. Child rearing initiates children 
into the network of particularistic debt and exchange, and the parent is the central node in this 
network. Thus there is a clear emotional and material imbalance from the outset in the parent-child 
relationship, and hierarchy arises from particularistic obligation without the need for a collectivistic 
ideology of the family. 
Nevertheless, as the following two chapters will show, there are many cases in which children not 
only pay less attention to the wishes of their parents, but even cease to feel the force of 
subordination within the relationship. In the most extreme cases, young people claim that they no 
longer feel they owe their parents anything, unless their parents continue to provide them with 
support and affection (Yan, 2011). 
Like the increasingly transactional nature of subordination to the state and to superiors in the 
workplace, these cases seem to suggest not only an attenuation of hierarchy, but a shift to a view in 
which people submit themselves to hierarchical relationships only on the condition that they 
continue to derive a benefit from doing so. Chapter 5 argued that the relational ethic may be 
weakening, in part because people now have the option not only of leaving a network through 
migration and the labour market, but of securing resources through non-network means altogether. 
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The transactional view of hierarchy would appear to be consistent with this; for the less dependent 
people become on the endurance of a given relationship, the more numerous are the conditions 
under which they may simply ‘exit’, rather than remaining subordinated. In the absence of a 
justificatory ideology, there is little to stop this happening. 
6.4.3 Hierarchy as a default principle of coordination 
Nevertheless, hierarchy remains the default principle of coordination, particularly in workplaces. 
That is to say, the general expectation is that the lingdao takes responsibility for decision-making, 
and in return for this, his subordinates will not express dissent or otherwise allow him to lose face, 
but will instead obey, allowing him to take credit for any successes. As the previous chapter showed, 
this arrangement often continues even when the lingdao or his subordinates feel they would benefit 
from a different way of doing things. Without the old ideology, and with the loosening of 
hierarchical ties in general, one might expect that in these cases, hierarchical coordination would fall 
away. Why, then, does it persist? This section will attempt an answer. It will consider, first, the idea 
that notions of hierarchical thinking, in relationships and beyond, are conceptually enforced through 
linguistic practices; second, the possibility that this conceptual enforcement may be reflected by 
psychologically entrenched tendencies toward hierarchical cognition; and finally, the idea that the 
resulting ‘habitus’ may mean that problems are naturally understood first through hierarchy, and 
that non-hierarchical practices may struggle to take root in part because of the greater cognitive 
effort they require. 
It is easy to see how hierarchical thinking may be reinforced by practices in Chinese society. Not only 
are individuals constantly surrounded by examples of hierarchical comparison, but they are ranked 
from an early age as a result of intense competition, in everything from their performance at school, 
to university entrance exams which produce a single ranking encompassing every examinee 
throughout the country. More fundamentally, it may be that without the countervailing influence of 
an egalitarian ideology, the impulse to rank others and oneself simply operates unchecked, fuelled 
by rapidly increasing inequalities and the insecurity that comes with those inequalities. Xiao Yi, a 34 
year-old female office worker in Beijing, complained, 
“Every time I meet someone, the first thing they always want to know is: How much money do you 
make? What is your job? Do you have a child, a house? They ask these questions because they want 
to compare themselves to others, to show they are better than others, or just to know where you 
stand in comparison to them.” 
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Might the pervasiveness of explicit rankings in speech mirror an underlying hierarchical cognitive 
style? Research in social and cross-cultural psychology has long suggested that individuals in some 
cultural contexts may be more disposed to hierarchical approaches to interpersonal relationships 
(Smith, et al., 1996), or to recognising and adhering to a clear ‘pecking order’ within organisations 
(Hofstede, 1980). Given that most of the examples of ranking talk noted above directly or indirectly 
concern the ranking of people, or at least human institutions, it is not entirely implausible that, there 
may indeed be an underlying psychological disposition toward hierarchical ranking of people, 
expressed in sentiments such as the idea that ‘human beings were born essentially different and 
unequal’ (Hu, 2008, p. 630). 
If these arguments are correct, then it may be that part of the explanation for hierarchy as the 
default mode of coordination is simply that it fits most closely with existing patterns of thought and 
action. At an individual level, cognitive psychology suggests that once learned, interactional schemas 
may become dominant and be employed by default, even across domains. Cultural evolutionary 
models have suggested that concepts and practices tend to spread through a population more easily 
if they induce lower levels of cognitive dissonance or effort—if they are in some sense intuitive, or 
minimally counterintuitive, given the existing cognitive architecture of the majority of the population 
(Upal, 2010). We might expect alternative interactional schemas to struggle to become established 
against the existing backdrop. 
Moreover, given that hierarchical coordination is known to be the dominant practice, it may simply 
be the path of least resistance for any given individual. As this chapter has argued, there appear in 
some cases to be social norms proscribing certain behaviours required by a mode of coordination 
like democratic decision-making. But, arguably as a legacy of the old hierarchical ideology, there are 
no such social norms proscribing hierarchical coordination. Thus the risks of employing it are low. 
In summary, both linguistic and psychological evidence suggests an overall tendency toward 
hierarchical categorisation and cognition. Hierarchical coordination is arguably a familiar, intuitive 
pattern of engagement. Moreover, social norms proscribing other forms of coordination make 
experimentation risky. It is likely, then, that the tendency to default to hierarchy even in the absence 
of ideological justification, and even given the attenuation of dependence on networks, may result 
from cognitive and social inertia sustained by a hierarchical habitus (Pieke, 2004). 
Section 6.4 has argued that hierarchical practices in China persist because of a combination of strong 
incentives for participants within personalistic exchange networks and possibly dominant cognitive 
schemas which are themselves reinforced by the prevalence of hierarchical discourse and behaviour. 
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The old ideologies of hierarchy are long gone, although some of their rituals and symbols remain, 
refashioned for use in the new society. The Party has attempted to promote a new Confucianism, in 
which not only allegiance to the nation-state, but also to notionally ‘traditional’ family values, 
underpins a conception of the wider function of a stable hierarchy. However, if there is a popular 
ideology of hierarchy today, it rather consists of the notion that Chinese people are incapable of 
equality, or that it is dangerous, and leads to instability—not that the hierarchy exists for the 
common good of all. One exception is within the family, where the idea still persists that parents, 
and especially fathers, should be obeyed. But this obedience is weakening in some cases. Even 
where it is not, it consists of loyalty within a dyadic tie, and often the respectful expectation that 
one’s parents know better what will promote one’s own individual well-being, rather than stemming 
from a belief that filial piety serves to promote the harmony and flourishing of the family as a social 
whole. Thus the traces of successive waves of modernisation, culminating in the Cultural Revolution 
and the economic reform, are clear. Hierarchy remains an important organising principle, but it is 
looser than ever, inhering not in collectivistic concepts of family and society, but rather in dyadic 
relationships which work together in networks, not wholes. When collective decision-making fails in 
co-operatives, it is in part because hierarchy offers such a familiar, safe alternative. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored a fundamental problem of co-operation in co-operatives. While the 
previous chapter showed that many Chinese co-operatives avoid problems of resource sharing, the 
nature of co-operatives means that there is one collective action problem they cannot avoid: that of 
‘democratic management’, or at least of member participation in decision-making. This is not always 
a priority for those who found, lead and support co-operatives, and leadership figures often drive a 
model of top-down decision-making, in spite of professing a belief in principles of democratic 
management. However, it seems that there is more to the story than this. For participation in 
decision-making is, as this chapter has shown, a collective action problem in and of itself. 
The resulting reciprocal relationship between the collective action problem and paternalistic 
leadership is not, perhaps, one we would necessarily expect. There is no a priori reason why the 
solution to the problem of participation should be rule by a hierarchical mode of coordination. 
However, in a context in which notions of hierarchy have deep historical and social roots, 
paternalistic management and hierarchical coordination present themselves as an obvious default 
solution, arguably making it even more difficult to overcome the collective action problem of 
participation, because this relatively low cost alternative is always available. 
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This chapter concludes the core ethnographic treatment of the co-operative movement itself. As the 
preceding chapters have argued, the experience of this movement is coloured heavily by larger 
social changes, not least of which is a conflictual and rapidly shifting moral backdrop. The following 
chapters will examine that backdrop through the lives of individuals around and beyond the co-
operative movement, whose experiences of moral conflict help shed light on the difficulties of the 
co-operatives themselves. 
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7. The relational ethic under pressure 
The previous chapters explored experiences in the co-operative movement, arguing that they are 
compatible with the idea that the relational ethic is a form of indirect reciprocity; that the bases 
which theory predicts tend to support indirect reciprocity are beginning to break down; and that the 
weakened relational ethic has not been replaced by co-operativist morality, but instead by apathy, 
paternalism, and increasing reliance on market mechanisms for co-operation. The story, then, is one 
of the beginnings of moral change. To probe these suggestions further, it is helpful to examine not 
only the experience of the co-operatives, but also the general moral milieu in which they operate. 
The following three chapters aim to do just that—first, by investigating a series of life histories of 
individuals who have experienced moral conflict and change; then, with a psychometric survey 
designed to test the resulting hypotheses by examining patterns in moral cognition. 
The individuals profiled in this chapter and the next are not a random sample. They were selected on 
the basis of their experiences of value conflict—that is to say, they are all individuals with whom I 
became acquainted during the course of fieldwork, who had some experience of values or moral 
orientations which deviated from the norm, and often saw themselves as doing so. This chapter 
profiles two individuals whose lives ultimately do conform to the relational ethic, but who 
experience some degree of inner conflict because their values are not always in harmony with those 
of their peers. The next chapter looks instead at individuals who have deviated from the norm not 
only in their own value systems, but in their life choices. Together, these two chapters illustrate how 
and under what conditions the relational ethic may be breaking down, and assess to what extent 
this picture is compatible with the idea of the relational ethic as a form of indirect reciprocity, as well 
as whether a new moral order is being born in its place. 
7.1 Xiao Tao 
One cool spring day in Meibian, I rode with Xiao Tao on the back of his motorcycle out into the 
Gansu desert. He was not always free on weekends, as his manager in the local government could 
call on him at any time. But when he was, we would often travel together around the county, and he 
would either help me with my research, or show me the places he loved. That day, we headed for 
the Great Wall—or rather, a ruined section of the Great Wall that lay in the remote desert. No one 
ever visited it, because for most people, it was just meaningless rubble. But Xiao Tao was different, 
and he wanted to show me why. 
He stopped the motorbike at a gap in the wall. The road was visible in the distance, following the 
route of the old Silk Road through the Hexi Corridor. To the north, a mountain range marked the 
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southern border of the Gobi desert. With a mischievous look in his eye, he asked me if I would be 
able to scale the wall. Together, we climbed to the top, and stood looking out at the desert below. 
For a while, we stood in silence, listening to the wind. Then, Xiao Tao looked to the north and 
stretched out his arms. ‘You can just see it, can’t you? The barbarian armies, coming over the 
mountains. You can really feel it—those Han dynasty soldiers stood exactly on this spot. Just imagine 
what it must have been like!’ In the dirt on top of the wall, I found an old pottery sherd, and showed 
it to him. ‘Yes!’ he said. ‘This looks really ancient—it could be a wine container, it might have 
belonged to the guards who once were stationed here.’ 
This reverie was interrupted suddenly by the ring of Xiao Tao’s mobile phone. He answered, looking 
embarrassed, then reluctantly told the caller our location. After talking sheepishly for a while, he 
hung up, and explained. ‘That was my girlfriend. She laughed at me when I told her where we are. 
She wants to know why we are wasting time here, when it’s just an old pile of dirt. I told her you 
wanted to see it, but she doesn’t understand.’ 
It was then Xiao Tao explained his relationship with this place. Every weekend, he would ride out 
into the desert on his motorbike, looking for ruins like this, and other evocative places. There he 
would soak up the sense of history, and let his imagination carry him away. But crucially, he felt he 
could never tell people what he was doing. He would lie to his mother, and tell her he was on 
business for his manager. If he did not, she and others would tell him off for wasting time. What was 
the point, anyway? Who had time for old rubbish? What he ought to be doing was investing his time 
in his relationships, and his career; instead, on weekends he lived something of a double life. 
Xiao Tao is a 30 year-old civil servant, who recently returned to Meibian, the town of his birth, after 
a long period away. Insightful and energetic, he is frustrated by the dull and bureaucratic nature of 
his work, and feels a sense of claustrophobia and confinement in this small, provincial town. But in 
spite of his wide-ranging and cosmopolitan interests, he has decided to remain here, to buy a flat 
and get married, to fulfil his obligations to his family and live the life he is expected to lead. This 
contradiction—between his inner drives and worldview and the decisions he has made—provides an 
insight into the wider contradictions which exist for much of a generation which has grown up both 
open to the world, and still firmly embedded in older Chinese social structures. 
Growing up in Meibian, Xiao Tao recalls a provincial childhood, in which time was filled with 
dreaming. 
“There wasn’t much to do here when I was young. My friends and I would sometimes go to the old 
Buddhist temple in the hills, and play in the caves or around the temple. Sometimes we would hang 
Page 154 of 253 
 
out at the reservoir. We weren’t allowed to swim, and we didn’t fish, but we would just play, or hang 
out. I have always loved the outdoors, natural and ancient places. In a place like this, where people’s 
world is very small, the best thing was to spend time in those places.” 
Not only did Xiao Tao seek to escape through his physical environment; he was deeply intellectually 
curious, and fascinated by philosophy, politics and science from a young age. 
“What I always loved the most was physics—when I was a teenager, my favourite book was Stephen 
Hawking’s Brief History of Time. But my parents wanted me to study something that would 
guarantee a job, so I studied management instead. This is the problem with China. People can’t do 
what they want to do.” 
Frustrated by his inability to pursue his own interests, Xiao Tao was relieved when the opportunity 
arose to leave Meibian for university, studying in Shandong for eight years. There, he broadened his 
horizons, and exposed himself not only to Western ideas, but to knowledge and concepts from other 
parts of the world. 
“I really admire India—their Buddhist philosophy is very profound. Unlike China, they are not 
obsessed with money, and they’re always happy and optimistic. Also Japan—you cannot say it these 
days, but we have much to learn from them. The 1920s and 1930s were a golden age in China, when 
we resembled Japan; the Chinese aristocracy combined ancient customs with learning from the West. 
In Shandong, I studied all these things, and I am still searching for a better way forward for our 
society.” 
When he graduated, Xiao Tao’s parents wanted him to further his studies. He enrolled in a master’s 
degree in politics, to which his parents gave their blessing in anticipation that this might lead to a job 
in the civil service. But what he enjoyed was the chance to explore his own interests in political 
philosophy. 
“During my master’s, I wrote a dissertation about food safety. And it is an important topic in China 
today—how to change people’s ethics, how to change the system so that we have fewer poisoning 
scandals. To be honest, when thinking about politics, I always really liked democracy. Locke, 
Rousseau—I find their ideas very inspiring. Until I was about 22, I thought the US system was much 
better than China’s, and I didn’t see why we couldn’t have it. Later, I saw that our government does 
good things as well as bad things. But I still do not know the answer.” 
After his master’s, Xiao Tao felt it was time to find a job. He would have liked to have continued with 
his studies, and perhaps pursue a PhD, which would have allowed him to explore his intellectual 
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interests further. But just as he did not feel it was within his power to study physics, he felt he had 
no choice but to start work, as his parents wished. He soon found a position in a large Chinese 
technology company, in which he further experienced the influence of Western culture and a way of 
doing things he had not seen before or since. 
“In that company, things were very different from most Chinese organisations. It was like an 
international company, I think—very equal. If you had an idea, people would listen to you. If 
something was wrong, you could disagree with it. Your time was your time; they couldn’t just call on 
you at all hours. I really liked it there. It was exciting, and I could use my brain every day. Life in 
[Shandong] was also exciting—it was a big city, with many international people. You felt connected 
to the world, to things that were changing every day.” 
After several years working in that position, Xiao Tao was presented with what he considered a 
golden opportunity: the chance not only to work abroad, but to work somewhere exotic and 
fascinating. 
“I received an offer, to leave China and work in the Middle East—in Qatar. I thought, ‘Wow, this is 
brilliant’. Not only to see the world, but to go somewhere really different, to experience a new culture 
and a new life. That was something I had dreamed of since I was little. It would have meant more 
money, of course, but most importantly, new experiences. My friends thought I was crazy—who 
would want to go to the Middle East? For most Chinese people, the Middle East is dangerous, 
frightening, and unstable. Most people prefer to stay at home with other Chinese people. But for me, 
this was really everything I wanted.” 
This was a turning point in Xiao Tao’s life. Had he gone overseas, as he understood it, he would have 
had the chance to fulfil the daydreams he had had since childhood, of experiencing other worlds and 
cultures. He would have broadened his horizons still further, and although he would not have been 
doing intellectual work, it was a path which held the promise of allowing him to learn more about 
the things which really enthused him—human life, society, and the world. But it was not to be. 
“In the end, my parents did not agree. My mother was worried about me going to the Middle East—
she thought it might be dangerous, but more importantly, she worried I would not find a job again 
after I returned. It seemed like too much of a risk to her. Instead she wanted me to come back here to 
Meibian, to be closer to my family. Besides, my parents had found an opportunity for me here, 
working for the local civil service. Of course, it paid less than my previous career, but my parents are 
a bit old fashioned. They think a government job is the best, because it is very secure. And they 
wanted me to be close to them, not far away.” 
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When Xiao Tao relates his decision to return to Meibian rather than going to Qatar, there is a deep 
wistfulness about him—a sense of the road not taken, and the person he might have been. But there 
is also a sense of powerlessness, that there was never any question he might have defied his parents’ 
wishes. This was simply the way it had to be. Back in Meibian, he found his new work demoralising. 
“Of course, after living in a big city, coming back to a place like this can be hard… My office now is 
not like the company where I worked before. The management style is very traditional—like we are 
in the 1950s. I have no free time; my boss can call me any time, day or night, and I must go to work, 
or do whatever he asks. I cannot speak up if there is something I disagree with, and whatever the 
boss says goes. This work is really boring. But there are no other jobs around here, so this is what I 
must do.” 
Meanwhile, Xiao Tao found readjusting to social life in Meibian equally difficult. His school friends, 
many of whom had never left, some of whom had left and returned, continued to have the 
provincial mentality which had so frustrated him as a child. Though he would go along with groups of 
these friends to eat and drink, he preferred to meet singly with the few friends with whom he could 
have more intimate and profound conversations. This was a role into which I fit easily. We would go 
for hotpot or sit in a private booth at a local bar, talking for hours about politics and philosophy. This 
was something Xiao Tao loved to do whenever possible, with his friends who occasionally came to 
visit from outside Meibian. When obliged to spend time instead with school friends who simply 
wanted to drink and gamble, he was visibly uncomfortable. 
In his love life, too, Xiao Tao felt a loss of agency. His girlfriend, whom he intended to marry, was a 
girl from Henan to whom he had been introduced through family connections, and who was 
supposed to move to Meibian to marry him after he had bought a flat and a car. The flat was still 
being built when we met, and he felt a sense of unease about whether things would go according to 
plan. 
“I’ve been to Henan to meet her parents, and they seem to like me. She hasn’t been to Meibian yet. I 
do worry sometimes. I feel pressure from her to make money, and pressure for the flat I am buying to 
be a good one. I know she thinks I waste too much time—doing things like visiting the Great Wall. Of 
course, I would like to make her happy, to have a good family, which would make my parents happy, 
too. But it is very difficult to do all the things I have to do to make that a reality.” 
This feeling of unease, and lack of agency, was echoed even more starkly by Jinhai, a friend of Xiao 
Tao who also lived in Meibian. One evening, as he prepared a badly-made cup of coffee for me in a 
local bar owned by his brother, Jinhai told me: 
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“I’m a Party member, but I don’t believe in Communism. For all of us, it’s very distant (yaoyuan). It’s 
just that you can’t get certain jobs if you’re not in the Party; 90% of local government workers are 
Party members. If you’re not, it’s thought there’s something wrong with your thinking. Confucianism 
is the same, in fact—most people know nothing about Confucianism, and don’t really believe in it; 
they just say they do when they have to. Most Chinese people just pay attention to their own 
business. As for me, in fact, I believe in liberalism. But I can’t really, because my parents will decide 
who I can marry. They don’t agree with me marrying my girlfriend, because her parents won’t agree 
with her moving to Meibian, and I won’t agree to move to Lanzhou. So even though we’ve been in 
love for two years, there’s nothing we can do. And I will do exactly the same to my children: I will 
expect them to come back and take care of me, since I took care of them.” 
At the time I left Meibian, Xiao Tao seemed resigned to a life which could not satisfy him, but which 
seemed inevitable. None of the major decisions in his life—what he studied, what work he did, 
where he lived, or his romantic choices—seemed to be his. This would not, perhaps, have seemed 
particularly salient, except that Xiao Tao was, in many ways, different from his peers. He had been a 
daydreamer from childhood, fascinated by the universe and the wider world. He had also been a 
critical thinker—casting doubt on social and political arrangements around him, and burning with a 
desire to probe reality further, and perhaps to change it. Moreover, he felt he had stood on the 
precipice of a wholly different life, one in which he saw the wider world, and pursued his passions 
freely. But at the last minute, he had pulled back from that precipice, and simply accepted the 
expectations others had of him. 
This, too, might seem unremarkable, were it not for the fact that even after accepting this reality, 
Xiao Tao could not but construct a different, secret reality of his own, to cope. Alienated by the petty, 
provincial chatter around him, and the numbing nature of his work, he took solace and pride in the 
most important symbol of his remaining independence: his motorcycle. With it, he escaped Meibian 
at every opportunity, lying about his whereabouts and taking off into the countryside, to imagine 
himself as a mediaeval Buddhist monk in a monastery, or a Han dynasty soldier standing guard on 
the Great Wall, as hordes of Mongols poured over the mountains. He could not, and would not, 
share this aspect of his existence with anyone he knew. For it was more than a bit shameful for a 
man of his age to ‘waste’ time in this way, when he ought to be concerning himself with advancing 
his career, and putting all the necessary conditions in place to have a prosperous and stable family. 
Still, Xiao Tao could not resist doing it. 
Xiao Tao’s case sheds valuable light on the workings of the relational ethic for many young people in 
China today. He is not a person who has ever really rebelled against that ethic; his major life 
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decisions have been taken in consultation with, and deference to, his parents—even when this has 
meant he had to give up his greatest aspirations and the sources of his happiness. But inside, 
unbeknownst to those around him, he has all along harboured hopes and dreams of a different life, 
guided by different ideals (Remmert, 2016, p. 127). 
Why did Xiao Tao return to Meibian, and defer to his parents? In part, the answer seems to be his 
emotional ties to his family, and the fact that his kin, lacking any experience of the outside world or 
any form of cosmopolitan education, could not see the value in the forms of life which attracted him. 
Xiao Tao’s social world, too, comprised friends and colleagues who thought the idea of working in 
the Middle East seemed bizarre and pointless. The value system of those around him inevitably 
overrode the ideas he formed from books and his own contemplation. 
Thus the relational ethic in this case emerges undefeated, and perhaps substantially unchallenged—
but it is nevertheless under pressure. Xiao Tao feels the pull of other values, and other morals. In 
part, these are simply the values of intellectual excitement and stimulation, the thrill of experiencing 
new things and thinking new thoughts. But there is also the pull of other moral systems; the 
liberalism and democratic ideals which appealed to him in his youth, and the sense that he would 
like to do something to serve society, even if it is only to recommend a better food safety system. 
Somehow, in spite of the time and energy he has devoted to these feelings, it has been impossible 
for him to escape the nexus of family ties which has kept him firmly within the world of the 
relational ethic. But as the safety valve of his secret sojourns into the countryside shows, this has 
happened in spite of, rather than in harmony with, many of his own desires. The relational ethic no 
longer exists in a vacuum, if it ever did; instead, it must now compete with other ideas and values. 
Even when it wins out, cases like Xiao Tao’s show that there is often conflict and contradiction 
lurking beneath a seemingly harmonious surface. 
7.2 Weishan 
“I was in college when for the first time, I saw my favourite movie: Forrest Gump. I think I’m kind of 
like Forrest Gump. I’m not very clever, I think. I was touched by his persistence. I think if we persist in 
doing something, eventually we can achieve success. He inspired me a lot. Whenever I have 
difficulties, I watch that movie, Forrest Gump, and it gives me some kind of power, helps me to go on.” 
Weishan is a 32 year-old secondary school teacher in Guangzhou. He teaches English at an elite 
private boarding school, a post which has given him the chance to travel abroad, to the US and UK, 
where he has liaised with Western universities and led groups of students on study tours. He is 
overworked and frustrated by the feeling that he never quite has the time or resources to do what 
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he considers to be an adequate job as a teacher; he feels that his primary obligation is to his 
students, and regardless of compensation, he cannot be happy as long as he is not fulfilling that duty. 
In this respect, Weishan exhibits a concern with what is an archetypal particularistic obligation, that 
of teacher to student. Much of his frustration with not being able to meet this obligation results 
from structural factors which mean that many of his students have not been genuinely interested in 
his teaching; but he takes every setback to heart as a personal failure. Over the months in which I 
came to know Weishan, I was impressed by both his sense of duty and my own sense that this was in 
contradiction with the environment around him. To probe further what this meant to him, we 
conducted a life history interview. 
Weishan was born in a small, economically underdeveloped village in Hunan. His parents had come 
from a nearby village, of one thousand people, where all of his family had been peasants. His father 
worked as a civil servant, and in his early childhood, was rarely present. Weishan’s mother was a 
nurse who worked in a hospital in the town. His earliest memories are of the hospital, where he 
slept in the workers’ dormitory and was looked after by mother’s colleague. He remembers, too, life 
in the hospital being redolent with early lessons about morality. 
“Whenever the family got together, we would talk about these things—issues happening in the 
hospital. My mum always told me the important thing was that she was kind to her patients. Some of 
her colleagues treated the patients very badly, so they were complained about and even lost their 
jobs. She’s not that kind of person… My mum’s brother also worked in the hospital, as a pharmacist… 
and he always said he was successful because people trust him, because he treats them well, and is 
honest. To respect others, to be kind, my parents didn’t teach me these things explicitly, but I learned 
about them every day.” 
Weishan’s father travelled frequently on business, and while he was not often present, he left an 
important impression. 
“My father travelled to many different provinces, different cities, and each time he came back from 
business trips, he would have some photos, or some local foods. I learned early on that in the outside 
world, there were many new, interesting things. So I wanted to see the world from the very 
beginning. My home was close to the bus station—the only connection between our county and the 
outside world. But I didn’t have any chance to see the outside world.” 
Weishan’s early childhood was not unusual for a child of his background. His family did not have 
books in the house, and the village had little by way of entertainment. He remembers that he was 
not taught to read or write, or given any other formal instruction by his parents; instead, his early 
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memories are of watching television in the hospital, and listening to the radio, learning songs and 
dancing to them. Then, when he was six years old, Weishan moved to the county town with his 
parents, and began attending primary school. 
“Nobody told me what would happen in primary school… I just thought it was a kind of fun, so my 
marks weren’t very good, because I didn’t know how to behave. We would be punished if we didn’t 
do the work well, but I usually didn’t. I never did my homework, and at school I’d be punished, made 
to stand in the back of the room.” 
Because Weishan’s parents both worked long hours, he was for a long time able to avoid doing 
homework without detection. Every day, he would go home alone and watch television until they 
returned and he went to bed. After a time, the school notified his parents that he was failing to do 
homework, and his father began to monitor him and give him extra tasks to improve his marks. His 
marks in Chinese class improved, but in other areas continued to suffer. 
“The maths teacher always said to me, ‘You’re so stupid, this is such an easy question, why can’t you 
answer it?’… I wasn’t a well-behaved student. I liked to talk to the person sitting next to me, to play 
cards in class.” 
Although Weishan and his parents had migrated to the county town, his extended family remained 
present. His grandparents remained in the village, and he saw them only at major festivals, a few 
times a year. But his mother’s brother and his two sons moved to the county town, and saw 
Weishan occasionally, living about 40 minutes’ walk away. Thus although Weishan did not grow up 
in a context in which his extended family could actively help with his upbringing and schooling, he 
was aware enough of his kin network that it impinged on his life and his consciousness. 
Still, his studies continued to suffer. In middle school, he recalls spending time with other students 
with ‘behavioural problems’. Together, they would play truant and hang out talking about girls and 
gossip. Bored in a town with little to do, they occupied themselves with fantasies of a different life, 
far away. 
“There was a private room you could go to, pay one RMB and stay there as long as you want. They 
would play videos from Hong Kong, about gangsters and action and sometimes pornography. If the 
school found out you’d been there, you’d be expelled. So we would go there secretly. We would try to 
imitate the gangsters, so sometimes we picked fights with older children,  because we thought it was 
cool.” 
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When he was alone, he continued to neglect his homework, escaping into television instead—
Japanese cartoons, or Kung Fu films from Hong Kong. 
With his poor marks, Weishan’s prospects for entering a good high school were slim. The county 
town had two high schools—number one and number two—and number one was known for 
sending more leavers to university. His parents wanted him to attend the number one school, to 
have a chance at university, but his marks were too low. 
“They needed to find someone to help me. So they tried to use connections to find someone to help. 
That was the first time I knew that my parents were trying to use connections to solve problems for 
me. But it takes a long time, it’s really hard, because everyone wants to get into university, but 
resources are limited. It took about two months, and then I finally got a place at that school. From 
then on I realised I had to work hard, because my parents spent a lot of time, and also extra money, 
to get the place… My first day of high school, my mum took out the money and counted the notes 
one by one in front of me. From then on I realised I needed to work hard.” 
High school was a turning point for Weishan. For the first time, he got to know academically 
successful students, and formed friendships with them, playing video games, football and basketball 
together. He learned from them that the most successful students had a good social life, too—and 
he also learned more about the wider world, whiling away hours talking about the NBA, the 
Champions’ League, and football matches around the world. Finally, in his second year, Weishan was 
randomly placed in an advanced class, which had been created for top students, but which required 
a quota of ‘problem students’. Although he had no idea at the time why he had been placed in this 
class, it was a wholly new experience for him. He was surrounded by ambitious and talented peers, 
and his teachers took a new interest in his needs. Fearing their performance indicators would be 
harmed, they began to give him individual attention. 
“For the first time, I got a sense of what it is to have a dream. All of those students had a very clear 
goal, they wanted to achieve it, they were strong-minded. They influenced me a lot. But even though 
I tried hard, I didn’t have a good foundation. Most of the time I couldn’t understand what the maths 
teacher was teaching.” 
In spite of his hard work, Weishan failed the gaokao. He was faced with the choice of finding a job 
without going to university, or repeating a year. Then his cousins, who were university students, 
recommended he visit their university in Changsha and speak to the admissions office, to see if he 
had any chance of being admitted. This journey to Changsha left a deep impression. 
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“It was my first time leaving our small county, and the first time I saw a big city. It was a long trip—
we took the night bus, and when we got to Changsha, it was morning. I saw the streetlights, and I 
thought, ‘Oh, that’s great’—because there were no streetlights in our county. I went to shopping 
centres and looked at all the things for sale. I saw that people dressed very differently, very 
fashionably. Their faces looked energetic. I thought, ‘I want a life like this, full of hope’. We stayed in 
Changsha only three days. I went to the admissions office, and in the waiting room, someone asked 
me about my marks. When I told them, they smiled. I knew it wasn’t because they welcomed me, but 
because they thought the mark was too low. I felt humiliated. But I knew from then on I wanted to go 
to the big city.” 
Returning home, Weishan told his parents he wanted to repeat a year. But to go back to the same 
school would have meant losing face (diu lian), so he asked his parents to send him to the number 
two high school, instead. 
“After that, I studied harder than before, because I realised I wanted to change my life. I wanted to 
go to university. I wanted to go live in the big city—my desire to go to the big city was very strong. 
Most of my classmates were top students, and several had gone to university in Beijing, Shanghai, or 
even Macau. Chatting online had become popular, so I saw the pictures they took, and I knew that 
life there was very different.” 
Weishan’s father was angry with him, believing he was wasting time. But his mother supported his 
wish to repeat a year, and again, found a connection who enabled him to do so. This time, his 
gaokao result was a bit better, and he was able to enter a local three-year college. But he remained 
fixated on the dream of moving to Changsha—Beijing or Shanghai never occurred to him, as they 
seemed so far off, but Changsha held the promise of a modern, colourful life. Instead, his stay at 
college turned into a full undergraduate degree, and he remained there five years, taking a degree in 
English. 
“I told my parents I wanted to study Chinese, because I thought I was good at Chinese literature and I 
was interested in it. But they said studying Chinese is all right, but at the end, you’ll need to find a job. 
And if you have a degree in Chinese, you only have two choices: to become a teacher or a civil servant. 
Becoming a civil servant is difficult, because you need connections. And there is more demand for 
English teachers than for Chinese teachers.” 
Although English was not his first choice, Weishan recalls feeling it was a good decision, after all. He 
was particularly happy to have the chance to be taught on occasion by foreign teachers, with 
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Western teaching techniques. He has fond memories of a British teacher called Charlie, his first 
foreign acquaintance. 
“I still remember our first lesson. He asked us to introduce ourselves, one by one. It was very different 
from Chinese teachers, who don’t care who you are—they just want to tell you who they are. But we 
were only 36 in the class, which was much smaller than in high school. We all had a chance to talk to 
him, and he asked us to do some role playing, some group discussions—it was really fun.” 
Another British teacher, Julia, introduced her class to a particularly sensitive topic. 
“She talked to us about sex, and how to prevent AIDS. She even used a bottle of glue, and showed us 
how to use a condom—at the time it was really uncommon to have lessons like that. We were 
excited because everything we knew about sex came from Japanese movies, pornography—so we 
were curious about it, but we knew nothing about it… We did a lot of role plays, and I still remember 
once I was assigned to play an HIV carrier who wants to get a job, and someone else was acting as 
the boss, who turned down my application, and I had to argue. Most of us agreed that we shouldn’t 
discriminate against HIV patients—but it was kind of far away from us, something we never thought 
would happen in our lives.” 
Weishan credits these experiences with giving him a different perspective, seeing the world through 
the eyes of foreigners. They also helped form his approach to education, which became important 
when he started work as a teacher. 
He began work at a vocational school in a small town in Guangdong, where he taught English to 
students destined for factory work, who had little interest in English. Rather than finding satisfaction 
in the knowledge that he had a secure career and decent income, Weishan was frustrated by his 
students’ lack of interest. 
“Life was simple… I was happy with my colleagues, and with my students, though I wasn’t very happy 
to be living in a rural area again. But I was not very satisfied because at that school, English was not 
very important. The students were not interested, so I had to motivate them. Sometimes I’d just 
teach them very basic things, and then I’d tell them jokes or stories in Chinese, just to motivate them, 
to entertain them, to keep them in order. I wasn’t happy with that. I wanted to be a real English 
teacher. I wanted to teach English, not just be a person who supervises students and makes sure they 
don’t cause trouble.” 
By this point, Weishan had a serious girlfriend, Chunhua, who was also training to be a teacher, and 
shared his dream of living in a big city. He realised at this point that if wanted to marry her, he had to 
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be able to provide a better life for her; and he could not be happy in the work he was doing. So after 
working for two years, he applied to study for a master’s degree. 
“Most postgraduate students in China, the reason they want to pursue a master’s is not to be a 
scholar, but to have a better CV, so they can get a better job. I was exactly like that. I didn’t want to 
do research or become an academic. I just wanted to change jobs—to be a real teacher. Also because 
Chunhua likes big cities, too, she wanted to have a better life, and I wanted to be able to give her a 
different life, a better life. So I had to be able to get a good job, in a bigger city.” 
Weishan was accepted for a master’s in Guilin, and he studied there for three years. During that 
time, he experienced a different kind of life, and had more exposure to foreigners, and new ideas. 
“Those three years were very different from my previous life. Guilin is a bigger city… Many tourists go 
there, and there were more opportunities. We had some teachers from the US. One of them made a 
deep impression on me. He was an expert on linguistics, specialising in pragmatics. He was a real 
scholar, and always emphasised that if you want to be a good researcher you have to read a lot of 
books.” 
This was the period when I first met Weishan. At the time, he was agonising over what research 
methods to use in his master’s dissertation. Under the influence of the aforementioned lecturer, he 
was determined not just to do what was necessary to pass, but to complete a piece of high quality 
research. His confidence had been knocked by years of being told he was academically inferior, and 
he seemed determined to work hard, because he felt this was the only way he could succeed. It is 
important to underline just how unusual this attitude was. Many other Chinese students express 
different sentiments. A representative view is given by Chaoxiang, a 23 year-old master’s student 
from Haibian: 
“Why are you doing so much research for your PhD thesis? No Chinese student would do what you 
are doing. We all do the same thing: We just copy each other. Doing research takes too much time. 
After all, there’s only one reason to get a master’s or a PhD: so you can have a better CV, make more 
money and be more respected. Why waste time doing research?” 
The prevalence of this kind of attitude was what made Weishan’s approach so striking. Although he 
had no aspiration to be a researcher, and saw himself as academically inept, he was not only 
unwilling to plagiarise; he spent an inordinate amount of time thinking about the design of his 
research project. After we had shared many long conversations about research methodology, he 
decided to settle on autoethnography. At the time, he was working part-time as an English teacher, 
to gain experience as part of his degree. He would record his own feelings and subjective 
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experiences, and use this to write a dissertation about the role of a teacher’s personal development 
in pedagogy. This approach was considered highly unconventional, and was initially opposed by his 
academic supervisors. But he persisted, and asked me for copies of literature on autoethnography to 
assist him in his project. In the end, he passed. 
“From the year I repeated high school, I realised that if you don’t work hard, you can’t achieve things. 
But working hard is one thing; you also have to figure out the right direction. Working hard, but in 
the right direction—this is very important. This is something I learned; I didn’t understand it when I 
was younger. I think working hard is the only way to change your situation. I wanted to change, I 
wanted a different life.” 
Weishan agonised, too, over his own teaching methods. He was keen to experiment with 
participatory teaching methods he had seen Western teachers use, and he tried these out on his 
students in Guilin. But they, too, were vocational students, and were only interested in preparing for 
exams. When Weishan introduced the concept of anonymous feedback, he was met with mean-
spirited notes calling him ‘The worst teacher I have ever had’ and demanding he stop wasting time 
on participation, and help them memorise words for the exam. This left Weishan feeling deeply 
dispirited. He wanted to find a way to be a better teacher, and felt he was letting his students down. 
‘I cannot say it is their fault’, he would say. ‘It is my fault, because I am using the wrong methods. I 
must find the right methods for them.’ 
After his master’s, Weishan and his girlfriend applied for teaching work all over China. They were 
interviewed and received offers in several provinces, but ultimately decided to accept work at the 
elite boarding school in Guangzhou. 
“We both thought this would be a good school, because we knew the English level of the students 
was much higher than average. I thought it could be a good place, because I wanted to be a real 
English teacher. I wanted to teach English. I didn’t want just to entertain students. So I thought, ‘This 
is what I want’. And we knew that this school would give us many opportunities to go abroad, so we 
could understand other countries. Also, it’s not far from our hometown, and it pays very well.” 
Thus this decision, too, was made taking into account a combination of factors: Weishan and his 
girlfriend wanted satisfying work, in a big city, which offered the chance for foreign travel; but their 
parents also wanted them nearby, so they could visit frequently; and he felt pressure from both his 
girlfriend and his parents to earn a reasonably high salary. Later, on a work trip to the UK, Weishan 
proposed to Chunhua on London’s Millennium Eye, and they married shortly thereafter. 
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This and other work trips have been important for Weishan. He sees himself as different from many 
Chinese travellers, because he wants to travel for its own sake, rather than simply to buy souvenirs 
or take photos. 
“I don’t like staying in the same place. Being abroad, I find that wherever I go, I can always see fresh 
things. I enjoy experiencing new things, trying new foods. Ever since my childhood, I dreamed of 
going abroad, seeing the outside world. My other dreams didn’t come true—I dreamt of being an 
astronaut, or an army officer, or a scientist, but my marks were not good enough. But being a 
teacher, going abroad is a dream I can realise.” 
Both Weishan and Chunhua feel conflicted in their job. The work is intense, and leaves them with 
little free time. Weishan feels enormous pressure to stay in this job to earn the necessary money to 
pay their mortgage. But he also feels he never has enough time to prepare for lessons, and his 
students do not respect him because his English is not as good as their foreign teachers. Although he 
is well-compensated, he feels constantly anxious and insecure about his own ability and 
performance as a teacher. 
“It’s a question of job satisfaction. I’m not the kind of person who can just accept any outcome, as 
long as I get my money. I think if I’m a teacher, I should try my best to gain respect from my students, 
to inspire them, to make them think it’s worthwhile to be my student. Because even if the students 
don’t say anything, if you bore them, you can see it in their faces. I’m really sensitive to this. When I 
finish a lesson, if I can see in their faces that they think I’ve wasted their time, I feel really bad. I think 
if a teacher cannot satisfy the students’ need for knowledge, this is not a good teacher—this person 
should not be qualified as a teacher. If I’m doing things badly, I feel so guilty, because I think I’m not 
qualified.” 
Weishan knows that this attitude is not always shared by colleagues, many of whom view teaching 
as simply a way to earn a salary. He has not found many friends among fellow teachers, who view his 
attempts to introduce new teaching methods with suspicion. 
“Some teachers think, ‘It’s not my problem, it’s the students’. But I mostly think it’s not the students’ 
fault. There must be something wrong with my methods, so I have to change them. Sometimes they 
don’t respect you because they don’t think you’re qualified. Then I feel really bad.” 
Thus for Weishan, there is a strong sense of obligation to his students, to do his best by them and 
fulfil his responsibilities as a teacher. This is reminiscent of Confucian ideas about particularistic 
duties of teachers toward students, and vice versa. However, he claims that he would feel the same 
way, irrespective of what profession he had chosen. Even if he were an engineer, he thinks he would 
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be driven to perform well, because ‘I’ve always felt I had to make things better, to work harder, to 
cause less trouble for others’. Thus he feels an abiding sense of duty, even when it comes into 
conflict with a social environment which gives students every incentive not to reciprocate. 
Having achieved a marriage, a house, a decent salary, and the ability to visit his parents often in their 
old age, Weishan feels at a loss as to what to do next. 
“Currently, I think I have no dreams. I don’t know what I want, what I should aim for. I don’t know 
what my passion is. This is my problem now. What should I work hard for? Before, I had a very strong 
desire. I wanted to change my situation. But now I don’t know. I’m confused. I need money because I 
want to have a family. Our parents are urging us to have babies—they think we are old enough, we 
should have a baby. But if we have a baby, that means we won’t have freedom. So we need to think 
about it seriously.” 
In many ways, Weishan’s story is a classic illustration of the vibrancy and relevance of the relational 
ethic today. He has found meaning and satisfaction not only in his relationships with his family and 
his wife, but also in striving to perform what he sees as his duties toward his students, to deliver to 
them what he owes them by virtue of the relationship between teacher and student. If anything, this 
is vitiated only by the fact that the students themselves seem unwilling to reciprocate, whether 
because they see lessons as a mere vehicle to pass exams, or because they lack respect for him in 
comparison to other teachers. But in spite of the one-sided nature of the relationship, Weishan 
presses on, determined to do well at his job and to carry out the duties he associates with his role. 
Perhaps, however, the story is not so simple. For Weishan believes he would feel the same about 
any job, even one without direct, dyadic interpersonal obligations. And for him, the key moral lesson 
of his childhood came from watching his mother and uncle in the hospital, and imbibing their 
conversations about what a good nurse, doctor or pharmacist should do to serve their patients, and 
how they should treat others with kindness and honesty. He seems to experience the drive to do 
well as a teacher not simply as a particularistic duty toward his students, but as something mirroring 
what he felt he observed in the hospital: a general, perhaps universalistic, duty to do a good job, and 
to serve others. This is the sort of ethic which his parents’ generation may have absorbed from the 
socialist period. 
At the same time, his long-standing insecurities about his academic abilities, and his drive to work 
ever harder to better himself, seem to point to the growing pre-occupation with individual self-
development which has been observed by a number of ethnographers (Hansen & Pang, 2010; Yan, 
2011). While in some instances, this has been attributed to the intense pressures of market 
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competition and accompanying neoliberal conceptions of the self (Chang, 2008; Kipnis, 2007; 
Hoffman, 2010), Weishan appears to see his struggle for self-betterment principally in terms of 
validating his own self-worth, rather than developing market competitiveness. The duty to do well 
by one’s students is, for him, inextricably tied up with the notion of becoming a better teacher; 
Weishan thus seems to stand in clear contrast with the notion of self-development as an amoral 
pursuit (Farquhar & Zhang, 2005). 
Thus Weishan’s path in life can perhaps best be understood as resulting from an articulation of 
multiple value systems. On the one hand, particularistic obligations toward his parents and his wife 
have heavily coloured many of his choices, from what to study to where to live. On the other hand, 
his sense of a more universalistic obligation to do his job well and to serve those around him has 
pushed him to work harder than was sometimes necessary, and to experiment with new teaching 
methods where others are content to repeat established practice. 
His current dissatisfaction can be easily understood, taking into account the interplay of these two 
forces. He has finally reached a point where his personalistic obligations are fulfilled, but he 
nevertheless feels that something is missing, because the nature of his work renders him unable to 
do what would make him most happy, which is to be a good teacher. Although he can continue in his 
job, start a family, and continue to fulfil his obligations under the relational ethic, this is not enough 
for him to be content. Whether because of values deposited during the socialist period and passed 
onto him by his parents, because of foreign influence from hours spent watching television or the 
foreigners he has known, or simply because of his own unique character, Weishan is not content. He 
has everything he needs to comply with the relational ethic, but this is not enough. 
7.3 Discussion 
Xiao Tao and Weishan are two young men who have found an accommodation with the society 
around them, and worked hard to fulfil their obligations under the relational ethic. Their families and 
friends have every reason to feel that they are morally upright individuals, who can be relied upon to 
carry out their duties in the sustenance of the exchange networks in which they are enmeshed. But 
beneath the surface of both men lies an inner life which is rife with contradiction, anxiety and 
discontent. 
It is easy to see why the relational ethic should guide their life choices. Both are only children, who 
have good relationships with their extended families, and know that their parents will depend on 
their support in old age. They both come from ordinary families in economically depressed, remote 
areas, and they lack the resources to support either their families or themselves independently from 
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the prevailing norms around them. In other words, it would be too much of a risk to deviate from 
those norms—a fact recognised most explicitly by Xiao Tao’s mother in her intervention against him 
moving abroad. While both have spent long periods of time in urban areas, they remain firmly 
rooted in the rural areas from whence they came, by virtue of their parents having remained there. 
Thus familial, economic and geographic factors conspire to keep the relational ethic in place. 
But at the same time, both men have experienced forces which may contribute to a degree of inner 
conflict. They are both thoughtful, introspective types, who have been exposed to a wide range of 
foreign influences, and have been open to using foreign values as a yardstick by which to evaluate 
their own social context. Both grew up as dreamers, imagining themselves in faraway lands as a way 
to escape the boredom and drudgery of everyday existence; and both have found more solace in the 
concepts and images of those faraway lands than in the often demoralising world which surrounds 
them. 
Nonetheless, each life story must necessarily be the result of the myriad interactions between social 
pressures and inner life (Chibnik, 2011; Boholm, et al., 2013). The seeds of discontent have not 
motivated either of them to break away from established patterns of existence. Xiao Tao has 
sacrificed a great deal to fit one of those patterns, but he adopts an attitude of resignation, 
accepting this as inevitable. Weishan, on the other hand, blames himself for his own inadequacies, 
refusing to see his students’ lack of receptiveness as anything but a sign of his failures. Shades of 
other values and other value systems are present in both men, but both have come to terms with 
this by turning inward, rather than come into contradiction with prevailing norms. 
This chapter, then, has aimed to illustrate how for some young people, the relational ethic may be 
fraying at the edges, but it nevertheless continues in force. The next chapter will examine cases in 
which the balance has tipped, and for some individuals, that ethic has been severely weakened, or 
almost entirely broken down. 
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8. The relational ethic in transition 
The previous chapter showed the enduring strength, for many, of the relational ethic. It argued that 
this ethic forms a system which can effectively prevent competing values from taking root or 
expressing themselves. But for some, the relational ethic has, indeed, weakened. In some cases, but 
not all, it has then been supplanted by other norms. This chapter will explore four life histories which 
illustrate different ways in which this attenuation may be expressed. It will argue that while 
competing norms may contribute to the erosion of the relational ethic, the overriding cause of this 
weakening is likely to be changes in sociological factors which had previously acted to support the 
system. 
The stories explored in this chapter illustrate a wide range of experiences among young people. All 
four individuals are in their late twenties or early thirties, and all four feel somewhat outside the 
norms they perceive as governing the society around them. But they vary widely in terms of whether 
they experience this difference as one of moral orientation. The first, Meiyu, is a language teacher in 
Yunnan, who feels that her drives and ambitions are different from those of her peers, but does not 
see this difference in ethical terms. The second, Li Qiang, is an academic in Shandong who lived 
abroad for many years, and is profoundly interested in world religions and universalistic values. The 
third, Li Ming, is a banker in Beijing who has also spent time abroad, and feels called to contribute to 
a cultural and moral renaissance in China. The fourth, Li Juan, is a tour guide in Guangxi who has 
lived an unusual life from an early age, but for whom circumstances conspire such that she expresses 
no sense of moral conflict at all. All four have substantial exposure to foreign culture, but this has 
had different implications for each. 
What follows will examine each life history in turn, considering both how each individual has 
experienced the factors which may have set them apart from their peers, and what this means for 
their experience of the relational ethic. Finally, section 8.5 will argue that these stories illustrate the 
possibility that the erosion of the relational ethic is being driven by larger social factors, but its 
expression, and its relation to other ethical systems, depends on another, largely independent set of 
factors. 
8.1 Meiyu: A life of experience and feeling 
“I have a recurring dream… In my dream there are two women, one very beautiful girl, with long hair. 
Every time there is a danger, there’s a girl who will come rescue her. That one has short hair. After 
she rescues the first one, they fall in love, and stay together… They say your dreams are related to 
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your inner world (neixin). Maybe I have this dream because lesbians are what people don’t accept. 
When I’m with all those people who just want to get married and have kids, maybe that is how I feel.” 
Meiyu is a 29 year-old Chinese language teacher in Yunnan. She was born in a small village just 
outside of the city, studied at a local university, and has remained in Kunming, not far from her 
ancestral village. In these respects, she has not led an unusual life. But one only has to scratch the 
surface to understand why she feels that she is so ‘strange’ compared to her peers. She has never 
been concerned with finding a job or a husband, preferring to escape into novels or television, to 
daydream about the world, or to travel alone and see the world. She spent two years in Thailand and 
one in the Philippines, working as a language teacher. And she sought out these experiences not 
because of a concern with career or furthering her contributions to family or other relationships, but 
simply because she wanted to see new places and cultures. What has led her to be so different from 
her peers? She does not know—her response to this is simply that ‘everyone is different’. But an 
examination of her life story suggests some important possibilities. 
In many respects, Meiyu had an ordinary childhood. She was born in a single-surname village, in 
which everyone was considered kin. Her parents were peasants, though she also counted among her 
uncles and aunts schoolteachers and small merchants, who regularly travelled to Kunming to buy 
and sell clothing and other goods. She grew up with one little brother, four years her junior. In 
addition, she grew up with ‘two paternal grandfathers and two paternal grandmothers’—her 
biological ones, whom she called ‘da yeye’ and ‘da nainai’, and the little brother of her grandfather, 
her ‘xiao yeye’ and his wife, ‘xiao nainai’. Her ‘xiao yeye’ was a primary school maths teacher, who 
died when Meiyu was very young, after which her ‘xiao nainai’ shared a bed with Meiyu. She has 
fond memories of her ‘xiao nainai’ teaching her numbers from 1 to 100 as they lay in bed. 
Although Meiyu’s paternal aunts and uncles were teachers and merchants, her immediate family 
were less educated. There were no books in her house. Every day, she and the other village children 
would walk half an hour to their school. But while the other children would have to walk back home 
at lunchtime to eat, Meiyu’s uncle was a teacher at the school, so she could eat at his house, and 
stay there when the weather was bad. This, in addition to the relative prosperity of her paternal kin, 
gave Meiyu something of a charmed early childhood: 
“I had a lot of friends. Because we had a pretty good family… our family’s house was more beautiful 
than others, bigger, so everyone thought our family had more money. We had a bicycle when other 
families didn’t. In the village, everyone thought I was a princess. In the school, my uncle and other 
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teachers all liked me, because I was very cute, and my marks were good. So lots of people knew me, 
and boys also fancied me.” 
But there were unhappy times, too. Meiyu’s father gambled and drank, relying on his wife to provide 
for the family. She remembers her family as strongly patriarchal, with a preference for men over 
women (‘zhongnanqingnü’). At times, her father would gamble away all of the family’s money, 
leaving nothing for her school fee. Her mother and father would fight, sometimes violently. 
“When I was small, I hated bad people. For example, my grandmother, my father, my uncles. I hated 
my grandmother because I thought she had a lot to do with why my father was like that—she 
doesn’t like my mum, she likes to give all the good things to her own son. She also really loved my 
younger brother, but didn’t love me much.” 
Around this time, Meiyu remembers seeing the example of a very different male figure: Zhou Enlai. 
“He was a very remarkable man. When he spoke, he had a lot of wisdom, and he seemed very gentle. 
We watched a lot of historical television series in my family, and I knew Mao, he did some bad things, 
but Zhou Enlai, he was a very honest person. He had no flaws—I thought he was perfect. That’s why 
when I was small, I always dreamt of being a diplomat, just like him. Now you live in one country, 
next year you can move to a new country. You could see a different world. I had this dream when I 
was 7 or 8 years old. No one else I knew thought like me.” 
As long as Meiyu was considered beautiful and achieved high marks, she was relatively secure in her 
status. Even her grandmother seemed to like her then, because she felt she gave her a lot of face 
(mianzi). But when Meiyu entered middle school as a 12 year-old, things changed. She found herself 
unable to do well in science-related subjects, and felt that her natural ability lay only in humanities. 
At this point, she says, she ‘became a rebel’, and started to hang out with ‘bad people’. 
“One time, a boy wrote me a love letter in class. One of the teachers found it, and told my uncle, who 
threatened to expel the boy from school. My family found out, and they thought I was falling in love, 
and that’s why my marks were bad. They didn’t know I didn’t like science. They just thought I had 
become bad (bian huai). So, they didn’t love me anymore. Everyone stopped loving me.” 
As a teenager, Meiyu felt hated by her paternal kin, and suffered in school. Her only allies in her 
family were her ‘xiao nainai’ and, her shushu, the son of her ‘xiao yeye’—a teacher at another school. 
When her marks were too low to enter a good high school, he told her to come to his school and 
repeat a year. Meiyu’s father objected. ‘He was very disappointed in me. He wanted me to go out 
and make money. But my mum agreed and let me go study.’ 
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Nonetheless, when she entered high school, Meiyu was still not interested in her studies. She would 
sneak novels into class and read them, ignoring her teachers. After class, she preferred to sleep or 
chat with her friends, rather than doing any homework. Finally she began to cheat on exams, so her 
marks improved—only stopping this when she was caught one day and had to beg her teacher for 
forgiveness. 
After the cheating incident, her shushu confronted her. He explained that her mother was working 
by herself to support the family, and that Meiyu’s behaviour would harm her. 
“They said, ‘Do you know that your mum is going through a lot of trouble (hen xinku) at home? 
Because your father, your uncles and everyone, they didn’t want to let you come here to study. But 
your mum has to face a lot of pressure, all alone… After I heard what they said, I cried.” 
This was a turning point for Meiyu. Fortuitously, in the second year of high school she was allowed 
to stop studying sciences, and her marks improved. But when she found that others assumed she 
was still cheating, she became determined to prove herself. She worked hard, and ultimately ranked 
second in her class in the university entrance exams. 
“No one expected it. My father and paternal uncles finally realised that I’m a very able person (hen 
lihai de ren). I grew up. I didn’t have any respect for my father, because he’s a useless man. But his 
attitude toward me changed.” 
With the option of university open to her, Meiyu now wanted to leave the province, to study far 
away from her family, but they disagreed, and in the end, prevailed. 
“I had been with my kin from the time I was small. The whole time, I had my uncles next to me. I 
didn’t have freedom (ziyou). Everything I did, they could see. I wanted to see the outside world, to see 
lots of different people. My heart wanted to travel, but I didn’t have money. So I thought if I go 
elsewhere to study, I can experience the outside world. But my aunts and uncles, everyone disagreed. 
So I could only study here.” 
Once the decision about where to study had been made for her, it was a foregone conclusion that 
her family would choose her degree course. ‘I had no idea what to study’, she says, ‘They decided it, 
and told me after’. Because of their background as teachers, her uncles decided she would study 
English, and become a teacher. ‘I thought, whatever, it doesn’t matter. I just didn’t want to study 
here, I wanted to leave the province—when they decided I had to stay, I didn’t care what I studied.’ 
When she arrived at university, Meiyu felt ‘very ordinary’—compared with the students from urban 
areas, who spoke good English and had many hobbies and talents, she and the other rural students 
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seemed poor and unimpressive. ‘I felt very ordinary, extremely ordinary. But I didn’t want to be a 
special person, so it didn’t matter.’ 
Nevertheless, she made friends easily and lived a fairly happy life, reverting to her habit of studying 
as little as possible and not paying attention in class. 
“I would often skip classes, because I thought they were boring. I would watch dramas alone on 
television in the dorm, and buy food and eat it at home. I turned into the same person I was as a 
teenager, because there was no one there to watch me. So I was free.” 
Whenever possible, Meiyu would watch foreign films and international news, or read about it in 
newspapers. ‘I thought global things were related to me, because my dream was to go to many 
places around the world, so I wanted to know what was happening there.’ 
In her second year, Meiyu founded a student society devoted to travel and cultural activities. 
Organising paid activities allowed her to travel and explore the area around the city, and to show a 
different foreign film every month. While she didn’t connect personally with most of the people in 
the society, it gave her the opportunity and resources to explore her interests. She cannot explain 
why she has always been so interested in foreign cultures. 
“I’ve liked these things since I was little. My classmates weren’t like this. All of my classmates and 
friends just wanted to do something to make money. They thought, ‘When I grow up, I want to make 
money’. They didn’t think, ‘I want to go travel, see the world, see cultural things.’ I was never 
interested in making money.” 
Throughout university, she felt bored and disengaged with her studies. Her family pressured her to 
sit exams for professional certifications, out of concern that without these, she had little hope of 
finding a job. ‘Because I didn’t have connections (guanxi), money, or high marks, it would be very 
hard to become a teacher. So my family told me to sit more exams.’ Even when she agreed to sit 
these exams, she decided from the outset not to bother studying for them. ‘I always looked for an 
excuse not to. Because if you study and fail, this means you aren’t very good—so I prefer not to 
study.’ 
In Meiyu’s final year, her classmates were preoccupied with finding a job. She remembers them 
travelling all around China for job interviews, investigating every possibility. But she was different. 
“Every day I just sat in my room watching TV, eating. I didn’t care about looking for jobs, and I didn’t 
have any job interviews. I wasn’t worried about it. Everyone else travelled all around the country with 
Page 175 of 253 
 
their CV. I don’t know why I wasn’t worried. I guess it was my mentality. I never cared about money. I 
just thought, why should I waste my time and money looking for jobs that weren’t for me?” 
One day, when Meiyu was sat eating at her computer, a message arrived with an announcement 
that the university was looking for volunteers to teach Chinese in Thailand. 
“I was very excited! I went out, running around telling other people, ‘I’m going to Thailand to work! 
I’m going to Thailand to work!’ As soon as I saw that message, I told everyone I was going. My 
roommates and classmates thought I was crazy, because I didn’t even know if I would be accepted. 
But my heart (xinli) told me: This work is for me. What I was waiting for was this work. I had an 
intuition (zhijue). Really, my intuition told me.” 
Her family was completely opposed. They warned her that if she went abroad, she would be unable 
to find work when she returned. 
“I had no respect for my father, so I didn’t listen to him. My mother loves me most, and I love her 
most. She didn’t approve either, but there was nothing she could do to stop me. I thought, ‘This is 
what I want to do, I want to go.’” 
During her first year in Thailand, Meiyu rarely contacted her family. She felt they no longer approved 
of her or liked her, because she was not ‘successful’, so she preferred to avoid contact—‘I thought, 
“I’d prefer to be alone in this place”’. Instead, she occupied herself with her teaching, and with 
experiencing this new cultural context. She noticed that Thai people seemed to be very rule-bound, 
whether in dress or in conduct, but that they seemed to have ‘two personalities’—a rule-bound one 
while in class or at work, and a more relaxed one afterward. This struck her as unlike her and unlike 
Chinese people generally. She also observed that they seemed constantly happy, although their 
salaries were low. 
“They pass every day happily… They don’t think too much about the future; they think about the 
present, whether they’re happy or not. I am not like this. If I want to be happy now, I have to think 
I’m going to be happy in the future. Why? Because it gives me a feeling of security. I want to see the 
world, and I have to save money to do it.” 
Meiyu spent two years in Thailand, where she got to know students and teachers from Western 
countries. She enjoyed exploring Thailand with her colleagues, eating, drinking and chatting with 
them. But she felt that these friendships were only temporary, because she would not see them 
again. 
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“For me, it was very clear—they are just my friends for now. After I go home, they will go their way, 
we will have very little contact. If they were Chinese, it would be different—we would keep in contact 
after we came back. So we were good friends, but it couldn’t continue after. If you have a really good 
friend, with really good feelings (ganqing), if there is no way to see each other again, it will be really 
sad. And it’s very hard for me to become a really good friend with someone. Two people must really 
be kindred spirits (xingge hen touyuan). This is my problem.” 
Superficially, Meiyu’s consideration that her Western friendships were necessarily temporary is 
certainly representative of commonly held sentiments among many Chinese people abroad. Chinese 
students overseas, for example, often restrict their social circles to their compatriots, on the basis 
that it is not worth investing in a relationship if it is not likely to continue, or linked to their long-
term social network in China. But Meiyu did not eschew friendships with foreigners entirely. Instead, 
she enjoyed spending time with them and learning about them. Her reasoning for maintaining a 
certain emotional distance was instead that it was difficult to meet someone with whom she really 
deeply connected, and moreover, had she done so, it would have been too painful to be separated 
and not see each other again. Thus while her outlook on these friendships as temporary is consistent 
with the structure of the relational ethic, the story she tells about the motivation for this is rather 
different. 
When she returned to Kunming from Thailand, a friend found work for her in a Southeast Asia 
tourism company. She accepted it, thinking that it would provide opportunities for more travel 
abroad, but this did not materialise. 
“During those 18 months back in Kunming, I felt like a fish, but living in an environment without 
water—so I would soon die. That was my feeling. In Thailand, every day was different. But here, 
every day was the same. It was very boring. My heart just thought, I don’t like it this way.” 
Soon, Meiyu quit her job and enrolled on a postgraduate course that presented the possibility of 
further teaching abroad. Bored as ever with her studies, she took every opportunity during the 
course to travel around China. Unusually, she did almost all of this travelling alone. 
“I really like travelling alone, in my own way. When you go to new places, there are no restrictions 
(jushu). You can do what you like. This makes me feel very good… I also went to Malaysia alone. 
When you travel alone, you can meet more people, and really talk with them.” 
Not only did she prefer travelling alone, rather than with friends or in tour groups, but her 
experience of the places she went in China was itself unusual. 
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“When I go travelling, I don’t go online and read what other people say beforehand. I go to places I 
know about, from stories or TV series, because I want to see what they are really like. When I’m there, 
I think of the story, of what happened there, and it gives me a certain feeling. Sometimes I feel a bit 
disappointed. For example, there’s a temple in Hangzhou—in the stories, it is a barren, ancient, calm 
place. There are no people there. But I went to this temple. There were so many people with tourist 
groups. The temple is very commercialised. You see it like this and feel a very heavy weight on your 
shoulders. So sometimes I don’t go inside—I’m afraid all the beautiful things in my mind will be 
destroyed.” 
As for the other tourists around her, she had a very different impression. 
“They definitely won’t think this way. They’ll think, ‘Oh, look at this temple!’ and go inside and burn 
some incense, and come back out again. They just talk a lot and take pictures. All tourist spots are 
the same for them. But for me, they’re not all the same. So I don’t feel like taking pictures—I’d rather 
just get out of the way.” 
Meiyu’s final experience of living abroad was in the Philippines, where she taught Chinese for 
another year. There, she became friends with local colleagues, as well as others from around East 
Asia. Conversations with them opened her eyes to realities of life in Taiwan, Korea, and elsewhere. 
She attended a weekly Bible study group, never intending actually to convert, but simply to learn 
more about Christian culture. Although her life in the Philippines was more repetitive and boring 
than her time in Thailand, she valued the memories it gave her. Finally, she returned to Kunming and 
arrived in her current job as a Chinese language teacher.  
“My father and uncles think my choice to go to Thailand was mistaken. They think I was wrong, that I 
should have stayed here, so I would already have a house, a car, a husband, a job, maybe a child—
just like everyone else. At the beginning, my friends thought I was very happy, free and unrestrained. 
The men in my family thought I just wanted to have a good time, and hadn’t planned well. They think 
I made a mistake. But the women in my family think I should choose my own life. The men have very 
rigid brains—work, starting a family, house, car—this is success. They think travelling is pointless.” 
Noting again the difference between her and all those around her, she emphasised that this litany of 
desiderata—which she repeated each time as a kind of tedious ritual—was something she neither 
had nor wanted. 
“These are the things everyone else wants, but not me. What I want is my dream. My dream is to go 
to lots of places around the world to know and explore lots of cultures. Just as I was in Thailand and 
the Philippines, to work in one country for a while, then another, to learn lots of different things.” 
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But at the time of these interviews, Meiyu saw no prospect of living abroad again. 
“It’s a matter of the contradiction between dreams and reality. I don’t have the courage to keep 
going, because I haven’t found another opportunity. Sometimes I think, some of my classmates don’t 
know as much as me, but they can just focus on their lives, make money, work. They won’t think ‘My 
life is boring, I want to choose my own life’. They just do it—they don’t have any other ideas. I think, 
‘Why can’t I be like them? Work, work, work, find a person to get married, have children. Why can’t I? 
Have I seen too many things? Thought too many thoughts?’ So I don’t have a way to calm my heart. I 
think, if I have to stay here, how can I turn into someone like them? And if I turn into them, is that 
good or bad?” 
Discussion 
Meiyu’s experience shows one way in which the values of the relational ethic may weaken, and be 
partially replaced with new values, which are nevertheless not themselves moral as such. Although 
she finds the Buddhism of Thailand and the Christianity of the Philippines interesting as cultural 
objects, she is not swayed by their moral injunctions or by any other competing moral system. 
Instead, what she values most is the pursuit of her own dream, the dream of travelling to experience 
the world. She has eschewed typical relational ethic practices, such as travelling for the sake of 
enhancing relationships, and replaced them with hedonically motivated practices such as travelling 
to give herself a certain ‘feeling’, by experiencing the places she has read about and imagined 
through stories. Her sense of obligation to those in her social network has not been eroded by any 
other obligations, but instead by a simple desire to live life according to what her ‘heart’ and 
‘intuition’ tell her. 
It is therefore instructive that Meiyu herself describes her current predicament of being unwillingly 
settled in China as a contradiction between ‘Western and Confucian culture’. By ‘Confucian culture’, 
she means the obligation of her peers to pursue the standard set of desiderata—job, house, car, 
husband, family—to satisfy their relational obligations, including through the accumulation of ‘face’. 
But by ‘Western culture’, she refers not to Christianity or any other moral system, but instead to the 
idea that a person in their twenties is still young and free, and can do what they like. This is not a 
conflict between two moral systems, but a conflict between the moral system which surrounds her 
and the amoral values which have gripped her more deeply. 
This raises the question of why Meiyu has turned out so differently from her peers. She herself 
wonders about this question, though she certainly provides some hints about possibilities. We could 
speculate about the individual psychological factors which may have contributed to her 
development. Certainly, the patriarchal nature of her family, and the bias of many of her family 
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members toward her younger brother, coupled with an early sense that she had disappointed them, 
began a lifelong sense of distance from her kin. In particular, her estrangement from her father and 
his mistreatment of her mother left her feeling little obligation to help any family member apart 
from her mother. It is not difficult to see how a girl growing up in such circumstances could feel less 
than fully persuaded by obligations to kin and, by extension, the network of exchange partners to 
whom most Chinese young people are initially introduced through kin. Neither is it difficult to 
imagine the appeal of Western films and other media, and the hedonic values of individual self-
expression they often convey. 
However, individual motives are not sufficient to explain this case. In China’s rural past, a person 
with the same experiences would likely not have had the opportunity to express them in the same 
way; locked into dependency on their relationship network, they would simply have had to follow 
the rules of exchange within that network to survive (Judd, 2008)., Something about the social 
environment must have changed to facilitate this kind of existence. 
Part of the answer must be the simple point that urbanisation and the growth of bureaucracy as a 
coordination mechanism provide people with more opportunities to escape dependence on their 
relationships. For Meiyu, frequent trips to the city during her childhood already prepared her with 
knowledge of a wider world, and her ability to migrate to the city for university meant that she 
entered a new social milieu. As she says, she lacked connections and resources, having come from a 
poor rural family; and indeed, when she did rely on connections to find jobs, it was always her urban 
friends, met through university, rather than people known to her through her kin. Thus she had little 
to lose from jettisoning her obligations to her kin, and much to gain from the city. Moreover, the 
bureaucratic institution of the university provided her with formal entrance criteria into 
opportunities like teaching in Thailand, for which she appears to have applied without relying on any 
connections. Thus the relevance of the relational ethic for her life has been substantially weakened. 
8.2 Li Qiang: Developing a cross-cultural identity 
Li Qiang is a young man who burns in equal measure with passion and frustration. Tall, handsome, 
and 30 years old when I first met him, he has a deep interest in Chinese high culture. He has read 
and re-read several times the four classical Chinese novels, as well as works of Confucius and the 
Taoists. But he sees China as if through the eyes of an outsider, expressing cynicism and hope for 
Chinese civilisation often in the same breath. 
This viewpoint was, undoubtedly, formed in part by his long stay abroad, and only recent 
homecoming. For unusually, Li Qiang, an ordinary Haibian boy, had left China at the age of 18 to 
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study in Russia, and remained there for ten years before returning. He abruptly returned when he 
felt his parents were now too old for him to be overseas, but he felt he left part of his heart behind 
in Russia. 
“It was unusual for me to stay in Russia, just because I liked it. Most Chinese people do not 
understand why I would do such a thing. Neither do I, really, but I did.” 
Indeed, Li Qiang’s decision clashed with what many other young people say about major life 
decisions such as studying abroad. More typical is Lili, 23, a student in Beijing: 
“I dream of going abroad to study one day—maybe to America or England. Of course, I would not 
stay forever, just long enough to gain a good degree. I think this way I can return to China and have a 
better life. But I could never fall in love or remain overseas—this is my country, and my life is here.” 
Not only does Li Qiang’s decision set him apart; the implications of his choice do, too. Upon 
returning to China, he took a decent academic job, but he has been frustrated with the Chinese way 
of doing business—and the focus on interpersonal relationships, rather than on the values he holds 
most dear, of truth, the advancement of knowledge, and social justice. 
“I myself do not understand why we do things this way—drinking so much, worrying about ‘face’ and 
not behaving honestly. I do understand, because I am Chinese, but I do not like it. It is very difficult.” 
Thus perhaps Li Qiang’s unusual life choices have left him with a value orientation at odds with the 
society around him. But there is more to the story. Why did he make the unusual choice of moving 
to Russia, studying literature, and attempting to integrate into Russian culture? To find out more, he 
and I carried out several days of life history interviews, which revealed perhaps as much about his 
generation as they do about him. 
Li Qiang’s upbringing 
From the beginning, Li Qiang remembered feeling like an outsider. At school, he had few friends, and 
those he did have were outsiders, too. 
“We had a fat teacher who always laughed at me, because she thought I was not normal. Because I 
ate a lot, I talked to myself, and I didn’t obey her, so she thought I was strange. When we were 
supposed to sleep, I read cartoons instead, and she caught me. She called me ‘crazy’ (chixian) 
because I didn’t agree with her, I read books, I talked to myself, I didn’t play with other children.” 
He vividly recalls skipping school at the age of 6, simply because he found the classes boring, as he 
had already learned the material himself. Alone, he would wander the streets of Haibian, observing 
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people and inventing stories for himself about their lives. He particularly liked the port and the 
railway station, where he whiled away hours dreaming of escaping to lands far away. 
“I cherish that time, because it gave me space to think, to imagine, to dream. Education didn’t teach 
me those things—just competition and struggle and challenge, not to be a loser. That half year was 
different. I had the freedom to think.” 
This early preoccupation with foreign lands was perhaps linked partly to his sense of himself as not 
fitting in, and the disapproval of his teachers. But throughout his childhood, Li Qiang was exposed, 
too, to many foreign influences. As a teenager, he went to great lengths to obtain Japanese films; 
and during his younger years, he read a wide range of literature, both Chinese and foreign novels. 
Most striking of all, perhaps, is his very earliest memory. 
“I remember educational programmes on television, about English—this is my first memory. It was 
my first impression of foreigners. I remember that they were blonde, very tall, with coloured shoes, 
and they spoke English. I don’t remember cartoons or films from that time, just these programmes. I 
thought, ‘These people are different. They are not Chinese. They are not people from my real life.’ I 
think these memories influenced me for my whole life. Later, I decided to study in Russia—and maybe 
this was the first step.” 
Li Qiang was a bright boy and a misfit, whose imagination was fuelled by depictions of foreign places 
and cultures. But crucially, rather than reprimanding him as many Chinese parents might have done, 
his were unusually supportive. His mother read him advanced Chinese poetry from an early age, and 
often put intellectual discussion programmes on the television. His father, a blue collar engineer, 
had a passion for studying Chinese medicine, and filled the house with books. When Li Qiang was 
finally discovered playing truant, and told his father dishonestly that he was innocent, his father 
responded in an unusual way. 
“He asked me, ‘Is it true?’ I said, ‘No!’ and then he said, ‘Your headmaster told me you skipped 
school!’ At last I confessed. My father has beaten me only twice in my life—and this was the first 
time. He told me, ‘I’m beating you not because you skipped school, but because you lied.’” 
What made his parents so unusually supportive of their son’s eccentricities? He is himself aware that 
the norm for Chinese parents is to attempt instead to iron out these quirks in order better to equip 
their offspring with the qualifications and social connections necessary to succeed materially and 
support their family. But Li Qiang’s parents were different. 
Page 182 of 253 
 
His mother’s background was anything but ordinary. Her mother had come from a highly educated 
petit bourgeois family before the founding of the PRC. Heavily influenced by new liberal ideas, Li 
Qiang’s grandmother’s brothers had all gone to university, one becoming a renowned physicist in 
Beijing. His grandmother had not, but she showed all the signs of a modernising family background, 
from her liberal attitudes to her unbound feet. Li Qiang’s mother had thus grown up in a family 
steeped in cosmopolitanism and in which intellect was valued for its own sake. But during the 
Cultural Revolution, she was one of the generation deprived access to normal schooling, and as a 
consequence, she set out to inculcate the intrinsic value of the intellect in her son. 
Li Qiang’s paternal grandfather came from a less illustrious, but nonetheless well-off background. A 
mechanic when cars were new, he made a small fortune operating garages in Haibian. While he was 
not a Communist, after 1949 he shrewdly donated his garages to the state and became an ordinary 
factory engineer. Thus Li Qiang’s father, too, had perhaps absorbed an unusually early experience of 
capitalism and foreign ideas and values. 
It is therefore apparent that Li Qiang’s parents inherited a set of values which themselves had roots 
in China’s early modernisation and contact with the West. The trauma of the Cultural Revolution 
only magnified these. 
But beyond the nuclear family, extended kin networks have historically played an important role in 
the socialisation of Chinese children. Here, too, Li Qiang’s experience sheds important light. 
In his earliest years, Li Qiang and his parents lived in a sort of walled community within Haibian. This 
community had been formed by extended kin networks which had migrated from the rural area 
whence Li Qiang’s ancestors came. He remembers aunts, uncles and grandparents living nearby in 
the community along with their affinal groups, as well as a number of people whom he considered 
distant kin, but with whom he could not reckon an exact relationship. Within the community were 
shops, a school, and a communal watering station. Relationships mirrored those of a village: 
neighbours and kin exchanged favours and gifts and attended each other’s funerals and weddings, 
according to the normal pattern. Li Qiang remembers in particular that his father used to volunteer 
to help the woman who ran the watering station, who was perhaps distant kin. Thus in spite of the 
peculiarities of Li Qiang’s parents, it would seem that there was ample opportunity for socialisation 
into typical norms through the wider community. 
But all this changed abruptly when Li Qiang was 8 years old. The state declared that the community 
would be demolished and replaced with modern apartment blocks. Some were available on the spot, 
and Li Qiang’s grandmother and ailing grandfather chose to remain. But superior quarters were 
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available in another part of the city. Li Qiang’s father initially decided to stay to be close to his 
elderly parents. But Li Qiang’s grandmother refused, insisting it was more important they take the 
better apartment, even if it meant they would see her more infrequently. Li Qiang puts this down to 
his grandmother’s unusual open-mindedness. 
“My grandmother is very open-minded, a wise woman. She even had big feet, because her family 
was not very traditional. They had a modern education, and her father was a merchant. So they did 
not bind her feet. She always spoke gently, and valued education. And she told him to leave, because 
of the quality of the flat, because she wanted her son to have a better life.” 
Thus urbanisation and the modernising agenda of the Chinese state, coupled with his grandmother’s 
own modernising ideas, took Li Qiang out of a typical social network. In turn, his upbringing was 
framed by layers of experiences of modernisation and Western ideas deposited across multiple 
generations. As shown by his father’s disapproval of dishonesty rather than shame, by his mother’s 
valuation of intellect for its own sake, and by his grandmother’s insistence on the happiness of her 
children over their obligations to her, these deposits went beyond mere awareness of unorthodox 
ideas, and embraced fully universalistic values and norms. Finally, the interplay of these factors 
unfolded in the context of China’s opening up and the sudden availability of foreign media and 
values which fed Li Qiang’s young imagination. 
Thus the young man who made the unusual decision to study in and fall in love with Russia was no 
fluke. Urbanisation, economic development, waves of new moral ideas from abroad, and the trauma 
of the Cultural Revolution all contributed to his formation. It was, then, a logical step for him to seek 
to expand his horizons in the wider world. 
Li Qiang’s journey abroad 
At the age of 18, having attended a technical secondary school (zhongzhuan) which did not offer the 
possibility of university entrance, Li Qiang was unsure what to do. He considered for a time 
becoming a lawyer, ‘Because it is related to morality. I wanted to understand where laws came from, 
why we are obliged to obey them, and the relationship between ethics and law’. In the midst of 
these contemplations, a new opportunity arose. A friend of his father’s, whose son was studying in 
Russia, suggested he apply to do the same. 
“My parents told me, we will give you one week to think about it. If I agreed, then I would go to 
Russia. My father always respects my decisions. He didn’t tell me what to do. So I thought for one 
week. And my heart told me that I should go. I felt that the world was calling me, that I should go 
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and make a journey—just like when I was a child, imagining adventures in faraway lands. I felt the 
dream from my childhood had finally come true.” 
This decision was not welcomed by much of Li Qiang’s extended family. Both paternal and maternal 
kin objected. Studying abroad would cost too much money. Moreover, after the fall of the Soviet 
Union, Russia was considered to be weak and poor, so at best there was no point going there, and at 
worst, it would be dangerous. But his parents told him to ignore all these opinions, and make the 
decision for himself. ‘You make the choice’, said his father, ‘and I will support you’. 
Arriving in Russia was at first a great adventure. It took some time for Li Qiang to master the Russian 
language, but from the beginning, he set about learning everything he could about Russian culture. 
Other Chinese students at his university stuck to themselves, not interested in Russia or Russians—
perhaps, he says, out of fear. He was not interested in them, and instead formed friendships with 
Russians, took buses around the city to observe this alien culture, and wrote down what he saw 
every day in his diary. As soon as he could, he moved out of his student hostel to live with a Russian 
family, so he could distance himself from his Chinese classmates and immerse himself in Russia. 
In this first year, Li Qiang compared everything he saw to China. He felt at first that Russian culture 
was ‘better’ than that of China, that people were ‘more polite, more respectful’. They respected 
traffic lights, formed orderly queues, and spoke quietly when in public. Streets and classrooms were 
clean and orderly. ‘I thought then that Russian people were principled, they respect principles. And 
when I saw these things I thought, “Wow! We should be like this, too”’. 
Things took a turn for the worse in his second year, when Li Qiang was required to live again in a 
student hostel with his compatriots. Arguments and eventually violence broke out between Chinese 
and Russian students, sparked by Chinese students disregarding a rule banning loud noise and music 
in the evenings, and a troublesome young Russian connected to organised crime, who did not like 
the Chinese. Tensions culminated in a vicious fight. 
“There was blood everywhere, bottles, chairs. I tried to stop them…It was lucky because I hid all of 
the knives—our big Chinese cooking knives—I had a cupboard, and hid them all. When I tried to call 
the police, the ‘mafia’ boys just hit me. Three of them beat me. It was a nightmare.” 
After a slow police response, the university administration refused to hold anyone responsible. From 
that moment, Li Qiang lost his positive impression of Russia. The violence left its mark, and he 
distrusted all Russian men, feeling that they could all secretly be ‘mafia’, so he must always be ready 
for a fight. 
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For three years, he focused on his studies, and while he had Russian friends, the idea of Russia itself 
had lost its lustre. Then, he met his first love, a girl who briefly restored his faith that not all Russians 
were bad. But a year later, their relationship ended and he was left with a broken heart. Had it not 
been for her friends, who commiserated with and supported him, inviting him into their homes, he 
might have lost all hope. Soon after this, he graduated from university. 
“I wanted to leave Russia after graduation, because of my broken heart. I told my father I wanted to 
go back to China to work. He asked me, ‘Have you lost interest in studying?’ I said, ‘Not at all, but I 
want to help our family—I have a degree, I speak two foreign languages, and I think I can earn 
money.’ But he told me, ‘If you haven’t lost interest in studying, I suggest you carry on.’ This was the 
first time he ever gave me such a suggestion. Even then, he said it was my choice—this was his 
suggestion, but it was my choice. And I thought he was right. I hadn’t lost interest in studying. That 
was the only reason—not for a job, not for a definite purpose, just to learn. I felt that I should do it, 
even though I hated Russia. My interests were more important to me.” 
So it was that Li Qiang moved to another city in Russia to begin his PhD. There, he met another 
problem that would further chip away at his trust in Russian people. One of the staff, on whom he 
depended, demanded a bribe in exchange for his continued support. 
“It was terrible. I lost hope again. My classmates had helped me to rebuild my belief in Russia, and 
this man absolutely broke my last hope. Bastard! But I stayed. I didn’t pay him—but instead I decided 
to prove myself.” 
Shortly thereafter, at Christmas vacation, he stayed again with his former classmates, including the 
friends of his ex-girlfriend. They helped him to calm down and recover, and advised him about how 
to proceed. This was a sort of turning point for Li Qiang. He found a way to manage his relationship 
with the staff member in question, and set out to find work to support himself financially. 
From this point on, he travelled extensively in Russia, both to collect data for his PhD, and as part of 
his new job as an interpreter for Chinese engineers working on Russian railways. These travels gave 
him time to reflect, and to interact with a range of people, both Chinese and Russian. He saw both 
good and bad behaviour among both, and began to understand that even those who had behaved 
badly had their motivations. 
“At last, I found out the reason why [the staff member] needed money from me. Because his 
daughter was ill, and he didn’t have any other way to make money. Of course his behaviour was 
absolutely not correct, but he had his reasons. So, I could forgive him… Travelling around, I tried to 
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understand people, Russian people and Chinese people. Now I know that Russian culture is not good, 
and it’s not bad. Like Chinese culture—not good, not bad. I can’t judge any culture, or any nation.” 
His PhD complete, after more than a decade in Russia, Li Qiang decided to return to China. He had 
come to enjoy his life there. His work on the railways gave him time to think and read, and it paid 
well—money he was able to keep, as his family did not expect him to send any remittances back to 
them. Moreover, he felt little pressure to return from his parents. 
“I suddenly noticed that my grandmother was old. And I thought, ‘This is the time. If I stay in Russia 
for five more years, maybe I won’t see her again. I will lose her forever.’ My father said, ‘It’s your 
decision, you can stay there if you want, and we will visit you once or twice a year.’ But if I lost my 
family, I thought, what is the meaning of my life?” 
Having finally come to the point where he felt he could understand and live as part of both cultures, 
Li Qiang returned home to China. His return was not without sadness. He had grown attached to 
Russia. But he returned, not because of the pressure of obligations, but because of his own desire to 
be close to those he loved. 
8.3 Li Ming: A cosmopolitan life 
Li Ming is a 30 year-old Beijinger who works in banking, speaks impeccable American English, and 
enjoys an aspirational and cosmopolitan lifestyle. His hobbies range from collecting models of old 
ships to travelling the world, trying out local cuisines and exploring the outdoors. I met him not 
through the network of co-operativists, but through foreign journalists in Beijing, one of the circles 
in which he moves. It was immediately apparent that he, too, deviated from many of the norms of 
his peers, and his thoughtful outlook provides a further insight into conflicting moral worldviews. Li 
Ming aspires to contribute to society and the world, and while he is lucidly aware of a different 
moral reality around him, he copes with this by existing within a network of friends and associates 
who are either foreign or have themselves spent extensive time abroad. From within this enclave, he 
dreams of contributing toward a larger moral transformation in Chinese society; but the existence of 
the enclave itself allows him to live a contented life. 
Li Ming was born and grew up in Hubei province. Although his family was not rich, they lived a 
moderately comfortable existence, supported by his father’s work as an academic and his mother’s 
job in local government. He remembers a happy childhood, and one in which there was not a great 
sense of pressure to become financially successful. 
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“I always did well at school, teachers liked me, my classmates all liked me. You take a lot of things for 
granted—I just felt like that was how it was supposed to be. My parents never emphasised money 
much at all. Throughout my upbringing, they never talked about it, never said ‘You should earn this 
much money, money’s so important, this and that’—I just think throughout my life I felt like money 
was never an issue, nothing to worry about.” 
This relatively carefree childhood was perhaps underpinned by the unusual background of his 
parents. Li Ming’s maternal grandparents both studied at university during the Nationalist period, 
attending campuses that had been evacuated to the southwest during the Japanese occupation. He 
remembers his grandfather as being a bit ‘aloof’, and being proud all his life of having attended the 
most prestigious university in China at the time. As intellectuals educated under the Nationalists, his 
grandparents suffered during the Cultural Revolution, and Li Ming’s mother passed down to him her 
dislike of Mao, often muttering that he was a ‘dictator’, or ‘mad’.  
His father’s family came from a more ‘traditional’ background, from a remote town in Hubei. Li 
Ming’s paternal grandfather joined the PLA just before the Communist victory in 1949, and went to 
work for a state-owned company. In spite of the uneducated background of his family, Li Ming’s 
father went to university as a mature student after the Cultural Revolution, eventually completing a 
PhD and becoming a university lecturer. He became ‘the intellectual of the family’. 
It was perhaps this mix of backgrounds which induced Li Ming’s parents to take up an early 
opportunity, in the 1980s, to work for a period in Japan. This made a strong impression on his 
mother. 
“Back then the gap between China and Japan was huge. Before they went, they had never even seen 
an elevator before. My mom told me that even working part time, she could earn in one day what 
she could earn in four months in China. It really opened their eyes, seeing what was outside China, so 
when they came back they thought it would be very good for their son to study abroad.” 
Again, unusually, Li Ming’s mother did not pressure him to study abroad, but rather attempted to 
influence him by other means. 
“She’s not the typical ‘tiger mom’, like, ‘Hey, you should do this, because I told you so’. Rather, she 
kind of hinted in that direction. Instead of saying, ‘You should study English’, she let me pursue my 
interests, like watching Hollywood movies or American TV shows. So when I watched a show and 
liked it, my mom would suggest, ‘If you like it, you’d understand even more in the original language, 
instead of just reading subtitles’. So my parents, especially my mom, had a huge influence on me 
studying abroad.” 
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Thus in 2002, after applying to many American universities, Li Ming won a scholarship from an 
American foundation and went to study in an elite US university. At the time, it was still unusual for 
Chinese students to go abroad for their undergraduate degree. From the beginning, he aspired not 
only to use this degree to further his career, but to integrate himself into American culture in a way 
that would allow him to reinvent his personality. 
“Day one at university, I set myself a goal: To be as American as I could be by the time I graduated. I 
think I largely fulfilled that goal. But throughout that process, I was mindful about striking the right 
balance—spending time with my countrymen, and also with Americans. Traditional Chinese students 
are good at studying, but are very quiet. I was trying to be different. I did a lot of extracurricular 
activities—I was the only foreign student in the student government… That helped me to make 
friends, interacting with people a lot. Through all these interactions I became a more rounded person, 
immersed in American culture. Now in many ways America is my second home.” 
On his arrival in the US, Li Ming experienced being an outsider for the first time. Immediately noting 
the contrast between the homogeneity of Chinese society with the US, he was unsure whether he 
would be welcomed. To his surprise, he was. 
“I became a minority, because I didn’t yet speak English well, I didn’t know how to play baseball or 
football. I became one of the marginalised, the fringe of society… But people treated me as a family 
member. The very first Thanksgiving, I didn’t have any plans, so I thought, I’ll just hang out on 
campus. But a classmate of mine said, ‘Why don’t you come with me to my home to spend 
Thanksgiving with me?’… I was on the fringe of society, but nobody treated me as such. Everyone 
treated me as equal.”  
In particular, Li Ming was struck by being aware of inequality, and concern for inequality, for the first 
time in his life. At home in Hubei province, he had lived a relatively charmed existence, and been 
concerned mainly for his own well-being. But in the US, he came into contact with American ideas 
about egalitarianism, and the deeply unequal society with which those ideas coexist. 
“At my university I saw people from a really underprivileged background. In the past I took it for 
granted that everyone is equal, but it’s not really like that. I realised, ‘Wow, there are so many people 
in society who have never had a chance to go to the right school or have the right job. They can be 
smarter or work harder than me, but they just never have a chance’. Chinese are very 
discriminatory… My experience at university helped me to think everyone should be respected and 
treated the same, no matter whether you’re prime minister, or you’re just someone sweeping the 
street. Because in China, that thinking is really lacking. People show off, drive fancy cars, treat people 
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without power or money as if they’re so inferior to them. I really don’t like that—but it’s very 
prevalent in China.” 
When he graduated, Li Ming made the decision to return to China. Although he had received offers 
of employment from Wall Street firms, and felt he could build a career in the US, he explains that he 
decided to return to China because he felt that in the long run, opportunities would be better there. 
On one hand, he feared the possibility that subtle discrimination against East Asians in the US might 
harm him. On the other hand, he felt that China, as a still-developing country, presented more 
opportunities both for personal advancement and for being involved in interesting changes. 
However, in spite of the decision to return, Li Ming views his four years of university as the key 
turning point in his life. 
“Before that, I was open-minded, but you need to be in an environment where you can be open-
minded. If you’re ‘like a frog sitting at the bottom of a well’, you look up and all you see is the small 
sky. So I saw the world outside. I see things from a different perspective now. For example, the 
Communist Party will always say things in certain ways, but from an American perspective you see 
things a bit differently. My values as well… For example, I consider myself a feminist. I think men and 
women are equal—unlike prevailing thoughts in China nowadays, that women should rely on men to 
make a good living. That’s something I don’t agree with, but I think [gender equality] is a very typical 
American value.” 
Although Li Ming returned to China to live, his career in banking has allowed him to continue with a 
globally-minded existence. He has always worked for foreign firms in China, and travelled frequently. 
At work and in his social life, he has found a world of people within China who share his values. He is 
nevertheless aware that he thinks differently from many people around him. 
“It can be difficult. That’s why a lot of my close friends studied abroad as well. You hang out with like-
minded people, so that helps. Very few fu’erdai [children of the new elite]—it’s not that I can’t find 
them, I just don’t like to hang out with those kind of people. Of course you can’t avoid interacting 
with people like that. What I do is, if it’s for work purposes, I keep it strictly for work purposes—let’s 
get the thing done and that’s it, I don’t want to get into your personal life…I’ve always worked with 
American firms…if I worked at a coal mining company or an SOE, it would be very different. A lot of 
people think like me at the beginning of their career, but they have to change for their job.” 
Li Ming recognises that even if he wanted to maintain this separate social world, the separation of 
personal and professional life would be impossible if he were working for many Chinese 
organisations, which demand a merging of interpersonal networks and a blurring of the lines 
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between professional and personal obligations. Moreover, it must be said that the economic 
resources afforded him by his career provide Li Ming with the possibility of defining the geographical 
and cultural boundaries of his own social world. Even if his parents wished to pressure him to 
conform to more conventional norms, he has ample resources both to support them and to exist 
independently from them; but instead, they share in his cosmopolitan lifestyle, often going on 
holidays abroad with him and displaying pride in their son’s unusual choices. All these factors appear 
to allow Li Ming to exist in his own way and with his own worldview, although he is aware of the 
conflicting values of the society around him. 
What is more, he wishes for a change in that society. He has a keen interest in history, and is 
convinced that the moral vacuum he perceives in China today is a result primarily of poverty and 
inequality, and that people will naturally become more empathetic and charitable as they become 
richer. He expresses a typically American fusion of moral vision with the idea of personal enrichment. 
“I want to make a difference in the world… A person’s life’s worth is not measured by how much 
money or power you have. You should be measured instead by how many people’s lives are really 
influenced for the better because of you… I want to give back, to do something to help others. If I 
were ever to become very successful, I want to be like Bill Gates and Warren Buffett—I want to give 
the money away.” 
To that end, Li Ming has set up a sort of social enterprise, to promote Chinese cultural heritage 
around the world, in part by selling products with an educational value. In this project, he sees hope 
for a combination of three of his aspirations: to become ‘successful’, to help others, and to 
contribute to a rebirth of Chinese civilisation. 
“I’m very proud of my country’s history and heritage, but it’s hugely underappreciated. A lot of 
Chinese people are not even aware of it. I want to promote our traditional culture and values, to let 
people know that we Chinese should be more confident.” 
When he talks about his hopes and aspirations for the future, Li Ming does not frame his dreams in 
terms of his interpersonal relationships, or what his family or friends will think of him. He couches 
them instead in universalistic concepts like helping the poor, and to some degree in nationalist ideas 
about contributing to China itself. Materially he has already achieved what many poorer Chinese 
people can only dream of—but as his own experience attests, his affluent peers maintain the 
particularistic relational ethic he has himself rejected. What his case illustrates, then, is that it is 
possible to construct a life outside that ethic even if one sometimes cannot avoid dealing with it. In 
his case, several enabling factors were in place: supportive parents who themselves were a product 
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of early Chinese modernising education and had experience abroad; his personal experience of study 
in the US; the pool of cosmopolitan friends afforded by life in Beijing; and the economic and social 
resources provided by his career with foreign firms. Moral conflict is not absent here, but because of 
the presence of these conditions, Li Ming experiences that conflict as an intellectual problem which 
he hopes to address on a social scale, rather than a personal problem constraining his life. 
8.4 Li Juan: Growing up as an ‘independent’ person 
All of the cases discussed so far suggest conflicts between moral systems, a sense that even if one 
gives up the relational ethic, there will always be a feeling of pressure to return to it. Li Juan is 
different. A 32 year-old who worked much of her life as a tour guide in Guilin before becoming a 
Chinese language teacher, she is multilingual and has many foreign friends. She has travelled 
independently and sees her life not in terms of explicit criteria of ‘success’ or of pleasing her family 
or others, but rather in terms of doing the things she enjoys and exploring the world. But although in 
all these respects she deviates from the commonly understood norm, she expresses no conflict 
between herself and that norm, no pressure to do other than what she has done. An examination of 
her life story offers some suggestions as to why. 
Li Juan’s family background provided little opportunity for her to become embedded in a network of 
kin. Her parents were both factory workers, who missed out on education because of the Cultural 
Revolution, and migrated to Guilin, leaving their families behind in other cities. Her grandparents all 
died before she was born, and she had little contact with other extended family. Li Juan’s father 
served in the army during China’s war with Vietnam, so was absent for some years. He returned 
bearing scars, but did not speak of what he had experienced. When Li Juan was in primary school, 
her father died suddenly—but she is quick to emphasise she felt this had little effect on her. 
“I have a particularity in my childhood, because when I was 9 years old, my father got sick and died. 
Then my mother took care of me and my younger sister alone; it’s been like this until today. I was 9 
years old, in third grade. But I don’t think it had an especially big influence, because I’ve always been 
an independent person. It didn’t matter if my father was there or not.” 
Her mother, meanwhile, had distant and sometimes conflictual relations with her own family. 
“She was alone in Guilin; all her family were in Nanning… Her relationships with my uncles and aunt 
were not very good; my mum doesn’t have much to do with her family.”  
Indeed, this extended not only to kin, but to friends and neighbours, from whom her mother 
remained unusually distant. 
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“The difference between my mum and me is that I have a lot of friends, and I really like to be in 
contact with lots of people. My mum has friends, but few good friends. She knows who she knows, 
but she won’t actively go and seek them out to spend time with them. At the spring festival, I say to 
her, ‘Aren’t you going to go visit them?’ She says no. So at the spring festival, it’s just the three of us. 
Every year, just the three of us.” 
Li Juan thus recalls her experience of family as three people on their own—her mother, her younger 
sister, and herself. But far from retreating into this small family unit, she recalls a strong sense of 
independence from a young age. 
“I always liked to go have fun by myself or with others. My parents and my sister never really 
understood me as well as my friends did. They would often hit me, because I was very naughty. I left 
very early in the morning and came back very late at night.  I like my family, but I can’t constantly be 
with them for a long time. I like to go away somewhere, then come back, go away somewhere else, 
come back.” 
This sense was bolstered by the fact that her mother took a laissez-faire attitude toward Li Juan’s 
choices in life. 
“My mum sometimes is also a very enlightened (kaiming) person. She won’t force me to do anything. 
Maybe it’s also because my family is a single-parent family. But she hasn’t given me or my sister 
much pressure, there’s never pressure. She just wanted us to study well, take care of our health, be 
safe. She never told us to go make money to buy a house, or to make more money for her sake. She’s 
never said these things. Never.” 
What brought Li Juan’s mother to take this attitude? Given her own absence from wider social 
networks, she may not have experienced the pressure that often comes from these ties, and 
therefore had no impetus for transmitting it to her daughters. That is, in the relational ethic, one 
without obligations themselves has little motive for imposing obligations on others. Moreover, as an 
uneducated child of the Cultural Revolution, she may have imbibed its egalitarian influence, without 
later having this tempered by the pressures of interpersonal obligations. Finally, Li Juan herself 
speculates that her mother’s attitude may have been partly down to being a single mother, and it is 
conceivable that her emotional dependence on her daughters may have led her to be wary of 
pressuring them. However, in a society where such pressure is the norm, this explanation on its own 
seems insufficient. 
Whatever the causes, from an early age, Li Juan recalls being a deeply independent person. What is 
more, her youth was coloured heavily by the experience of being a ‘tomboy’. 
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“My hair was long in primary school, but in junior high school I cut it short, because I liked Nick Carter, 
from the Backstreet Boys. Then I became a tomboy. We had a school uniform, and I asked my teacher 
if I could wear the boys’ uniform instead. I wore boys’ clothes, I didn’t like wearing skirts. I didn’t like 
girls’ things. Other people said, ‘She’s a tomboy! (nanshinu)’. I didn’t care, because I thought I looked 
handsome and cool.” 
The sense of independence and of being outside the norm was apparently unopposed by her mother, 
and as she grew older, Li Juan felt increasingly that she was different from others. She found an 
outlet for this in foreign media, particularly music. 
“I really liked the Backstreet Boys, and Michael Jackson. I liked to watch foreign films, and MTV. I 
would buy myself lots of music magazines—every month, I would buy one for 5 RMB, which was very 
expensive at the time. I’d buy it, so I knew a lot of Western music. I always liked foreign things. I read 
the magazine ‘Zhongwai Shangnian’. It talked about Chinese kids going abroad, stories of them 
abroad, and about the thinking of foreigners. I thought, ‘Oh, cool. I like these things’.” 
Around this time, she began to cultivate pen friends from around China, Malaysia and France, first 
through a magazine and later, after it arrived, through the Internet. For Li Juan, this was not a search 
for difference or foreignness, but a way of finding others who were similar to her, with whom she 
could form a connection. 
“I didn’t think they were very different [from Chinese people] at all. The only difference was what 
language we used to communicate. But I didn’t think they were very special. I just liked having 
friends far away who had a similar life to mine.” 
8.5 Discussion 
The four cases explored in this chapter illustrate four ways in which individuals can deviate from the 
dominance of the relational ethic. They differ not only in their experience of that shift, but in its 
causes and the effects it has had on their lives. 
A common thread running through all four cases is the influence of family background. For Li Qiang 
and Li Ming, a family history stretching back to grandparents who received a university education 
and imbibed modernising liberal values during the Nationalist period provided a backdrop against 
which the pressure to conform to network obligations was perhaps weaker than usual. Meiyu’s 
fraught relationship with her father and his family meant that she, too, felt a weaker sense of 
obligation to a kin network. And Li Juan’s parents’ migration, her father’s early death and her 
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mother’s own troubled relationship with her family meant that she grew up without any sense of 
being embedded in a network larger than her immediate family itself. 
The Cultural Revolution plays a recurring role in these stories. Li Juan intimates that the divisions in 
her family may be connected to traumatic events of that period. Li Ming, too, suggests that his 
maternal grandparents’ persecution as intellectuals contributed to his mother’s disaffection and 
desire for him to see the world. Li Qiang tells a similar story. In all of these cases, the collective 
trauma of the Cultural Revolution, and the damage it did to the strength of many relationships 
throughout society, may have played a role in the weakening of family networks. 
But it is not only the Cultural Revolution; urbanisation and migration, too, further attenuated the 
strength of family ties, in particular for Li Qiang, Meiyu and Li Juan, creating  wider space in which 
they could operate outside the constraints of the relational ethic. 
Urbanisation has also further enabled another element which appears to be a contributing factor: 
economic independence. When Meiyu went to the city for university, she was able to find work 
without relying on family networks, instead applying directly or through friends; the growth of the 
city and of its connectedness to the world has expanded her horizons such that she does not have to 
concern herself with maintaining a status within the village network whence she came. Li Ming’s 
work with foreign financial companies allows him to choose his friends, and gives him the monetary 
resources he needs to live a life unencumbered by particularistic ties. In all four cases, the lack of 
dependency—both material and affiliative—on an exchange network is supported by the availability 
of alternatives, whether they come from abroad, from bureaucratic institutions, or from elsewhere. 
Thus there are reasons to believe that for these four, the relational ethic breaks down just where the 
theoretical model proposed in chapter 3 would predict. That ethic depends on material 
interdependency, on an exchange network into which individuals are initiated at birth, and on the 
attitudes and values which go along with playing one’s part in that network. For some, those values 
have been eroded by modernising education or exposure to foreign cultures, but crucially, what 
appears to make the difference in cases like those discussed in this chapter is the erosion of the 
structural supports of the system. Exchange relationships may be weakened by migration, political 
upheaval, or personal conflict. At the same time, the growth of the urban economy, of markets and 
bureaucratic modes of coordination, and of the availability of friends and resources from abroad, 
have provided alternatives to the exchange network, allowing some individuals to seek emotional 
and material resources elsewhere. When these factors combine, it would appear that at least in 
some cases, the relational ethic tends to break down. 
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However, even a cursory examination of these four cases shows wide variation in how people 
experience this breakdown. For Li Juan, there is no sense of conflict at all; she has created a life of 
her own, and there is no one to pressure her to do otherwise. For Li Ming, there is a conflict, but 
rather than feeling pulled toward the relational ethic, he views it at a distance, with some disdain. Li 
Qiang experiences a daily contradiction between his universalistic values and the necessary 
particularistic machinations of the networks in which he and his colleagues are embedded, and can 
only seek to resolve this by cultivating an inner world apart, ‘in his own heart’. Meiyu is pulled to and 
fro—spending long periods abroad, but questioning whether, if she is to stay in China, she must 
become a different person, with different values. 
It is notable that the two individuals who experience the most turmoil over this problem out of these 
four—Meiyu and Li Qiang—are the two who lack the alternative resources which would enable them 
securely to live a life apart. Li Juan and Li Ming both have an extensive pool of like-minded friends, as 
well as the economic means to secure their well-being independently. Meiyu and Li Qiang, on the 
other hand, are more beholden to the networks around them, and correspondingly feel more torn. 
There is at least a prima facie case for suggesting that this indicates that as the structural conditions 
for independence from the relational ethic become more precarious, anxiety is likely to increase as 
the contradiction between the social system and one’s own values becomes more acute. 
This chapter and the last have examined a series of somewhat unusual lives, and argued that these 
lives, though in some sense marginal, suggest a broader movement and perhaps the beginning of a 
larger social change. The next chapter will examine an attempt to test this idea at a cognitive level. 
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9. Changes in moral cognition: Evidence from Beijing 
While qualitative evidence can help elucidate the nature of moral change, and can suggest causal 
relationships in selected cases, to gain a broader understanding of processes of social change in a 
complex society, it is helpful to augment this qualitative evidence with quantitative data allowing for 
statistical inference. Attempting to measure the prevalence and relative importance of competing 
moral systems is not a straightforward matter, and measurement could conceivably be carried out in 
a number of ways, including the use of behavioural, attitudinal and psychometric questions. Each of 
these methods has disadvantages: behavioural questions rely on accurate self-reporting, and do not 
necessarily capture how subjects feel about or reflect on their behaviours; attitudinal questions may 
tend to evoke responses in accordance with perceived norms; and psychometric batteries require 
complex analysis and a great deal of interpretation. As such, the approach taken here was to 
combine all three of these question types in one questionnaire, to attempt to measure a 
combination of subjects’ moral attitudes, behaviours relevant to the moral systems in question, and 
the unconscious cognitive and affective structures underlying moral cognition. 
Although it would be ideal to carry out the survey across China, resource constraints necessitated 
restricting it to Beijing only, with additional pilot and development work carried out in Taipei. It is 
not possible to make direct inferences to the whole country from a survey carried out only in Beijing. 
However, because Beijing, like other Chinese cities, has experienced a mass influx of migrants from 
all regions of China over the past few decades, any findings which hold in Beijing are at least highly 
suggestive for trends in China more broadly. 
9.1 Psychometrics and the measurement of moral judgement 
Modern research in cognitive moral psychology begins with Piaget (1932), who interviewed young 
children about their understanding of a variety of stories about moral violations, and suggested on 
the basis of these interviews that differences in moral reasoning were driven by cognitive 
development, and corresponded to two distinct phases: a ‘heteronomous’ stage, in which younger 
children understand moral rules as absolute, and ascertain them from the behaviour of adults and 
older children; and a later ‘autonomous’ stage, in which children become aware that moral rules are 
a matter of social convention, and they must freely decide whether to adhere to them. This early 
hypothesis was extended by Kohlberg (1958), who conducted similar interviews with adolescents—
presenting them with moral dilemmas, and asking what the main character of the story should do, 
and why—and concluded that in place of Piaget’s two-stage theory, a six-stage formulation was 
more adequate to explain moral development. As the theory became further elaborated, Kohlberg 
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suggested that these six were sub-stages of three broader levels: a ‘preconventional’ stage in which 
rules are followed to avoid punishment or secure reward; a ‘conventional’ stage in which norms 
derive their legitimacy from the expectations of others or the consensus of the group; and a 
‘postconventional’ stage in which moral reasoning is based on more abstract principles, which may 
even trump the accepted norms of society (Kolhberg, 1984). The theory is meant to describe an 
invariant, universal sequence of developmental stages, strongly linked to age (Kohlberg, 1981; Rest, 
1979). 
This theoretical framework gave birth to a substantial body of research aimed at testing and 
elaborating Kohlberg’s theory, including its claims to universal cultural validity (Gibbs, 2003; Boyes & 
Walker, 1988; Locke, 1979). By way of testing the various forms of the theory, a panoply of 
psychometric instruments were developed to attempt to detect the activation of cognitive schemas 
(Derry, 1996) corresponding to each developmental stage. While these have typically shared Piaget 
and Kohlberg’s original approach of presenting subjects with short stories involving moral dilemmas, 
followed by questions, the specifics have varied widely. Their formats can be grouped into two main 
categories. The first are open-ended instruments, such as the Moral Judgement Interview (MJI) 
(Colby, et al., 1983) and the Sociomoral Reflection Measure (Gibbs, et al., 1984), which function like 
semi-structured interviews, in which participants are asked to talk through their reasoning about 
why the protagonist should act in one way or another, or why a particular action is right or wrong. 
Responses are then coded and analysed accordingly. In part because of the time-consuming and 
allegedly subjective nature of this coding process, a second category of ‘reactive’ instruments have 
been developed. Instead of asking open-ended questions, instruments like the Defining Issues Test 
(DIT) (Rest, et al., 1974) and the Hahm-Beller Values Choice Inventory (Hahm, et al., 1989) present 
subjects with moral dilemma vignettes, followed by a series of forced-choice items, typically Likert 
scales rating the importance of various considerations in the decision the subject has chosen for 
each story. While there was much debate over the relative merits of open-ended versus reactive 
instruments, the most important distinction was long understood to have been one of ease of 
administration and interpretation by researchers (Elm & Weber, 1994). 
But the foundations of developments which would call this assumption into question were already 
being laid by the ‘affective revolution’ of the 1980s, in which cognitive psychologists not only turned 
increasingly to the study of affect, but began to question the distinction between cognition and 
affect itself (Watson, 2016). Rather than comprising a wholly separate domain, affective processes 
came to be seen as a crucial component of cognition, and vice versa; concomitantly, this period saw 
the rise of so-called ‘dual process’ models of cognition, in which the bulk of cognitive tasks are 
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accomplished by fast, reactive, ‘hot’ systems often cued by immediate emotional reactions, while a 
smaller proportion of tasks are achieved by a slow, conscious, deliberative reasoning process (St 
Evans, 2007; Kahneman, 2003). Thus it became increasingly clear that the drivers of most behaviour 
must be distinguished from the verbal rationalisations people offer themselves and others—
reaffirming the long-standing anthropological insight that motivation must be distinguished from 
justification (Vaisey, 2009). 
For moral psychology, these insights have called into question the ‘cold’, cognitivist approach of 
Kohlberg and his colleagues, in which explicit verbal reasoning is taken to reflect the same cognitive 
structures which underpin intuitive moral judgement in everyday life. This has driven a move toward 
models of moral judgement which distinguish intuition from reasoning (Kristjánsson, 2016); although 
in practice they are likely to be interrelated, as in Haidt’s (2002; 2001) ‘social intuitionist model’, it is 
no longer tenable to conflate the measurement of the two. The implications for the psychometry of 
moral cognition are clear; for if these new approaches are correct, then open-ended instruments like 
the MJI should measure explicit reasoning, while reactive measures like the DIT should correspond 
more closely to intuitive moral judgement, and therefore to the activation of cognitive structures 
typically employed in everyday life (Narvaez & Bock, 2002). 
In addition to coalescing around dual-process and intuitionist views, contemporary moral psychology 
has seen a flowering of cross-cultural research intended to go beyond Kohlberg’s developmental 
framework, to search instead for the presence of culturally-determined moral cognitive schemas. 
Beginning with the work of the anthropologist Richard Shweder (1991), who proposed a set of 
distinct moral domains present across cultures but activated differently in each, cross-cultural 
psychologists have suggested that moral cognition in any given cultural context is the product of 
culturally-specific cognitive schemas which may be based to varying degrees on underlying cross-
cultural cognitive tendencies (Haidt, 2007; Haidt, et al., 1993). 
The survey described in this chapter was motivated by the combination of these considerations. If 
moral cognitive schemas vary not only across individuals, but across cultures, and if the kind of 
moral change and conflict described in the preceding chapters is taking place in China today, then it 
should in principle be possible to detect the presence of schemas associated with the relational ethic, 
and with other moral orientations, such as universalism and collectivism. If these could be detected, 
then it would be possible to test the hypotheses suggested above, namely that the relational ethic is 
declining in importance for those who are relatively less dependent on personalistic networks, and 
that this decline possibly facilitates, but does not necessitate, the development of alternative moral 
orientations. Moreover, to attempt to measure intuitive cognition, rather than explicit justification, 
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it would be necessary to develop a reactive instrument, like the DIT. The remainder of this chapter 
describes the development and implementation of that instrument. 
9.2 Survey development process 
I began development of the survey in early 2013, employing a series of qualitative and quantitative 
methods to develop and refine the final survey design. As an initial step, I carried out a preparatory 
survey in both Beijing (n=29) and Taipei (n=31). The purpose of this survey was twofold. First, it 
asked respondents to list five ‘bad’ and five ‘good’ things they or their friends had done recently. 
This served to generate a list of ideas that would inform the stories used in the final survey. Second, 
it asked respondents to rate, on a scale of 0 to 100, the strength of a series of words describing three 
spectra: agreement, acceptance, and importance. The purpose of this section of the survey was to 
choose appropriate words for the scales to be used in the main survey (only the importance scale 
was used in the final survey). The lists of words were generated by asking informants in both 
locations to write down as many words as they could think of for describing degrees along these 
spectra. It has been shown that using this method, it is often possible to find a remarkable degree of 
consensus about the numerical value of such terms, and by choosing terms which are roughly evenly 
distributed along the scale in a given population, the reliability of the resulting data can be improved 
significantly (Pasek & Krosnick, 2010; Krosnick & Fabrigar, 1997). 
Label Scale value Beijing values Taipei values 
完全不重要 
(‘completely unimportant’) 
0% N/A N/A 
不重要 
(‘not important’) 
25% Mean: 34.14 (±7.56) 
Std dev: 19.5 
Mean: 29.7 (±6.44) 
Std dev: 17.55 
不那么重要 
(‘not that important’) 
50% Mean: 46.621 (±7.53) 
Std dev: 19.8 
Mean: 42.39 (±5.98) 
Std dev: 16.3 
重要 
(‘important’) 
75% Mean: 75 (±4.31) 
Std dev: 11.34 
Mean: 70.9 (±3.68) 
Std dev: 10.05 
极度重要 
(‘extremely important’) 
100% Mean: 96.93 (±2.6) 
Std dev: 6.83 
Mean: 96.06 (±1.915) 
Std dev: 5.21 
 
The terms chosen for the ‘importance’ rating scales in the final survey are shown in the table above, 
with corresponding means (and 95% confidence intervals) for Beijing and Taipei. The labels for 
‘important’ and ‘extremely important’ are a better fit than the lower scale labels; nonetheless, ‘not 
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important’ and ‘not that important’ are a better fit than any of the alternatives. Unfortunately, none 
of the words listed in the initial survey returned a value corresponding to zero. As I did not have the 
resources to carry out another preparatory survey, I chose the phrase ‘完全不重要’ (‘completely 
unimportant’), and confirmed with several informants in both Beijing and Taipei that they felt this 
corresponded to a zero value. 
Following this initial survey, I developed the first draft of the main questionnaire. The questionnaire 
for the pilot included six stories about moral dilemmas. These stories were based in part on real 
problems faced by several of my informants, in part on the responses to the open-ended questions 
in the preparatory survey, and in part on Chinese news reports. I first wrote the stories and 
questionnaire in English, then had them translated into Chinese by professional translators in Taipei 
and Beijing, and finally combined the two versions into one. 
The questionnaire administration procedure was as follows. First, interviewers read out a short 
introduction explaining the survey process. Then, for each story, beginning with an example story to 
allow respondents to practise, respondents were handed a card with the story text, and an image 
illustrating the scale of importance to emphasise the relationship between scale adjectives (see 
appendix A). The interviewer then read the story aloud, repeated it if the respondent requested this, 
and asked the respondent what he or she thought the protagonist should do in response to the 
given moral dilemma. Next, the interviewer presented a series of ‘issues’ (14 in the pilot, 10 in the 
final survey), phrased as questions, and ask the respondent to rate each one in terms of how 
important it was to deciding what to do. In the final survey, respondents were then asked to rank 
the top three issues by importance. After all stories were administered, interviewers moved on to 
attitudinal, behavioural, and attribute questions. Finally, interviewers were asked to note any other 
comments made by respondents, and their own observations. 
The order of the stories, the issue questions within the stories, and the behavioural questions were 
all randomised to eliminate order effects (Krosnick, 1992). 
Research assistants were postgraduate students in the social sciences, whom I recruited through 
friends at a local university. To provide a sufficient incentive to ensure the survey was carried out to 
a high standard, I developed relationships with the research assistants as both informants and 
friends, and provided them with training as well as pay (50 RMB per questionnaire). 
The initial draft was revised through focus groups and individual interviews with the team of 
assistants, and informants in Beijing. Following the pilot, the same process was carried out with the 
final draft of the questionnaire. 
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9.2.1 Pilot 
The pilot (n=47) was carried out in Beijing in October 2013. It included 6 stories of moral dilemmas, 
with 14 issue questions per story. Respondents were chosen from public places in areas near the 
university where the assistants lived. Following the pilot, all interviewers were interviewed about 
their experiences. On the basis of feedback, adjustments were made to question wording, survey 
format, and instructions to interviewers. 
To allow for the capture of multiple possible moral cognition constructs, initial issue questions were 
designed to reflect 7 broad a priori constructs, with 12 items assigned to each construct (2 per story). 
The constructs as initially conceived were as follows: universalist individualism (UI), an orientation 
toward fulfilment of general obligations toward all individuals; particularist individualism (PI), one 
toward obligations to individuals dependent on relationship status; amoral self-interest (AS), a 
concern with one’s own satisfaction irrespective of consequences for others; universalist collectivism 
(UC), an orientation toward general duties to collectives, such as the state or locality; particularist 
collectivism (PC), an orientation toward duties to collectives dependent on the status of one’s 
relationship with the collective; homophilous universalism (HU), an orientation toward duties to all 
those with whom one shares certain traits; and homophilous particularism (HP), a concern with 
duties to the same individuals, but contingent on relational status. 
Item analysis was carried out on the initial 84 issue questions. 
For both forms of universalism (UI and UC), initial indications were that these constructs were 
unsatisfactory. In the case of UI, inter-item correlations (Spearman’s rho) ranged from good to poor, 
and inter-item consistency was poor (Cronbach’s alpha=.571). After dropping those items with no 
significant (p < 0.01) correlations, principal components analysis (PCA) was carried out on the 
remaining eight items. Four further items were dropped to yield a fairly satisfactory one-component 
solution. However, inter-item correlations for these four items remained low, and Cronbach’s alpha 
remained unsatisfactory, at .650. 
Slightly better results obtained for UC. Here, Cronbach’s alpha reached an acceptable, but still 
suboptimal level of .770. Inter-item correlations were greater than for UI, but remained patchy. PCA 
was again used to select four items which yielded a one-component solution. Although correlations 
here were good, Cronbach’s alpha decreased to .696. 
On the suspicion that the UC and UI constructs might be poorly distinguished, further analysis was 
carried out on a combination of the final items produced by the UC and UI analyses. PCA produced a 
satisfactory one-component solution based on seven items, explaining 48.5% of variance and with a 
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clear scree plot ‘elbow’ after the first component. Inter-item consistency was increased to a good 
level (Cronbach’s alpha=.812), and inter-item correlations were also good (ranging from .42 to .68, p 
< 0.01). This analysis, combined with the content of these seven items, provided prima facie 
evidence for a construct reflecting neither UC nor UI specifically, but rather a general concern with 
the well-being of people and society large—what might be called simply ‘universalism’. 
The 12 items measuring PI showed somewhat better initial consistency (Cronbach’s alpha=.72), but 
still patchy inter-item correlations. Removing the four items with lowest correlations, it was possible 
to increase Cronbach’s alpha to a maximum of .756. PCA on the remaining eight items produced a 
two-component solution with an unclear interpretation. After removing the three items which failed 
to load on the first component, PCA produced a satisfactory one-component solution explaining 
49.26% of variance in the remaining five items, with a clear elbow in the scree plot after the first 
component. These five items retained an acceptable level of consistency (Cronbach’s alpha=.732) 
and fairly good inter-item correlations (ranging from .3 to .587, p < 0.05). 
Results for PC were better still. The initial 12 items showed good consistency (Cronbach’s alpha=.83) 
and fairly good inter-item correlations. Removing the two items with the lowest inter-item 
correlations increased Cronbach’s alpha to .850. Again, PCA was used to assess the dimensionality of 
the remaining ten items. This yielded a two-component solution, in which oblique rotation (Oblimin) 
suggested a correlation of .536 between the two components, again indicating a suboptimal solution. 
Removing the items which failed to load on the first component produced a one-component 
solution explaining 48.42% of variance, with a clear elbow in the scree plot. The seven remaining 
items used in this PCA retained a Cronbach’s alpha of .811 with fairly strong inter-item correlations. 
Could PI and PC reflect a shared underlying construct, like UC and UI? Combining the items resulting 
from the previous two analyses did, indeed, produce good inter-item consistency (Cronbach’s 
alpha=.851). However, PCA on this combination suggested a clear two-dimensional structure in the 
data, corroborating the distinction between PI and PC. Similar results obtained when attempting to 
combine the best items from PI and UI, as well as PC and UC, with both resulting in a moderately 
higher consistency (Cronbach’s alpha=.778 and .839, respectively) but a clear division between the 
constructs in PCA. 
In the case of HU, the initial 12 items displayed acceptable consistency (Cronbach’s alpha=.769), 
rising to a good consistency (Cronbach’s alpha=.803) after the removal of six items with low 
correlations. PCA suggested the removal of two further items to yield a one-component solution 
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explaining 60.32% of variance. The remaining four items displayed a lower consistency (Cronbach’s 
alpha=.747), but good inter-item correlations (ranging from .387 to .645, p < 0.01). 
For HP, results were stronger. The initial items yielded good consistency (Cronbach’s alpha=.843), 
improving with the removal of three items with low inter-item correlations (Cronbach’s alpha=.853). 
PCA on the remaining nine items yielded a one-component solution explaining 48.64% of variance. 
Could HP and HU reflect a shared homophily construct? The combination of the best items from 
both of these analyses resulted in a set with nearly excellent consistency (Cronbach’s alpha=.897). 
PCA suggested the removal of two items to yield a one-component solution from eleven items, 
explaining 50.84% of variance. This result provided strong prima facie evidence that HP and HU 
might be better understood as reflecting a single underlying construct, ‘homophily’. 
Further combinations were attempted. A combination of homophily and universalism items yielded 
a Cronbach’s alpha of .898; however, PCA suggested a multi-dimensional structure with a fairly clear 
division between the two constructs. A more interesting combination was that of homophily and PC, 
yielding an initial Cronbach’s alpha of .922, decreasing to .899 after PCA suggested the removal of 
seven items to achieve a one-component solution explaining 52.87% of variance. This eleven-item 
combination suggested that homophily and PC might reflect a single construct, perhaps a general 
orientation toward the in-group. 
In the case of AS, the initial 12 items showed acceptable consistency (Cronbach’s alpha=.712), rising 
somewhat after the removal of the four items with low inter-item correlations (Cronbach’s 
alpha=.758). PCA on the remaining eight items suggested the removal of two further items, to reveal 
a one-component solution explaining 46.3% of variance. These remaining six items retained an 
acceptable level of inter-item correlation and consistency (Cronbach’s alpha=.756). 
On the basis of the preceding analysis, it was hypothesised that the initial constructs should be 
replaced by the following four constructs: particularist individualism, universalism, in-group 
preference, and amoral self-interest. Although the pilot sample was too small to perform 
confirmatory factor analysis to test this hypothesis, exploratory factor analysis was carried out, and 
suggested that although the universalism dimension was distinct, there may be some overlap 
between in-group preference and AS. Moreover, PI items were unsatisfactorily indistinct from other 
dimensions. It was therefore decided to retain additional items for each of these constructs, in the 
hope that a larger sample size would provide clearer results. 
However, the overriding priority at this stage was item elimination. Interviews with the research 
assistants made clear that respondents were quickly fatigued by the number of stories and items. On 
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the basis of the preceding analysis, it was decided that two full stories could be removed, as well as 
four questions per story for the remaining four stories. Thus 40 items in total were retained, out of 
the original 84. 
9.3 Main stage 
On the basis of qualitative information from the pilot, and initial statistical analysis of the results, the 
final questionnaire draft was prepared. Interviewers were asked to read and respond to the final 
draft in a focus group, and final revisions were made. 
The survey (n=297) was carried out by a team of 12 research assistants, 2 of whom had been 
involved in the pilot. After training and preparation, the team carried out the survey over a period of 
2 months, from late November 2014 to early January 2015. Questionnaires were administered in 
public places, such as parks and shopping centres. The sample was stratified according to 
geographical subdivisions of urban Beijing, and their respective populations, as shown in the table. 
District Population Proportion of total 
(11,716,00) 
Number of questionnaires 
Dongcheng 919,000 7.8% 24 
Xicheng 1,243,000 10.6% 32 
Chaoyang 3,545,000 30.3% 91 
Haidian 3,281,000 28% 84 
Fengtai 2,112,000 18% 54 
Shijingshan 616,000 5.3% 16 
 
Research assistants were asked to choose an equal proportion of men and women, and a range of 
‘different kinds of people’, but apart from geographical stratification, the sample was not formally 
stratified. The resulting sample comprised 48.1% females and 51.9% males. 90.2% were Han Chinese, 
while 8.5% identified as another ethnic group, roughly corresponding to official proportions at a 
national level. 89.6% claimed no religion, versus 9.1% who identified with a religion; of the 27 who 
claimed religious affiliation, one third belonged to ethnic minorities. 
The sample was heavily skewed toward students (39.1%) and those in the 19-25 age group (45.1%), 
an unanticipated consequence of the age and occupation of the research assistants. To compensate, 
analyses were carried out on with weights reflecting the overall demographic structure (CIA, 2015). 
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9.3.1 Initial confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
Attempts were made to fit a series of CFA models corresponding to the data structures suggested by 
the pilot. However, these models were either unspecified or produced consistently poor fit 
parameters, suggesting the structure found in the pilot may have been an artefact of the sample size. 
As an additional exercise before reverting to exploratory factor analysis, a CFA model was 
constructed with each item mapped to one of four of the five moral domains posited by Moral 
Foundations Theory (Haidt, 2012), in the hope that the questionnaire might have inadvertently 
picked up these structures. However, it was not possible to construct a satisfactory model along 
these lines. The decision was therefore taken to return to an exploratory analysis. 
9.3.2 Exploratory analysis 
Ordinal multidimensional scaling (MDS) was carried out on the whole set of story items. Unlike PCA, 
ordinal MDS does not assume linear relationships, and is therefore able to detect similarities where 
these are less visible to PCA (Jaworska & Chupetlovska-Anastasova, 2009). Indeed, initial MDS 
produced a clustering of two sets: on one hand, items which correspond to considerations of moral 
duty—whether these consist of obligations to family, to the country, or simply considerations of the 
impact of one’s actions on the well-being of others. The other set appears to correspond to what 
might be called, quite narrowly, ‘particularism’—that is, consideration of particular features of the 
case, the history of one’s relationship with the other party, the consequences for oneself, and so on. 
 
Figure 1: MDS shows two item clusters (particularism circled). A one-dimensional solution was preferred, but the 
structure is clearer in two dimensions. 
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To break this down further, I carried out a separate MDS on the items of each story, and was able to 
reproduce a similar structure for each, while eliminating a few outlier items. To determine whether 
the two sets identified thus far themselves comprised further structure, I then conducted MDS on 
each of those sets separately. The result of this was a clear division of the ‘duty’ items into two 
categories: one corresponding to duty to non-kin, the other corresponding to duty to family. 
This ‘familism’ grouping includes several items which appear to have to do with the well-being of the 
respondent—asking, for example, whether he or she will undergo a great deal of ‘hardship’ as a 
result of an action—but it would appear from their sharp distinction from other items asking more 
directly about individual consequences that these items were interpreted as having direct 
implications for close family. This clustering is supported by all of my other analyses, including those 
mentioned below, and it is consistent with similar results in neuroscience to the effect that Chinese 
subjects were found to cluster motivational self-concept and concepts of close family tightly 
together (Zhu, et al., 2016). It is also consistent with the notion of the ‘expansive I’ (Chen, 2015). 
.
 
Figure 2 Item clustering. A is 'duty', breaking down into A1, 'familism' and A2, 'duty to 
strangers'. B is 'particularism' 
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While the ‘duty’ items partitioned into these two subsets, the ‘particularism’ items did not form a 
useful partition. This was further supported by hierarchical clustering analysis, which showed a very 
similar structure, in particular the division between the two larger categories, but also the earlier 
and clearer clustering of subdivisions within the ‘duty’ set. I therefore adopted the tentative 
hypothesis that these three constructs could be an adequate partition for analysis. 
9.3.3 Confirmatory factor analysis 
A CFA measurement model was then constructed on the basis of these three constructs. After 
removing some of the more weakly loading items and allowing appropriate error terms to covary, a 
satisfactory model was produced (χ2 = 137, df = 131, p = .34; CFI = .991, RMSEA = .031). Items loaded 
uniquely on each factor, and factor loadings were all of the correct sign and reasonable magnitude, 
as shown in the diagram below. 
 
Figure 3: CFA measurement model 
9.3.4 Relationships between the factors 
Because of the relatively small sample size given the number of parameters, it was decided to 
generate factor scores from the CFA measurement model and perform regression analysis on these 
scores, rather than attempting structural equation modelling. 
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The correlation matrix between the factors showed significant, but relatively moderate relationships 
between particularism (‘conditionality’) and familism (.189, p < 0.01), and duty to non-kin and 
familism (.274, p < 0.01) but no correlation between particularism and duty to non-kin. A possible 
explanation for this is that familism shares an aspect of each of the other two factors, i.e. it is a 
sense of moral obligation, but one which is restricted to a certain domain of individuals; thus we 
might expect both increased particularism and increased duty to increase familism. Linear regression 
tended to confirm this; a model with familism loading on the other two factors resulted in a low, but 
significant adjusted R2 = .111, with both factors loading positively (p < 0.01). 
The effect changed markedly when the analysis was segmented by sex. For women, the values in the 
correlation matrix increased strongly, and the regression improved correspondingly; R2 increased 
to .272, and the magnitude of both loading factors increased as well. But for men, the significant 
correlations disappeared entirely, as did the significance of the regression; thus it seems women are 
responsible for the whole of the relationship between these factors. A breakdown of sex differences 
on the factors (t-test for equality of means insignificant in all cases) shows why: 
 
 Sex Mean Std. Deviation 
DutyToFamilySelf 
F .0690 .66519 
M -.0235 .60386 
DutyToNonKin 
F .0488 .49065 
M .0103 .40468 
Particularism 
F .0618 .45564 
M .0095 .52041 
 
Evidently, men exhibit a markedly (and significantly) lower mean on all three. It might be suspected 
that female respondents are simply suffering from an acquiescence bias; however, they also exhibit 
higher standard deviations than the men on the first two factors, as well as higher variances on the 
item scores themselves. Alternatively, this result could reflect a higher level of conscientiousness or 
engagement amongst female respondents. It is difficult to ascertain whether the pattern reflects a 
measurement error or a real distinction in moral psychology. Suffice it to say that were this 
instrument to be carried forward in a further study, it would be crucial to attempt to answer this 
question. In any event, for these reasons, all further analyses were carried out separately on males 
and females. 
To test the hypothesis that rural-urban migration and the resulting severing or attenuation of 
relationships is resulting in a weakening of the relational ethic, several regression models were fitted 
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to evaluate whether for those born in the countryside, the proportion of one’s life spent in the city 
might affect one’s moral orientation. While no relationship was found with general duty or familism, 
both men and women showed significant effects. For men (R2 = .107, p < 0.01) particularism 
significantly decreased with time spent in the city; for women (R2 = .181, p < 0.01) it instead 
increased with time in the city. Unfortunately, these effects are too weak to justify speculation about 
a genuinely divergent causal relation. This result calls again for further methodological investigation. 
However, it does show that there is at least a weak interaction between rural-urban migration and 
particularism. 
Similarly weak results were found when attempting to evaluate relationships between the factors 
and other measurement variables, such as measures of economic status and education—many of 
which were plagued by heteroscedasticity which resisted a number of attempted transformations. It 
must be concluded that although the measurement model has prima facie validity, and the CFA 
analysis supports the idea that this may, indeed, reflect a true psychological partition, the causal 
component of the survey yielded inconclusive results. 
The one apparent exception to this is the relationship between age and familism. Both men and 
women showed a clear effect: familism increased linearly with age (R2 = .243, p < 0.01) (neither of 
the other two factors showed any relationship with age). That is to say, familism shows a decreasing 
trend in younger generations. This pattern is amenable to at least two explanations. On the one 
hand, it may be that, consistent with the argument made elsewhere in this thesis, familism—as part 
of the relational ethic more widely—is weakening across generations, and thus this statistical 
evidence can be taken to support that hypothesis. On the other hand, it is possible that the age 
effect here reflects a life cycle pattern in which individuals of all generations become more familistic 
as they age. In that case, the pattern found here may not indicate a cultural shift at all. Without 
longitudinal data, it is impossible to determine which interpretation is correct. However, when 
considered in the context of ethnographic evidence presented in the rest of the thesis, this finding is 
at the very least suggestive. 
9.4 Discussion 
While these results do not allow for the evaluation of the principal causal hypotheses for which they 
were designed, they are enlightening. The measurement model tested and validated above chimes 
not only with the idea that self and immediate family are still conceptually elided, at least in moral 
cognition; but also with the notion that there is a clear distinction between a particularistic 
orientation and the notion of duty to strangers (perhaps ‘universalism’). It suggests, moreover, that 
far from being inversely related, these constructs are in large part orthogonal. This finding, at least, 
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is certainly consistent with the suggestion made in this thesis that for those for whom the relational 
ethic is weakening, it is not a necessary consequence that universalism should take its place. Indeed, 
the positive relationship found in this sample between universalism and familism suggests that they 
may have as much in common as they do apart. 
Thus the above analysis is consistent with the claim, made elsewhere in this thesis, that multiple 
moral systems are at work in Chinese society today, and that these systems are instantiated by 
distinct sets of individual dispositions. The orthogonality of the two corresponding factors suggests 
that for any given individual, both the relational ethic and an alternative, universalistic ethic may be 
simultaneously at work—or, indeed, that only one, or neither, may be salient. Moreover, the weakly 
positive relationship between familism and concern for strangers suggests that the relational ethic is 
not only not being supplanted by universalism, but that it may be that in some cases, those 
individuals more strongly guided by universalistic concerns are the same individuals most concerned 
with the relational ethic—that is, perhaps those who feel a stronger moral orientation more 
generally. Where the relational ethic is weakening, then, it is not necessarily being replaced by any 
other moral system, although for some people, this is the case.  
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10. Conclusion 
One evening in Meibian, I met my friend Wei to have a beer at a local bar. We sat in one of the 
private booths in the bar, as we generally did. He seemed agitated. We had spent the last couple of 
months working together to try to convince the local police to formalise my permission to stay in the 
county. Each time we had fulfilled their requirements, they had given us new ones, but he 
generously pressed on, insisting on helping me. The day before, we had given them a new tranche of 
documents, and I was eager to hear the result. 
“I had a call from the police today. They told me these documents are not enough. But then do you 
know what they said? ‘We advise you not to go on helping that foreigner, and not to be his friend 
anymore. It could be very bad for you. It might damage your future.’” 
It was obvious I had to leave. In the days leading up to this, it had become clear that the police had 
been following me, and had visited, and intimidated, several of my informants after I spoke with 
them. Although my research questions had been innocent enough, I had discovered what seemed to 
lie behind this behaviour. For one afternoon following a banquet, a drunken official accompanying 
me in the back of a car related a curious story. 
“You know why things are a little sensitive in Meibian? Last year, there was a foreigner who made a 
big mess of things. He came and ran a training project for co-operatives, but this training was funded 
by an American company. And that company is on the blacklist. You know what I mean when I say 
‘blacklist’? Officially, it doesn’t exist, but… The local people didn’t realise until it was too late. But it 
was their responsibility. So let’s say, it wasn’t the best time for you to come.” 
This local political scandal had, it turned out, been the hidden reason behind the prolonged 
difficulties I had with permission in Meibian, and the nervousness of some of my informants. It had 
been kept secret not only from me, but from the foreigner involved in the training project in 
question; only his Chinese partners were informed and held responsible. So, after Wei received his 
threatening phone call, I decided I must leave, lest I put him or anyone else in danger. He tried to 
stop me: ‘You must stay! I know my rights as a Chinese citizen’. But I had no choice. 
That night, I booked a flight from a small airfield in the desert nearby to Lanzhou, and on to Beijing. 
In the morning, I took the first taxi from outside of the hotel where I had stayed throughout my 
months in Meibian. The driver headed into the desert, but immediately made a call on his mobile, 
talking agitatedly to someone about the whereabouts of the airport. We left the main road and 
started to wind around desert tracks, apparently lost. 
Page 212 of 253 
 
Suddenly, the driver pointed at a gate, and said, ‘Oh, the airport should be just on the other side of 
that military base—we’ll just go straight through’. Before I could object, he drove up to the entrance, 
rolled down his window and exclaimed, ‘Comrades, comrades! I have an American here. Please let 
us through!’ 
In an instant, a group of soldiers pounced on the car, opening the doors and pulling us both out. 
Between shouting and barking at us, they went through the car, pulling out my luggage and 
searching for hidden objects. Then I was frogmarched to a tent and placed under armed guard. 
During my 14 hours of detention, I was subjected to a ‘good cop/bad cop’ interrogation. A young 
soldier would enter the tent, telling me he just wanted to have a friendly chat, then casually ask 
whether I had been to Japan or Taiwan, and so on. Then he would leave, and an angry-looking 
officer would enter and shout at me that they knew I was a spy, that I had broken the law, that I had 
no right to speak to my embassy and that I would be thrown in prison for a very long time. 
This carried on until the arrival of intelligence officers, who would conduct my formal interrogation. I 
was made to sit in a chair underneath a bright lightbulb, facing a panel of interrogators sat at a table 
with my luggage on display, and a video camera to capture the process. I was told to make a 
statement explaining what I was doing in China, and giving the names of everyone I had met there—
an impossible task. They asked repeatedly what I was doing in Meibian, seemingly incredulous that 
any foreigner would want to stay in such a ‘backward’ place. Then they went through the files on my 
laptop, including my field notes. Although they did not speak English, they asked me about every 
Chinese name they came across. 
Finally, at four in the morning, they told me they had not found anything with which to incriminate 
me, and they would let me go—but that it would be in my best interest not to return to this province. 
This episode, which ended my stay in Meibian, but not my fieldwork, is far from an unusual 
occurrence for researchers in China. While chapter 2 discussed some of the difficulties of fieldwork 
stemming from the personalistic organisation of society, there is, too, the constant difficulty of 
interactions with the Chinese state—an all-pervasive, but opaque and often barely detectable force. 
The scandal in Meibian illustrates the uneasy relationship between the priorities of the state and 
those of the co-operative movement, including its foreign participants. Not only the soldiers who 
interrogated me, but also local police, and other officials, showed a sense of suspicion which is not 
unusual. Why should foreigners—who, after all occupy a higher level of the hierarchical world 
described in chapter 6—wish to spend time in a poor, ‘backward’ place, if not for some ulterior 
motive? Perhaps it was all right for them to conduct a few co-operative training sessions, so long as 
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it did no harm; but the overriding priority was to guard against the possibility of subversion. Similarly, 
those within the state who see co-operativism as a convenient way to achieve the overriding aims of 
economic growth and urbanisation appear happy to allow idealistic activists to advocate their cause; 
but the autonomy afforded to co-operatives, as illustrated by the case of the SHCs, never reaches to 
the point of contradicting the policy prerogatives of the state. 
There is a story, too, about morality here. The activists who remained in Meibian after the scandal, 
and who did their best to assist my research, showed a deep commitment to co-operativism. And 
Wei’s willingness to stand his ground, and his assertion that he knew his rights as a citizen of China, 
showed not only courage, but also moral conviction. For I was only a relatively recent friend; my 
disappearance would have no impact on the rest of his relationship network. And his invocation of 
‘rights’ was no coincidence, for he and I had spoken at length about his desire to serve the country, 
and the idea that things could be improved if people were to start respecting universal rules. The 
soldiers who interrogated me may also have been moved by feelings of duty to country. In short, 
while the outcome may have been frustrating for all concerned, what played out in this remote 
corner of the desert was not a story of cynical amorality, but one of conflict between shifting and 
ambiguous, but unquestionably moral, positions. 
This thesis has argued that the story of the co-operative movement, and the milieu of moral change 
which surrounds it, is much the same. This chapter concludes the argument, by placing it in the 
context of broader theories of social change. The first section will provide a synopsis of the thesis, 
bringing the various threads of the argument back together. The following section will then consider 
lessons for the study of Chinese society, and in particular for arguments about the trajectory of 
social and moral change there. Section 3 will revisit the theory of co-operation discussed throughout 
the thesis, asking what lessons its findings might have for that theory. Finally, section 4 will put the 
thesis in the context of more global theories of post-socialism and modernisation. 
10.1 Synopsis 
The thesis began by posing a broad question: What does it mean to be a co-operative in 
contemporary China—in a post-socialist society, undergoing rapid economic, social and moral 
change—and what can the answer to this tell us about that society more broadly? 
By way of setting the stage for an exploration of that question, chapter 2 outlined an idealised 
theoretical model of what this thesis has called ‘the relational ethic’. This model reflects much of 
what has become the archetypal characterisation of Chinese morality and social structure: a 
personalistic, particularistic system of relationships, in which moral behaviour is enforced through 
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shame and notions of ‘face’, as well as multiplex affective and material exchange. The chapter then 
offered ethnographic evidence to the effect that, while ‘individualisation’ and even the decline of 
the relational self may be taking root, the relational ethic remains in force as the dominant 
structuring principle in interpersonal relations. 
The theoretical and historical chapter which followed attempted to make the picture more precise, 
firstly by framing the relational ethic in terms of broader cultural evolutionary theories of human co-
operation, and secondly by arguing that the modern history of labour co-operation in China, 
including the co-operative movement itself, can be usefully understood through the lens of this 
theory. Specifically, it showed that the relational ethic can be seen as a particular form of indirect 
reciprocity—a mechanism predicted in a range of theoretical models to support co-operation. It 
suggested that failures of co-operation in the Mao period may have stemmed from policies which 
undermined indirect reciprocity, without replacing it; and that if broadly accurate, this story may 
shed some light on the experience of modern co-operatives. 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 provided an ethnographic treatment of co-operation problems faced by the co-
operative movement in its various guises. First, chapter 4 examined the activists and institutions 
which support and promote co-operatives, including the state itself, and argued that by providing 
resources, these institutions risk ‘crowding out’ moral motivation and co-operation. Second, the 
following chapter examined problems faced by the co-operatives themselves—the lack of formal 
rule enforcement, changes in the social fabric that might work to undermine indirect reciprocity, and 
lingering effects of failed experiments of the Mao period—arguing that together, these forces have 
driven many co-operatives to close, and others to operate with a highly circumscribed form of co-
operation. Finally, chapter 6 focused on the particular problem of participation in decision-making, 
arguing that this itself constitutes a collective action problem, which co-operatives have struggled to 
overcome; and that this problem may be exacerbated by a tendency to default to a hierarchical 
mode of action and thought, which may have deep historical roots in Chinese culture. 
The remaining three chapters sought to give a more general context to the problems faced by co-
operatives in recent years, by painting a portrait of moral change in Chinese society more generally. 
Through a combination of life history interviews with young people struggling with moral conflict, 
and a psychometric survey designed to examine moral cognition and its determinants, they showed 
the difficulty of navigating the complex and shifting moral terrain of contemporary China, for people 
in general, let alone for co-operativists. They argued, moreover, that the moral changes occurring 
are not doing so randomly, but appear consistent with the predictions of the theory of co-operation 
put forward in chapter 3. That is to say, indirect reciprocity is attenuated when the conditions for its 
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existence begin to weaken—and what replaces it is by no means predetermined. For these reasons, 
it is easy to understand the myriad difficulties faced by co-operativists in their attempts to introduce 
forms of organisation dependent on more than the most direct, immediate forms of exchange. 
10.2 Social and moral change in China 
This thesis has presented evidence for what may appear to be two conflicting hypotheses about the 
state of the relational ethic. On the one hand, it has argued that in many cases, a weakening of 
material interdependency and the lessening through migration and other forces of the stability of 
social networks is leading to a concomitant decline in the strength of the relational ethic. The 
argument here is not that the relational ethic is changing to some new form, but that it is in decline. 
Moreover, as the individualisation hypothesis would suggest, many young people seem increasingly 
to understand themselves, and morality generally, in ways incompatible with that ethic. But on the 
other hand, as sociological studies continue to show, personalistic networks remain the single most 
important mode of coordination in a wide range of domains. For many individuals, regardless of how 
they may feel, the relational ethic continues to appear as the inevitable structure of social 
interaction. How, then, are we to explain these two apparently contradictory findings? 
Any satisfactory answer to this question must begin with the consideration that changes in morality, 
personhood and social organisation in China are by no means uniform or universal, either between 
locations and individuals or within any given individual’s experience of life (Pieke, 2014). This thesis 
has described individuals who experience the relational ethic as a natural and comfortable system 
structuring the bulk of their social experience; others who strain against it and eventually reject it 
almost entirely; and many others who fall somewhere in between. Similarly, within the co-operative 
movement, there are not only those motivated by a burning passion for co-operativist ethics, and 
those who see those ethics as nothing more than a means to further their relational goals, but a 
great many people for whom both of these motives are at work, and may, indeed, sometimes be 
indistinguishable. All that is to say that part of the answer to the question of why there appear to be 
contradictory forces at work in social and psychological change must surely always be that this is 
simply the fact of the matter of human existence. 
Nevertheless, this thesis has presented evidence which suggests the possibility of a further answer. 
For as we have seen repeatedly, from the experiences of frustrated co-operativist activists to those 
of some of the young people who feel trapped in relationship-building practices they deeply dislike, 
it appears there is often a deep incongruity between how people feel about the relational ethic and 
what they must, and do, enact in social interaction. For while the final chapters of this thesis 
presented evidence in favour of the individualisation hypothesis at an individual level, both they and 
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the conflicted experiences of many of the informants described within the co-operative movement 
seem to suggest that change at an individual level does not necessarily translate into change in social 
interaction. Instead, the ability for individuals to remove themselves behaviourally from the 
relational ethic appears to be contingent on the degree to which they are able to function and 
secure resources through channels other than personalistic networks. To the extent they are unable 
to do this, the relational ethic must continue to govern their interactions, irrespective of whether 
this conflicts with their concept of themselves and the world. 
Similarly, other forms of morality, and other modes of coordination, often seem to struggle to 
establish themselves. Chapter 6 argued that the paternalistic decision-making engendered by the 
relational ethic tends to reassert itself against attempts to introduce other practices—even though 
many individuals might prefer those practices. This problem has vitiated attempts at moral 
engineering, not only in the co-operative movement, but arguably, in the project to introduce village 
democracy. Thus even if the relational ethic is weakening in some respects, its continuing position as 
the dominant mode of coordination appears to undermine the ability for other forms of morality 
and organisation to take root. 
There are many exceptions to this. The most obvious one, which this thesis has not addressed 
directly, is that of the new religious communities which have sprung up and grown rapidly during the 
reform era, including Christians, neo-Buddhists, and others (Tarocco, 2007; Yang, 2006). But this may 
be the exception that proves the rule. For a religious community is just that; to join it means to join a 
larger group of people committed to its alternative ethos, from whom support can be drawn in lieu 
of whatever resources one might lose in so doing (Tong, 2013). That is to say that, as with those 
individuals able to withdraw from the relational ethic because of their material wealth or 
relationships with foreigners, religious movements may facilitate moral alternatives precisely 
because, rather than transforming communities from within, they form parallel communities which 
afford individuals a choice they would not otherwise have (Yang, 2005; Kupfer, 2013). 
For those who do not have or avail themselves of options like these, the relational ethic and the 
networks governed by it remain deeply important. Even then, it is not the only mode of coordination; 
for as we have seen, there is reason to believe that in many domains, the market mechanism has 
begun to usurp it (Wedeman, 2003; Wei, 2001). 
This, however, could lead to increasing pressures on Chinese society. For if marketisation is driving a 
process of ‘disembedding’ from personalistic networks, but this in turn is not being met by the 
introduction of any alternative non-market forms of coordination, then the social fabric on which 
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the market economy depends may be eroded, undermining market coordination, too (Polanyi, 2001 
[1944]). As is clear from cases like that of Xiao Zhang, the young man discussed in chapter 5 who 
feels the builders he hires will only work so long as he is watching, market-based co-operation 
without accompanying moral or legal enforcement mechanisms can carry enormous costs. Indeed, 
this would seem to be just a case of the general rule that markets everywhere depend heavily on the 
functioning of non-market moral orientations and systems of social relations (Granovetter, 1985; 
Polanyi, 1957). It would seem, then, that the gradual attenuation of the relational ethic, without an 
alternative non-market moral system to take its place, may represent the carrying out of the first 
phase of Polanyi’s ‘double movement’—the erosion by market forces of their own social basis. The 
second ‘movement’ may be yet to come. 
We might wonder, too, about the effects of a growing incongruity between individual 
understandings and the social world—and how long this process can continue before some form of 
qualitative shift is engendered (Harmon-Jones, 1999; Rabin, 1994). This thesis has argued that where 
the relational ethic retains its force, it does so in large part because of continuing material 
interdependency; nevertheless, concepts of self and the person cannot help but be influenced by 
wider forces of individualisation in society, and their representations in mass media and popular 
discourse (Yu, 2014; Wedell-Wedellsborg, 2010; Kim, 2012). It is tempting to draw a parallel with 
social strains felt in many Western countries at the beginning of the 1960s, when conventional social 
norms were felt to come into conflict with the increasingly individualistic worldview of the young 
(Roberts & Helson, 1997; Thomson, 1992), just at the time when Beck’s ‘individualisation’ ostensibly 
began in earnest (Beck, 1997). But as Yan (2010) cautions, the rise of the individual in China has 
taken place against a very different backdrop, in which both a lack of general affluence and the 
paramountcy of maintaining unshakeable state power are likely to lead to rather different outcomes. 
It would be futile to attempt to prognosticate about the direction of moral and social change at this 
juncture—not only because of the inherent complexity of the case, but because this is a moment 
which appears in many ways to be a liminal one. So many of the institutions, values and concepts of 
not only the socialist past, but the Imperial society before that, have either lost their force, or are 
beginning to look increasingly frayed at the edges. Without a clear new pattern coming into view, it 
is easy to understand why so many feel a sense of moral crisis. Yet as this thesis has shown, the 
sense of moral failing is often present precisely because of the deep moral sense of ordinary people, 
cast adrift in the storms of social change. 
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10.3 Theories of co-operation revisited 
If the arguments presented in this thesis are correct, then our broader understanding of the cultural 
evolution of co-operation can draw important lessons from the Chinese case. Again, if the relational 
ethic is properly understood as a form of indirect reciprocity, then the weakening of the force of that 
system in supporting co-operation appears to coincide with the predictions of theoretical models. 
For indirect reciprocity to support co-operation, the reputational sanction must be able to operate 
through the threat of exclusion from or punishment through the exchange network. But when the 
network becomes more fluid as a result of migration, and when other networks and other means of 
securing resources become available, as a result of urbanisation and marketisation, the sanction 
becomes weaker. Indeed, this account not only tends to confirm these predictions; it sheds light on 
just how rapidly cultural evolutionary change can occur (Henrich, 2001). 
At the same time, the story of the co-operative movement illustrates the obstacles that may stand in 
the way of new forms of co-operation taking root and spreading. On the one hand, there can be little 
question that history, and historiography, matters here; the traumatic experiences of the failures of 
collectivism, or at least their traumatic retellings, appear to contribute to a suspicion of attempts at 
new forms of collective action, reflecting the cultural evolutionary notion that practices often 
spread—or fail to spread—as a result of a general human tendency to attend carefully to whether 
they have rendered others vulnerable to free-riding in the past (Gürerk, et al., 2006; Boyd, et al., 
2003; Seymour, et al., 2007; Price, et al., 2002). On the other hand, because the relational ethic itself 
frames co-operation as a series of dyadic exchanges, the notion of engendering co-operation 
through other means, such as group norms enforced by ‘strong reciprocity’, is perhaps inevitably at a 
disadvantage (Rege & Telle, 2004; Tyler, 2006; Baumard, 2013). For even as the relational ethic may 
be weakening at the margins, it remains the dominant paradigm for understanding and enacting 
non-market co-operation. Indeed, as chapter 6 argued, there is often deep suspicion of those who 
claim to attempt prosocial behaviour beyond the framework of dyadic exchange. Thus the 
establishment of new forms of co-operation is hindered not only by the resource risk of forsaking 
the exchange network, but also by the powerful effects of cultural learning—both from singular past 
events, and from an all-pervasive present social model (Baumeister, et al., 2004). 
Moreover, the difficulties of the co-operative movement provide an example of notions of ‘crowding 
out’ which have loomed large in the literature on common pool resource management and co-
operation. This thesis has argued that crowding out has afflicted the co-operative movement in a 
number of ways. Not only can the moral motivations of individuals be crowded out by the provision 
of material incentives for prosocial behaviour; but the creation of institutions which serve to do this 
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can attract large numbers of people with ulterior motives, further undermining the motivations of 
others to adhere to co-operative norms. Moreover, the provision of resources at the level of the 
state can create a transactional chain in which moral motivation is crowded out at each level, 
reaching down to that of co-operatives themselves. But crowding out goes beyond the simple 
provision of material resources. As we have seen, the framing of norms can have an important 
impact on whether people see them as legitimate, generally accepted, and worth adhering to 
(Henrich, et al., 2004, p. 46). In the contemporary Chinese case, in which political and moral 
discourse has taken on a ritualised and often wholly cynical form, anyone attempting to introduce a 
new explicit norm, such as the ethic of co-operativism, must grapple with the obstacle that for many, 
talk of explicit norms is to be greeted by a default reaction of cynicism. In a sense, sincere moral and 
political discourse is crowded out by the vast quantity of insincere and cynical speech in this domain. 
If adherence to a norm depends heavily on the perception that others, too, will do so, the 
willingness to consider a new norm is surely vulnerable to falling at the first hurdle of the perception 
that even its explicit proponents have ulterior motives. 
In addition to problems of crowding out, as well as the erosion of the foundations of indirect 
reciprocity, this thesis has argued that co-operatives face a particularly thorny collective action 
problem, in the form of democratic participation itself. If the arguments presented in chapter 6 are 
correct, they may have implications beyond China, both for co-operatives and for democratic 
structures more generally. For although the problem may be exacerbated in this case by the 
particularities of ‘face’ and the power of hierarchical coordination schemas, the general structure of 
the problem may apply to co-operatives in a wide variety of cultural contexts. This further underlines 
not only the importance of informal institutions in solving, or indeed reinforcing, co-operation 
problems, but also the centrality of such institutions in the interpretation and enactment of formal 
rules. As chapter 5 argued, the flexible and amorphous role of laws in China is readily intelligible in 
the light of the insight of legal anthropology that the force of laws derives from the way in which 
they are employed in discourse and everyday practice. This applies equally to the formal rules of co-
operatives, which often bear little resemblance to the de facto operation of the organisation. In 
some sense, then, any claim that a human group solves co-operation problems by enacting formal 
rules is simply begging the question; for what matters is not the rules themselves, but the way in 
which they are deployed in social practice. 
More generally, this account sheds light on the broader relationship between moral psychology and 
moral behaviour, and how these can be understood within the framework of the evolution of co-
operation. While the power of individual suspicion of new forms of co-operation may appear to 
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suggest that psychological inertia, or even a form of cognitive hysteresis, takes explanatory priority 
over social forces, this notion is belied by accounts presented above which suggest that in many 
cases, when psychological change conflicts with social reality, it is the social reality that wins out. 
This lends credence to the notion that social change is often best understood ‘epidemiologically’—as 
the result of psychological and social processes which are intertwined, if not inseparable (Sperber, 
2001). The weakening of the relational ethic appears, as theory would predict, to coincide with the 
weakening of the material basis of indirect reciprocity; but this change is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for individuals to develop concepts and attitudes at variance with the relational ethic. 
Some young people feel deeply uncomfortable with that ethic, but feel they have no choice but to 
go along with it; others either feel little conflict, or adjust their understandings to correspond with 
the world around them. For others, even when material exchange through indirect reciprocity has 
vanished, as in certain highly atomised rural communities, the relational self and associated needs 
for affective exchange linger to promote forms of sociality, such as virtual ‘helping’ in housebuilding, 
which seem to mirror the old exchange networks. Thus stories of how people grapple with, and 
transform, the shifting moral sands around them are as varied as the stories of people themselves. 
10.4 Implications beyond: Post-socialism and modernity 
It is, then, difficult to deny Yan’s (2010) claim that something like a process of disembedding has at 
least begun to take place. Indeed, the cultural evolutionary lens helps to shed light on the 
mechanisms underpinning this process. For if the tightly woven exchange networks which have long 
comprised the Chinese social fabric instantiate a form of indirect reciprocity, and are therefore 
predicated on material interdependency, multiplexity and relative relational stability, then it is easy 
to see why the erosion of just those foundations would lead the network to begin to unravel. 
Beck (1997) suggests that disembedding and individualisation lead eventually to a ‘second’, ‘reflexive 
modernity’, in which individuals, cut adrift from the state and other collectivities as well as from 
ascribed social relations, begin to question the foundations of society itself, including the state, and 
imperatives such as economic growth. At present, this seems to ring no more true for China than 
older theories of modernisation and development which suggested the inevitable eventual triumph 
of universalistic ethics and the rule of law. Instead, this thesis has argued that the growing vacuum 
created by the weakening of the relational ethic must not necessarily be filled by any other moral 
orientation—much less an orientation toward principles which would call into question the 
foundations of society. 
It could simply be too early to tell. Yan (2010, p. 510) appears to suggest this, claiming that ‘the 
Chinese individualization process remains at the stage… of first modernity’. Perhaps Polanyi’s double 
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movement must inevitably assert itself, lest the economy self-destruct. Or perhaps the theorists of 
liberal globalisation will eventually be vindicated, when the Chinese regime inevitably tumbles and is 
replaced by a rule-of-law system, populated by autonomous, rights-bearing individuals. On the other 
hand, it could be that Chinese modernity is destined for a different path—that the apparent triumph 
of universalistic ethics in the West was not an inevitable consequence of modernisation, but rather a 
contingent legacy of Christianity or some other factor. In that case, China may be in the process of 
carving out a new and distinctive form of modernity. 
But we must not forget what is a crucial strand of the story: the experience of socialism, and the 
marks it left both on China and on its formerly ‘fraternal’ countries. Each of these societies has had 
to cope in its own way both with the disappointments of the past, and with the experience of seeing 
a comprehensive and universally inculcated belief system discarded, then officially rubbished, 
overnight. Cynicism, and suspicion of belief systems and ideologies, is certainly not unique to China; 
in post-Soviet Russia, Ries (2002, p. 277) describes how cynical talk allows people to ‘deconstruct 
whatever legitimizing discourses or practices are presented on behalf of the reformulated political-
economic order, and thus regularly inoculate themselves against any naïve belief in state or market 
ideology’. Other formerly socialist countries, too, have experienced the ‘disembedding’ of individuals 
not only from the collectives to which they were formerly attached, but also from informal exchange 
networks which permeated many socialist economies, leaving behind a mottled moral texture in 
which collectivist values are still employed in moral judgement, but there is deep distrust of 
authority and of collective endeavour, leaving many to lead increasingly atomised lives (Klumbytė, 
2006; Knudsen, 2015; Wanner, 2005). 
Is this deep cynicism—nihilism, even—the sort of questioning envisaged by the notion of ‘reflexive 
modernity’, with its promise to transcend the nation state and shake up rigid social distinctions 
(Beck, et al., 2003)? It may, instead, simply represent a form of shell shock—as chapter 5 argued, the 
powerful effects of culturally transmitted narratives relating the putative failure of morally 
motivated projects and collective endeavours. Indeed, the rise of post-socialist personality cults 
(Cassiday & Johnson, 2010; Polese, 2015) would seem to suggest that the essence of this cynicism 
was not a ‘reflexive’ questioning of all authority, but rather a singular reaction to a specific chain of 
events—the dissolution of the socialist bloc, which left not only its inhabitants, but arguably much of 
the rest of humanity too, scarred by deep suspicion of belief systems, ideals, and collectivist dreams 
of all kinds. 
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10.5 Conclusion 
Chinese civilisation has, as nationalist propaganda reminds us, extraordinarily ancient roots. Indeed, 
there is every reason to believe that elements of the relational ethic, if not the system as a whole, 
can be traced back many centuries, and even into prehistory. Today, however, what sets China apart 
is not its antiquity, but the unprecedented scale and rapidity of the transformation it is undergoing. 
Within a matter of decades, an agrarian society has become an urban one, as the new megacities 
have swallowed up thousands of villages, each with its own name and its own history, now lost in 
the mists of time. 
In the context of this incalculable upheaval, it is easy to understand why many feel a sense of moral 
panic. We should not be too quick to dismiss nostalgia, or to denigrate the sense of loss felt by many. 
For something has been lost—from the erasure of memories in the Cultural Revolution, to the more 
recent emptying out of the countryside. Something has been lost in all the former socialist 
countries—a loss not only of stability and social order, but of values, worldviews and dreams now 
only dimly remembered, if at all (Pine & Bridger, 1998; Blank, 2004). Indeed, as globalised capitalism 
has consolidated its spread throughout the world, all manner of alternative values, meanings and 
moral universes seem to fade increasingly into obscurity. 
Is China’s social and moral trajectory really so distinctive? This thesis has argued that to understand 
the trajectory of the present, it is necessary to understand the past. Cultural evolutionary theory 
suggests that some of the fundamental threads weaving together the fabric of Chinese society may 
have developed long ago as a highly effective way of supporting co-operation through networks. 
Even if these networks are now beginning to weaken, there is, I have argued, a path dependency. 
What comes next for China—what sorts of co-operation mechanisms and moral orientations will 
manage to take hold—will in part be determined by the path  already trodden. In that sense, we may 
have every reason to expect a uniquely Chinese form of modernity. 
But at the same time, we must also bear in mind what all humans have in common—and in 
particular, the extraordinary degree to which we seem primed to co-operate, and at scales never 
before found in the animal kingdom. For all our failed attempts, we thrive on co-operation and 
mutual aid. Perhaps that is one reason for the enduring global appeal of the co-operative movement. 
For co-operativism has never been simply about the attempt to alleviate poverty or economic 
insecurity. From the beginning, it has stood for something more: the promise of building, or 
rebuilding, bonds of interdependence and fellow feeling, in the face of market forces which have 
torn up that social fabric as the price of industrial prosperity. 
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The Chinese co-operative movement is rooted in the same basic ideals. While this thesis has 
documented the enormous, and perhaps often insurmountable, challenges facing that movement, 
what is perhaps more important is that the movement exists at all. The efforts of countless ordinary 
people to make sense of and transform their own lives and those around them show that morality is 
alive and well in contemporary China—and that the process of cultural evolution is anything but 
spent. 
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Appendix A: Questionnaire wording 
For the moral dilemma section of the survey, respondents were handed a laminated card for each 
vignette in turn, with the text of the vignette and a diagram illustrating the response scale, as in the 
below figure. Research assistants then read the text of the vignette aloud to them while they held 
the card. Before beginning the survey proper, the procedure was first explained using an example 
card, to ensure respondents understood. 
 
Figure 3: Example vignette card 
After each story was read out, respondents were asked to respond first to what the protagonist in 
the story should do, then to rate, quickly and without too much thought, the importance of each of 
the items read to them in their decision. The order of both the stories and the response items was 
randomised. 
What follows are the four vignettes used in the final survey described in chapter 9, and the ten 























































































2.  不知道 
3. 不应该去 
31 如果人们不再造访这些历史遗址，他们的下一代会不会失去历史知识？ 
32 李强的父母对于李强结婚这件事会不会感到很开心？ 
33 站在古人曾经走动过的地方不会感到慷慨激昂吗？ 
34 遗址所在县市的人会不会受益于历史遗址的存在而历史意识愈趋强烈？ 
35 面对前人所遗留给我们的东西，我们会不会感觉对过去社会有所亏欠？ 
36 身为一个公务员，李强怠忽职守会不会亏欠群众？ 
37 李强的同事们不是应该要理解李强对于工作的倦怠吗？毕竟他们做的是相同的工作 
38 如果李强继续对他父母保守这个秘密，对他来说会不会很困难？ 
39 如果李强继续保守秘密，他父母知道后会不会很难过？ 
40 如果李强停止造访那座古庙，他能再找到其他古迹继续探索吗？ 
 
